Class 234.3P Book S153
General Theological Seminary Library
Chelsea Square, New York

PRESENTED BY
Soc'y for Promoting Religion and Learning

RECONCILIATION BY INCARNATION

BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

THE REDEMPTION OF MAN: Discussions Bearing on the Atonement. In demy 8vo, price 10s. 6d.

Principal FAIRBAIRN, Mansfield College, writes: "I wish to say how stimulating and helpful I have found your book. Its criticism is constructive as well as incisive, while its point of view is elevated and commanding. It made me feel quite vividly how superficial most of the recent discussions on the Atonement have been."

Professor R. FLINT, D.D., writes: "Its learning, ample although that be, is its least merit: it has the far higher and rarer qualities of freshness of view and deep ethical insight. I hope it will find the general and cordial reception it so well deserves."

THE BIBLE AN OUTGROWTH OF THEOCRATIC LIFE. In crown 8vo, price 4s. 6d.

Guardian.—"This book will well repay perusal. It contains a great deal of learning as well as ingenuity, and the style is clear."

Dr. JOHN BROWN, of Bedford, writes: "I feel sure that such of your readers as may make acquaintance with it will be as grateful for its valuable help as I have been myself."

Edinburgh: T. & T. CLARK, 38 George Street.

RECONCILIATION BY INCARNATION

THE RECONCILIATION OF GOD AND MAN BY THE INCARNATION OF THE DIVINE WORD

BY

D. W. SIMON, D.D.

PRINCIPAL OF THE UNITED COLLEGE, BRADFORD

TRANSLATOR OF

DORNER'S "HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERSON OF CHRIST," ETC., AND

AUTHOR OF

"THE REDEMPTION OF MAN: DISCUSSIONS BEARING ON THE ATONEMENT"

"THE BIBLE AN OUTGROWTH OF THEOCRATIC LIFE"

"SOME BIBLE PROBLEMS"

ETC. ETC.

EDINBURGH

T. & T. CLARK, 38 GEORGE STREET

1898

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2025

https://archive.org/details/reconciliationby0000dwsi

PREFACE

THE central theme of this book, which I may be allowed to say is a kind of sequel to one on *The Redemption of Man* which I published in 1889, is the Reconciliation of God and Man, that is, be it stated as distinctly as I can state it, of God with man as well as of man with God. In subordination to the main theme, I have very briefly sketched, first, the Cosmology which in my judgment lies behind the Scriptures and the Faith of the Christian Church; and second, some features of the Incarnation of the Divine Word by means of which the foundation of the Reconciliation of God and man was laid.

My reason for adopting the unusual course of dealing with *Cosmology* in a monograph on the Atonement is the strong conviction I entertain that the chief intellectual difficulties in the way of that fact or doctrine are rooted in a defective or false philosophical view of the rise, constitution, and history of the cosmos in general and the world in particular; and that the principles embodied in Redemption, particularly in the Reconciliation of God and man, are the same principles at a higher level that are

embodied in the divine creation, sustentation, and rule, in a word, the evolution, of the world.

I have also somewhat deviated from custom in the amount of attention devoted to the doctrine of the *Incarnation*. My chief reason for this is that the view of the Atonement which I expound has for its correlate the view I have set forth of the Person of Christ. Neither the "moral" nor the forensic view of the Atonement has any serious rational basis unless Christ be an incarnate Person of the Trinity; and unless His Incarnation had the roots and the character which I have taken for granted, Reconciliation could not have been its result.

A further reason, I must confess, is the fact that at the present moment, even an approach to a satisfactory doctrine of the Person of Christ cannot be said to exist. Those who recoil from the more or less veiled dualism of the traditional doctrine are taking up either with the Swedenborgian view of Christ as God; or with humanitarianism more or less veiled by philosophical terminology; or are trying to do without a doctrine altogether.

The theory or doctrine of "Reconciliation" which is here set forth may be defined as *personal*. In a sense, the "moral" view of the Atonement might also be described by the same term; but whereas, according to it, there is only *one* person to be reconciled, namely, man; on my interpretation of Scripture and Faith there are *two* persons to be reconciled, namely, God and man.

Both Reconciliation and the Incarnation, in the sense elsewhere defined, let me repeat here, are for me real

facts or transactions—as objectively real as any other fact or transaction, whether of the physical or spiritual sphere.

If I am asked why I hold them to be facts, I summarily reply, *first* and *primarily*, on the authority of Scripture, particularly, of course, the New Testament, which I believe to be a true reflection or record of facts, whose outer form and inner significance the Comforter, the Spirit of Truth, enabled the writers to grasp and discern; *secondarily*, because the witness of Scripture has been, and is still being, confirmed by Christian experience and insight; *thirdly*, because my own experience and intellectual insight are converting into certainty what, at the outset, I received on authority, and was therefore merely matter of probability.

Inasmuch as I accept the Atonement and Incarnation as facts, I have no difficulty in adding, that if it should become clear to me that my theory fails to do justice to, or misrepresents, or explains away either of them, I shall try at once humbly to follow the example set by all truly scientific men in dealing with facts in other spheres, namely, cease to propound it, and set to work again.

There is another matter to which I wish to refer, and I will take the liberty of doing so partly in words from the Preface to my book on *The Redemption of Man*. I refer to the use frequently made of the term "orthodox."

"Alike by those who regard themselves as forming the 'broad,' or 'liberal,' or 'advanced' school of Christian thought, and by those who claim to

'stand in the old path,' its employment is marked by great looseness. Between the two opposed parties there is, in fact, not a pin to choose as to this particular point.

"If 'orthodox' be applied to the *faith once delivered to the saints*, to the *credenda*,—in this case the *credenda* of the Atonement and the Incarnation,—there is such a thing as orthodoxy and a standard of orthodoxy; or rather, to coin a word, *orthopisty*. This is what Paul referred to when he used the words, *Though we or an angel from heaven preach any other gospel unto you than that which we have preached unto you, let him be* ACCURSED. There is such a thing as a right faith, that is, using faith in its objective sense; there is such a thing as the objects of faith held and presented in their genuine, undiluted, untwisted form. Those who change, diminish, mutilate, misrepresent them, Paul anathematises.

"But if by 'orthodoxy' be understood, as is only too frequently the case, a certain right, recognised, 'doctrine,' systematic formulation or statement, explanation or theory of these *credenda*, there is not now, and there never was, any such thing, at all events in Protestantism. There may have been, or be now, a show of such a thing in the Romish Church. But even if men do no more than go direct to Scripture to learn its teachings—and Scripture alone gives us definite information on these *credenda*, so that if it is untrustworthy we have no definite knowledge at all about them—the results of their inquiry in the shape of a classification, or formulation, or correlation of the

material with which it supplies them, will vary: much more will the men differ from each other when they try to think out or explain Scripture teachings. No Protestant theologian has yet existed who was willing just to repeat what his teacher taught him. Rabbi Elieser Hyrkanus, who was praised for holding, and of course giving out, the teachings of his teacher like a water-tight cistern, has had no Protestant imitators.[1] Even a slight reorganisation, or rearrangement of the subject-matter, involves changes which render the idea of a fixed standard in this sense absurd."

Critical readers will notice that I have done very little in the way of explicit reckoning with other writers, and that references to other works are few and far between. The reason is not lack of appreciation, but the wish to keep down the size of my book. I should like here, however, to adduce the titles of some of the more important recent British works bearing on the themes of this book which I have consulted:—Dr. Fairbairn's *Christ in Modern Theology*, *Lux Mundi*; Canon Gore's Bampton Lecture, and *Dissertations* on *The Incarnation*; the Rev. J. R. Illingworth's Bampton Lecture, *Personality, Human and Divine*, and *Divine Immanence*; the Rev. R. L. Ottley's *The Doctrine of the Incarnation*; the Rev. H. C. Powell's *The Principle of the Incarnation*; Professor Dr. Orr's *The Christian View of God and the World*; The Rev. D. Somerville's *St. Paul's Conception of Christ*; the Rev. Dr. D. W. Forrest's *The Christ of History and Experience*; and last, not least,

[1] *Pirke Aboth*, ii. 11.

the Rev. J. Scott Lidgett's *The Spiritual Principle of the Atonement as a Satisfaction for the Sins of the World.*

These and other publications deserve careful attention, not only as an indication of the revival of interest in the great problems of Systematic Theology, and for their intrinsic value, but also because of the evidence they furnish that the ethical principle which my never-to-be-forgotten teacher and friend Dr. J. A. Dorner so vigorously emphasised, is at length beginning to find in this country the recognition due to its supreme importance.

The Index has been prepared by one of my students, Mr. James Knox, M.A., to whom, for his painstaking kindness, I wish here to tender very hearty thanks.

I will venture to conclude with the words which a great theologian of the seventeenth century, Francis Turrettine, addressed to his readers at the close of the Preface to his *Institutio theologiæ elenctica*: "Tu vero, Lector Amice, dum bene dictis favorem, et erratis veniam indulges,

> 'Si quid novisti rectius istis,
> Candidus imperti: si non, his utere mecum.'"
> Hor. *Ep.* I. i. 68.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

PAGE

REDEMPTION—ITS THREE PHASES OR STAGES 1, 2
Reconciliation—Liberation from sin—Deliverance from evils—Reconciliation the chief theme of this work 2

CHAPTER II

THE RECONCILIATION OF GOD AND MAN 3–9
Reconciliation a fact in the history of God and man . . . 3
Spiritual or religious facts as real as physical facts . . . 4, 5
Their place in the cosmic system 6
Miracles—Goethe quoted—Insight into the reasonableness of reconciliation dependent on cosmology 7–9

CHAPTER III

COSMOLOGY PRESUPPOSED BY THE INCARNATION AND ATONEMENT 10–35
Ultimate factors of the universe 10
I. Matter—Created by God—Its nature 12
Views of Lotze, Tait, Schelling, Jacobi . . . 13
Gnostics and Emanationists 14
II. Energy—Proceeds from God—Zwingli quoted . . 15
Works on and through matter—Letourneau . . . 15, 16
III. Idea—Plan and laws divine 16
Philosophy, science, and Bible agreed 17
Why forces act orderly—Tyndall 18
IV. Energy and its differentiations 19
Idea and its differentiations—Matter and its forms . 20

PAGE

V. Evolution—Heredity, variability 31
Recapitulation, prevails throughout, culminates in man —Scotus Erigena and Emerson quoted . . . 21–26
VI. What about man's higher nature?—A. R. Wallace, Calderwood, Aquinas, Plato, St. Paul 26–28
Consciousness distinctive of man, yet incomplete . . 29, 30
VII. The cosmos and its constitutive systems . . . 31–33
VIII. Emission of divine energy—How regulated—Kenosis . 33
IX. The relations of the Persons of the Trinity to the cosmos 34, 35

CHAPTER IV

The Nature and Constitution of Man 36–43
1. The biological law to which he is subject 36–39
2. Condition of the development of the deepest potentialities . 39, 40
3. Man's environment twofold—Sir John Davies quoted . . 40–43

CHAPTER V

God as the Environment of Man 44–78
God holds normally two relations to man—Cowper quoted .
I. Personal relation of God to man 45
1. The personal defined—Need of personal relations . 45, 46
2. Confirmation of history—Absolute Father needed, alike for heart, intellect, and will—Divine inspiration 46–48
II. Vital or bio-dynamic relation of God to man . . . 50
1. Organic waste of matter and energy—H. Spencer—True of mind as well as body 51
Supplies for both drawn from physical world . . 52–55
2. Has pneumatic energy the same source?—Considerations in favour of the position—Sanctioned by religious language—Do ideas invigorate?—Le Gallienne and Goethe quoted 55–61
3. Scripture teaching on the subject—Old and New Testaments—God, Christ, Holy Spirit 62–67
4. Testimony of the Church 67–69
5. Taking the fact for granted, what are the channels or vehicles?—Four chief answers (1) Physical energy; (2) Sacraments, Roman Catholic, Monnier quoted; (3) the Word of God, Luther, Calov, Quenstedt, Hollaz, Wernsdorff, Calvin; (4) Without medium, direct 69–78

CHAPTER VI

PAGE

THE DIVINE RELATION TO MAN CONDITIONED BY THE RELATION OF MAN TO GOD 79–100

This involved in the cosmology expounded 79

I. God's personal relation thus conditioned—Distinction between being and behaving as a Father . . . 80, 81

1. The principle an application of biological law—The crucial case of love 82–86

2. The truth in the view criticised—Goodness and love . 86–88

3. The right to transfer this to God—Objections . . 89–91

4. Even Fatherly action on God's part otherwise a peril 91, 92

II. God's dynamic relation thus conditioned 92

1. Man's control of assimilation, its reason . . . 92–95

2. Involved in personality 95–97

3. Inner reasonableness of the condition—Objection—Answer—Browning quoted 98, 99

Men's subtlest temptations from the will itself—Important point involved 99

CHAPTER VII

NORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN GOD AND MAN, THAT IS, OF GOD TO MAN AND OF MAN TO GOD 101–116

I. The relations of God to Man—Transcendent and immanent relations 101

1. The normal personal relation of God to man—Divine relation to law 102

(1) Man's natural and human environment teaches him law 103–106

(2) Divine co-operation—The need thereof . . 106, 107

(3) How does God reveal laws?—He is Himself the light 107–109

Laws facilitate activity—George Herbert quoted 109, 110

2. The normal dynamic relation of God to man—Divine grace or energy maintains equilibrium . . 111–113

II. The normal relation of man to God—Man's relation to God only personal—Simplest normal relation—Higher relations—Milton quoted 113–116

CHAPTER VIII

THE ACTUAL PERSONAL RELATION OF MAN TO GOD . 117–127

Current notion of man's religious history—The Fall . . 118

PAGE

1. Mistakes to be avoided 118
(1) Exaggeration of heinousness of the first sin . . 118, 119
(2) Treatment of heathenism before and after Christ as identical 119–122
(3) Ascription of the sinfulness of mankind to individual men 122
(4) Identification of actual and ideal sin 123
(5) Estimate of guilt by overt acts 124
2. Man's actual relation to God is abnormal 125
(1) Irreverence; (2) Distrust; (3) Enmity . . 126, 127

CHAPTER IX

Results of the Abnormal Personal Relation of Man to God 128–164
I. The results for God—God's immanent and transcendent relation—Energy or grace reserved . . . 128, 129
God is a factor of the system of the universe . . . 129
Disorder anywhere affects all factors 130
Evil results for God—Objections raised by philosophy and common sense—Reply 131–135
1. Sin and God's immanent relation 135
2. Sin and God's transcendent relation 135
(1) God's personal relation changed—Even though there were no anger, the condemnation of sin is a change—Shakespeare quoted 135–138
(2) Bio-dynamic relation changed 138
3. Further characterisation of the change—The Ruler and Judge in God evoked—Reaction against sin morally obligatory—Shakespeare quoted . . . 148–145
Light on the forensic view of the Atonement—What moral government involves 145–147
4. The divine feelings disturbed, not the divine nature—God grieved and pained 147–150
II. The results for man 150–164
1. Scripture teachings—Evil is both result and punishment . 151
Implicit goal of sin 152
2. The results for man as an organic whole—Mankind an organism at first—Truth in the idea of Federal Headship 154, 155
The organism injured—Testimony of history . . 156, 157
3. Results for individuals, to their constitution, their functions or activities 158–160
4. Disturbance of feeling—Reaction of the state of the divine mind on man—Conscience—Æschylus and Browning quoted 163

CHAPTER X

PAGE
THE RECTIFICATION OF THE ABNORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN GOD AND MAN 165–178
I. The position—Review of the ground traversed . . . 165
II. Three views of the question 167
1. Denial that God needs to be reconciled . . 167–169
2. Legal rectification—Continuance of a legal relation no rectification 169
Double abnormality of the common view . . . 170
Objections met—Political loyalty and satisfaction . . 172
Relation of Israel to Jehovah—Sacrificial system . 172–175
3. Personal rectification—Theologians shrunk from it—Personal offence freely remissible—Reply . . 175, 176
4. True element in the legal or forensic conception . . 177
Fitting for the Divine Father to assert law . . 177, 178

CHAPTER XI

THE CONDITIONS OF THE RECTIFICATION OF THE ABNORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN GOD AND MAN 179–198
I. Condemnation and confession of sin from the point of view of God 179
This is the case between men—Men not equally sinful—Supposed infinitude of sin 180–185
II. Sorrow and pain because of the divine sorrow and pain . 186
So among men—No two men quite alike 186
Two kinds of sorrow: first, on our own account; second, on account of those whom we have sorrowed—Shakespeare quoted 187–189
So between man and God 189, 190
Each man to the extent of his fault—Not all equal—Congruous to the essential nature of personality . . 190–192
III. Desire to atone or offer satisfaction—Not purchase . . 193
So between men—Two ways of atoning: doing honour to law; undoing mischief. 195
The root is taking God's part against ourselves . . 195

CHAPTER XII

PRESUPPOSITIONS OF THE FULFILMENT OF THE CONDITIONS OF THE RECONCILIATION OF GOD AND MAN . . . 199–227
Orthodox and heterodox view of the conditions . . . 199
The function of environment—God's special function as the environment of men 201–203

PAGE

I. Personal divine action necessary 203
1. God Himself must bring home to man the true nature of the sin committed, the grief caused, and the satisfaction due by him 203
(1) Human analogies—Parents do the same for children; society for men—The offended ought to do it—Why left mostly to others?—Chief difficulty with the third condition 203–208
All this specially applicable to God—*Ad hoc* divine action needed—Evidence from history . . 210–212
(2) Significance of the experience described—Entering into an offended one's judgment of sin is never a merely intellectual process, but vital realisation—Feeling applicable to God—Shakespeare's *Richard III.* and *Hamlet* 212, 217
So too with sorrow and resentment . . . 217–219
So with the compensation due to God, terrible . 219–221
2. God must bring home to man the real purpose and meaning of the manifestation which caused the experience . 221
This purpose is man's deliverance 222–224
II. Dynamic action of God necessary 224–227
Natural environment must energise in us if its appeal to consciousness is to be effective 224
God must reveal and energise in us to understand, appreciate, and bear His revelation—The Holy Spirit's work . 226

CHAPTER XIII

THE DILEMMA 228–231
The law that God's relation, personal and vital, is conditioned by man's personal relation is cosmic 228
The personal divine action described is apparently fitted to defeat its own purpose 229
The fulfilment of the conditions of rectification seems to precede that without which it itself is impossible—Ethical ὕστερα πρότερα 230
Antinomies constituting the problem of the reconciliation of God and man 230, 231

CHAPTER XIV

METHODS PURSUED WITH HUMANITY BY GOD . . . 232–251
Objection to speaking of divine methods or plans with man . 232

PAGE

I. God worked first through the existing order of things in the realms of humanity and nature 233
This was the method pursued with the heathen . . 233
His purpose the one previously described 235
Special treatment of Jews denied—Mistakes into which science of religion falls 237
1. God's deictic or revealing action and the heathen . . 239
(1) Kept alive the sense of His existence and presence—Heathen found God everywhere 241
(2) Revelation of the divine mind regarding sin . . 242
Conscience as the "voice of God" 243
Natural festivals rightly made religious—Sense of sin general, though it varied in intensity—Plato, Marcus Aurelius, *Rig-Veda*, *Atharva-Veda* quoted 243–245
2. God specially stirred in, and inspired, elect men . . 246
II. The second course was that pursued with Israelites . . 247
Why Abraham was called—How God proceeded with him and his descendants 247–249
III. Failure of the methods described 249
Gentiles went from bad to worse 249
Israelites were unfaithful 250
Meaning of divine failures 251

CHAPTER XV

Some Features of the Constitution of Humanity which have a Special Bearing on the Divine Method of Reconciliation 252–262
I. The law of heredity and contemporaneous interaction and intercommunication 252
II. Potentialities invigorated and evoked by the efforts and achievements of members—Lewis Morris quoted . 259–260
III. Actualisation of potentialities conditional on due response to an appeal to consciousness 260–262

CHAPTER XVI

The Problem 263–275
Brief reconsideration of the conditions to be fulfilled—
1. The divine condemnation of sin to be practically appreciated 264
2. The burden of the divine sorrow to be borne, yea, borne away 264

PAGE

3. God's estimate of the dishonour done to Himself to be realised 264
4. Yet the inner meaning of the divine action to be revealed . 265
5. Whoever fulfils these conditions must be tempted yet without sin 265–268
6. He must be able to serve as a channel of divine energy to the entire race, past, present, and to come . . 260–271
7. His very sufferings must be a manifestation of divine grace 271
8. He must bring appropriate influence to bear on men, so that the new potence may be actualised . . 272, 273
9. A tremendous problem 273–275

CHAPTER XVII

The Solution 276–278
According to the New Testament and the faith of the Church, it is solved by the incarnation of the Logos and what was involved therein 277
The world is already redeemed in and by Christ . . . 278

CHAPTER XVIII

The Constitutional Relation of the Logos to the World, apart from Sin and under Sin 279–305
I. The constitutional relation apart from sin 279
1. The earth is a partial immateriation of the Logos-idea . 279
2. The Logos imposed accommodation on Himself in His relation to the cosmos — Its forces not directly wielded 281, 282
3. Self-limitation also—Kenosis correlated to self-limitation 283
(1) The divine power self-limited 283
(2) The divine knowledge self-limited—God knows the cosmos partly by observation, specially man's free acts 284
Foreknowledge and freedom—What man is ! . . 286
4. Immateriation is a process—Man recapitulates the whole —Gradual approach to personality in the cosmos . 289
5. Gradual approach to incarnation in evolution — What took place at the conception of the Son of God is shadowed forth in Genesis, ch. i. 290, 291
6. Man foreshadows the Incarnation in that he turns back on himself and the world, and finds God in both—He never finds himself save in God—Wordsworth quoted 292, 293
Man, however, means humanity 293

PAGE

II. The relations of the Logos to humanity under sin . . 295
Sin is an effort to use the process of evolution for the realisation of an idea contrary to the Logos — God intervened—Idea of divine intervention ridiculed . 296, 297
1. A world disordered by sin demands still fuller divine limitation, unless it is to be destroyed . . 297–299
Human sin dark to God—A man sinning is a divine thing contradicting itself 300
Divine love is limited—The highest in God, is as it were, partially hidden from God 302
2. A step further is inevitable—The life in man acts abnormally on the divine life 303
A certain schism is caused in God: an anticipation of the words, "Made sin for us," and "My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?" 305

CHAPTER XIX

The Actual Incarnation of the Logos . . . 306–319
The kenosis imposed on the Logos by the creation of man; partial, transitory—A fuller kenosis possible . . . 306, 307
I. Light thrown on the subject by human experience . . 307
1. Every man in a true sense of divine nature, yet not conscious of being divine—Aim of Mystics . . 308, 309
2. Significance of ideals—Logos did what man cannot do . 310
II. The difficulties that present themselves—Human experience 311
1. Possession of power and knowledge possible by man without consciousness 311–313
2. So by the Logos as incarnate—Unconscious of power—Hence works regarded as given Him to do by the Father—So also knowledge 313–315
Explains, first, ignorance; secondly, tone of authority—Ignorance, not error 315–317
Ethnic Incarnations—Illingworth quoted . . 317–319

CHAPTER XX

The Supernatural Conception 320–325
Conception not birth—Luke's account of the event—Matthew's account—John's reference—Silence of Mark, James, Peter, Paul 321, 322
1. Present thought in sympathy with the idea of Incarnation 322
2. Difficulty in the supernatural conception depends on cosmology—Preparation in the cosmos 323

CHAPTER XXI

PAGE

THE PROPER NATURE AND DESIGNATION OF THE INCARNATE WORD 326–329
Oscillation between two positions relatively to Christ . . 326
New Testament designation "Son of God"—The Logos so termed as Incarnate, not prior to becoming Incarnate . 327, 328
Humanity a Son of God—Why the incarnate Logos is human . 329
Appollinarism 329

CHAPTER XXII

THE RELATION OF THE INCARNATE LOGOS OR THE SON OF GOD TO THE FATHER 330–334
Christ's relation closer than that of men, yet had its darkenings 330
Analogous human experiences—Influences which intensified His fellowship with God; voices, upflashings, mighty works 332–334

CHAPTER XXIII

THE FULFILMENT OF THE CONDITIONS OF RECONCILIATION BY THE INCARNATE WORD 335–377
The conditions, confession, sorrow, satisfaction . . . 335
I. The Son must share man's moral position without sin 335, 336
1. The Logos renounced not His nature, but the consciousness thereof—Human analogies and differences . 336–338
2. Life after Incarnation more affected by sin than before—Human analogies — Conscious and sub-conscious regions in Christ 338–340
Law of heredity—Weaknesses and conflicts through the body—The sins of the race seemed to be His own 340–346
3. Sinlessness not due to Virgin birth—Scientific opinion quoted 346–448
4. Temptibility apparently nullified by the possession of divine power—Every man needs divine power in order to be normal—Christ's unconsciousness of the possession 349–353
The alternatives: either it asserted itself independently, or He must regard it as given by the Father in answer to prayer—Five points to be remembered—Conclusion, He is our example in an infinitely fuller sense than if He were a mere man . . 353–356

PAGE

II. The specific task of the Son of God; energising the race 356, 357
1. A moral wonder 358, 359
2. He sympathised fully with God whilst bearing the divine inflictions 359–361
3. Culmination in death—Death not the sole aim of Christ's mission — Death and the "death of the cross" not identical—Shakespeare on the fear of death 361–364
Christ essentially immortal, yet unconscious thereof . 364
The significance of death to Him . . . 365–367
III. Christ made satisfaction for the dishonour done to God 367–369
IV. The deictic part of Christ's task 369, 370
He approaches men—
1. From without, through the Church;—preaching: the Written Word—New Testament and Church; worship, rites, etc.—Conduct of believers—Sympathy of the Church with Christ 370–374
2. From within—The Holy Spirit's deictic and dynamic action 374
3. An intellectualistic mistake 376, 377

CHAPTER XXIV

EVIDENCE THAT THE CONDITIONS OF RECONCILIATION WERE ACTUALLY FULFILLED BY THE INCARNATE WORD . . 378–381
Christ's immediate aim, not actual but potential reconciliation —Human co-operation essential 378
Contrast of heathen and Christian consciousness as regards treatment of sin, sympathy with God, and the rendering of satisfaction to God 379–381

INDEX 383

RECONCILIATION BY INCARNATION

THE RECONCILIATION OF GOD AND MAN

CHAPTER I

Redemption—Its Three Phases or Stages

The redemption of man has three phases or stages. The first is the reconciliation of God and man, that is, of God with man and man with God,—a change in their personal relations of the nature of that referred to in the words of Isaiah, "I will give thanks unto thee, O Jehovah; for though Thou wast angry with me, Thine anger is turned away, and Thou comfortedst me" (Isa. xii. 1). The second is liberation from sin and restoration to righteousness, which are the negative and positive sides of one and the same process—the process referred to in the words of David, "Wash me thoroughly from mine iniquity, and cleanse me from my sin; create in me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right spirit within me" (Ps. li. 2, 10). The third is

deliverance from the evils which, regarded from one point of view, are the result, regarded from another, are the punishment of sin; and the bestowal of good —the good of which the culmination is described in the words of The Revelation of John, "There shall be no more death, nor sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain . . . Behold, I make all things new: . . . a new heaven and a new earth" (Rev. xxi. 4, 5, 1).

The stages of redemption are distinct and successive only in the sense in which distinctness and successiveness may also be affirmed of the stages in the development of any living being; though it must not be forgotten that redemption has its negative as well as its positive aspect,—that it involves the putting-off of sin and the attainment of righteousness, no less than the realisation of freedom from evil and the enjoyment of good. Whilst reconciliation, however, is an accomplished fact, the second and third phases of redemption, with all that they involve, are matters of slow and irregular growth.

The *first* of these stages is the chief theme of the following passages. Their aim is to show how the *reconciliation of God and man* — that is, let it be repeated, of *God with man* and of *man with God*— was rendered possible and initiated by the incarnation, earthly life, sufferings, and death of the Eternal Word.

CHAPTER II

The Reconciliation of God and Man

The reconciliation in question is a fact in the history both of God and man. The Logos undertook His mission to our earth for the accomplishment of definite tasks, in a definite way, for a definite end; and when He gave up the ghost on the cross, He had as really finished His work—the work He came to do—as God finished the work He had undertaken, when, as it is said, "He rested on the seventh day from all His work which He had made" (Gen. ii. 2). God's work was the creative initiation of the process of evolving a world; Christ's was the creative initiation of the process of redeeming it.

The effect produced by the mission of the Son of God was a fact, which like all other facts, whatever the domain to which they belong, presupposes other kindred and correlate facts, constituting a system; this system in turn presupposes another still larger system, of which it is a part; and so on and on till we get back to the infinite system of which God and the universe are the supreme factors. No being or relation, no effect or change, can be more than partially understood, save in the light, first,

of its own particular system, and in the light of the whole.

In scientific procedure, it is generally necessary to begin by marking out a certain region or subject as the field of our investigation, and to confine attention to it, leaving the rest of the universe out of account till the particular investigation is completed. But, in doing so, we need to be on our guard against two mistakes—one, that of treating the system as isolated in fact; the other, that of interpreting the mundane system, if not the whole universe, in terms of the particular system under consideration.

Into the second of these mistakes theologians used to be supposed specially liable to fall. Perhaps the supposition was not entirely groundless. Of late, however, it has been the special besetment of their critics the physicists, the chemists, and the biologists; for each of these classes of investigators has not only endeavoured to annex the domain at least next his own, but has cast greedy eyes also on the sphere of the spiritual. Into the first are falling a good many at the present day who are well disposed towards Christianity; nay more, who profess to be sincerely anxious to see it safely ensconced within fortifications which shall be impregnable alike to critical and to scientific artillery. The independence of religion in general, and of the Christian religion in particular, of both history and natural science, might almost be termed the special battle-cry of one of the most influential theological schools of the age. Religion, it is said, forms a domain by itself. Natural science and historical

criticism go their own way, and Christian faith goes its way; they need not interfere with each other.

Now, the group or system of facts to which the fact of the reconciliation of God and man belongs is commonly described as spiritual or religious. Unfortunately, these terms are vaguely treated as if they denoted something totally different from all other phenomena, particularly as not *real* in the sense in which other phenomena are real. They are allowed to have a sort of existence of their own. Moderate men would refuse to classify them with illusions. Yet somehow it never seems to suggest itself that religious or spiritual relations are real modes of relation between real forces—both no whit less real than the relations and forces whose reality no one hesitates to recognise. Even if the religious or spiritual life be regarded as a form of feeling, the treatment in question would be unwarranted. For, after all, feelings are as real effects of their kind as the physical wounds which are the immediate antecedents of some of them. But a religious or spiritual relation is as little merely feeling as the relation to certain parts of our physical environment, called eating, is merely feeling. Mental phenomena are either states or activities of an entity as real as any other entity, the former largely produced by the action of other real entities, the latter producing real effects, somewhere or other, on some other real entity or entities.

The change designated reconciliation, though spiritual or religious, was as real as any that can

take place in a system of physical forces; was brought about by the action of a force as real as any force working in the physical sphere; and by action as real as any other mode of action occurring in the universe. Any difference that exists is one, not of reality, but of the nature of the forces or beings which constitute the particular system with which we are more immediately concerned. Those forces, as has been urged, are spiritual forces, but not therefore less real than other forces.

But, if this is true, the question at once arises, What place is occupied by this system among the other systems, co-ordinate and subordinate, by which the world is constituted? and what effects do changes occurring in it produce in other systems? Science accepts it as a fact that there is no such thing as isolation in the cosmos, not even of the constitutive factors of systems, much less of systems; changes therefore happening in one system cannot but more or less affect other systems. Does this cease to hold good when we reach the spiritual system, which, as we found, is as really constituted by real forces, as any other of the systems of the cosmos?

One thing is certain, namely, that religious faiths have always recognised the truth of what has just been advanced. They may justly be chargeable with clothing their recognition in fanciful forms, and with giving the rein to exaggeration; but this does not warrant us in denying all force to the recognition; still less in ignoring its kernel. The rise, progress, and invigoration of religion have so commonly been

associated, for example, with the remarkable physical phenomena termed miracles, as to give rise to the saying of the great German poet, Goethe—

"Das Wunder ist des Glaubens liebstes Kind,"—

a saying which is a great favourite with those who deny objective reality to these children of faith. But, if the position previously taken up be sound, the words may be a poetic expression of the truth that when spiritual forces are specially strong and specially active they cannot but give rise to or condition changes in the physical system or systems with which they are more closely interlaced—which changes in some cases deserve to be described as miraculous. Let expressions like an "age of faith" stand for the fact, not merely that large bodies of men have a stronger persuasion than usual of the reality, nearness, and action of the invisible world, but also that God is acting with special directness and power on the souls of men, and that men in turn are responding specially to the divine approaches; in other words, that an unusually strong *interaction* between the divine and human factors of the great system of the universe is going on—then physical signs and wonders become not only possible but probable. Analogies enough are furnished by the physical sphere. Unusual stirrings in any one of its systems are at once followed by corresponding changes, more or less marked, in other systems. The impossibility or even improbability of a parallel relation between the spiritual and the physical systems is grounded solely

in the notion, either that the spiritual, somehow, lacks reality, such as we predicate of the physical; or else that the spiritual differs so radically from the physical, or is so isolated from it that no changes in the one, were they ever so mighty, could produce effects warranting an appeal to analogy, such as was just now made.

The inner reasonableness, however, of the position just laid down, cannot be made clear as long as one cosmology dominates the spiritual domain, and another the physical domain, each antagonistic to the other. A cosmology is needed which shall do justice, alike to the facts which the science of nature has brought to light and established, on the one hand, and to the facts which may be in general designated spiritual on the other—a cosmology, in other words, among whose great momenta shall be creation and evolution, freedom and conscience. The rectification of the relations of God and man, of man and God, and of man and nature, wrought out by the Logos or Word of God, in that, through the power of the Holy Spirit, He became incarnate, taught, lived, died, rose again from the dead and ascended on high, presupposes a specific origin, constitution, and evolution of the cosmos in general, and of the earth in particular. Apart from a true rationale of the rise of the world there can be no true rationale of the redemption of the world. Given one cosmology, and redemption in the Christian sense—that is redemption in any sense—must seem from beginning to end irrational; given another cosmology, and as faith quickens and illumines

intellect, its reasonableness will become increasingly evident.[1]

The scope of this treatise forbids a full exposition of the cosmology, which, in my humble judgment, fulfils the conditions just laid down; but inasmuch as it is presupposed by the theory of the atonement, to be hereafter set forth, it is advisable, not to say necessary, to indicate very briefly its main features.

[1] The *word* redemption may be used in conjunction with various cosmologies, *e.g.* with that ordinarily but falsely termed evolution; but the reality "redemption," *i.e.* the Christian redemption, which is the only redemption, and alone really redemption, cannot be consistently held, save in conjunction with a particular cosmology.

CHAPTER III

Cosmology presupposed by the Incarnation and Atonement

The ultimate factors of the universe or cosmos are matter, energy, and law, or the complex of laws which is termed idea:—*matter*, to which God gave existence; *energy*, which God is perennially putting forth; and *idea*, with which God informs, or which He interweaves with the energy. Neither of these factors is reducible to the other. Into these every cosmology hitherto attempted, really, though in some cases unwillingly, in others unwittingly, resolves the existences and relations to be explained. One of the most eminent physicists of the day says, indeed, "in the physical universe there are but two classes of things, matter and energy";[1] but we find him, after laying down this position, constantly referring, not only to states of matter and modifications of energy, but also to *laws* as though they were something other than either matter or energy. Another eminent scientist, too, now alas! deceased, whilst avowedly endeavouring to supersede the Christian view of the world, affirmed

[1] Tait, *Properties of Matter*, p. 2. Cf. Stallo, *Concepts of Modern Science*, p. 39.

very categorically that "all and every law follows as a necessary sequence from the persistence of force and the primary qualities of matter,"[1] by which he meant that the innumerable relations assumed by matter in the course of the ages—relations of integration and disintegration, of co-ordination, subordination, and interdependence,—that its modes of behaviour, whether in gravitating, or cohering, or attracting, or repelling, or combining, or organising, were all due to its very constitution. Yet he, too, like other monists, after a while surreptitiously introduced the very thing which which was supposed to follow from the essence of matter, namely, law; for in face of the words just quoted, he gravely asked, "*Starting* with these data, namely, matter and force *and the law of gravitation*, what must happen?"[2] Mr. Herbert Spencer postulates "matter, motion, force"; though why he should need *motion* as an ultimate, in addition to the force that presumably originates and manifests itself in and through motion, does not appear.

This is also the implicit assumption of the Christian Scriptures, especially of those designated the Old Testament. It is not, of course, expressly taught; for to think, much more to discuss and teach such matters, lay beyond the range of the majority of those who wrote the biblical books. The three ultimates in question seem to me, however, to be pretty distinctly presupposed and indicated, not only in the cosmology

[1] *Critical Examination of Theism*, by Physicus (G. J. Romanes), p. 52. See, however, his legacy published by the Rev. Canon Gore.

[2] *Critical Examination of Theism*, p. 63.

of Genesis, but also by the references to creation found in other parts both of the Old and New Testament.

I. *Matter*, which is the "constant"[1] element in the cosmos, as contrasted with its variable elements, energy and law, owes its existence to God. It exists in consequence of His creative activity. This is the doctrine that controlled the minds and utterances of the thinkers whose thoughts are deposited in the Bible, even though they do not lay it down in the formal and explicit manner which is so natural to Christian writers after centuries of investigation and controversy. No word, either Hebrew or Greek, is used which denotes exclusively or necessarily *bringing into being*, as distinguished from giving *mode* of existtence; but the position is implied. The biblical, the Christian, conception of God excludes the notion of the independent eternal coexistence of all matter, either in an ordered or unordered state:—whether it also excludes that of the *eternal creation* of *some* matter is a different question,—one with regard to which eminent Christian thinkers have always differed. It is of course not self-existent. Even if it be eternal it is non-living, non-active; it is non-intelligent and non-intelligible; it is non-feeling; in fine, it is non-personal, non-spiritual. Matter is necessarily dark, non-rational, passive or inert, non-moral.

Science and philosophy alike furnish indirect

[1] "The prime postulate of science is, that there is some constant amid all phenomenal variations." Stallo, *Concepts of Modern Science*, p. 25. See Rothe's view of matter, summarised by v. Solms in Rothe's *Spekulation, etc.*

evidence of the correctness of this description. If, as Lotze maintains, the only quality that can in logical consistency be predicated of matter is impenetrability;[1] and if, to quote the words of Professor Tait, its primal characteristic is "inertia or passivity, or dogged perseverance, but in no sense whatever revolutionary activity"; and if "it is the plaything of force, submitting to any change of state that may be imposed on it, but vigorously persevering in the state in which it is left, until force again acts upon it"[2]—one may well apply to it the description given by another German philosopher, "dark, unintelligible, incomprehensible — a mysterious riddle."[3] Or, with Schelling, say of the question—"Qu'est ce que la matière?" put by Napoleon to Jacobi, and which Jacobi confessed himself unable to answer—"this question touches the point which may be termed the *σκάνδαλον*, the trap of philosophy."[4] An inert plaything, which submits to any change of state, or perhaps rather of position, that may be imposed on it, would seem to be, in the very nature of the case, nothing but bare substance—the very something, which, according to the fundamental law or category of human thought, namely, substantiality, we are compelled to postulate as the subject of qualities, or the object of action—the ultimate thing-in-itself. And, regarded as an object of inquiry, it would seem hopeless to be able to predicate any-

[1] *Naturphilosophie*, sec. 27.

[2] *Properties of Matter*, sec. 108.

[3] Frohschammer, *Die Phantasie als Grundprinzip des Weltprocesses*, p. 232.

[4] Quoted in Huber, *Die Forschung nach der Materie*, p. 3.

thing of that which submits to be anywhere, or anyhow at the pleasure of the energy in the cosmos. Hitherto, moreover, all efforts to agree on a determination of the nature of matter in its ultimate or primary form have proved fruitless. No fewer than twenty-five different hypotheses on the subject are adduced by the most comprehensively learned British scholar of the day;[1] and there are some which even he has not noticed.[2]

To resolve matter into God, as gnostics and emanationists did in old times, and as under other and vaguer forms they are still doing, solves the problem by throwing religion, ethics, and personality into utter confusion; and to represent it as a form of force is either to deny to it the qualities of inertia and impenetrability, by which it is fundamentally known, or to create the curious problem, how force should empty itself of one of its own essential characteristics. The theological conception of *creatio e nihilo*, which correctly formulates biblical presuppositions and hints, is doubtless unrepresentable and unfathomable—necessarily so to beings which are themselves created; but, besides not being in any sense a *contradictio in adjecto*, it lends itself in a wonderful way to the construction of a view of the world which—as every true view of the world must be that shall satisfy the human intellect—is essentially and supremely ethical or spiritual. Monism

[1] Professor Flint, in an appendix to Tait's *Properties of Matter*.

[2] See Huber, *ubi supra*; and Frohschammer's *Monaden und Weltphantasie*. See Hettinger, *Apologie des Christenthums*, vol. i. p. 177; and Rothe's view of creation as "Weltwerdung Gottes," or rather of His "Natur," in *Dogmatik*, i. p. 146.

in every form, new as well as old, is logically antagonistic alike to God, man, and nature. To resolve either into the other is to rid ourselves of all three.

II. *Energy*.—The cosmology which lies behind the Bible, which forms as it were the framework by which its principles and facts are held together, especially that greatest of all facts the redemption that is in Christ, requires us to affirm that the energy which has thus far wrought out the cosmos proceeded from God. Matter—whether its ultimate form be a continuous unique something, or countless discrete atoms, or molecules and masses of which so-called atoms are decompositions[1]—having been brought into existence, goes on to exist without active divine upholding; but the forces whose effects in and on matter we perceive are forms assumed by energy that takes its rise in God. There is no energy but divine energy, and without divine energy matter would neither move nor act, either in one way or another. Matter moves and acts because it is moved and energised, and that which moves and energises it is divine energy. As Zwingli puts it, *omnis virtus, numinis virtus est.*

The energy that thus *proceeds* from God never exists, still less works, apart from or independently of matter. It must not be conceived as floating after a manner *in vacuo*, or hovering over matter. Not only is matter, as far as man knows it, now actually matter energised, but all the energy thus proceeding from God is energy, so to speak, immateriated or incarnated. It may be conceded that motion is the

[1] Letourneau, *La Biologie*, p. 5.

primal step towards integration, or the reverse, and that the primal manifestation or effect of energy is motion; but whether all modes of relation are resolvable into modes of motion, and whether all matter is ceaselessly in motion, as is maintained, are different questions. At the same time, from the point of view here taken up, I might adopt, with slight modifications, the language of a writer previously quoted and say that, "in the universe there is neither force separate from matter, nor matter separate from force. Just as there may be said to be everywhere one substance, veritably protean, entering into an infinite variety of combinations; so we may speak of one energy, constantly changing its forms, yet never diminishing. In the very beginning there was nothing but moving matter, and the entire cosmical development originated with matter in motion."[1]

III. *Idea.*—That the Scriptures everywhere imply, often distinctly hint, and occasionally explicitly teach, that the heavens and the earth are an expression of the divine mind; that divine ideas, or a divine idea, is being realised in the cosmos; that in it God is carrying out a great purpose and plan of His own—this scarcely needs mentioning. That the laws of the world are God's laws; that the modes in which its forces work are prescribed by Him, is certainly the scriptural view, and as such has been set forth and emphasised by Jewish and Christian thinkers of all classes and ages, now in one form, then in another. It is certainly not a discovery of the present genera-

[1] Letourneau, p. 498.

tion. The forces working, work as God ordains; the changes occurring, occur according to His design. Were this not so, how strange that Israel's sacred singers should call upon "fire and hail, snow and vapour, stormy winds, mountains and hills, fruitful trees and cedars, beasts and all cattle, creeping things and flying fowl, to praise and magnify Jehovah" (Ps. cxlviii.).

As to the fact of the cosmos being a cosmos, human philosophy and science are at one with Scripture, even though they may not always ascribe it to God. Method, order, law, they agree, are no less discernible in the cosmos than energy. Wherever energy is found working, whether it be in the form of gravitation or cohesion or chemical attraction, or light or heat, or electricity or life—it works according to rule or law, or those complexes of laws which may be termed ideas. Psychical energy has also its law, though it is endowed with and often uses the power of disobeying it. Even what we call disorder in nature is order in another form. The forces at work in the volcanic eruptions of Vesuvius conform to law, whether the lava and ashes which they emit destroy or nourish the vines that grow on its slopes. The death-fraught bacillus and the bacillus-destroying antidote are alike under the sway of law; and it is energy proceeding from God that assumes now the one form, then the other.

Why should all the forces into which energy differentiates itself thus be actually or ideally controlled by law? Is it in the very nature of matter

or of energy, conceived simply as such, or of both, to behave thus and thus, and no otherwise? This is what the advocates of the monistic theory of the evolution of the world tell us. The best evidence of the inadequacy of this account of the matter is the fact of the tendency of monism to endow matter with other qualities than those of mere extension and impenetrability; such, for example, as mobility—which is of course opposed to the inertness usually regarded as its primary characteristic; very elementary degrees of vitality and sensibility; and, indeed, to quote the celebrated utterance of Professor Tyndall, "the promise and *potency*" of all that is now found in the cosmos.

Pantheism seems to many to escape the difficulty by which materialistic cosmogonies, modern no less than ancient, are in this respect beset; for, in one form or another, it ascribes to the universe an all-controlling, all-ordering, all-animating soul; and, though denying proper personality to this soul, certainly endows it with the powers which produce the effects that the Scriptures and Christian thought, not to say ethnic thought, with few exceptions, have ascribed to the free, conscious, intelligent action of a divine being or beings. But a solution of the problem in question by means of pantheism means, not merely defeat, but a confused rout ending in the destruction of reason.

IV. The energy which perennially proceeds forth from God differentiates itself into the manifold forces by which the work of constituting the cosmos out of

matter is being accomplished; whilst the idea which immanently guides the energy in its work undergoes contemporaneously a correspondent process of differentiation. The energy which at the very beginning, under the control of the immanent idea, caused the primal material elements to draw together after the manner which is commonly termed gravitation, is identical with that which out of scattered observations in the person of an Owen ideally reconstructs some animal long since extinct.

Mind power, whether of the higher kind which we ascribe to man, or of the lower kind which we ascribe to animals, is no less a differentiation of the energy that is constituting the cosmos than the various forces which are investigated by the physicist or the chemist or the biologist. Nor is the pneumatic power or ability which characterises those who are born again of the Spirit anything different: — it is the psychical in man as differentiated under the quickening influence of his divine environment.

Like the other forms of energy in the world, the psychical or pneumatic is never found dissociated from matter. Pure created spirit is a pure figment of the philosophico-theological imagination. The matter in which energy at its present stage of differentiation is immateriated is not, indeed, the only form of matter in which it can be immateriated; the *πνεῦμα* is capable of assuming a *σῶμα πνευματικόν*, even as the *ψυχή* assumes a *σῶμα ψυχικὸν*: without body it will never be.

The same thing is true with regard to the laws of

the cosmos—they are all diffentiations of the one idea incorporated with energy by its divine originator.

The *idea*, which at the primal stage of the operations of energy just referred to is the well-known law, "Every particle of matter in the universe attracts every other particle with a force whose direction is that of a line joining the two, and whose magnitude is directly as the product of their masses and inversely as the square of their distance from each other," when we reach man, has differentiated itself into the wonderfully complicated system of laws to which the human organism is either unconsciously and necessarily or consciously and freely subject—these last culminating in the two great laws formulated by Christ when He said, "The first and great commandment is to love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind"; and the second is like unto it, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself."

Matter also may be said, with Mr. Herbert Spencer, "concomitantly to pass" from "an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity," by manifold stages of alternating integration and disintegration,—a process carried on, of course, by the energy referred to above,—the ultimate elements entering at the beginning into the simplest physical relations to each other; and when man is reached, into those which are peculiar to the brain. But from the beginning to the end it is the same matter.

V. The process in its entirety, by which the cosmos has thus far come into existence, is now commonly designated evolution. Evolution has two momenta,

persistence and change; or speaking with exclusive reference to the biological sphere, *heredity* and *variability*. Taken together, these two momenta may be regarded as constituting what is known in biology as the law of *recapitulation*, of which the following lucid and interesting description is given by an eminent biologist recently deceased:[1] "Each animal has had a pedigree stretching back through all geologic time since the dawn of life on the globe; and bears the mark of its ancestry in its own development. The phases through which it passes in its progress from the egg to the adult represent more or less closely, in more or less modified manner, the successive ancestral stages through which the present condition has been acquired. Embryology reveals to us this ancestry because every animal in its own development repeats this history, climbs up its own genealogical tree. This being the case, there ought to be, and there actually is, a parallelism between the embryological and the palæontological records." "Not as is sometimes incorrectly imagined, that a young mammal was once like a little fish, afterwards like a reptile, and so forth; but that the embryo-mammal at one stage resembles the embryo-fish, at another stage the embryo-reptile, and so forth," as another writer puts it.[2]

"The record of the race-history in embryology, however, is undoubtedly neither complete nor straightforward; but a history of which entire chapters are

[1] Milnes Marshall. See *Nature*, Sept. 1890. Cf. H. Spencer, *First Principles*, p. 337, and Article in *Nineteenth Century* for Nov. 1895, p. 744 f.

[2] Thompson, *Study of Animal Life*, 197.

lost; while in those that remain many pages are misplaced, and others are so blurred as to be illegible; words, sentences, paragraphs are omitted, and worse still, alterations or spurious additions have been freely introduced by later hands; and at times so cunningly as to defy detection." "Nay more, cases are found of abrupt metamorphosis; of transitions, which instead of being gradual are sudden: there are not only small jumps such as are very common in nature, but bounds forward of startling magnitude, as *e.g.* from the sluggish leaf-eating caterpillar to the dainty butterfly. Yet that ontogeny is really a repetition of phylogeny must be admitted, in spite of the numerous and various ways in which the ancestral history may be distorted during actual development." [1]

It is only in the domain of animal life that evidences of the prevalence of this law have up to the present moment been discovered. And little or no express effort has thus far been made to include vegetal life within its scope; unless Mr. Herbert Spencer's significant words, "The human germ, primarily similar to all others, first differentiates itself from vegetal germs and subsequently assumes the mammalian, placental, un-

[1] Milnes Marshall, *ubi supra.* Kölliker uses the expression "Sprungweise auftretende heterogene Zeugung," quoted by Dr. W. Sorge in *Religion und Naturwissenschaft*, 1893. "Biologists," says the author of *The New Truth and the Old Faith* ("A Scientific Layman"), "now talk of waves of 'morphological force,' in which the current of life seems to have swelled with a new being and to have sunk again, after the birth was over, into a period of quiet; just as we sometimes see a family advance until it produces a great man, then recede to mediocrity again." "*Strides* or jumps as an agent in development were suggested by the authors of the *Vestiges of Creation*" 1844.

guiculate, and lastly the human characters,"[1] point in this direction. Still less has it been extended to the præ-organic sphere.[2]

So that unless it be greatly widened it will afford us little help in getting, so to speak, inside, in laying hold on the true inwardness of a process within the scope of which the entire world, not to say cosmos, is embraced. Does the law of recapitulation prevail throughout? does it dominate the process which led up from the cosmic mist to vegetal life; through that to animal life; and through animal to human life? Is such a widening warranted? If it is, each stage of the onward and upward evolution of the cosmos must in some sense recapitulate the previous stages; or, to speak after the manner of Hegelianism, each stage in the development must take up into itself and preserve all that has gone before. So that, for example, the chemical sphere will recapitulate the stages by which it was preceded; the vegetable stage in like manner that which led up to it: and so forth, each new stage naturally displaying its own specific and distinctive characteristics.

Passing up through the animal domain to man, he too must be found recapitulating the entire previous evolution whilst exhibiting distinctive peculiarities of his own.

Is this the case? Has the whole cosmic process

[1] H. Spencer, *Epitome of the Synthetic Philosophy*, by F. H. Collins, p. 84.

[2] Evolution prevails in the præ-organic sphere:—this has been pointed out by Principal Chapman in his able, interesting, and too little-heeded work *Præ-organic Evolution*; but this is a different thing from saying that recapitulation also prevails.

left its mark in the process of the development of man? Can he be said to repeat in himself the history of the world, and to climb up his own genealogical tree? And does his constitution, development, activity, help us therefore in some measure to appreciate the process by which the world is being evolved? Are traces both of the præ-organic and the præ-animal stages discoverable in him?

One thing is certain, that energy in man is actually found doing the chief kinds of work done by the forces of the physical world:—the kinds of work investigated by the physicist, the chemist, the biologist. "The matter of the human body," says an eminent physicist, "is the same as that of the world around us, and the forces of the human body are identical with those of inorganic nature. It is an apparatus exquisite and effectual beyond all others in transforming and distributing energy."

"The food we place in our stomachs is so much combustible matter. It is first dissolved by purely chemical processes, and the nutritive fluid is poured into the blood. Here it comes into contact with atmospheric oxygen admitted by the lungs. It unites with the oxygen as wood or coal might unite with it in a furnace. The matter products and the force products are in both cases the same; in the one carbonic acid and water, in the other heat and work. Every action of the organism belongs thus far to the domain either of physics or chemistry."[1] The same

[1] Tyndall, *Fragments of Science; Science and Man.* Cf. Wundt's *Philosophie*, p. 548; Letourneau, *Biologie*, p. 481.

energy and matter are further differentiated and transformed into muscle, nerve and brain matter, and energy.

These are facts. Now to their meaning—to the analogical inferences which they seem to warrant.

May it not be said to be highly probable that if we could trace back the genesis of any individual man to its very fountainhead, we should find that he began with a movement of two or more particles of matter towards each other, either according to the law of gravitation or to some prior law; that thereupon they cohered and attracted others; that in due course molecules arose and then the internal motion termed heat was set up which is the preliminary step to chemical relations; that thereafter arose the combination which manifests itself in vital phenomena; and that at last, after passing through a kind of vegetal stage, discrete though correlate forms of living matter coalesced to constitute the germ which eventually, after an embryonic development recapitulating the evolution of the animal sphere, issued in man.[1]

[1] Scotus Erigena (Christlieb, pp. 267–270) says: "Inter primordiales rerum causas homo ad imaginem Dei factus est ut in eo omnis creatura, et intelligibilis et sensibilis, ex quibus veluti diversis extremitatibus compositus (est) unum inseparabile fieret, et ut esset medietas atque adunatio omnium creaturarum," *De div. nat.* ii. 9; "Deus omnem creaturam, visibilem et invisibilem in hominem fecit," iv. 7; "Omnis creatura in homine est," v. 25; "Homo in occultis naturæ causis secundum quas primitus conditus est, et ad quas reversurus est, continetur, in quantum est," ii. 7; "Non immerito dicitur homo creaturarum omnium officina, quoniam in ipso universalis creatura continetur. Intelligit quidem ut angelus, ratiocinatur ut homo, sentit ut animal, vivit ut germen, corpore animaque subsistit, nullius creaturæ expers," iii. 37. Cf. Staudenmaier, *Lehre v. d. Idee.*

May we adopt, of course with modifications, the words of Emerson quoted by Professor Tyndall in his *Fragments of Science*?

> "If thou would'st know the mystic song
> Chaunted when the sphere was young,
> Aloft, abroad, the pæan swells,
> O wise man, hear'st thou half it tells?
> To the open ear it sings
> The early genesis of things:
> Of tendency through endless ages
> Of star-dust and star-pilgrimages,
> Of rounded worlds, of space and time,
> Of the old floods' subsiding slime,
> Of chemic matter, force and form,
> Of poles and powers, cold, wet and warm.
> The rushing metamorphosis
> Dissolving all that pristine is,
> Melts things that be to things that seem,
> And solid nature to a dream."

VI. But even, if this were conceded, what about the higher nature, functions, and activities of man, as we term them? Many evolutionists cry halt! when we reach the soul. They maintain that as its activities are new, the energy which is manifested in them must also be new. "The rational life of man stands out to view on an eminence completely severed from the scheme of organic evolution," says an eminent philosopher. "As an animal life—a type of physical existence—human life is fitted into the system of organic life on the earth. As a rational life—a type of spiritual existence—human life is exalted above all life besides, severed from companionship of animals."

See further, Tyndall's *Fragments of Science*, vol. ii. pp. 80–84, where the process is traced from crystallisation to man.

"Man belongs to two orders—the one organic, the other spiritual."[1]

Thus regarded, man would be a recapitulation as to the body; a completely new thing as to the spirit within him.

But is there adequate reason for positing such a dual origin for man? Have we not, on the contrary, good grounds for maintaining that he is a unity? not body alone, indeed; not spirit alone; but the two organically united: or rather, to use language more in harmony with the line of thought hitherto expounded, is he not essentially a combination of matter, brought about by a highly differentiated form of cosmic energy, working according to a correspondingly differentiated form of the cosmic idea? The energy which constitutes him at the earliest stage of his existence is to all appearance the same energy which constitutes and acts in him at the later stages; yea, at the very highest stage, though at the latest stage it has become far more highly differentiated.

"I am the child of earth and air and sea!
My lullaby by hoarse Silurian storms
Was chanted; and through endless changing forms
Of plant and bird and beast, unceasingly
The toiling ages wrought to fashion me.
Lo! these large ancestors have left a breath
Of their strong souls in mine, defying death
And change. I grow and blossom as the tree,
And ever feel deep-delving, earthy roots
Binding me daily to the common clay.
But with its airy impulse upwards shoots
My life into the realms of light and day;
And thou, O Sea, stern mother of my soul,
Thy tempests sing in me, thy billows roll."

H. H. Boyesen, quoted in
The New Truth and the Old Faith.

[1] Calderwood, *Evolution and Man's Place in Nature*, 338 f. So A. Wallace. See Thompson, p. 343.

As to this point, Thomas Aquinas long ago gave utterance to the substantial truth when he maintained that one and the same principle, namely, the anima, is at once the formative principle of the body and also the anima sensitiva, appetitiva seu motiva; nay more, the anima rationalis sive intellectualis.[1]

The view just referred to leads back logically to Plato's conception of the body as an organic whole, complete in itself, into which the soul enters and which, whilst partially controlled and used by it, is also in some respects to it a kind of prison-house—a conception controverted by Aquinas:[2]—a conception, too, notwithstanding the wide acceptance it has found among Christians, untenable alike on biblical and scientific grounds. For man is essentially a somatico-psychical being.

We may justly quote in this connection the profoundly significant words of St. Paul, "All flesh is not the same flesh: but there is one flesh of men, and another flesh of beasts, and another flesh of birds, and another flesh of fishes";[3] for body and soul, alike in beast and man, are so closely related that neither in any case could be other than it is, save as both were different. The idea of the loose, contingent relation of the human body and soul implied in much teaching, both scientific and popular, is not only groundless but mischievous.

It is scarcely needful to say that this is a totally

[1] See Ueberweg, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, ii. 200. Cf. also Frohschammer, *Philosophie des Thomas v. Aquino*, p. 363.

[2] See Frohschammer, p. 363.

[3] 1 Cor. xv. 39.

different position from that which represents mind as a function of brain;[1] or that which, whilst professedly recognising to the full the difference between the mental and the material, speaks of a "human being as an extended and material mass, to which is attached the power of becoming alive to feeling and thought, the extreme remove from all that is material."[2]

It is one and the same energy which at different stages of differentiation, *i.e.* as different forces, does properly physical work, then chemical, then vital of the various kinds, and finally mental, beginning with that which is found in the mere animal and ending with that which is found in the various orders of created intelligences, from man upwards.

These several forces make their appearance in the human organism in succession; but having once made their appearance, they continue to exist and work, normally in subordination, the earlier to the later, the simpler to the more complex, the lower to the higher, and, in general, the corporeal to the mental.

Each of these differentiations of the one energy, in other words, each of these forces, works within its own sphere according to its own law or laws; and though conflict and disorder may and do occur, the rule is harmonious co-operation for the promotion of the growth and development of the human organism as a whole.

The earlier and lower differentiations of this energy do their work unconsciously, though under the control

[1] Maudsley, *Physiology of Mind*, p. 38.
[2] Bain, *Mind and Body*, p. 137.

of the *idea* of the whole. It is only the higher differentiation—which in general may be termed the psychical—that works freely, knows that it is working, and is also more or less distinctly aware that its activities should be conformed to an immanent, though not self-acting, law or idea. But even the human consciousness is not complete. As to this we may compare ourselves to men standing on the shore of a narrow channel connecting two seas, each concealed by a dense mist which only now and again breaks and reveals the whence and whither of the waters whose flow we are watching. Meanwhile the other and earlier differentiations of the one energy continue doing their work, all unknown to themselves; nay more, unknown save indirectly even to the partially self-conscious organism. Strangely enough, too, this energy in its mental and self-conscious differentiation has the power to make a greater or less use of the lower differentiations and their material combinations, for the purpose of controlling and modifying others. In other words, as we ordinarily say, mind can use one part of its body in order more or less to affect another part.

Nay more, this differentiation of energy which constitutes man, though itself an essential part of the world, is able to turn round upon, to observe, to examine, to investigate, to endeavour to understand and even to modify the world and itself. Till man is evolved the energy, which by its differentiations and their work generates the world, remains unconscious of itself, unless we regard, as perhaps we should, the feelings, sensibilities, and *præ-self-conscious* psychical

activities of the animal world as upflashings of the coming dawn, dumb prophecies of the mind that is to be.[1] In man the world, by discovering its own secret, discovers also the divine source of its being. Profoundly true, therefore, interpreted in the light of sin, are the words of Paul, "Creation itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God"—that liberty one of whose prime elements is knowing as friends, and not being condemned to work in the dark as servants.

VII. Ideally considered, the cosmos is already, and was from the very first, a great whole or system completely organised; actually it is a system of co-ordinate and subordinate systems, of each of which we can say in turn, that it is gradually becoming actually

[1] A dim and imperfect glimmering of the view thus presented is found in the following lines from a Persian poem of the thirteenth century:—

"First man appeared in the class of inorganic things,
Next he passed therefrom into that of plants.
For years he lived as one of the plants,
Remembering nought of his inorganic state so different:
And when he passed from the vegetive to the animal state
He had no remembrance of his state as a plant,
Except the inclination he felt to the world of plants,
Especially at the time of spring and sweet flowers;
Like the inclination of infants towards their mothers,
Which know not the cause of their inclination to the breast.
Again, the great Creator, as you know,
Drew man out of the animal into the human state.
Thus man passed from one order of nature to another,
Till he became wise and knowing and strong as he is now.
Of his past souls he has now no remembrance,
And he will be again changed from his present soul."

Masnavi (Bk. iv.) of Jalâl ad Dîn,
quoted in Clodd's *Story of Creation*.

what it already is ideally. The recapitulation predicated of individuals is true also of the systems which successively arise. Each of these systems, too, has as truly an immanent idea of its own as the cosmos to which it belongs. Each is possessed, moreover, of a certain measure of independence within its co-ordination and subordination.

Humanity is one of these systems, constituting a system, not merely in the looser sense in which the term is otherwise applied, but also an organic whole, with an idea which it is destined gradually to realise, and consisting of individuals, each of which is in turn a relatively independent system, or rather organism, with its own immanent idea.

Between all the systems which constitute the cosmos a constant interaction, infinitely varied both in kind and degree, is going on. Every system acts on every other system: and every factor of every system acts on every other factor, not only of its own particular system, but also on every factor of every other of the innumerable systems by which the cosmos is constituted. This follows from the fact that the cosmos is a real, though ever-varying because ever-evolving, unity.

Referring more especially to the domain of life, one may say that every part of the cosmos, or at all events of the earth, holds the relation of environment to every other part. And of the living factors, if not exclusively yet very specially, it holds true that their normal growth and development are conditional on the maintenance of fitting interaction between them and a fitting environment. This applies with as much force

to man as to any other of the living beings which have been or are the outcome of the process of evolution.

VIII. The emission of the energy by whose action on matter the cosmos is being evolved, and the informing of the energy with its regulative idea,—which regulative idea is the articulated divine idea of the world,—is consciously and freely controlled by God, with constant and due regard to the successive stages through which the cosmos passes in the process of evolution. As soon, however, as the divine energy, either at the beginning or at the later stages, enters on its cosmic work it ceases to be under the direct control, or perhaps even open to the immediate knowledge, of God; not, be it remarked, because of a necessity imposed on God from without, but in pursuance of His own plan and purpose. In other words, the divine energy undergoes a kind of *kenosis*.[1] This latter relation of God to the world may be termed His immanence; the former His transcendence.

The due regard at each successive step to the stage reached by the cosmos, that is, to the specific characteristics of the beings or the system evolved just referred to, assumes a very special character when man is evolved. For owing to the consciousness and freedom with which he is endowed, the divine action on him, save indirectly through nature, has in a sense to submit itself to his conscious pleasure and choice.

It is further obviously involved in the positions

[1] See Ottley, *Incarnation*, iii. 285. Further reference will be made to this kenotic element in the divine relation to the cosmos at a later stage.

laid down, that the cosmos, though possessing a certain independence of its own, is in no sense self-contained or self-sufficient. On the contrary, it is continuously dependent on God;—God is, in fact, its living, ever active, ever necessary originator and constitutor, as well as in a narrower sense its environment.

Between the cosmos and God, therefore, in whom it "lives and moves and has its being," there must necessarily be an interaction to which the nearest analogy is furnished perhaps by the relation between a mother and her unborn offspring.

IX. In accordance with the hints contained in the Scriptures, especially of the New Testament, and agreeably to the, in point of substance, uniform teachings of the Christian Church, the relation severally of the three persons which constitute the Godhead to the creation, evolution, and government of the cosmos in general, and of the world in particular, may be approximately formulated as follows. The person known as *Father* is in a special sense the creator of the matter out of which the cosmos is being evolved. The person known as the *Holy Spirit* is the intra-divine centre, and extra-divine wielder of the energy by which the cosmos is being evolved. The person known as the *Logos* or *Word*, who as incarnate is designated the Son of God, is the intra-divine centre of the activity by which the cosmic idea is formed and the extra-divine power which informs or interweaves the complex of laws or idea with the cosmic energy. Inasmuch, however, as the three persons, or, as it would be more accurate to describe them, the three *personific* factors of the God-

head, though distinct from each other, are yet so in each other that in a very true sense what each does all do, and what all do each does, they are therefore frequently referred to, alike in Scripture and in the thought of the Church, as if certain of their functions and activities were interchangeable.

Such are the main features of the cosmology which lies behind the Bible; which crops out under the greatest variety of circumstances, though it is never formally expounded: and within which, as if it be true, must needs be the case, there is room for God immanent and God transcendent, for nature and spirit, for necessity and freedom, for law and miracle, for sin and redemption. This cosmology is presupposed by the doctrine or theory of the atonement, which it is my aim in the following pages to expound.

CHAPTER IV

The Nature and Constitution of Man

In accordance with the cosmological principles previously laid down, man may be described as constituted by a special differentiation of cosmic energy, embodied in specially integrated matter, together with which it forms a living unity, the growth development and activity of which are designed to be controlled and regulated by a correspondingly differentiated indwelling law, or complex of laws, termed idea.

1. As such he is subject, along with all other living beings, to the great biological law, that normal growth and development depend on fitting relations between him and a fitting environment.

Like all other beings, too, he clearly owes himself to God; in other words, the matter which in part constitutes him is matter created by God; the energy which has organised the matter of which he consists into a body, and which discharges a variety of functions and puts forth a variety of activities, is divine energy; and the complex of laws, or, otherwise expressed, the idea, which has either regulated the energy by necessity, or prescribes to it its modes of action, is a divine idea or system of laws. At the same time,

both the matter, the energy, and the idea which constitute him arose out of the mundane system to which he belongs; otherwise expressed, he came into existence not directly from God but from the world. Immediately, he owes his existence to what we call second causes. He is the flower of the process of evolution. In him the process has thus far culminated.

Such being his origin and position in the world, it would seem, and is by many maintained, that he, equally with all preceding products of evolution, must lack the moral nature and the spiritual needs by which he is ordinarily supposed to be distinguished from the animals below him, yea, even from the very highest. How can he, it is asked, if this be true, be anything but the highest link of the great chain of nature, and need anything beyond what this mundane system, including of course his fellow-men, is able to supply?

In the view of many, both of the friends and critics of revelation, any such evolutionary cosmology as that just sketched logically lands us in this conclusion; and for this reason most friends of revelation postulate, in order to account for, or to render possible, the higher nature of man, a direct divine intervention or a new creation.

But this is a mistake, due to an imperfect appreciation of some features of the process of evolution itself. When we examine that process carefully, we find running through the biological sphere, if not indeed also through, at all events, a part of the præ-organic

sphere, a principle of *selection* which as we approach man assumes more and more completely the character of choice, and is more and more attended and conditioned by consciousness. In man this culminates; and as found in him we call it *will*, which is the capability of conscious selection, in harmony with one or more of the laws that constitute the system of laws, designated his idea.

Still further, mute anticipations and prophecies of the intellectual, affectional, and emotional characteristics of man are undoubtedly to be found among his animal ancestors,—prophecies and anticipations which become more and more distinct and clear as man is approached,—but, as is recognised even by thoroughgoing evolutionists, they culminate in man and find in him their interpretation. It is just because *all* these higher qualities reach their highest mundane potency in man that it is possible for any one of them to be at its highest. Especially true is it that if the will, with its correlate consciousness, in other words, the moral nature, remains undeveloped, the other qualities rarely pass far beyond the animal stage. It is *self*-consciousness that specially differentiates man from the animals below him; and where this is little developed, there man fails also to develop the other higher potencies with which he is endowed.

No substantial reason will exist why even the most earnest upholder of the Christian faith should hesitate to recognise as facts the anticipations of man's highest qualities in the animal world, to which reference has

been made, if the fundamental assumptions of the cosmology previously sketched be accepted; that is, if the determining factors of the process of evolution be the divine energy and idea immanent in it, the former differentiating itself in harmony with, or under the control of, the latter. If matter, however, be conceived as having in itself the "promise and potency" of the cosmos; and if in addition it be treated, consciously or unconsciously, as the self-existent beginning of all things, then it must be allowed such a view of man and his ancestry *will contradict the Christian faith*; but not otherwise.

2. There is another respect in which the animal ancestry of man may be said mutely to point towards their wonderful descendant, the heir of all the ages. I refer to what seems to be, at all events in a limited respect, a law, that the deepest potentialities of the several species of the animal kingdom are never evolved until they are fittingly acted upon by one or more of the species that are above them. A unique influence in this respect belongs to man as regards the creatures below him. As the history of civilisation teaches, he has been constantly evoking, in certain of the creatures around him, powers which apart from his action they had never exhibited; powers, too, which they have invariably only too soon lost when his hand was withdrawn.

Such, too, is the law to which man is subject. He also needs to be acted on by a higher environment if his potentialities are to be evoked and realised. Nay more, if we take heed to his history, it will be found

to bear one long testimony to the fact that the environment which he needs is divine. Men are constituted that they should "seek after God and find Him, though He is not far from each one of us; for in Him we live and move and have our being. For we are also His offspring." The closer his intercourse with God—a thing which involves a certain measure of acquaintance—the fuller and richer his development; though it is as true of him as it is analogously of the creatures below him, that the more he withdraws himself from the influence of his divine environment, the greater the fall beneath himself.

So far as this law is concerned, the differences between man and the creatures below him consist (1) in the greater complexity of his constitution and the consequent greater complexity of the environment, whose action on him conditions his growth and development; (2) in the fact that, save at the earliest stages of his existence, the relations which condition his growth and development cannot be entered on without first becoming matter of consciousness; (3) in the fact that, to a certain extent, the relations between him and his environment are subject to his free control, that in other words, within limits, he is able to control his own development and life.

3. Answering to the double constitution and indwelling idea of man, his environment is also twofold, namely, physical and psychical or spiritual, neither really separable from the other. The world which we call physical is itself, in point of fact, both physical and psychical or spiritual. Accordingly, it not only

supplies physical nutriment and a sphere of exercise for the human body, besides influencing it in other ways, but by its action on man's senses, as well as through its indwelling laws, evokes and fosters the activity of his intellect, and in various ways meets its needs. Neither of these functions, however, would be discharged, save in a very imperfect degree, apart from the prior and contemporary action of man's properly psychical or spiritual environment.

Shelley, and those who explicitly or implicitly share his position, are, however, profoundly in error when they say—

> "This world is the nurse of all we know;
> This world is the nurse of all we feel."

It would not be true if we were to include the human race in the "world." Not less in error are the advocates of monistic evolution. Indeed, the picture they themselves draw of the state of the human race during the early period of its existence is the best proof of the inadequacy of nature and men alone to serve the purpose of developing the higher human potentialities. Evidence of a like intent is provided by the savages of to-day if, as we are assured, they are essentially in the state in which all men once were. For they are assumed to have had no nurse of thought and feeling save nature and one another.

The human world is the earliest and, as men are *at present*, the most potent factor of their psychical environment. The proviso which qualifies the statement is added because there is good reason for maintaining that the *first* human beings, especially if evolved

from some lower animal, however complete their potentialities, would not, nay more, could not, have developed into men as we now know them, if they had not been acted on by some more or less completely developed personality.

Human beings could never, however, have been an adequate environment, no, not even had they formed societies that attained to a high degree of civilisation. The highest type of man will never be produced by the influence of man alone. An element of absoluteness pertains to the idea immanent in man's nature, which it is his destiny to realise, that can never be awakened into life or developed save as he is fittingly acted on by the Absolute.

In short, the supreme factor of man's environment is God. This is the great presupposition of the Bible, of Christianity as a whole, and in a special respect of redemption.

"Even so the Soul which in this earthly mould
The Spirit of God doth secretly infuse;
Because at first she doth the earth behold,
And only this material world she views:

At first her mother-earth she holdeth dear,
And doth embrace the world and worldly things;
She flies close by the ground, and hovers here,
And mounts not up with her celestial wings.

Yet under heaven she cannot light on aught
That with her heavenly nature doth agree;
She cannot rest, she cannot fix her thought,
She cannot in this world contented be:

Then as a bee which among weeds doth fall,
Which seem sweet flowers, with lustre fresh and gay,
She lights on that, and this, and tasteth all,
But pleased with none, doth rise and soar away.

So when the Soul finds here no true content,
And, like Noah's dove, can no sure footing take,
She doth return from whence she first was sent,
And flies to Him that first her wings did make."

SIR JOHN DAVIES, died 1626.

CHAPTER V

God as the Environment of Man

As the environment of man, God holds to him normally a twofold relation,—a relation that may be designated personal; and one that may be described as vital or bio-dynamic. In other words, if man is to develop normally, God must behave towards, and act on, man in ways analogous to those in which human persons normally behave towards, and act on, each other; and He must also vitally energise man, that is, communicate to him real strength—nourish, quicken, invigorate him in a manner analogous to that in which he is nourished, quickened, and invigorated, as to the body, by his physical environment. This order of things, let it be remembered, was constituted by God Himself: He imposed this function on Himself, in that He created man what he is.

> "Thou art the source and centre of all minds,
> Their only point of rest, Eternal Word!
> From Thee departing they are lost, and rove
> At random without honour, hope, or peace.
> From Thee is all that soothes the life of man,
> His high endeavour, and his glad success,
> His strength to suffer, and his will to serve.
> But O thou bounteous giver of all good,
> Thou art of all Thy gifts Thyself the crown!
> Give what Thou canst, without Thee we are poor:
> And with Thee rich, take what Thou wilt away!"
>
> Cowper, *The Task.*

Let us briefly consider these two relations.

I. A specific, direct, *personal* relation of God to man is necessary to man's normal *personal* development, growth, and life.

1. Man *personally* considered is man, as capable of thought, knowledge, affection, feeling, self-possession, and self-control. Personal relations to men are relations, or modes of behaviour, which affect or influence them in one, or other, or all of these aspects of their nature. As they have the capabilities or potentialities enumerated, so they *need* not only to think and know, to cherish affections, to experience feelings, and to possess and control themselves; but also to be acted on by beings who think and know, who cherish affections, who experience feelings, who possess and control themselves, that is, by men. Not only the actualisation of these various potentialities, but also the satisfaction of corresponding wants and cravings, is impossible apart from contact with those in whom the potentialities have already been more or less completely actualised. Indeed, the two things are, strictly speaking, inseparable. They are but the two sides of one and the same process or experience.

Whilst what has been advanced holds good of every aspect of man's personal nature and life, the sense and satisfaction of need have been, and are for the most part, referred to and emphasised chiefly in connection with the *affections* and *feelings*. Doubtless, too, the majority of men are sensible of need,—which may become an aching void,—solely, or nearly so, in the region of the affections and feelings, especially the

former. Nor is this altogether unnatural, for, after all, it is chiefly through the heart, which is the seat of the affections, that men are linked to each other; not through the intellect or the will; though the latter, of course, have their part to play. It is only when human nature has been warped and debased by a long course of selfishness that it becomes indifferent how men regard it and how it regards men. Normally we all yearn to bestow as well as to receive, receive as well as to bestow, respect, trust, and love, which are the chief forms or stages of true affection; and those who either lack or refuse to avail themselves of opportunities of reciprocation,—those especially who refuse,—as inevitably undergo atrophy and degeneration as does a bodily organ which is not supplied with nutriment, or is not put to use. This holds equally true, however, of both the intellect and the power of self-control, usually termed the will. Neither of them grows and develops healthily without fitting interaction between them and their environment.

2. That what has just been urged is true of men in relation to each other, history and daily observation amply confirm. So far from being doubted, still less questioned, the idea nowadays is in danger of being too strongly emphasised. Environment is being magnified at the expense of that which is environed. A vigorous healthy society is to be built up out of units which have neither health nor strength of their own. Yet true it is, and will ever remain true, that individual men cannot realise their capabilities, or live an ideal life, unless they are being constantly and duly acted

on by the human race as a whole. Not less true, however, is it that humanity, as a whole, can never realise its idea unless the individuals by which it is constituted are also realising their idea.

It has been too customary, indeed, to lay chief, nay sometimes exclusive, stress on the relation of such intercourse to the heart and its affections. Although, considered in itself, this was a mistake, the excuse may be pleaded for it, that the human heart needs to go forth without let or hindrance. When it has been stirred into activity by contact with human beings, this need becomes a conscious desire,—a desire, or even yearning, to trust, love, and reverence without limits. Otherwise expressed, we instinctively grope and feel after a person or persons to whom we can unreservedly surrender ourselves. Under this impulse when young we treat, first our parents, then our friends, our teachers, and others, as realisations of all that is most worthy of respect, trust, and love; and one of the intensest pains the human soul can experience is that which ensues on the discovery that the persons whom it has idealised are, like itself, imperfect. When the imperfection is moral, and the person is a father, or mother, or religious teacher, or friend greatly admired and trusted, the disillusionment is exceedingly perilous.

But this capability of bestowing the reverence, trust, and love of the whole heart cannot be called forth into healthy activity save by One who embodies in absolute measure the qualities which answer to these affections. Nor, of course, can the heart of man realise the satisfaction and peace which naturally result from absolutely

normal relations to an absolutely fitting object until it is found by and finds The One. Till then it will be as one who beats the air, that is, it will remain restless and discontented. This must at all events be the case, until the heart has grown sick through hope too long deferred, has become weary of searching in vain, and is as good as dead.

And as an ideal father would be the fittest man to discharge the function just described, so far as it devolves on the human environment; so an Absolute Father would be the absolutely fittest to evoke and to provide perfect nutriment and exercise for the deepest and highest potentialities of the children of men.

But, as was previously remarked, neither human potentialities can be evoked into actuality nor human needs be satisfied by man alone. It is no less impossible for the human race than it is for the natural world adequately to render either the one service or the other to a single one of its innumerable members. Each individual man, as well as the whole of humanity, is created for God; and God has constituted Himself the living environment for both.

This holds good of every aspect of man's personal nature. The Christian Church, however, as was previously remarked, has made a grievous mistake in so frequently losing sight of, or at all events in neglecting duly to emphasise, the fact that God is the supreme factor of man's environment, not merely relatively to his affections and feelings, but also relatively to his intellect and will. Our intelligence cannot work at its

best apart from God. It is not a question merely of receiving knowledge. No, it is a question of being qualified to exercise our own powers of thought and to acquire knowledge for ourselves. But God does not do man's intellectual work for him. It might be, nay it probably was, necessary at the earlier stages of his history that God should do what wise human teachers do, namely, unveil a little in order to give his human pupil a start; but were He to have revealed to the extent to which most of us in our weaker moments desire, instead of evoking and quickening, He would have atrophied our intellectual potentialities. Divine inspiration, in the sense in which poets, speaking better than they knew, asked it for themselves, is the term by which the normal action of God on the human intelligence may fitly be designated. Man was constituted for it, and normally such inspiration would have been to his intellect what the air he breathes is to his lungs, and the light he beholds is to his eyes. That it should have been something exceptional in his history was not according to the divine order;—it was a result of sin, a deviation from law.

But intercourse with God is still further the condition of the attainment of that self-possession and self-control which are characteristic of true personality. Independence of character, power of initiative, courage, endurance,—all that constitutes true manliness,—can develop heathily and fully only as men walk with God. Close fellowship with strong *men* has not always this effect. But the closer our fellowship with God, the Almighty One, the mightier we ourselves become.

Such has been the experience of men in all ages, though some phenomena and conceptions of religion have given rise to the notion that it tends rather to weakness than to strength, to unmanliness than to manliness.

II. A direct *vital* or bio-dynamic relation of God is necessary to man's normal development, growth, and life.

The vital or bio-dynamic action of God consists essentially in the communication of a specific form of energy—the energy which man needs for the upkeep of his pneumatic life and the discharge of his pneumatic functions; in a word, *spiritual* energy. In consequence, however, of the vagueness commonly attaching to the word spiritual, it is necessary to remark that spiritual energy is as real a form of energy as gravitation or electricity. This form of the divine action is too often practically identified with that considered under the last head, namely, with the personal.

The necessity for such communication is grounded, as has been previously maintained, in the order of the cosmos and the constitution given by God to man; not, as the Churches of Christ seem too often to have implicitly taught, in the fact of sin. In other words, it was necessary for normal man, consequently still more for abnormal man. Its necessity abnormally is rooted in its normal necessity.

As the position thus taken up is by some explicitly controverted, by others implicitly, and by many, if not most Christian believers, whether theologians or not, scantily or imperfectly appreciated, especially in com-

parison with the principle first laid down, it will be well to consider it somewhat at length.

It would be an error, of course, to say that it has been entirely overlooked. But owing to its having been almost exclusively regarded in connection with and as an integral part of the work of redemption, its fundamental significance, not only in a theoretical but also in a practical respect, has never been adequately realised.

1. In accordance with the cosmological principles previously laid down, man must be described as the highest known "differentiation of organisms," to quote a word of Mr. Herbert Spencer's. As such he is constituted, first, by matter in a specially differentiated form; next, by a special differentiation of cosmic energy; and both together form a living unity, the growth, development, and activity of which are designed to be regulated by a correspondingly differentiated indwelling law or, perhaps rather, complex of laws or idea. Like all other organisms, he is subject to a constant waste of matter and dissipation of energy. He therefore constantly needs new supplies both of matter and energy, which have to be assimilated from his environment.

As far as the body is concerned, both the waste of matter and dissipation of energy are universally recognised. In the form of food, too, as everybody knows, we are constantly supplying ourselves with both matter and energy from our physical environment, namely, the material world.

What now about the *psychical* side of man's constitution? Is that subject to the same law? If his

thinking, loving, and other mental activities or functions presuppose a specific differentiation of energy or force, must it not be as really exhausted by those activities as his bodily energy or force is exhausted by bodily effort and toil? Obvious as this would seem, it is certainly not the popular idea. The man who works with his body, he it is who claims for himself *par excellence* the title working-man or labourer; it is only grudgingly conceded to men whose business it is to think or to instruct; to guide the erring; to comfort the sorrowing; to raise the fallen; and in other ways to minister to humanity in its intellectual, moral, and religious needs. When such men, specially the last mentioned, speak of getting weary and exhausted they gain little credence and less sympathy from the classes referred to, unless the ministry in question has at the same time plainly involved a considerable amount of real physical strain.

As a matter of fact, however, mental effort of any kind, and even experiences which to all appearance require no effort, involve real expenditure of psychical energy. They do this sometimes when we are not sensible of the body being affected in the same way, —not, at all events, to a corresponding degree. Prolonged and severe intellectual exertion; seasons of moral and spiritual wrestling, whether with ourselves or others; protracted religious engagements; strong emotions of any kind; intense feelings of pleasure or pain,—each and all produce effects on the mind analogous to bodily weariness and exhaustion. In fact, not a function can be discharged, not an activity put

forth; nay more, not an experience of any kind, can be gone through,—seeing that experiences, even in the narrowest sense of the term, always and necessarily involve reaction of some kind or degree on the part of the organism,—without some waste of energy and loss of matter. This needs only stating to find recognition:—it is indeed almost too obvious for express remark.

It is commonly supposed, indeed, that exercise—that is, effort, up to a certain point, actually increases strength. That it is followed by a *sense* of exhilaration and invigoration, physical or mental, according to the nature of the work done, cannot be doubted. But it is equally certain that there has been expenditure, not increase of energy.

The explanation of the phenomenon in question is, primarily, that when effort is put forth, energy is drafted off, so to speak, to the particular organ or side of man's nature subjected to special strain, the immediate result of which is the feeling just referred to. In point of fact, however, whether the effort has been mental or physical, the store of energy, as well as of matter, in the system has been expended.

But a further effect is also produced on the system, and it is this effect which chiefly accounts for the notion under consideration. It may be described in the words of a recent writer as follows: "All motion or action is at the expense of bodily tissue, and if continued too long the tissue becomes degenerate and unable to act. Of this we have abundant evidence after any kind of exercise that causes fatigue. But though this is the case, healthy exercise always stimulates

the blood circulation, and. if the blood is in good condition and a proper supply of food is taken, the waste of tissue caused by the exercise is speedily made good. Indeed, it is more than made good, for the minute cells which form the tissues of the body being stimulated by exercise, and well supplied with pure nourishing blood, quickly regain their normal condition, and in addition, through increase of vitality, multiply by dividing into two parts, each of which quickly becomes a perfect cell, capable of discharging all the functions of a cell. Thus, under proper conditions, temporary waste leads to permanent growth, and the muscular system, with proper exercise, increases both in size and strength." What is thus expressed in terms of the organic vehicle of energy, namely, of cells, tissue, muscle, may be also expressed in terms of energy.

Now this holds equally good of the mental activities; and the law may be expressed in terms either of brain-matter, or of the energy for which the brain-matter serves as vehicle or organ. Provided that by means of adequate and proper food, and as in the case of the body in general, sufficient rest, the wasted brain-matter and energy are adequately replenished, mental power grows up to a certain point through and in consequence of exercise; though otherwise it diminishes. The language frequently employed implying, if not positively stating, that the bare act of putting forth our higher energies in some way or other invigorates them, is mistaken. Our power of thinking is not increased by the exercise thereof; our capability of loving is not enlarged by the simple act of loving. Were it the fact, either

thinking and loving would not be manifestations of energy or force, or else the store of energy would be not only maintained but even increased by drawing upon it. This is, however, not the case. Mental power is no more enriched or increased by mental exertion than corporeal strength is increased by corporeal exertion.

What has been just advanced is confirmed by phenomena of another order. As a matter of fact, daily experience teaches, not only that the body is invigorated to discharge its various functions and put forth its various activities by the assimilation of food—food which is constituted of certain forms of matter and energy corresponding and adapted to our system, —but also that by the same means the psychical side of our nature is quickened and invigorated. We are actually helped to think; and normally the stirring of our affections is made less difficult by its assimilation. Exceptions to this rule are apparent rather than real.

2. Now the question is, whether the energy needed in order to live the pneumatic or spiritual life cannot come to us through the same channels?

The animals below man—even the highest, we are told—draw their entire stock of energy, into whatever forms of force it may differentiate itself, from their physical environment; that is, from the air, water, food, with which that environment supplies them. The intelligence, often wonderful, of the dog; its affection, sometimes enough to melt a heart of stone; its apparently keen sense, within certain limits, of its own rights and of the rights of others; its devotion to its master

—a devotion which sometimes seems to verge on religion;—all these things are functions or exercises of energy which was originally given by the natural world and is replenished from the same source:—so at all events it is maintained. Shall not the same thing be said regarding man? Why not assume that all the energy in him too is in like manner drawn from physical sources, and enters him through physical channels? Many echo, Why not? nay more, they boldly affirm that man forms no exception to the otherwise universal zoological law. An eminent German scientist of the last generation laid it down as a principle both of science and philosophy, that *der Mensch ist was er isst*; that is, man is what he eats. If this were true, to maintain that he needs direct divine action of the kind under consideration would be absurd. Another writer says: "Granting that life is from the Creator, each being starts independently of further creation, the influx of [physical] food being its sole further support." This puts the contrary case in a nutshell.

Considerations of apparent importance can undoubtedly be pleaded in favour of the view just set forth. Let us briefly examine them. First of all, it is recognised as an unquestionable fact by biologists, that new differentiations of resident energy, fuller developments of existing differentiations, and intenser, more vigorous, and more staying manifestations thereof, are conditioned, if not exactly caused, by the fitting action of a fitting environment. Given due nutriment and stimulus, and the various potentialities of living organisms will in due course not only be evoked into action,

but also be maintained in activity:—potentialities, too, which had never been dreamed of; nay more, new forms to which the description potentialities might or perhaps would be denied.[1]

This law embraces man with the sole limitation that, to a certain extent, he can consciously control the process indirectly and directly. Shall we not then say that, if he so choose, he can draw all the *energy* he needs from his mundane environment; and that beyond this nothing further is requisite save that all the other factors of his environment should so bring their influence to bear upon him as to evoke his potentialities into actuality? Or, to narrow the issue, in harmony with the purpose now in view, given such assimilation and stimulus, will not his normal spiritual growth, development, and activity, with all that it involves, be secured by an action of the divine factor of his environment that does not involve the communication of specific energy? When God rises above the horizon of the soul, and acts on it personally, as was described under the previous head, will not a new differentiation, or a specialisation of an existing differentiation, no less than an intenser activity of already existing higher differen-

[1] "By continued dilution of salt water the species of crustacea designated artemia has been developed into another species, and this again into a branchipus—a genus of larger dimensions with an extra abdominal segment and a different tail; a genus, moreover, which is propagated sexually, whereas the artemia, *as a rule* [*sic*], is parthenogenetic. This fact proves specific and even general differences to originate simply through the gradual changes of the medium and the adaptation of the organism to these new conditions. It also disproves the notion that organic beings must be exposed during several generations to new conditions to cause any appreciable amount of variation—a notion adopted even by Darwin" (Lewes, *Physical Basis of Mind*, p. 125 f.).

tiations, be initiated? And to interpret this as a new or specific communication of divine energy,—is it not needless? Is not this what really happens? Is not this all that really happens?

This view of the matter is favoured by the following fact. Whilst there are fixed limits to the total amount of energy that can be stored up, so to speak, in any individual man; and whilst the limits within which any particular differentiation can draw on the store in question may also be strictly fixed, it is not only possible that particular differentiations may not be utilising all the energy at their disposal, but also that under appropriate stimulus new differentiations may be set up, and accordingly a new mode of activity commence. Otherwise expressed, energy may remain latent for lack of proper or complete relations between ourselves and our environment. The whole energy of which any individual is a reservoir can never be expended, for example, in the discharge of the bodily functions, nor in the discharge of the intellectual functions, in addition, nor through these functions with those of the affections superadded; that is, so far as men are their sole object. There will be an unexhausted residue, not only when and so far as the process of differentiation is incomplete, but also as often as the activity of any one or other differentiation is not as steady and full as it might be. Accordingly, a man who has been living almost exclusively, say, for the body, may, under the fitting action of a fitting environment, gradually, or even suddenly, develop intellectual capabilities and be awakened to intellectual activities of one or the other

kind—philosophical, scientific, or æsthetic—of which neither he nor anyone else had dreamed. So, too, a person who had apparently been self-centred, either for the body or for the intellect, and in whom the affections seemed well-nigh non-existent, may develop an intensity of reverence, or trust, or love, that astonishes everyone and revolutionises his life. Equally so with regard to a special direction of these same affections. One who has cared solely for his relatives and fellow-men may, for example, become stirred by a love and zeal for God to which he had previously been a perfect stranger when God is revealed or draws nigh to him, as He *possibly* drew nigh to ethnic men of loyal attitude towards the highest they knew and of consequent fuller spiritual insight; or as he *actually* did draw nigh to Jewish prophets and saints, especially, however, as He has drawn nigh to humanity in and through Jesus Christ.

There is not a little plausibility in this view of the matter, and it commends itself to many thoughtful minds. Nay more, whether understood or not, it really forms the logical substructure of so-called Christian teaching which represents man as needing for his deliverance from sin and death, and salvation unto righteousness and life,—for his realisation of the moral and religious ideal,—solely instruction in truth, the stimulus and guidance of the ideal embodied completely in one personal life, partially in other lives, the influence of the hope of a noble and blessed immortality, and so forth. For in none of these ways can new energy be said to be imparted. All that is

thus done is to evoke or set free energy already possessed.

Countenance is undoubtedly further lent to the notion under consideration by the language commonly used in religious circles. Emphasis so strong is laid on the need of God's revealing Himself to men, teaching them, showing them, guiding them, inspiring them; the importance of a lively sense of God's nearness and favour, of an experience of His forgiving grace and fatherly love, is so constantly exalted in prayers, hymns, books of devotion, sermons, and theological treatises, not to mention religious biographies, that the energising or bio-dynamic relation of God to man, if not positively discredited, is certainly overshadowed. Not that, as was remarked already, it is actually denied; on the contrary, it is practically recognised, at all events, implicitly when petitions or thanksgivings are offered for *help*. Theologically, too, it finds a place under the head of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, whose work is said to be not only to enlighten and inspire, but also to invigorate and quicken. So far, too, as sanctification is His special function, so far is He conceived as putting forth power. He creates in men a clean heart and renews in them a right spirit, which assuredly is something more than enlightenment, important as that may be in its place.

In another way, too, religious people unintentionally lend their sanction to the error I am combating. Their conduct, if not their language, is such that one seems warranted in ascribing to them the notion that

spiritual functions can be discharged without any of the waste of energy caused by the discharge of all the other functions; that, in other words, though they are essentially activities no energy is expended. At all events, neither Christian people nor their teachers appear to have realised that the spiritual life stands in as thorough need of alternations of nourishment, activity, and quietude as the bodily life; and that as activity necessarily involves expenditure of energy and waste of matter, if exhaustion and feebleness are not to supervene, there must be assimilation of fresh stores from some source or other.

Not a few, further, who formally recognise man's need of something more than physical food, with the energy it supplies,—more, too, than mere instruction or stimulus; yea, also his need of specific vitalising and quickening,—yet really take up the position which I am criticising. It is possible, indeed, nay even probable, that they have not thought the matter out; but if they are to be judged by their words, what I have just remarked is true.

One of them, a popular writer of the present day, refers to the subject as follows:—"Great books are among the *batteries* for the *recharging* of the *will*,—and Emerson's 'Essay on Self-Reliance' is, of course, a well-known preparation of phosphates."[1] A kind of substantial reality analogous to that of bread is thus

[1] Le Gallienne, *Religion of a Literary Man*, p. 38. Goethe knew better, for he writes—

> "Ich fühl's, vergebens hab' ich alle Schätze
> Des Menschengeists auf mich herbeigerafft;
> Quillt innerlich doch keine neue Kraft."

ascribed to books, *i.e.* to ideas or truths; and a relation accordingly postulated for them in words, if not in intention, under the influence of sentiment, perhaps, rather than of clear thought, analogous to that held by their material symbol.

By religious teachers the words of the Lord Jesus Christ are sometimes quoted, not indeed in logical justification of the idea, but as if they obviously or even necessarily implied it: "My words they are spirit and they are life." Other biblical passages are also adduced as more or less explicitly favouring the notion.

3. Scripture teaching with regard to the vital relation of God to man. According to the implicit assumption and explicit teaching of the Scriptures, man is so constituted that he cannot discharge his highest functions and perform his highest activities, unless to the energy which he draws from his physical environment through the body there is superadded energy drawn directly from his spiritual environment, especially from God. In proportion as he assimilates such energy is he in the best sense spiritually strong and active; in proportion as he lacks it is he spiritually weak and inactive or perversely active.

This, as was previously maintained, is according to man's original constitution: it is not a characteristic due to the entrance of sin into the world; though sin is undoubtedly conceived as having intensified it. A plant does not stand in greater need of the energy which it draws from the atmosphere, in addition to that which it derives from the soil and water, than

man stands in need of energy directly bestowed on him by God—that energy which, to use the phrase of an eminent Unitarian writer, belongs to the "reserved possibilities which God keeps in His own hands," though not as the same writer seems to think, merely for the purpose of "neutralising as effectually as possible temporary disorder occasioned by misused freedom,"[1] but rather in order that true freedom and normal development might be possible.

It is true, of course, that according to the cosmological principles from which I start all energy alike in the natural and human worlds comes from God, and that the higher energy in man is a preordained differentiation of the energy which at an earlier stage gives him real existence—which constitutes him potentially a man. But besides this constitutive energy, and that which has to be constantly assimilated from his physical environment in order to make up for the expenditure produced by his corporeal, intellectual, and affectional activities, he needs the influx of divine grace. This is certainly involved in the *Weltanschauung* which underlies the Bible, and after which the faith of the Christian Church has never ceased, and never will cease, nay more, never can cease, to reach out so long as faith remains faith. Unless he assimilate directly from God, not only will he remain in the highest respect weak, and therefore relatively inactive, but the lower systems of force in him will tend to assert themselves too vigorously and independently and thus produce disorder. Every one

[1] Upton, *Hibbert Lecture—Via, Veritas, Vita*, p. 307; cf. p. 324.

knows that when the bodily force which is called vital becomes too weak to control the force which is called chemical, disintegration sets in through the body:—in like manner, if the spiritual force in him is not kept at a sufficiently high level, the whole man tends to fall into anarchy. This is the key to the teachings of the New Testament regarding the flesh.

Ample recognition of the principle under consideration is contained in the *Old Testament.* Passages almost without number will suggest themselves to careful readers of the Bible. The following are but examples of the crowd that might be adduced. "The everlasting God, Jehovah, the Creator of the ends of the earth, giveth power to the faint; and to them that have no might he increaseth strength. They that wait upon Jehovah shall renew their strength" (Isa. xl. 28–31). "Fear thou not; for I am with thee: I will strengthen thee; yea, I will help thee" (Isa. xli. 10). "Jehovah, my strength and fortress, and my refuge in the day of my distress" (Jer. xvi. 19). "Blessed is the man that trusteth in Jehovah; for he shall be like a tree planted by the waters, and that spreadeth out its roots by a stream" (Jer. xvii. 7 f.). "I will rejoice in Jehovah—Jehovah the Lord is my strength" (Hab. iii. 19; Ps. cxix. 28). "In the day when I called thou answeredst me, thou didst strengthen me with strength in my soul" (Ps. cxxxviii. 3). "Blessed is the man whose strength is in Thee" (Ps. lxxxiv. 5). "Jehovah is a sun and shield: Jehovah will give grace and glory: no good will He withhold from them that walk uprightly" (Ps. lxxxiv. 11; cf. xxi. 1). "I

will strengthen the sick. A new heart also will I give you and a new spirit will I put within you—and cause you to walk in my statutes, and my judgments ye shall keep and do. I will pour out My spirit on all flesh; and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy," etc. (Joel ii. 28).

In connection with many passages that might be quoted—perhaps in connection with some that have been adduced—a doubt may possibly arise whether the writers are thinking of a communication of divine energy, or merely of external deliverances. I question, however, for my part, whether they drew any such a hard-and-fast line between the external and the internal as has been common among ourselves. Nay more, I doubt whether the separation we try to make is according to truth. If the principles which are dominating this discussion are sound, the separation in question is unsound. The material and the spiritual are much too closely interwoven, no less in the cosmos than in man, to admit of any clear and marked division. For the Old Testament writers, to say the least, the two spheres faded away into each other in such wise that we shall not go wrong if we recognise the meaning for which I am contending whenever the context does not distinctly forbid it. But apart altogether from passages of the kind just referred to, the testimony to the principle under consideration is unmistakable enough.

The New Testament is equally, if not still more, explicit in its recognition of the principle in question.

God is in many places spoken of as the one who

strengthens. So, for example, in "Finally, my brethren, be strong in the Lord, and in the power of His might" (Eph vi. 10);—"that ye may know what is the exceeding greatness of His power to us-ward who believe, according to the energy of His mighty power" (Eph. i. 19);—"unto Him that is able to do exceedingly abundantly above all that we can ask or think, according to the power that energiseth in us" (Eph. iii. 20);—"Whereunto also I labour, striving according to His working, which energiseth in me mightily" (Col. i. 29):—all which are, it is true, indirect testimonies; but for that reason even more significant. A direct statement of the principle is contained in the following words:—"It is God that energiseth in you to will and to energise according to His good pleasure" (Phil. ii. 13).

Christ, as is well known, represents Himself, and is represented, as the bread of life. "I am the living bread which came down from heaven: if any man eat of this bread, he shall live for ever" (John vi. 51);—"Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink His blood, ye have no life in you" (John vi. 53; cf. Gal. ii. 20). But to be without life is to be without energy—without true spiritual energy. With Christ's own words agree those of His apostles. Paul, for example, says: "I thank Jesus Christ, who hath enabled or dynamised in me" (1 Tim. i. 12);—"I can do all things through Christ dynamising in me" (Phil. iv. 13);—"The Lord stood by me, and dynamised in me; that by me the message might be fulfilled, and all the Gentiles hear" (2 Tim. iv. 17). So in many other places.

The *Holy Spirit*, again, is represented as working in those who believe. "The Spirit helpeth our infirmities: for we know not what we should pray for as we ought" (Rom. viii. 26);—"God grant you to be strengthened with power through His Spirit in the inner man" (Eph. iii. 16; cf. vi. 10). A great variety of gifts and graces is traced to the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, and among them power holds a prominent place.

4. Testimony of the *Christian Church* to the principle under consideration.

The Church of Christ has borne well-nigh, if not absolutely, uninterrupted testimony to the principle.

It has done so both in ways that are more directly the outcome of living experience; no less than in its theology.

Among the former may be reckoned prayers, whether written and printed or extempore, hymns, devotional treatises, sermons, and the like. Petitions such as that of St. Basil (329–379) are surely typical: "Renew in our souls a willing mind, and control by Thy Spirit our frivolous senses. Strengthen us that we may run in the way of Thy commandments." But petitions for strength to vanquish temptation from within and without; to overcome sin; to bear burdens; to walk worthily of Christ; to fight a good fight; to do good work for the kingdom; yea, to think, love, and feel rightly,—these are the hinges on which earnest prayer has ever turned. And even when in verbal form they seem to be for light and guidance, rather than for energy, as is largely the case in the liturgy of the Greek Church, with its somewhat intellectualistic

character,—too frequently also among Protestants,—behind them, is the implicit recognition of the fact, that man needs divine strength, as well as divine light. This is strikingly indicated in the following verse from a German hymn :—

> "If thou but suffer God to guide thee,
> And hope in Him through all thy ways,
> He'll give thee *strength* whate'er betide thee,
> And bear thee through the evil days.
> Who trust in God's unchanging love,
> Build on the rock that nought can move."

Hymns addressed to God—to the Father, Son, and the Holy Ghost—seldom lack earnest petitions, in one form or another, for the bestowal of the vital power needed by the soul in its conflict with the world, the flesh, and the devil.

As to *books of devotion*, *sermons*, and *practical religious works generally*, they surely bear witness that the more resolutely the Church is trying to live according to Christ, the more frequent and full is the recognition of the fact that man can only realise the divine idea for him, as gracious energy is regularly communicated to him from the living God.

Theologically the principle under consideration, as was previously remarked, has found a place under the head of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit and His work. Of late, indeed since the person of Christ has come to the front of the thought of Christendom, after having been for a long period overshadowed by His work, it has become common to transfer to Him the function of inward invigoration, which Scripture and the faith of the Church assign to the Holy Ghost; though signs

are not wanting that the true order of the economy of salvation, as rooted in the constitution of God and the cosmos, will once again find adequate and explicit recognition among Christian believers and teachers. Shortcomings in this respect have a prejudicial effect not only on the intellectual, but also on the practical life of the Christian Church.

5. As to the fact of man needing energy that proceeds directly from God if he is to grow and develop normally, all spiritual thinkers are agreed—and with these alone I can here concern myself. The only question, therefore, is, In what way, by what channels, if any, is it supplied? Four chief answers have been given, which most of those who have occupied themselves with the problem seem to regard as mutually exclusive:—they might, however, be shown, perhaps, to be mutually complementary.

(1) The first is, that God makes use of the same channels as those through which we receive the various forms of physical energy for the communication of the specific energy under consideration.

We may conceive of this taking place in the one or the other of two ways. The energy perennially flowing from God may be employed as a kind of vehicle in, with, and under which the specific spiritual energy needed by the spirit of man is conveyed to him. In answer to prayer there may be given to the believing soul, as it were, along with the food which it draws from its bodily environment, the supplies of spiritual energy or grace which it needs and asks. If, as seems not at all impossible, one form of physical force uses

another as a medium through which to transmit itself, —this is perhaps the case with electricity or magnetism, as also with the agency by which telepathic phenomena are produced,—why should not God analogously avail Himself of the cosmic energy as a medium by which to bestow on waiting, loyal souls the specific spiritual gift of which we are speaking?

Approaching the matter from another side, we may represent it to ourselves as follows. The pneumatic man becomes such; or rather, the merely psychical man enters on the pneumatic stage for which he is normally destined, not because a totally new pneumatic *nature* has been engrafted, so to speak, on the psychical stem, but because he has been so acted on by the Holy Spirit that the energy constituting him passes from the psychical stage of differentiation to that which Scripture designates pneumatic. It is essential to the ψυχή to reach forward to the πνεῦμα. The pneuma is, so to speak, the truth, the reality of the psyche. It is according to the idea of the latter that under appropriate environmental action, that is, under the gracious influence of God, it should differentiate itself into pneuma,—no less natural than that the chrysalis should pass into the butterfly; or that out of a common hedge-rose, by due culture, should be gradually developed the beautiful roses which are the ornament of our gardens and the delight of all lovers of flowers.

But if this is a true account of the rise of the pneuma in man, will it not be in accordance therewith to say, that in, with, and under the energy of which

ordinary food is the vehicle, there lies latent, as it were, the higher energy which the pneumatic man needs for the sustenance, growth, and development of his higher life? As a crystal of alum, thrown into a solution of sugar, alum, and salt, attracts the alum to itself, leaving the sugar and salt untouched, thus not only increasing its size, but even repairing its defects; so analogously, the pneumatic man. A man who has undergone conversion and regeneration becomes capable of a sort of new chemical action on his environment. He evokes a new form of energy from the ordinary food which he takes for the upkeep of his system. The measure in which he can do this is determined, of course, by the growth of his assimilative power: and this again by the degree of his loyalty to God. Accordingly, the food which once only invigorated him for bodily work and for psychical relations to the natural and human world, now supplies strength for grappling with things unseen and eternal.

Regarded in the light of these considerations, the vast tide of energy perennially flowing from the throne of the eternal might be described as laden with spiritual energy, of which all may freely partake; nay more, of which all do partake, who have begun and are faithfully endeavouring to foster the pneumatic life.

(2) A second position is that of Sacramentarians.

The Romish and Greek Churches teach that in the sacraments generally, though particularly in Baptism, the Eucharist, and Extreme Unction, grace, or in other words divine spiritual power or energy, "in a certain sense assumes bodily form; that is, becomes visible or

tangible, to the end that man, who consists of body and soul, may be able more easily to enter into connection with it and with God, who is its source, as often as he needs."[1]

A distinction is drawn between two things which, in the terminology of Romish theologians, are designated *materia* and *forma*.[2] The *materia* of the three sacraments above mentioned is respectively, the water, the bread and wine, and finally the oil:—their *forma*, again, in the case of Baptism, is the words, "I baptize thee in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost": in that of the Eucharist, the words, "this is My body; this is My blood": in that of Extreme Unction, "the Almighty and compassionate God forgive thee, through His most tender pity and this holy anointing, the sins which thou hast committed." The material elements possess no gracious virtue in themselves. They owe their virtue as means of grace to the act of consecration, of which the words just quoted are the most essential part: but the act itself can only be performed by a priest regularly ordained and authorised by a bishop, who himself stands in a canonical relation to the supreme authority of his Church; that is, in the case of the Romish Church, to the Pope of Rome.

After the words have been spoken, the material elements contain or embody divine grace or energy; and the grace or energy is communicated to all who fulfil the requisite conditions, as automatically, *i.e. ex*

[1] Monnier, *Katholische Theologie*, p. 105.
[2] *Ibid.* pp. 107, 110, 116 ff.

opere operato, as corporeal energy is communicated to him who eats natural bread or drinks natural wine.

Confirmation differs from the three sacraments just referred to, in so far as the visible elements, namely, the Laying on of Hands and the Anointing of the forehead with the consecrated Chrism, do not so much contain or embody, as *signify*, the *former*, the descent of the Holy Ghost into the soul; the *latter*, the characteristics of the grace which is communicated. This distinction is significant and worthy of notice, as we shall shortly find.

High Anglicans take essentially the same view of Baptism, the Eucharist, and Confirmation, though they more or less modify the manner of observance.

The position described by me under the first head may seem to come perilously near to furnishing a sort of justification of that of the Sacramentarians; if not, indeed, to identification therewith. But it needs to be borne in mind, what both Sacramentarians and their opponents have too often forgotten, namely, that there is no necessary connection between Sacramentarianism, even of the form just sketched, and *Priestly* or even *High Church* pretensions. The universal priesthood of believers may be, yea is a truth prior to, and determinant of, views of the sacraments and the word; indeed, of Christian rites and offices generally. It may be doubted, too, whether this would be absolutely denied even by the Romish Church, still less by the Anglicans:—it is certainly allowed by those who may be termed High Lutherans.

If the view just indicated be correct, every Christian believer, one might maintain, ought so to wield the

word and so to consecrate even the water, bread, wine, or other equivalents of his daily use, that they shall become to him all that the highest of High Churchmen can either desire or claim for the material elements of the sacraments; at all events, of that sacrament which by common consent is the crown of them all, namely, the Eucharist.

(3) A third view is, that the word of God is either *a* vehicle, or *the* vehicle, or means of grace.

The Greek and the Romish Churches, and the High Anglican section of the Established Church in England, all alike hold that it is to the sacramental words, duly pronounced by a fitting person, that the elements owe their gracious character and power.[1] In other words, simple water, bread, wine, oil, and the act of laying on the hands, owe to the accompanying words the virtue which constitutes their peculiar value.

It would appear, therefore, that the "word of God," the divinely appointed word, forms as it were the bridge across which, or the medium by which, supernatural grace or energy passes into the *materia* or sacramental elements.

Now the Lutheran Church went a step further than this as regards "the word," by ascribing to it not only the function just referred to, but holding it to be in and by itself, both as deposited in Scripture and as preached, an independent vehicle or medium of the gracious energy of God.

Luther, for example, taught, in opposition to the Enthusiasts, that the Holy Ghost is given to men

[1] See Monnier, 118.

exclusively through the medium of the word. He speaks of it as a *vehiculum gratiæ*, as itself divine power. "Where the word is handled," says he, "there God Himself is in men's mouths to destroy sin, death, and hell. The divine power necessary to accomplish this can only come in and through the word."[1] Not that on this point, any more than on any other, he was always consistent with himself; but that such was certainly, at intervals, his decided judgment.

Calov (1612–1686) also says: "The Spirit of God operates through and with the word; He uses the word as a sort of vehicle by which He insinuates Himself into our hearts."[2] "By the ordination and will of God, even prior to and aside from its legitimate use, the word of God has an intrinsic, divine, and sufficient power for the production, immediately and properly, of spiritual and divine effects, not only gracious but punitive." So Quenstedt.[3]

Some of the Lutheran theologians outdid even the Reformer himself in the ascription of power to the word. Hollaz (1684–1713), for example, says:[4] "The word of God is the most efficacious means of salvation: its power and efficacy are not merely objective, but also efficient, consisting not in moral persuasion, but in supernatural operation, not external and supervening when used by men, but intrinsic to the word; not

[1] See Köstlin, *Luther's Theologie*, ii. 493; cf. i. 314, 383, ii. 88, 249, 446.
[2] Bretschneider, *Dogmatik*, p. 691.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 691. Cf. Baier, *Compend. Theol. Positivæ.*
[4] Quoted by Julius Müller in an article, "Das Verhältniss zwischen der Wirksamkeit des heil. Geistes und dem Gnadenmittel des göttl. Wortes," in *Stud. u. Krit.* 1856, 330 f.

accidental, but necessary, with the necessity of divine ordination. The divine power which belongs originally and independently to the Holy Spirit, belongs to the word by communication and dependently on account of the mystical and intimate union formed between it and the Holy Spirit." Another theologian, Wernsdorff (1668–1729) says: "Not only are we trained and taught by the word, but also regenerated, amended, changed. It has the power not only of admonishing and persuading, but also of effecting and operating, and that owing to the perpetual influx of the Holy Spirit by which it is animated."[1]

Calvin and most of the Reformed divines took up a middle position. They held that without the co-operation of the Holy Spirit, the word of God could not have its intended effect on the minds and hearts of men, and protested as vigorously as Luther and the Lutheran theologians against the spiritualistic notion of the Enthusiasts; but they avoided the extreme view of which examples have just been quoted.

(4) The fourth view is, that God communicates energy to the human spirit without the intervention of any medium, solely on the condition of its taking up a position of receptivity, and of discharging the corresponding function of assimilation.[2]

In its favour may be urged the following considera-

[1] See Jul. Müller, *ubi supra.*

[2] Zwingli sanctions this view when he says: "Gratia a solo spiritu datur. Dux autem vel vehiculum spiritui non est necessarium. Ipse enim est virtus et latio qua cuncta feruntur." So also Alsted: "Deus liberrimus est et potentissimum agens, neque ullis mediis est adstrictus." See Schweizer, *Glaubenslehre der Evangel. Reformirten Kirche*, vol. ii. 579.

tions. First and foremost, of course, it is taken for granted that God is a factor,—yea, the supreme factor, of man's environment, and that this relationship between God and man is of the divine ordination.

Assuming this point, let it be remembered that a relation of interaction exists between every constituent of the system to which man belongs;—yes, strictly of *interaction*—of the most real interaction;—interaction, too, differing according to the nature of the beings related.

Now the question is, What is the nature of the action put forth by God, the supreme factor of the universe, on the factor man? Is it merely personal action of the kind which has been described as "responsive breathing," inspiring, revealing, self-unveiling, communion, fellowship? action that is morally, spiritually stimulating? Or does it consist also in the bestowal of vital energy, veritable power, which becomes ours when and as we seek it, and when and as He sees it wise to bestow?

It seems to me that the fundamental designation of God, namely, "the Living God," He who "has life in Himself," suggests, if it do not also involve, that He should be a life-*giver*, not only in creating, but also in sustaining, especially as regards the higher nature of His highest mundane creature man. If in any real sense He does act directly on man, is it not natural to assume that at the point where they touch, there will be a communication of spiritual energy?—of that spiritual energy which man needs in order to his being what he should be, not only in himself and in relation to the world, but particularly in relation to God?

Is not this further in harmony with the general law of the world? Our physical environment not only gives us physical life at the beginning; that is, brings us into existence as forms of organisation, but constantly imparts to us energy and matter appropriate to the upkeep thereof. It acts on us, it is true, in other ways, *e.g.* mechanically, psychically; but not in these alone. It is constantly imparting itself,—all of itself that we can assimilate, and thus invigorates. This is the part taken by nature in our sustentation. In point of fact, the other relations between ourselves and nature are dependent on the reality and normality of the relations just considered.

Shall God's action be restricted to what, in a sense, may be termed the lower plane of action from without? of solicitation and impulsion? that is, so far as it is direct. Or shall He act on us in every manner characteristic of our non-divine environment? Is it not truer to think that the modes in which the cosmos acts on man are but reflections of the modes in which God acts? that as it solicits, evokes, impels, reveals, quickens, sustains, energises; so God, its author, acts on His spiritual creatures, as revealer, stimulator, quickener, energiser, in harmony with their constitution as personal, self-controlling, self-conscious, self-constituting beings made in His image and likeness?

CHAPTER VI

The Divine Relation to Man conditioned by the Relation of Man to God

It is involved in the cosmology previously sketched, that the twofold relation of God to man—both that designated personal and that designated vital or bio-dynamic—is conditioned by the personal or ethical relation of man to God.

By a personal or ethical relation to God I mean, first and foremost, one that is self-controlled and chosen with adequate knowledge. This may be termed the *formal* side. Whatever the content or substance of the relation, it must be one originating in free conscious action.

There are relations, we all know, which are neither conscious nor free; and there are others which are conscious but not free. These latter, notwithstanding the consciousness which accompanies them, are not in the true sense personal, but natural or necessary.

As to the *content* of the relation,—it will consist of active intelligence and affection—the latter, normally, in the form or at the stage either of reverence or trust or love, or of the three in closest combination and union.

In other words, the relation will be one of self-

controlled obedience and loyalty; and self-controlled reverence, trust, and love. These, in various degrees and combinations, constitute what I mean by a properly personal or ethical relation to God,—normally considered.

I. The personal relation of God to man as affected by man's personal relation.

God can manifest Himself to us, act upon us, affect us, in such a manner as to meet the personal needs previously described, only as we respond to and approach Him, in a personal way answering or appropriate thereto.

I assume as granted and indeed self-evident, from the point of view of this discussion, that the first approaches are made by God. Seeing that He is the originator of the cosmos, as well as its ever-living and ever-active environment, what else can possibly be said?

Let us consider the point in connection with that relation of God in which all other lines of relationship are now, rightly or wrongly, deemed to converge, which is regarded as their recapitulation or crown, namely, the relationship of fatherhood. God is our Father, our absolute, our Heavenly Father. This, in the sense in which the designation is here used, is a natural relationship:—it is grounded in the constitution given to man by God Himself. This relationship, let it be here remarked in passing, neither excludes nor is inconsistent with that of lawgiver and ruler; on the contrary, it necessarily includes both. Or rather, perhaps, the element peculiar to each enters as a constitutive factor into the complete relation of God to man. God would

not be the absolute Father, were He not also the absolute lawgiver and ruler. Nor, indeed, could He be the ideally absolute ruler and lawgiver, if He were not also the absolute Father.

Man can no more help being, in the natural sense, God's child, and having needs which God alone can meet, than a plant can help being a plant, and having certain needs which its physical environment alone can supply.

It is equally true,—though let it be reverently spoken, —that God cannot avoid holding this relation as long as man exists. Man's personal or ethical relation cannot alter this natural relation. Only the reverent, trustful, loving son is, of course, in the full sense son; but yet even a rebellious son is a son. Nay more, a diabolised man would be a diabolised son; and God would in that case, awful as it may be to say it, be the father of such a son.

It is one thing, however, to *be* a father; another thing to discharge all the fatherly functions. We know this only too well in connection with men. Human fathers sometimes fail to behave like fathers for reasons lying solely in themselves; sometimes because of hindrances in the conduct or character of their children. No father can normally discharge his fatherly functions towards children who are unchildlike.

The position just laid down may seem ethically hard to accept. It is so fundamental, however, to the view of the work of Christ, which this treatise is designed to set forth, that it must be gone into more fully than may at first sight seem proportionate.

1. The principle or law involved in what has been advanced is in reality a special form or application of a more general principle or law of the whole biological sphere,—that sphere of which the highest domain is mind or spirit.

Living beings, as such, not only may, but indeed *should*, be looked at from a twofold point of view, namely, the potential and the actual. Regarded in the former light, though they owe their existence to another existence than themselves, still they *are*, they *exist*. That is an unconditional fact. Their actualisation, however, that is, their passage from potentiality to actuality, depends on conditions which may or may not be fulfilled. A seed, for example, is a seed, or a germ a germ: a particular seed may be potentially an orchid, or a germ an eagle:—that depends on nothing. Each is. But whether the former become an orchid and the latter an eagle, that depends on conditions; that is, on the relations which will subsist between itself and its environment. This, as all know, is one of the fundamental laws of life.

Does this law cease to be a law when life has become mind, or mental life? life whose forms are thought, knowledge, love, self-consciousness, self-control, and so forth,—in a word, personal life? All this may seem so obvious as to be irrelevant; but it involves important consequences for the subject under consideration.

Now, all living beings share to a greater or less degree a characteristic which it is of prime importance to note and duly appreciate. They not only begin their existence as potentialities; but after reaching a

certain stage of growth and development, that is, of actuality, are able to reduce themselves back, in a certain sense, in certain respects, to a certain degree, to the potential condition. In a *certain sense*, I say ;—not, of course, in the precise sense in which they were potentialities before attaining to actuality. As to active relations, they can be alternately potential and actual. Take, for example, a dog. A dog may show to one person all the attachment of which it is capable, yet a new person coming in its way may win a certain attachment from it ; in other words, what up to that moment had been potential in it, may become an actuality. Or, for some cause or other, this new person may excite its distrust and enmity ; and thus another kind of potentiality pass into actuality. On the other hand, the attachment felt towards a particular person may, through separation, fall into abeyance, may resume in a sort the state of potentiality ; yet, by a renewal of acquaintance, again become an actuality. In this and other cases supplied by the world below man there is, of course, no exercise of freedom or consciousness.

Analogous things occur in the experience of men. Let us take the case of love,—a crucial case. Any individual man may be actually loving only a certain comparatively or absolutely small number of his fellowmen ; yet there may be in him the capability, or as I have repeatedly termed it, the potentiality, of loving a far larger number. The conditions of a transition from potentiality as regards the larger number might lie partially within, partially, however, without, his control.

One of the conditions will doubtless be acquaintance; and that it is for him either to seek or avoid.

But there is another alternative. He may see good reasons for suspending the love he had been cherishing in the case of one and another of those who had shared its manifestations. Love will then be reduced, as far as they are concerned, to a potential state; or to speak more exactly, one of his activities, namely, love, as put forth towards a particular part of his environment, will be suspended; for an activity love surely is, and not merely a state of feeling, the quality or degree or even existence of which is beyond human control. Otherwise we should not be responsible for loving our fellow-men, still less God. Such a man does not cease to be able to love the persons in question; but he ceases for the time to love and to manifest love to them. When love is thus suspended another, and possibly a reverse, potentiality comes into play.

It is commonly said, indeed, that what happens, or ought to happen, is that the man loves on just the same, but displays his affection in different ways. Instead, for example, of smiling he frowns; instead of caressing he smites; instead of giving he withholds; instead of causing pleasure he causes pain; but the love continues unchanged: it simply puts on a new, and what is really an unnatural, face.

It may suit those who have a theory to maintain to represent the matter thus; but the description does not answer to the life. In point of fact, the love felt by men does often pass from actuality to potentiality; or, more fully expressed, from being a psychico-somatic

activity to a reverse state, namely, that of a psychico-somatic potentiality. Nay more, in many cases a different, yea opposed, potentiality passes into actuality. The process, as a rule, sets in without any distinctly conscious effort of the man's own. Not that it is therefore, altogether outside his control. On the contrary, he can check it at the very outset, if not by his own unaided strength, yet by that strength quickened and heightened by the grace of God.

Apart from this characteristic of man's affectional nature, he would find himself constantly, in a sense, beating the air. Specially would this be the case as regards love; for love that is not appreciated as love, that is not reciprocated as love; love that is treated with indifference, or even—which may and sometimes does occur—as an intrusion, not only fails to attain the end immanently prescribed to it by its very essence, but produces the reverse effect.

Still further, such a man violates one of the fundamental laws of the biological sphere, whilst dreaming that he is conforming his conduct thereto,—the law, namely, that the relations of living beings to their environment vary as their environment varies. This is a general law, and unless a complete change arises when *life becomes mental* or *personal life*, it must be recognised in the form now under consideration.

It is easy to talk of loving all men alike; but it is as irrational as to talk of a germ or plant behaving towards shadows as it behaves towards sunlight; unless, as was already remarked, the entrance of consciousness and self-control be assumed to introduce

a new principle. It would strike every healthy minded man as morally absurd, if not morally perverse, if he saw pure, noble, generous, and good men lavishing the same love on those who were unlike themselves as they lavish on those who were like themselves.

2. An important truth, however, must be allowed to underlie the view of love that has been combated; and it is this,—that in proportion as a man is good and true, in proportion, that is, as his very nature is such as to go forth in all forms of normal activity, and consequently in that form which is the highest and greatest of all, namely, love, in that proportion will he, whilst acting as I have described, also use means for so changing the conduct of his fellow-man that, consistently with the character of both of them, his love can be revived. What has just been advanced is in conformity with one of the essential characteristics of personal as distinguished from impersonal or quasi-personal life. Neither of the last-mentioned forms of life has the power of consciously, deliberately, purposely modifying, or working for the modification of, its environment, according to a preconceived method and for a definite end. But man can do this. He is constantly doing it in the interest of the lower aspects of his life:—he turns the wilderness, for example, into a fruitful field; he alters the fruits of his garden, or the crops of his farm, to suit the real or supposed requirements of his body. Shall not the same principle come into application in this higher sphere? Shall he not do his utmost to modify the parts of his personal

environment which, to say the least, repress his activities, which necessitate their being reduced to potentiality, which thus hinder his proper growth, and which therefore cause him pain? Not so would he act in relation to the bodily life; much less ought he, then, to act thus in relation to the mental life. Yet surely, as was already observed, it is the same principle in both cases.

Among the reasons which ought to have a peculiarly strong influence with him is the ingrained need man has of unity and harmony in his personal life. To be under the necessity of behaving differently to the extent defined brings with it a kind of inner discord or schism, and is always felt to be such. It is not, indeed, a moral schism or discord; not, at all events, so long as it remains within the limits which have been suggested, if not laid down. 'Twere rather moral discord to be related in exactly the same way to the good and the evil. Yet it is a sort of discord, even though it be a discord assumed or submitted to for the sake of preserving the profounder harmonies. As such, it demands effort for its removal; and that removal can only be effected—legitimately and therefore really effected—by means of fitting changes in the environment which has given rise to it. For, to do what some do and advocate, namely, to steel oneself into, indifference; or to ignore, or to try to make up for, the loss at one point by gain of the same kind at another point, is not really to remedy matters. It may rather be followed by permanent weakening, or the extinction of the potentiality itself.

Now the action which has just been described is often loosely designated love. Action in the interest of love —action which has the reintegration of love, the full actualisation of love for its end—it undoubtedly is; but to call it love involves confusion, and is as mistaken as it would be to designate the motive-power generating the activity that alters the physical environment by the same name as the relation of the body which is intended to be called into existence or rendered possible by the alterations effected.

As a matter of fact, the state of mind in question is rather the need and desire to love than actual love. Potentiality once drawn out into actuality, let it not be overlooked, necessarily becomes a conscious need; a conscious need once awakened by having been met, becomes a desire; and desire always has a definite object. But the desire for love shares with desire in general this aiming at a definite object. Accordingly, when love is repressed, it becomes a desire or a conscious need; to that extent, therefore, a potentiality,—though, of course, as was previously remarked, not exactly corresponding to a potentiality never before evoked. We know how powerful desire is to beget activity for its realisation; how easily, too, in the region of the affections proper, it may, for a time, be confounded with the actual relation; but the difference remains and it is mischievous, as well as unscientific, to ignore it.

Among the means which a man may adopt who desires the establishment for the first time, or the re-establishment of the relation styled love, are such

as were previously hinted at; but they are means to the end, and not, as some have taught, forms or manifestations of the relation which is sought as an end.

3. But even granting that what has been advanced holds true of man, have we a right to transfer it to God?

Is it not, *first* of all, to constitute man to a certain extent environment for God, and thus to make God in a measure dependent on man, who is absolutely dependent on Him? *then*, *again*, to introduce into the divine constitution and life contrasts like activity and activity held-in-abeyance, potentiality and actuality? *further*, to expose God to deprivation or pain at the will of man? and *lastly*, to subject Him to the necessity of contriving means to attain an end—Him the Omnipotent? And so forth.

To discuss these and other relevant questions at length would be to discuss the doctrine of God. A few words must therefore suffice. In my humble judgment, whosoever recognises the reality of the world, and in particular of man, is in logical consistency bound to answer them in the affirmative. The creative power of God manifested itself most supremely in that He brought into existence that which for Him was not a mere idea, not a mere seeming, but a veritable reality:—a reality which, as such, in a sense enforced a certain mode of behaviour on the part of its Creator,—behaviour, too, differentiated according to the nature of the particular part created; nay more, a reality which cannot but exercise an influence on the behaviour and life of the

Creator. Logically, we empty the notion of creation of its content, by denying this to be the case at any one point.

Acosmism, as it has been termed, necessarily follows from the denial of the possibility of God being influenced by the world; nay more, atheism; for what can God be, if we and all the universe of being are one vast illusion? Surely the illusion of an illusion.

It may be maintained, indeed, that there is no resemblance between the relation which God necessarily holds to the universe as a whole, and the behaviour with regard to which the difficulty is raised. God having initiated the evolution of the universe, continues the work which he has begun; that is, continues to supply the energy and inform it with the laws which condition the process. Nay more, the supply of energy is regulated according to the stages of the process which is being carried through. To this extent He may be said to *behave* even towards the natural world. But this is all. And there is scarcely any mode in which the universe can be said to act upon God, unless we describe as *action on God*, its enforcement of a recognition of the fact of its existence, of its undergoing a process, and of its being constituted by an infinite variety of factors. It needs no other relation; it is susceptible of no other relation.

I reply that the position is changed when we come to the domain of mind. The question we are considering can there be legitimately raised; nay more, it presents itself unsought, and must be dealt with on its merits.

The human factor of the world,—the highest known

product of the process of evolution, so far as the world is concerned,—cannot be or become what it is fit to become, according to its immanent idea, unless God does *behave* towards it,—behave, that is, in the human sense of the word behaviour. Man's most pressing need is for a certain mode of such behaviour. Did not Philip give unconscious utterance to the deepest yearning of humanity when he said to Christ, "Lord, show us the Father, and it sufficeth us"?—a yearning which found more passionate, though perhaps not so significant, expression in the words of the Psalmist: "As the hart panteth after the waterbrooks, so panteth my soul after Thee, O God. My soul thirsteth for God, for the living God; when shall I come and appear before God?"

But it lies in the very nature of this need, that it can only be met, if the creature in whom it has become a conscious desire, can also act in such a way that God cannot meet it,—*cannot*, whether it be regarded from the divine or from the human side. God the supreme Personality is such, and the human personality has by God been constituted such, that God cannot but let His supply of man's deepest needs wait on the good pleasure of man himself.

4. *But to return to the question of the personal relation between God and man.* Not even the fatherliness of God would be acceptable to man, if it were to exhibit itself of necessity, or if it were to force itself on men; that is, otherwise viewed, if it were required to be appreciated as a matter of compulsion. This, however, involves the converse law, that if man's rela-

tion to God is unfilial, God's relation to him cannot be fatherly. For did the fatherly relation continue unchanged, then, so far as the unfilial conduct was conscious, God's behaviour would not only be repelled, but might become a new source of unfilial conduct; for constituted as man is, its tendency would be to undermine the respect which is the foundation of all right personal relation, yea, even of love. That which ought to be a "savour of life unto life" might thus have become a "savour of death unto death." What relation must take the place of the fatherly, I shall have to point out farther on.

God cannot, then, be personally to man what is necessary to man's personal life, unless man fulfil certain conditions. Apart therefrom, love is suspended, that is, reduced from actuality to a kind of potentiality; and another relation, which up to that point had been merely potential, becomes actual.

II. God's action in the supply of energy is also conditional on man's personal relation to Him.

The energy by which man is constituted a living entity is drawn, as was previously pointed out, in the last instance from God; yea, is a differentiation of divine energy. Man receives it, or rather, man *is* it,—that is, otherwise expressed, is himself, in virtue of it, without being asked whether he will or not. At a certain stage in his development, however, he, *i.e.* the matter, energy, and idea which constitute the living being known as man, becomes self-conscious and assumes self-control.

1. When he has once reached this stage he can also

control; nay more, he *must* exercise a certain amount of control over the supply of the energy which is necessary to make up the waste that is constantly going on. This matter and energy are not, as he is himself, a *datum*; they are not like his nature, compulsorily, necessarily his. He has to select, and take, and assimilate them. Up to a certain point, all that he needs can be drawn, as was remarked before, from the physical world, through the medium of the body. The energy thus secured is also, of course, divine energy; but it is given or withheld according to man's free relation to it; which relation, though obviously a relation to that which is *of* God, is not a relation *to God Himself*. It *may* be taken up in ignorance, or even in denial of God; or, whilst there is greater or less indifference, yea, even hostility, to God.

Looked at from man's side, the relation to his natural environment just touched on is personal, in so far as it is self-conscious and free. Even at this lower stage, therefore, fresh supplies of divine energy depend on the fulfilment of personal conditions. They differ, however, very markedly from those which have to be fulfilled when the energy has to be drawn directly from, or sought at, the hands of the personal being designated God.

Beyond the limits just referred to, the energy supplied by God through our natural environment ceases, as we have seen, to be adequate to man's needs. In order to the due discharge of his highest spiritual functions, and the full realisation of the idea of his being, he requires spiritual nutriment—nutriment, that is, which can only

be drawn directly from God, on his own application, with God's consent. As already indicated, when it is a question of the energy stored in the physical world, we can simply take, consulting solely our own needs and tastes,—in a normal state, wisely, of course, and with due regard to the harmony and well-being of every part of our environment, inorganic or organic, vegetable or animal, insensitive or sensitive. When, however, we seek direct divine energy or grace, we have to be self-conscious and free, not only in the form referred to above, but with a special content;—in other words, we must be consciously and freely reverential, trustful, loving; at the very least, we must be ready to render loyal obedience.

A word or two with regard to the fundamental reason why the appropriation of energy for the upkeep of his nature and life, at the lower as well as at the higher stages, whether drawn from his mundane or from his divine environment, should be so largely left to man's own free choice, will prepare the way, to some extent, for what follows.

The fundamental reason thereof is, that man is designed to bear the image and likeness of his Maker as to that which is most essential to God, namely, *self-constitution*, *self-making*,—the controlling of his own destiny. He cannot, of course, absolutely constitute himself; because, unlike God, he is not eternal, has not life in himself: he derives his being from God, and lives by means of his environment; but, at all events, he has control within limits over his own action towards his environment; indirectly, therefore, he has in his

own hands the supply, constitution, and the control of his own life. In free conscious beings God created the highest possible counterparts to Himself: to have gone further would, of course, have been to create *gods*, which for the Christian mind—not for the heathen mind—is a self-contradiction ; for a created god is not absolute, not divine—not, at all events, on any but a pantheistic or semi-pantheistic view of God and His relation to the universe.

But man would not be the *moral* image of God,—to be which is his central characteristic and supreme glory ;—he would not, in fact, be moral at all, had he not the self-control I have postulated for him. Were he not consciously free over against his natural environment, he would be like the animals below him, a part of nature, and therefore like nature necessitated ; were he not consciously free over against God, he would be a part of God, and necessitated by God :—in neither case would he be moral. It is the capability of self-control that warrants us in predicating morality or immorality of him ; for morality and conscious self-control are interchangeable terms.

2. That the bestowal of grace or energy directly from God should be conditional on a relation denoted by terms like reverence, love, loyalty, and so forth, arises from the very nature of personality. We take, and are at liberty to take, as was previously remarked, what we need from nature without personal sentiments or affections entering into consideration. But when we have to do with persons, it is another matter. It is so even with created persons. What is in their

power to bestow must be asked for; nay more, asked for in a certain way; at the highest, the seeker is expected to be seeking the giver, rather than what the giver has to give. To him who seeks mine, but not me, I either refuse altogether or give grudgingly;—and that is not hard or harsh, but required by a true law of the personal life. To him, on the contrary, who seeks first me, I say, "All mine is thine";—an attitude which implies, and is impossible apart from the implicit right to add, "All thine is mine." For no one can seek me truly who is not truly ready to give; nay more, who is not already actually giving himself to me. This is most emphatically true of God. Even if the opposite be not self-evidently irrational as regards created persons, it is so as regards the Uncreated One, who is also the supreme and Absolute Good, in comparison with which any other Good scarcely deserves the name. God willingly serves as environment, from which we may directly supply ourselves with the energy needed by our higher nature when we fulfil the fundamental law, that we seek first Him, then His; otherwise expressed, when we take up towards Him the appropriate, the due, personal relation.

Still further, if God is really the Supreme Good, and the possession and enjoyment of Himself is the supreme need of man, were He to bestow His energy without Himself, His love to man would not be the perfect ideal of love. On the contrary, He would in His measure be chargeable with a weakness analogous to that shown by earthly parents, when they consent to

supply property to children who care little or nothing for themselves; and thus in a sense widen and fix the personal gulf which has been opened.

3. The inner reasonableness of this will further appear if we remember that on any other supposition it would follow, first, that God might be bestowing His grace, that is, His specific energy, on those who are not His friends, and thus be putting Himself at the disposal of a spirit of alienation or even hostility; secondly, that He might be furthering growth, development, harmonious and blessed life, in human beings who the while were not conscious of enjoying the love of God, still less of cherishing love towards God.

A vague sense of this truth has, perhaps, in part led to the use of dynamic language regarding the properly personal relations, to which reference was previously made.

4. It may, however, be objected, that if it be true, as was previously maintained, that the energy appropriated by man from his natural environment—appropriated, too, at his pleasure—comes really from God, even though through the medium of the cosmic system; to this extent God *does* put His power at the disposal even of those who may be His enemies. Why, then, should divine communications stop there?

There is force in this objection; but it clearly holds good against every theistic view of the world. That man should not only owe his existence to God, but also be maintained and upheld by God, on whom he turns his back, whom he forgets, misrepresents, doubts,

denies, disobeys,—this has ever been a mystery of mysteries. It is not created by the theory just alluded to. It can only be escaped in one way,—the way which many thinkers have trodden, only to find themselves plunging into ever thicker darkness,—the way, namely, of dualism. The Scriptures, at all events, teach that we "live and move and have our being in God," and yet live our life and move our movements to some extent in opposition to the law of our nature, that is, to the law and will of God, whose energy constitutes us what we are.

What answer shall be made, then, to the objection? There is but one. Inasmuch as the existence given to man is not merely a statical existence, like that possessed by inorganic beings, but one that grows and develops; inasmuch, further, as he is himself intended to wield conscious, if indirect and partial, control over this very growth and development; and inasmuch as it is in virtue of divine energy alone that either of these things is possible, seeing that other energy there is not; clearly, if he is to enter into the relation to God which conditions the communication of the higher specific spiritual energy, without which he cannot become the highest he is meant to become, it must be in his power, in the first instance, to appropriate the energy necessary for this purpose independently of that condition. This power is in fact the *natural* condition of the fulfilment of the higher *personal* condition to which I am referring.

He would not, however, be able to exercise this freedom were God not in a certain sense veiled from

him; had God not set him, as it were, at a distance from Himself, as Browning puts it—

> "God, whose pleasure brought
> Man into being, stands away,
> As it were a handbreadth off, to give
> Room for the newly made man to live
> And look at Him from a place apart,
> And use his gifts of brain and heart."

Had he to receive every gift consciously and directly from God; were the divine source of the energy which works in him, and by which he works, forced at every moment on his attention; could he not, as to consciousness, escape from God, he would never dare to act at all,—choice would be out of the question; in fact, he would be so overawed, overpowered, that the bare idea of choosing would scarcely suggest itself.

Or, such a position might give rise in the more energetic minds to a spirit of revolt against dependence. For, indeed, the *most subtle and perilous temptation which can assail a man comes to him from that in his nature which to a certain extent participates in the divine independence*, namely, *that which we call his will.*

These are the two perils which those are in danger of overlooking who yearn, or profess to yearn, under present conditions, for a constant, direct, open vision of the glory of God. Such open vision, now and here, would either crush out free activity or quicken it into antagonism. For this reason, the fact that even the physical energy which man assimilates is really divine energy from God is veiled;—man sees only the physical medium.

But, on the other hand, if *all* the energy man needs

could come to him in this veiled way, he must either be able to work out his destiny without knowing God; or if he came to know God from the personal side, it might be possible that, the more he was invigorated and the higher his development, the more abnormal might be his personal relation to God, and consequently his misery. As it is, the highest development is reserved for those whose personal relation to God of itself brings peace and blessedness, on the one hand; whilst, on the other hand, those who have no share in the blessedness flowing from the sense of God's love are shut out from the highest stages of development open to man. They can, therefore, neither work the highest good nor work the worst evil; but *neither can they experience the highest blessedness nor the most awful misery*.

CHAPTER VII

Normal Relations between God and Man—that is, of God to Man and of Man to God

I. The relations of God to man.

The relations of God to man may be classed as immanent and transcendent. The immanent relations are those apart from which man would not be man; nay, would not exist at all. The matter which partly constitutes him owes its origin and continued existence to God. The specific differentiation of the mundane or cosmic energy which organises matter into man is divine energy. And the system of laws, or the idea, which directs the energy in its action on matter is also a product of the divine mind. The relation of God thus described is mediated through the cosmic system; man, in other words, is not a *direct* creation of God. He arose, it is true, at the precise point of the process of evolution which had been foreordained by God; but his rise was not due to a special intervention, *ad hoc*. And men, as we all know, now come into existence through the mediation of men. In other words, God works through "second causes," although Old Testament writers speak poetically as if every man

were a direct product of the divine hand. If this is true, the immanent relation of God to man must obviously be of essentially the same character as His relation to the world or the cosmos generally.

We are concerned here, therefore, solely with the transcendent relations of God to man. These, for the purpose now in view, may be classed as *personal* and bio-dynamic or *vital.*

1. The normal personal relation of God to man.

These have already been considered in a general way. It was pointed out that God has so constituted men that, in addition to the action of nature and their fellow-men, they also need His own direct personal action, if their growth, development, and life are to be normal; and that this holds good, not only of the affections and emotions, but also of the intellect and of the powers which, in the narrower sense, are designated active.

There is, however, an aspect of the personal relation of God which deserves more explicit notice than it previously found. I refer to that which affects the *law* of man's growth, development, activities, life. To the consideration of this I shall limit myself in this connection.

That God is the supreme source of law for man is, of course, obviously involved in the cosmology previously sketched. The differentiation of energy, or the force, which is constituting men, is as really informed with a system of laws, otherwise expressed an idea, as any seed or germ or plant or animal. Every living being, from the simplest to the most complex, has its immanent idea, or, let us call it, law; and this law is,

in the strictest sense, a law of God. Not, indeed, in the sense that in each case it owes its existence and force to a direct enactment of God, so to speak, *ad hoc*; for, as the energy which is constituting the cosmos has a certain self-differentiating power, so not less the idea which is interwoven with it; but the seat of law in all cases is the bosom of God."

Equally true is it that "her voice is the harmony of the world; that all things in heaven and earth do her homage, the very least as feeling her care, and the greatest as not exempt from her power."

Now, as everybody knows, the beings below man are neither conscious of being subject to law, nor have they any power of free choice in relation thereto. Men, on the contrary, are able to know that they are under law, are able to discriminate between relations which are obligatory and those which are not; and in an immense number of cases can freely choose how they will act, whether they will conform or not to the claim or prohibition set before them.

(1) With regard to the modes of conduct binding on them in particular cases; in other words, with regard to the law laid down for them by God,—laid down in the sense previously indicated,—men's natural and human *environment* co-operates with their own intelligence for their guidance and illumination. In other words, it acts the part of a living legislator:—it says, "thus and thus shalt thou do, or not do." The environment neither creates the distinction between right and wrong, nor originates in man the capability and tendency to draw the distinction. These are

inherent in him; they are as integral a part of his mental constitution as are the capability and tendency to distinguish between truth and error, or between the beautiful and the ugly. "There is a right and a wrong," man says; he says it because of a necessitation: but when judging *what* is right, in the innumerable positions in which life places him, he needs and uses the help of his natural and human surroundings. These surroundings act upon him, of course, in other ways, but at present we are concerned with this particular point alone.

The guidance in question relates, be it observed, not only to modes of conduct that directly affect his own well-being, but also to behaviour that directly or indirectly affects the well-being of others.

That our environment should thus co-operate with each one of us is surely both natural and reasonable, in view of the fact—to which attention was previously called—of our being all factors of one great system, and of the interaction which constantly takes place between the said factors. As each of us—nay more, each cosmic existence, from an atom up to an archangel—is alternately environment and environed, that our environment should discharge the function referred to, is clearly grounded in the very constitution of things.

Nature, we know, has been in unnumbered ways the teacher of men, ever since they came into existence. It has never been, indeed, as some suppose, their only teacher: had they never had other guidance, the strata of human history would not contain, as they actually do, so many remains which tell of intellectual, moral, and religious activities, of which

scarcely an echo is discoverable among the lowest tribes of men now dwelling on the earth. For all that, however, it has to a large extent discharged its function; and, but for the misrelation of man to it, caused by the incoming of sin, would doubtless have played perfectly in the life of humanity the part assigned to it by the Divine Creator. Each domain of the system to which we belong has borne its share in our education. And as we are constantly being reminded by poets, artists, and scientists alike, as well as by their interpreters, the closer we follow nature, the more open we keep our ear to her voice, the clearer will be to us the path which the indwelling law of our nature bids us pursue.

That the *human* part of our environment discharges the function of a living law to each one of us is obvious enough. The very rudest of our human societies—those even which have only the most poverty-stricken of languages, and no literature, written or unwritten—are held together by a code of laws which often, as to very small and apparently insignificant matters, is both elaborate and refined, and in which every new-comer is carefully instructed. The elaboration of laws and the provision for their formulation and promulgation run parallel with the organisation of men into cities and nations, and groups of nations. So universal is the knowledge of a nation's laws assumed to be on the part of its members, high and low, that ignorance is very rarely accepted as any excuse for their violation. From earliest childhood, parents, relatives, acquaintances, teachers, and others with whom we have intercourse in business, in recreation, and in social, political,

and other affairs, not to mention the innumerable things and arrangements which constitute, or are connected with, property, all have been incessantly telling or showing us what we are to do or leave undone as we pass through life. And these laws, whether laws of custom or of legislation, are all more or less perfect applications of the principles interwoven with our constitution to the ever-varying circumstances in which we find ourselves placed. They are meant to further our growth, development, and happiness; and, normally considered, would have done so.

(2) What now shall be said regarding the *divine factor*? Normally the other factors of the cosmos would all, in their several places, modes, and degrees, have discharged for each other this very necessary ministry:—would the Divine Factor have looked on, so to speak, with folded arms? Would He have rendered men no help in deciding on the relations to each other, and to the world around them, which were fitted to promote healthy growth and development? To answer, He would not, must surely be impossible for any one who holds that the term Fatherhood best sums up the relations of God to the human beings which are the very flower of the process of evolution initiated by the Divine Creator—for anyone who credits God with being wise, holy, loving, good. Such a notion may be consistent with evolution of the naturalistic or deistic type, —the type ignorantly accepted as truly or even alone scientific for, at all events, the early history of the human race, by not a few Christian theists; it is obviously postulated by pantheism, as well by a doctrine of the

divine immanence which conceives God as the secret actor in all activity; but it is not really scientific—not even as regards the earliest history of the human race, —still less is it Christian.

Does God then co-operate? That He should do so would seem to be in harmony with the constitution of His own world,—the world which in a very true sense is being formed to set forth not only his power and wisdom, but His very deity or divinity (*θειότης*).

The *need* for His acting as the living interpreter of His own law, apart altogether from sin and its darkening influence, is also obvious enough. Every act of every individual man has some influence greater or less, direct or indirect, not only on the organism of humanity to which he belongs, but also on the entire mundane system, not to say the entire cosmos;—how then shall he thread his way through the infinitely complex labyrinth of life unless, whilst one hand is held by nature and his fellow-men, the other is laid in the hand of the heavenly Guide who has perfect knowledge both of the idea which he is to realise, and of the place he is meant to fill in the great system of which he is a member?

(3) The only question would seem to be, therefore, What is the mode, and what the extent, of the divine co-operation with man in judging with regard to his relations to himself, to nature, to his fellow-men, and to God?

In two ways, perhaps, God would normally have discharged this function for man. In some cases He would doubtless have expressly prescribed to individual

men what it was His will that they should do or leave undone; though, so far as we can now understand, He would have acted thus only under special circumstances and for special purposes; for nothing more effectually retards the development of the moral personality, in other words, interferes with the growth of the divine image in man, than minute instructions with regard to duty, which render free attention and careful judgment unnecessary.

God's chief method, therefore, would unquestionably have been that which men of all schools nowadays recognise as most consistent alike with the constitution of man and with the divine nature. We all of us learn best how to order our conduct without weakening our own individuality, through intercourse with those whose character and life are most completely conformed to the mind of God. I do not now refer to the stimulus and inspiration which we owe to them; but to the light they diffuse, and to the clarifying influence they exercise on our moral vision.

How much more fully, surely, and variously God must thus affect those whom He blesses with His fellowship, scarcely needs emphasising. Reference is not infrequently made to this point in the Scriptures, especially in the Book of Psalms. In His *light*, it is promised, *we* shall *see* light. Indirectly, at all events, it is constantly alluded to both by Psalmists and Prophets. With what emphasis does the Evangelist John also press on the attention of those to whom he wrote his Epistles, the fact that "God is light," and that those who have fellowship with Him cannot walk in dark-

ness. This is the true significance of the demand made at the present day, that those who would walk divinely shall company closely with Christ, and often ask themselves what Christ would do and say under particular circumstances if He were we and we were He. Rightly considered, this is our best course; but representations are not unfrequently given of it which, highly Christian as they look, are more plausible than practicable. His conduct, regarded in its details, was rarely such as we should imitate if we could, or could imitate if we wished and tried. The inward spirit of Christ was doubtless perfect and always in harmony with the mind of God, but as neither His nature nor His mission were those of one who is solely a man, no imaginative realisation of the details of *His* life, however perfect, could afford us such guidance in the conduct of *our* own. He was under the necessity of doing many things which we should have no right to do; others which there is not the slightest probability of our ever being in the circumstances to do; others, again, as was previously hinted, which we are not likely ever to have the power to do. It is as divine, and perhaps only as such, that He can be to us a living law; and in this respect His action is either identical with that of God, or is specially mediated by the Comforter, the Holy Spirit, whom He sends to lead us into all the truth,—that is, truth appertaining not merely to the intellect, but to our whole nature and life.

Apart from sin, laws are for men, but as channels or grooves along which their activities most readily, most naturally, most easily flow. They are, so to speak,

the lines of least resistance. As waters flow most smoothly which find channels already existing into which they can pour, instead of having to carve for themselves a path through solid earth, or even rock, so would laws, natural, human, and divine, normally rather have smoothed the course of human life, than have given rise to experiences like those so graphically described by the Apostle Paul in the Epistle to the Romans: "I see a different law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into the captivity to the law of sin, which is in my members. O wretched man that I am, who will deliver me from this body of death?" Just as well-disposed children fall in with the established order of a well-regulated family, as it were, without effort,—in point of fact, such regulations should always facilitate, call forth, and intensify effort, instead of making it more difficult, as, alas! seems only too frequent an experience,—so would men have fallen in with the cosmic order established by God. Nay more, their natural attitude towards revelations of the laws prescribing their relations to each other and to God would have resembled that of a truly scientific man when he comes face to face with the method by which he can most effectually, and with least expenditure of force, accomplish some task in which he is interested.

Thus regarded, and in view of the fact that all laws are divine laws, and that every revelation is, therefore, in the highest sense a manifestation of the grace of God, we may well sum up the normal relation of God to man in the words, *Love in Law* and *Law in Love*.

Law everywhere; but as the expression of love: love everywhere, but expressed in law.

"Lord, with what care hast Thou begirt us round!
Parents first season us; then schoolmasters
Deliver us to laws; they send us bound
To rules of reason, holy messengers,

Pulpits and Sundays, sorrow dogging sin,
Afflictions sorted, anguish of all sizes,
Fine nets and stratagems to catch us in,
Bibles laid open, millions of surprises,

Blessings beforehand, ties of gratefulness,
The sound of glory ringing in our ears:
Without, our shame; within, our consciences;
Angels and grace, eternal hopes and fears."

GEORGE HERBERT, "Sin."

2. The normal dynamic relation of God to man.

Normally the energy, the supply of which God reserved to Himself, would have flowed forth into the human spirit with the regularity of a law of nature. Any irregularity in man's present reception thereof is due to himself. Were he related as he should be to God, the divine relation to our higher life would be comparable in the fullest sense to that of the sun to our physical life. Any interruption of participation in its light and heat is ordinarily due to ourselves.

Yet, though the stream would have flowed on without interruption, neither its volume nor its exact quality would have remained ever the same. The former would have been regulated by the amount of the waste of energy in ourselves, the latter by the particular character of the energy wasted. For expenditure of energy, whatever its quantity, is always expenditure of a particular kind. This is true not only of that which

can be supplied from our mundane environment; but also of that which, being in the narrower sense spiritual, has to be supplied by our divine environment. The primary purpose of the supply from God is, of course, to fit the spirit for maintaining the equilibrium, order, and harmony for which the organism of man is specially designed. Just as lower organisms need the one and the other form of energy to be supplied along with its material vehicle from their physical environment, if the order, equilibrium, and harmony for which they are designed is to be maintained; so with man. This, be it observed, is not to stamp the physical nature of man as evil, any more than it is to stamp a part of the nature of a plant or animal as evil, because each needs special kinds of food and energy if other forces, with their material vehicles in them, are to be kept from falling into disorder, and thus threatening the well-being or even life of the whole organisation.

Whilst, however, this is the primary function of divine grace, it further distributes itself to the several sides of our spiritual nature, proportionally to the needs of each, any part which, owing to exceptional strain and expenditure in the exercise of a special vocation, has exceptional needs, receiving also special supplies.

Apart from sin and its disturbing, weakening, and corrupting influence, the whole man would have been morally and spiritually symmetrical, whatever else he might have been,—that, too, in virtue of, yea, solely in virtue of, the unbroken influx of the higher divine energy; at the same time, so far as he might have been fit for special work in the kingdom of God,

whether intellectual or other work, he would have been specially energised for its performance. There would have been none of the disproportion now too often noticeable between the general character and state and the particular vocation; or between the particular vocation and the general character and state: but each would have answered to the other.

II. The normal relation of man to God.

Whereas God can hold, as we saw, a twofold relation to man, namely, personal and dynamic, man can only hold a personal relation to God. What now is this personal relation, normally considered?

In dealing with this point, it is of the utmost importance to bear in mind that, as was previously hinted, a normal personal relation to God has its stages. Once stated, this is, of course, obvious enough; but nothing is more common than for it to be ignored, not only in sermons, devotional books and hymns, but also in formal theological treatises. The traditional conception of the state of man as he came forth from the hands of God,—of his endowments, of his attainments, and of his righteousness,—has, of course, stood in the way of the recognition of the point; and until that conception has been thoroughly displaced, neither the problem of sin, nor, by consequence, that of redemption or reconciliation, can be properly handled; and the pseudo-rationality of the view of the early history of man, now universally regarded as the only one consistent with a true and satisfactory theory of evolution, will continue not only to impose upon Christian minds, but also slowly to undermine the edifice of Christian truth and

life. In proportion as man's original state and relation to God are exalted, in that proportion is his first sin against God blackened; and if in redemption the awful steps have to be retraced by which he quitted God, the more arduous do we make his return. Black enough was and is man's sin, and arduous enough the way of recovery; but to depict his conduct and state as it has often been depicted, is to make his restoration impossible, save by the working of a miracle in him, which would have been rather a reconstitution than a restitution.

Perhaps the simplest, earliest normal personal relation to God—and with it we are here primarily concerned—was, as it still is, willing response to a claim or demand for action or abstention from action: or, taken at the potential stage, real, though possibly only half conscious, readiness to recognise and to fulfil the mind, will, command of God; such readiness as a good child feels and manifests towards a good parent.

If, without constraint, as a matter of course, with gladness, man had at once exclaimed, so to speak, "Here am I; what wilt thou have me to do?" his attitude would have been all that God at the outset demanded. The word obedience may express either too little or too much:—too little, so far as it suggests merely external submission or conformity to, or execution of, divine commands: too much, so far as it also suggests not only the *readiness* spoken of, but also the thorough carrying out of that to which there is a response. The carrying out depended on the bestowal and reception of the very energy which would have come in answer to the attitude described.

The higher normal relations would have been, as they still are, reverence, trust, love, growing in intensity, and ever more and more closely intertwined, as intercourse with God became more intimate, and the heights and depths and lengths and breadths of His holiness and power and truth and goodness and love became more clearly and fully appreciated.[1]

But the very earliest normal form of the personal relation of man, capable of recognising, apprehending, and responding to the divine, and still untouched even by a breath of sin, towards God drawing nigh to him with the condescending tenderness and kindness of a Father,—a relation into which self-control, self-determination was meant to enter, and did enter,—could only have been some such a one as was just defined. Now, according to the biblical representation of the primary state of man,—a representation which, as to its essential features, is, in my humble judgment, most rational, besides being the only one consistent with the rest of the biblical view of the world,—this was just his attitude at first. As soon as he awoke to existence and consciousness, God laid upon him a command and a prohibition, for the purpose of evoking his moral and spiritual potentialities into actuality; and his immediate response was ready conformity, without a thought to the contrary. In an innocent nature like his there was no room for anything else; there was nothing in it to generate an impulse to the contrary. Whatever of that kind is now to be found in man is due to the evil

[1] See the chapter on "Relations" in my book, *The Redemption of Man*, published by Messrs. T. & T. Clark.

bias he inherits. In proportion as the children of human parents now respond cheerfully and readily to their commands, in that proportion is their relation regarded as normal and true. No other would have been the judgment of the Heavenly Father regarding His children. There doubtless lay enfolded within this spirit of obedience or loyalty which naturally animated man,—which was as natural to him in relation to God as it is natural to a plant to turn to the light,—the reverence and awe which are the permanent bases, the abiding though not always visible roots, of religion and worship; the trust and confidence which dream not of doubt or fear, and the love which impels the soul to act out the saying:—"I am thine, and all mine is thine";—the spirit which Milton represents Adam as describing to Raphael—

> "From among the trees appeared,
> Presence divine. Rejoicing, but with awe,
> In adoration at his feet I fell,
> Submiss." *Par. Lost*, Book viii. 314.

Such also was the attitude taken up spontaneously by himself and Eve, and further described by Milton, in the response of the latter to the first approaches of the tempter:—

> "Serpent, we might have spared our coming hither,
> Fruitless to me, though fruit be here to excess,
> The credit of whose virtue rest with thee,
> Wondrous indeed, if cause of such effects.
> But of this tree we may not taste nor touch;
> God so commanded, and left that command
> Sole daughter of His voice: the rest, we live
> Law to ourselves; our reason is our law."
> *Par. Lost*, Book ix. 648.

CHAPTER VIII

The Actual Personal Relation of Man to God

It scarcely needs remarking that if the now current notion that man has gradually evolved upwards from a state in which his moral and religious ideas, feelings, state, were not only of the simplest, but also of the lowest and grossest kind; that whatever fall may be predicated of him is a fall upwards to consciousness of the difference between his actuality and the idea he was to realise; and that therefore his condition both always has been and is now one of *not having yet attained*, not one even of falling short, much less of blamable relapse, —if this notion were correct the idea of redemption would be an absurdity. The utmost that could then be conceded would be that education, stimulus, guidance—the action of environment to evoke, to quicken, and to direct effort—is a necessity;—a necessity of the cosmic order; one, too, as little open to exception as the action by which the sun evokes and quickens, nay more, also directs the responsive activity of a plant or tree.

Christ might then be conceded a special place and work in the moral and religious development of the human race, analogous to those which in other domains are assigned to great artists, poets, philosophers, scien-

tists, statesmen, inventors, and so forth, each of whom, in the loose or "broad" manner of the present day, might be described as a "redeemer" or "saviour," or what not else?

Apart from the "fact" of a *fall from integrity*—such integrity as must needs have characterised an intelligent creature just proceeding from the divine hand—into non-integrity or sin; and apart from the assumption that sin has never been a moral necessity, but was always morally blamable, the whole teaching, both of the Old and New Testament, with regard to the existing relation between God and man, must be treated as the outcome of superstition.

But whilst this is true, care needs to be taken in the discussion of the subject not to go beyond, still more not to pervert, the direct and indirect teaching of Scripture.

1. Various mistakes have been and still are made in dealing with this subject, to one or two of which it is advisable at this point to call attention.

(1) The mistake of exaggerating, not the *significance*, but the *heinousness* of the sin committed by the first man. The intrinsic significance of his sin is scarcely susceptible of exaggeration: its heinousness or guilt readily so. No justification can be found in the Scriptures either of the Old or New Testament for the latter mistake. It arose, in fact, out of, or at all events had for its correlate, and in turn found its justification in, a corresponding exaggeration of the intellectual, moral, and religious condition of the first man. The older Protestant theologians, whose views, strangely enough, still

influence the thought of Christendom, negatively where not positively, in the way of antagonism where not in the way of agreement, conceived the first human beings as created in a state of integrity which was defined, not merely negatively, as freedom from corruption, but positively, as the possession and use of all inborn perfections of intellect, will, heart, and body; the enjoyment of the blessedness of paradise; wisdom, sanctity, knowledge, and love to God; health, symmetry, and beauty of soul and body, both in themselves and in their mutual relations; dominion over nature, impassibility, and immortality of body and soul.

No wonder that so exalted a being should be chargeable with guilt of the blackest hue for disobeying the command of God, particularly under the circumstances and for the reason stated in Genesis.

Now, though at the moment there referred to, the development of man, both intellectual, moral, and religious had still to begin, and though his knowledge and experience therefore were necessarily of the most limited kind, the act of disobedience was still sin; for not only did he recognise God as the One who had authority to command, and whose purpose in prohibiting was good, but it was also as natural for him to render loyal obedience to the divine will as it is for a well-ordered child to obey its father and mother.

(2) A second mistake is that of treating *heathenism* prior to the advent of Christ, and heathenism since Christ,—especially that which has remained untouched by Christian influences,—as identical.

Heathenism as a whole, down to the time of Christ,

underwent a development, not in the direction of what was less heathenish, but, though of course not with unbroken continuity, in the direction of what was more and more heathenish. In other and perhaps more correct words, its history down to Christ was a degradation. And what was true of the heathenism before Christ is equally true, with the same qualification as to continuity, of the heathenism since Christ.

Humanity did not, however, begin its history with any form of what we call heathenism. As to this matter, I defer rather to the authority of the Apostle Paul than to that of some recent inquirers. As a Russian; writing in French, before a false application of the principle of evolution had blinded so many to the true meaning of facts, has remarked: "L'état naturel de l'homme c'est ni l'état sauvage, ni l'état de corruption, c'est un état simple, meilleur, plus rapproché de la divinité; l'homme sauvage et l'homme corrompu en sont également éloignés."[1] What we call heathenism is the result of what theology calls the Fall, that is, of the conduct described by Paul, "Knowing God, men glorified Him not as God:—they exchanged the truth of God for a lie, and worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator" (Rom. i. 21, 25).

Heathenism, as we know it, is a degradation—an evolution or development downwards. Many generations and centuries passed away ere men became true heathens; that is, men who were really "vain in their reasonings," and whose "senseless heart was darkened"

[1] Ouvaroff, *Essais sur les mystères d'Eleusis*, p. 10, Paris, 1816. Quoted by Tholuck in *Der sittliche Character des Heidenthums.*

(Rom. i. 21). Thousands of years passed ere they fully deserved the terrible indictment brought against them by Paul, in the very brief sketch of the religious history of mankind down to Christ given in the first chapter of the Epistle to the Romans.

Since Christ's advent the development of mankind has been along two opposed lines. Those who remained heathens have grown more and more heathenish: whilst those who have yielded to the new impulses and visions which the race owes to the work of Christ, have been for the most part gradually emancipating themselves from heathenism. But like all human development, neither line has been straight and unvarying. In some cases nations that had already taken vigorous strides in the new direction grew weary, began to go back, and have altogether lapsed into heathenism or perished. So, too, have there been among heathens periods when a brighter day seemed about to dawn, and the things that were ready to perish revived.

For be it never forgotten, there is no such thing as real stagnation in the life of humanity. We speak, indeed, of the unchanging East; but even if the outward framework of the life remain almost unaltered, the life itself, especially the moral and spiritual life, becomes better or worse, slowly perhaps and almost imperceptibly, yet really. The history of heathenism, in fact, despite the rise sporadically of men of deeper insight into moral and spiritual truth, genuine loyalty to the highest and best they discerned, and earnest and self-sacrificing, though often sadly mistaken, efforts to

do the right, especially in a religious respect, has been such as to make it practically certain that an effective halt in the downward path could never have taken place apart from the redeeming activity of the divine Father.

(3) A third mistake is that of ascribing to individual members of the race what is true of the race as a whole. Scarcely any terms can be employed too strong to depict the sins and sinfulness of *humanity*; the sins and sinfulness of *individual men* vary in degree to an extent altogether beyond human appreciation.

Both theologians and preachers have been in the habit of unconsciously interchanging the individual and the race, *i.e.* whilst preaching and theologising.

> "Man lumps his kind i' the mass. God singles thence
> Unit by unit. Thou and God exist—
> So think! for certain: think the mass—mankind—
> Disparts, disperses, leaves thyself alone!
> Ask thy lone soul what laws are plain to thee,—
> Thee and no other,—stand or fall by them!
> That is the part for thee."
>
> R. BROWNING, "Ferishtah's Fancies"—*Camel-Driver.*

In actual intercourse with men,—with men even in heathendom, much more, of course, with those in Christendom,—both of them have readily forgotten their theory, and recognised the fact that there are as many degrees and varieties of sinfulness as there are men.

The result of the mistake has unquestionably and naturally been the generation of unreality in the moral and spiritual consciousness of men, and extraordinary perversions of theological reasoning. If every man's sin

is identical with that of the whole race, or at anyrate as great as that of the whole race, no wonder that it should be characterised as infinite, and as deserving punishment, infinite both in quality and quantity, whether borne by every man for himself, or by one for all. But this is neither scriptural nor according to fact.

Yet, none the less, sin is ideally, if I may so speak, all that it has ever been imagined; and its final issues will be awful beyond conception.

(4) A mistake closely resembling the one just referred to, in fact involving the same results, is that of identifying every *actual* sin with the *ideal* of sin,—if it may be permitted for the moment to connect the word ideal with that which is the violation of the ideal.

The least sin, the least violation or deviation from the law (*ἀνομία*), doubtless may be the first step to the greatest sin. It may also be compared to, though it must not be identified with, a germ or a seed out of which the beautiful flower, or the mighty tree, or the most complicated animal organism under favourable circumstances will develop, and to which, therefore, in a sense might be given the name of the latter. But even allowing the analogy, as it would clearly be a misuse of language to call an acorn an oak, so would it in like manner be a blunder to speak of an early, an ordinary sin, as infinite. For to represent sins as infinite, because God against whom they are committed is infinite, logically involves the corresponding exaggeration of characterising the trust or reverence or love felt by a man towards God as infinite, because God is infinite,—

a position which no theologian, whether Romish or Protestant, has thus far ventured to lay down.

(5) A fifth mistake is that of estimating the wickedness and guilt of men solely by their *overt* acts, and by their own *feeling*, or lack of feeling, with regard to them.

Degradation and wickedness do not always increase in the same ratio, and that for the simple reason that degradation proper, as a rule, is largely due to the influence of ancestors and contemporaries. Different people may commit sins that are to all appearance the same, yet the moral heinousness of the sins may be by no means identical. Heathens may commit worse crimes and do viler deeds than most of the inhabitants of Christendom, yet the latter be notwithstanding worse men. Sins committed in Christendom are more guilty than the same sins committed in heathendom; and the virtues of heathen in like manner may be more virtuous than the same acts or characteristics in Christians.

The Christian estimate of sin is, of course, the truer in the abstract; but between sin in the abstract and sin in the concrete a great gulf may yawn. But to recognise the facts I have now referred to is also to confess that, though the heathenism of an earlier age may have been less heathenish; in other words, though the men of an earlier age may have been less debased and ignorant, less inaccessible to spiritual light and influence, than those of the present day, they were more guilty—their conduct towards God or the divine may have been for that reason more conscious, and therefore more inexcusable.

It is in the light of this consideration that it behoves us to read the fearful description of the Apostle Paul: "For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, holding the truth in unrighteousness; because that which is knowable in God is manifest to them; for God hath manifested it to them. For the invisible elements or aspects of Him since the creation of the cosmos are beheld, being understood by His works, even His eternal power and deity: to the end that they should be without excuse" (Rom. i. 18 ff.).

2. Man's actual relation to God is abnormal.

To consider at length and in detail the character of man's actual personal relation to God would involve the treatment of at least an important part of the doctrine of sin. As this lies aside from the scope of the present work, though it is necessary to briefly touch on the subject, it must suffice to cast a rapid glance at the main features of the abnormality by which man's personal relation to God is, and has been, characterised.

As a matter of fact, indeed, no mode in which man can be related to God, in which he can behave towards God, has ever been all that it should have been; though we are not warranted in going to the extreme of saying that every mode of relation and behaviour has always been all that it should not have been. For our present purpose, however, it will suffice to refer briefly to that which is central, namely, the specifically religious; in other words, the specifically affectional. For religion, though conditioned by, and conditioning, all other phases of human life, particularly the activities of the

intellect, is in its very essence a stage or degree—ideally the highest stage or degree—of *reverence*, *trust*, *love*.

(1) Men owe to God—it is grounded alike in their own constitution and the nature of God that they should render unto Him—*reverence*, reverence that knows no limit, no break; that is felt as obligatory, yet given freely; that constantly verges on awe, yet is full of childlike joy. But what is the fact? Both in their representations, embodiments, and conceptions of God; in their constant treatment of Him in word and deed; yea, even in their modes of worship, they have insulted the Most High. Even if we minimise the guilt of their conduct, by ascribing it to involuntary ignorance, the objective facts remain the same. All this is awfully true of the heathen world: but it was only too true of Israel; and it is still far from being totally untrue of Christendom.

(2) Again, what God, on the one hand, absolutely deserves and of moral necessity claims; and man, on the other, by his very constitution as a creature needs, and would normally be impelled to render, is perfect *trust*, perfect *confidence*. But what more natural to the "natural man" than distrust and suspicion? The life of the Gentiles was one of bondage, because of fear of the deities who, for their consciousness, had taken the place of the Eternal Father.

The many and constant reproaches hurled against Israel for not trusting the Lord their God testify plainly enough that their natural, or unnatural, bias had not been overcome: and how much easier it is even yet, in the very heart of Christendom, to doubt

and fear than to put our whole trust in God,—who among us does not know alike from observation and personal experience?

(3) Still further, the Eternal Father surely deserves the *love* of His human children. We know that He who of all born of women knew God best and knew man best, laid down as the chief commandment—the commandment of commandments—"Thou shalt *love* the Lord thy God with all thy heart and soul and mind and strength." And what should be more natural, more satisfying, more fraught with peace and joy to man! Yet the fact—the awful fact it has been and still is, that the natural mind is carnal; that the carnal mind is enmity against God; and that the hardest thing to attain unto is the *love of Him who is love.*

In a word, the personal relation of man to God is irreverence, distrust, and alienation in well-nigh all forms and degrees.

CHAPTER IX

Results of the Abnormal Personal Relation of Man to God

I. The results for God.

It will be well at this point briefly to recall to mind the chief features of the divine relation to the cosmos, according to the cosmology previously expounded.

God, let it be remembered, is the ever-active originator, orderer, and upholder of the universe. He is so through the energy perennially put forth by Him, acting on the matter created by Him, in accordance with laws implanted by Him.

But this activity is of two kinds, if the expression may be used, namely, immanent or natural, and transcendent or free and personal.

The former activity is, as it were, fixed, determined; it proceeds along the regular paths which science terms laws—the laws of nature. Its method is evolution.

The latter is activity which He holds, as it were, in reserve; which He puts forth and directs according to circumstances arising through the action of the creatures that come into existence endowed with the capability of conscious self-control. These creatures, namely, so far as we are here concerned with them,

men, are so constituted that, as was previously pointed out, their needs cannot be adequately met by the natural world, *i.e.* by God in his immanent relation to the cosmos:—they need what God has reserved for His own direct bestowal.

Now what God has reserved we found may be described as *personal* and *vital*, or bio-dynamic. Transcendently He is related in both these ways. The energy He supplies to man transcendently is supplementary, as I previously showed, to that which He supplies by immanent channels. The two forms of energy are neither mutually exclusive, nor related to each other merely as regards quantity or degree. Whether and how far this transcendent energy, or grace as it is also termed, can under special circumstances do duty for the immanent energy, is a question which I need not stay to discuss.

This position of God is of original divine ordination, not, in its essential character, due to human sin.

But God is Himself also a *factor of the universe*, or rather of the cosmos, as it might be termed; not merely its originator, upholder, orderer, ruler.

The universe is a system—a system, be it remembered, of which nature, man, other kingdoms, and, above all, God, are the constitutive factors. As such its parts are not only *designed* to hold, but *must* hold, certain definite relations to each other. A larger or smaller number of alternative relations, all equally normal, may be open to each part; but, whether few or many, they are determinate. No part can hold a relation that is not among the prescribed relations, without, to a greater

or less extent, bringing itself into conflict with the rest; without, as it were, outlawing itself, and thus introducing or increasing disorder,—which disorder is itself an evil and brings other evils in its train. No sooner does such disorder arise than evil arises. Logically the disorder precedes and causes the evil; really the one is in a sort the very shadow of the other.

I do not wish to be understood to imply that all the effects follow according to *natural* law. We are here concerned primarily with persons and personal relations, not with parts of mere nature and relations between them. At the same time, though the link of connection, the sequence, is not one of natural law or necessity, it is no less real and close, yea, no less necessary. Spiritual law is law, though, as already observed, it is not "natural" law; and it produces confusion to style it "natural," whether in connection with the visible or with the invisible world. At the same time, it may be allowed, and needs to be remembered, that in the invisible world, no less than in that which is visible, there are both natural and spiritual laws, because in the invisible no less than in the visible world there are forces which lack, as well as those which possess, the power of self-control. God alone is pure spirit. Wherever there is creaturehood, there is that which is in the strict sense "natural"; though there is also that which is within limits "spiritual":—this is, at all events, the case in the spheres known to us either by experience or report. Spiritual forces, however, act no less efficiently than natural forces; in some cases, too, with the directness and immediacy of natural forces; but still, as the forces

differ so also do their modes of action and the effects produced by them necessarily differ. When I speak of spiritual forces, I mean, as was previously expounded, differentiations of cosmic energy, *i.e.* of divine energy, as real as the differentiations called chemical, electrical, vital; and when I speak of spiritual effects, I mean effects as real as those produced by the forces just named.

These results necessarily affect, in a greater or less degree, every constitutive factor of the universal system. It would not, indeed, be in the full sense a *system* were this not the case. Moreover, every factor by its activity must affect, in a greater or less degree, in one or another way, every other factor. This is true, at all events, of the factors which in the narrower sense constitute the universe or cosmos. Within certain limits it would seem to hold good even of God Himself, so far as He has constituted Himself a factor of what I ventured to term the theo-cosm.

This being the case, various evil results naturally follow even for God.

Evil results for God! The very words will evoke criticism of various kinds. The bare idea that man's sin should involve evil for God, no less than for the being that commits it and the world to which the sinner belongs, may seem intolerable. What! shall the almighty and unchangeable God be thus, so to speak, at the mercy of weak and changeable man? Shall "the infinite," "the absolute," "the unconditioned," be conditioned and determined, yea even abnormally conditioned and determined, by "the finite" and "the conditioned"? Away with the supposition!

Philosophy and "common sense" alike set their faces against the position. The former treats it as a self-contradictory anthropomorphism. The latter, under the influence of the very anthropomorphism which it repudiates as absurd, asks, What can God care about human conduct? What can it matter to Him? Alike from the heights of abstraction, where the air is so rare as to be scarcely breathable, from the lofty speculation which treats and speaks of God as out beyond all that man can possibly define or picture; as well as from the low-lying region of vulgar deism, which thinks it beneath a creative, supreme intelligence to be concerned about the doings of a world so insignificant as ours,—there comes the question, "What is man, that the Supreme should be mindful of him?"

But, after all, the abstract reasoner and the disciple of common sense, no less than the simplest believer, is really guilty of anthropomorphising; for until man can really rise above and pass out beyond his own intellect, and the connate laws and conditions of its activity, he must reason as a man; that is, reason anthropomorphically. The philosopher may plead, indeed, that he puts into operation a power of self-criticism which seems to enable him to use himself as a lever to lift himself out of himself; and that the conclusions to which that process conducts him are truer than those of the believer. The deist, too, may urge that his conception of deity, though entertained by a human mind, belongs to a higher domain of its activity than that which he repudiates. Yet may not he too, who holds by the concrete representations which have been charac-

teristic of religious faiths everywhere,—ethnic and Hebrew, no less than Christian, in his turn also criticise both the philosopher and the deist? The God of *philosophy*, he may retort,—what is He but an empty abstraction? "The absolute" and "the infinite" are void of content; whereas if God be anything at all, He must be, as the Scripture says, the *Pleroma* (πλήρωμα,—the very ideal of a being and life full of content. You think to exalt God by emptying Him; to make Him more real by assimilating Him to nonentity. Pantheism is surely nearer the truth than such theism.

The God of *deism*, too, the believer may say,—what is He but the magnified image of a type of man who, so far from transcending man, really exemplifies and embodies the lower and lowest characteristics of men. It is weakness, selfishness, sloth, pride, that causes those whom your deity most resembles to withdraw themselves from the interests and cares of their fellowmen:—is that an exalted reason for deity taking no interest in the conduct of the creatures whom He has created, and refusing to participate in their experiences? Not superior, for this reason, is He; nay, rather inferior: not *more* God, but *less* God: not less human, in a sense, but more human as distinguished from and opposed to God. For

> "A loving worm within its clod
> Were diviner than a loveless God."
>
> BROWNING.

We, on the contrary, ascribe to Him all that we know of highest and noblest and truest in man in the fullest

measure. We exalt God in ascribing to Him all that is most exalted in man.

Besides, it may be pleaded that, if the universe which God is supposed to have brought into existence be a reality; if it have being, force, activities, laws of its own—given, it is true, by God, but yet really and truly, not seemingly given; then God cannot any longer be or live as He was before it passed out of the region of idea and purpose into that of realisation and actuality: it must, as a whole, have at all events a passive influence on the divine life; the divine life and activities must be in some measure conditioned by it. Nay more, if this be true of the whole, it must be proportionally true of the parts, for to God the parts are as real as the whole: nor does the infinitesimal escape His notice, any more than the immense absorbs it. Each part has its own place and influence relatively to God, so far as and because He Himself has assigned it that place and influence. Not without His will, but with His will, which, were it not so, would have been an ineffective will, a will that was only the show and semblance of a creative, that is, of a truly real, will.

This holds equally good with regard to man. Nay more, if man has been created that he may love and be loved by God; that he may honour and glorify God; that he may fill a special place in the divine plans,—then man, in particular, must hold a relation to God congruous to his peculiar nature. What that nature makes him capable of, and requires from him, we have seen elsewhere. If he love God, if his love is a reality, and if it has any significance for God, it must affect

the divine life and activity. If he fail to love, as lack of love is no mere negation, this, too, must also in its degree and manner touch Him from whom it is withheld. These evil results affect God in both the aspects previously referred to,—first, namely, as the one who is constituting the cosmos what it is; in other words, in His immanent relation to it: and further, as a factor of the cosmos which He is constituting; in other words, in His transcendent relation to it. In both relations, or rather, in the double relation, He is affected abnormally.

1. Consider, first, the influence of sin on the *immanent* or constitutive *relation* or position of God.

In one sense, it is true, the immanent activity of God is unchanged, unaffected, by the conduct of man. In another respect, however, it may be said to have been from the very first most profoundly affected. At the same time, the very absence of change in the divine activity; or otherwise expressed, the continued maintenance by God of the order which He had established, meant that for man, as a *sinner*, this very order acquired the character and assumed the position of an authority imperatively *claiming* obedience, *threatening* punishment to disobedience, and manifesting hostility to rebellion.

Apart from sin, man could never have had any such experience. It is, in fact, quite as true that by sin comes the knowledge of law, as it is true that by law cometh the knowledge of sin (Rom. iii. 20). The Old Testament keeps close to the truth, when in so many forms it represents the discord between nature and

man—its resistance to him, its refusal to serve him, and so forth—as due to sin; and when it treats this conduct of nature as an expression of the mind and a manifestation of the will of God.

2. Consider, further, the influence of sin on the *transcendent relation* or position of God.

(1) A change is wrought in the *personal relation* of God to man.

The personal relation of God to man would normally have been one of satisfaction with Him as realising His purpose and idea—satisfaction of the kind expressed in Genesis, "And God saw everything that He had made, and behold it was very good" (i. 31). As voluntarily rendering unto God loyal obedience and faithful, cheerful service, man would have received approval such as Christ expresses in the words, "Well done, good and faithful servant" (Matt. xxv. 21. 23). As cherishing towards God the reverence due unto His name, the child-like, implicit confidence that answers to the divine goodness and truth and as loving God with all his heart and soul and mind and strength, man would have been regarded with moral complacency, treated with such trust as was possible on the part of the Creator towards a creature, and blessed in the fullest measure with a father's love.

In all these respects a change—a sad change—was wrought by human sin.

Instead of pronouncing man good, we read that "it repented the Lord that He had made man on the earth": and He said, "I will destroy man, whom I have created, from the face of the ground; for it

repenteth Me that I have made him" (Gen. vi. 6 f.) —words which, whether historically spoken or not, exactly represent what was the state of the case. Instead of approving man's conduct and character, God condemns man in fact, if not exactly in words, of the character of those spoken by Christ, "Thou wicked and slothful servant," and "inasmuch as ye did it not unto one of these least, ye did it not to Me" (Matt. xxv. 26 f.). And in place of shedding on him the light of His countenance, and letting him taste of the sweetness of His friendship; instead of trusting and honouring him, God's face is hidden, and He lets him feel His displeasure, His resentment, yea, even His anger and wrath.[1] A terrible change is all this:—a change, too, made inevitable, morally inevitable, by the change in man; and as abnormal for God as its cause was abnormal in man. It is, of course, abnormal on God's part, in a sense quite different from that in which it is abnormal on man's part, yet veritably deserving of the designation.

Even were we to exclude from God everything of the nature of resentment or anger, because of its emotional character, still we should not escape from the position I am expounding. Suppose that, after the manner of many theologians, we restrict His attitude towards the sin of man to the *recognition thereof as sin*, to its simple disapproval or condemnation,—this surely would be an abnormality; for, it cannot be in harmony with the purpose and idea of God that He should have to pronounce the creature of His hand worthy

[1] On the "Anger of God," see *The Redemption of Man.*

of condemnation. Some thinkers, indeed, have felt themselves bound by the logic of immutability to go the full length and include even man's sin in the eternal plan of the world; but that is logically to abolish the sinfulness of sin and the rightfulness of right.

Whether the condemnation be termed legal or judicial, or governmental or moral, does not touch the point. In any and every case God regards man in a light, and treats him in a manner, contrary to his own original idea; in other words, a change admitting of the designation abnormal must be said to have been brought about in God's personal relation to man, through the change in man's personal relation to God.

The view which I have been controverting found long ago a fine advocate in Shakespeare, who, however, seems to me here to lack the remarkable ethical insight which he elsewhere displays—

> "Love is not love
> Which alters when it alteration finds,
> Or bends with the remover to remove:
> O no! it is an ever-fixèd mark,
> That looks on tempests, and is never shaken;
> It is the star to every wandering bark,
> Whose worth's unknown, although his height be taken.
> Love's not Time's fool, though rosy lips and cheeks
> Within his bending sickle's compass come;
> Love alters not with his brief hours and weeks,
> But bears it out even to the edge of doom.
> If this be error, and upon me prov'd,
> I never writ, nor no man ever lov'd."
>
> SHAKESPEARE, Sonnet CXVI.

(2) The *bio-dynamic* or *vital* relation of God to man is affected.

I pointed out previously that according to the divine constitution of man, whilst he was to draw from

the system to which he belongs both that which gave him being and maintained it at its primary and subordinate stages, God kept in His own hands, so to speak, the key to the store from which energy needed to be drawn for the development and sustentation of his higher powers, and consequently for the due control and utilisation of the lower powers. Attention was still further directed to the fact that access to this store of higher energy was conditioned by his personal attitude towards God.

An alien personal attitude having been assumed towards God.—an attitude the unchecked, ultimate issue of which would necessarily be hatred and hostility, —no course consistent with the divine holiness and love remained open but to close the door to His higher energy. Indeed, expressions like closing the door or withholding may convey a defective, not to say a false, impression; for normal relations between persons involve participation in each other's life to the extent to which, in the very nature of things, it is possible. Intercommunication must be continuous and perfect. Each must live in the other. But if either assumes an abnormal relation, the intercommunication is at once *ipso facto* checked,—checked, too, at every point. We men experience this, though we can scarcely be said either to bestow vital energy on each other or to withhold it,—not, at all events, in any very appreciable degree. Inasmuch, however, as fellowship with God implies participation to the measure of our capacity in all that God can give; and seeing that God can give not merely light, guidance, consolation, encouragement,

sympathy, but also life—vital energy; any break or abnormal change in personal relations necessarily involves lessened participation in the divine fulness; that is, a lessened share of the energy which comes directly from Him. Law prevails here as truly as in the impersonal sphere; though as the sphere is personal, so is the law. There is nothing of revenge in this procedure; in fact, even the word punishment can only be used regarding it with certain qualifications:—qualifications, however, which are fully warranted by Scripture usage. It is in the strictest sense a moral necessity. So plainly is it inevitable that a contrary procedure would be immoral. For any *human* person to place his powers at the free and full disposal of another, to give another a blank cheque, so to speak, to draw on the bank of his natural, much more on that of his spiritual, resources, there must be fullest harmony as to the highest moral ends of life. Not to insist thereon would be self-contradiction and suicide. How much more must this be true of the holy loving God!

3. The changes in question may be further and more generally characterised as follows.

Man is placed in a system of law, the fountainhead and living upholder of which is God. This is God's position because He created and sustains the beings whose relations, whether actual and necessary, or prescribed and voluntary, are expressed in laws. Man as free is able, as I have already said, not only to choose between various modes of relation, each of which may be in conformity with his own nature and with the nature of the beings to which he relates himself, and as such

normal; but also to choose relations which are opposed alike to his own nature and to the nature of his environment, and as such abnormal. He cannot exist out of all relations: relations he must hold. He may, indeed, assume an attitude of indifference towards this and the other part of his actual environment; he may ignore it; but so far as it is actually part of his environment, even his indifference is a positive relation, though a wrong one.

It is also in his power to choose more actively wrong relations: he may, for example, choose to speak of or to his fellow-man with harshness or bitterness, when he ought to speak with gentleness and kindness; or he may choose to inflict injury when he ought to confer benefit: but the relation designed to be held by him is unaffected by his choice; so long as he remains a man, it remains obligatory on him, and the man to whom the relation is due, so long as his humanity remains intact, cannot but demand it. Nay more, if he refuse to demand it, to that extent he puts himself out of the system. *Refusal*—on whatever ground—*to require the fulfilment of moral obligations outlaws a man as really as refusal to fulfil them when required. To claim the performance of duty—of course, in the right way—is as truly obligatory as it is obligatory to perform the duty which is prescribed.*

All this holds emphatically good of man in relation to God. He is meant freely to love Him; but if he choose the reverse, the law for his relation or behaviour remains the same. God continues, and cannot but continue, to demand loyalty as long as He is God,

and remains at the head of the great system which He has brought into existence. But, clearly, as soon as God and man are over against each other under such conditions, man must necessarily regard God chiefly, if not exclusively, as a ruler and exactor; and God must regard man as a defaulter and rebel. Nay more, unless God is ready to allow of a new mode of relation between man and Himself; unless He is willing that man should live without being loyal to Him; He must needs take steps to uphold the law which He has given. In other words, He assumes, *ipso facto*, towards man the relation of judge and ruler. As long as man freely conforms to the law, *i.e.* as long as his relation is one of loyalty, that of God to him is, in the nature of the case, the relation of a Father who cares for and loves His creature. The thought of law, rule, claim, and their opposites neither enters the mind of man nor makes its appearance in the behaviour of God. Sin changes man, and man's change involves a change in God. The element of rule and law in God at once and necessarily manifests itself, at once and necessarily makes itself felt.

That this should be so is in perfect harmony with the entire constitution of the world, so far as freedom of action in any degree or form can be predicated of it. Inorganic beings know nothing but law, that is, the law of necessity. For them alternatives do not exist. Not that a variety of relations is not open to this and the other element, as, for example, in chemistry, but that whatever appearance there may be of selection on their part—and sometimes there is a very remarkable resem-

blance thereto—it is not real selection: there is no real alternative, as in the cases I have supposed; but the stronger overcomes the weaker force, the temporary union is set aside for that which is more permanent; the more important and essential supersedes that which is less important and essential.

But wherever a being refuses or contravenes a relation that is really prescribed, that is, is rightfully due, the being to which it is owing, if it be one of the class we are here concerned with, namely, personal, in justice both to itself and to the system of which it is a member, should, and in one form or another, at some time or other, must, and will insist on its claim, and seek to enforce the law. Not to confess this is implicitly to do one or the other of two things:—*either* to assume that the transgressor cannot help himself, *or* to deny that the world is a system, an organised whole. The drift at the present day is towards the former alternative. When men commit offences we are told it is because they are ignorant, or weak, or diseased; or because they have not been, somehow, fairly treated by the system, and are on that account justified in doing what they have done; or, at all events, are not to be dealt with in the way intended. Or else a denial that the world is an organised whole is involved; consequently, therefore, the contrary assumption that the factors thereof are not meant, all of them, to hold certain specific relations; and still further, that those relations can be ignored or contravened without detriment to their well-being. Not to assert and maintain the law is in reality to be guilty of inflicting injury,

first on one's self and then on the system to which one belongs.

> "ISAB. Yet show some pity.
> ANG. I show it most of all when I show justice;
> For then I pity those I do not know,
> Which a dismiss'd offence would after gall;
> And do him right that, answering one foul wrong,
> Lives not to act another."
> SHAKESPEARE, *Measure for Measure*, Act II. ii.

> "Ignominy in ransom and free pardon
> Are of two houses: lawful mercy
> Is nothing kin to foul redemption."
> *Ibid.* Act II. iv.

So far as, or rather, in that, every creature is bound to take its part in upholding and furthering the interests of the system, so far is it bound, not only to guard itself against injury, as well as to refrain from inflicting injury; but also, as has already been remarked, to *claim* a certain kind of conduct, as well as to *exhibit* it. Efforts to this end may have to take the form of self-sacrifice; but self-sacrifice always signifies the sacrifice of the lower for the higher, never the higher for the lower; it is therefore in conformity with, not opposed to, the principle under consideration. The mode of asserting law must, of course, be of a kind not to involve a new and worse violation, as has often been the case;—so often and notably as to give rise to the jural saying, *Summa lex, summa injuria.*

What is true of the lesser members of the system is equally, in its way and measure, true of Him who may be regarded as its supreme member, on whose action the order and well-being of the whole depends. If man's relation to God is not what it should be, God

is bound by regard, not merely for Himself, but also for the system as a whole, and for every individual member of the system, according to the nature and position, to maintain and assert the law which has been transgressed. *The integrity of the divine nature and life is no less essential to the world God has made than it is essential to Himself.* All creatures, but in a special sense all intelligent creatures, depend on Him; and if He fail them, all else will fail them. How He shall assert and maintain the law is another question; but that it must be asserted and maintained is out of the question. And it is because of this that God deals with man as I have described under previous heads.

It is from the point of view here attained that we can best understand and appreciate the so-called forensic, judicial, rectoral, or governmental view of the divine relation to man, and of the atonement of Christ. Where the traditional treatment of these subjects has failed is in not forming an adequate conception of the distinction between the normal or ideal relation of God to man and His actual relation. Trinitarian, no less than Socinian, theologians, advocates of the forensic no less than advocates of the so-called moral view of the atonement, have alike failed in this respect.

That it is possible to form an adequate conception of God's normal relation to man, if God is regarded exclusively even as a *moral* Governor, can scarcely be maintained in face of the explicit as well as implicit teachings of Christ. His idea Father includes all that is essential to that of a moral governor, but more: and it is the more that differentiates it. Yet representations of God

which either exclude or thrust into the background, or fail duly to emphasise the aspect of His relation as moral governor, are equally defective.

Nay more, if the word moral which has been used to qualify the designation Governor serve no other purpose than to exclude the notion of the immoral or purely natural, it will need to be supplemented by some other term, if God's full ideal relation to man is to be expressed by the term Father. For, as Father, God is the originator, not only of the constitution of men, but also of the laws without which the constitution could not subsist, and to confess this necessitates the confession that He must uphold, maintain, assert those laws. Still further, unless God is prepared to be inconsistent with Himself, and to charge Himself with unwisdom, He must maintain them, regardless not only of contrary desires, but as we inaccurately and misleadingly say, of the happiness or misery of those who sin against them. These latter words are sometimes in place when human rulers are in question; but when speaking of the divine ruler and His laws, we need always to remember that apart from their observance misery is inevitable. Not to uphold law, both natural and spiritual, would be to contradict the very nature of natural spiritual forces or beings: and such contradiction—what could it possibly mean but misery, ruin, destruction? Up to a certain point this involves, of course, upholding the natural in the *natural* sphere, the spiritual in the *spiritual* sphere; but as the independence of the two spheres is only a restricted one, a point is soon reached where to uphold one is to uphold both—to uphold the natural is to uphold the spiritual,

to uphold the spiritual is to uphold the natural. As, however, there will be occasion for touching again on this matter in connection with the discussion of the method of rectifying the abnormal relations between God and man, the subject may be dropped for the present.

4. The state of the divine feelings, of the divine mind, is disturbed. The very being, the very nature, the very substance or essence of God cannot, of course, be prejudicially affected by human sin. To affirm that would certainly be inconsistent with an intelligent recognition of the divine absoluteness and self-sufficiency. As the One who has life in Himself, who is self-sustained, self-generated, absolutely self-controlled; as the One who is the source of all the energy that works in the creature,—yea, of the very energy which puts itself forth abnormally in the act of sin,—God cannot be injured by anything that the creature may do. Real injury for the creature means not merely the introduction of disorder into the system of forces by which it is constituted, but also in the long-run a lessening of its energy. Such lessening, however, of God's energy through the action of that which at the bottom is His own energy is clearly unthinkable.

But a distinction may be drawn between the divine essence or nature and the sphere of the manifestations of the divine nature—its manifestations or expressions, that is, in God Himself. We draw a distinction of this kind even with regard to ourselves. A man's nature and character may remain essentially unaltered—at all events relatively so—whilst his emotions and feelings are constantly varying. Within limits, in fact, the latter

may be out of harmony with the former—may be such as the former repudiates. They may be imposed on him from without; they may be necessitated by the position which some part of his environment has assumed towards him. Yet *he* may be uninjured. This is, at all events, relatively true, though, it must be allowed, only relatively. Something of this sort is true of God. He in Himself abides unaltered; no injury can be inflicted on Him as He is in Himself; but as to His emotions or feelings, these cannot but be affected by the conduct and state of the creatures He has brought into existence and sustains. That this should be possible must have formed part of His eternal purpose. If the creature had owed its existence to another will than the divine will, or embodied another idea than the divine idea, or been constituted in part of what God did not originate, then a position such as the one laid down would be intolerable; but, as a matter of fact, in laying Himself open to human action, God is carrying out His own purpose. Only, we must be careful to define its limits: and the limit above defined seems to me to be grounded in the very nature of things.

It cannot, of course, be doubted that in man's case his very being is largely determined not only by his thoughts and volitions, but also by his emotions and feelings. He, it is true, makes *them*; but *they* also make him. As he is, so they are; as they are, so he becomes and accordingly is. They constitute him, whilst he constitutes them. Stated in another form: we are men in the becoming or making, and in the process of becoming or of being made, we ourselves take a prominent—nay,

indeed, one might say the chief — part. We do so *indirectly*, in so far as we can solicit or deprecate, open or close ourselves to, approve or condemn, influences which do or would operate upon us; *directly*, in so far as the control, first and foremost of our thinking; then, in a secondary degree, of our words and deeds; still further, of our affections and emotions, is entrusted to ourselves. We are largely dependent, on the other hand, as has been repeatedly remarked, on our environment—on God, on our fellow-men, on the natural world—for what we become. This is involved in our creaturehood; in our being but parts of a whole, members of a great body; in the fact that in the first instance we owe our very being, our power, the law of our constitution, the sphere of our life and action, to a not-ourselves, mediately to the system to which we belong—ultimately to God.

God, as having life in Himself, determines Himself; and even when He lets us act on Him, it is still a self-determination. So that whilst conceding all that I have advanced, there still remains an infinite difference between our nature and life and their relation to each other, and the nature and life of God and their relation to the divine essence.

God is grieved and pained by the conduct of men. It is scarcely necessary to adduce evidence to this effect from Scripture. The godly men of Israel whose thoughts about God—whether due exclusively to revelation, or born of a perfectly normal and natural co-operation between their minds and the Spirit of God—are set forth in Scripture, had no doubt on this subject. We are told in Genesis that "it repented the Lord

that He had made man on the earth, and it grieved Him at His heart" (vi. 6); and in Isaiah, "But they rebelled and grieved His Holy Spirit" (lxiii. 10); again, "How oft did they rebel against Him in the wilderness, and grieve Him in the desert" (Ps. lxxviii. 40). In the New Testament, too, a solemn exhortation is given even to believers, to "Grieve not the Holy Spirit" (Eph. iv. 30) by their sins.

Not only because of the conduct of man towards Himself, and the change in His own relation to man, is God grieved and troubled, but also because of the failure of the world which He had made, to realise His idea. Meant to express His invisible and eternal glory; to be a "a thing of beauty and a joy for ever"; to be a home, every part of which should reveal the loving and wise care of the Father, and minister to the wants and pleasure of the children: how has it fallen short of this great ideal! And why? Because by the constitution thereof, when God withheld His energy and grace from man, energy was necessarily to that extent withholden from nature: and because even nature without God becomes "subject to vanity," and "groans under the bondage of corruption" (Rom. viii. 22).

Now both the state of the world and His own relation to it are abnormal; and so far as the former may be said to be the result of the latter, God is doubly grieved.

III. The results for man.

1. Scripture teachings.

The evils that accompany and follow upon sin, whether they befall man or nature, are in the Scrip-

tures, particularly in the Old Testament, treated and spoken of alternately as results or fruits of sin, and as divine inflictions or punishments for sin. This circumstance has not been sufficiently kept in view in the discussion of the question of sin and evil; perhaps because too exclusive stress was laid on the transcendence of God. If, however, the divine relation to the world be conceived to be vital, organic,—or, as it is now often termed, immanent,—the truth and fitness of Scripture representations will be obvious. God has not only beforehand so constituted and ordered the world, but so maintains it, by his ever-present power and wisdom, that sin and evil shall be most closely associated:—not always in a way that we can discern, but really. It is not given to any human eye, armed though it should be with the strongest and most suitable aids that human skill can devise, to discover the traces of disease which must lie in seeds that grow into unhealthy plants, yet they are there, and they come gradually to maturity. And so the sins men commit may not at once produce their corresponding evils in a form that man can discern, but they are assuredly there, and time will reveal the truth. The evils referred to are of God's ordaining, whilst they are also of man's producing. Man does not intend to suffer when he sins, nor does God intend man to sin in order that he may suffer; but when man sins he involuntarily brings suffering on himself, and it is in pursuance of the divine purpose and order that he suffers; in other words, God inflicts suffering, God punishes.

When man sins, his design, implicit, if not explicit and conscious, is not only to use the energy already stored up in himself, but also the energy which he may yet assimilate, in carrying out the devices and desires of his own evil heart as he may like or dislike; but he overlooks the fact that, in the act of sinning, to the degree to which he sins, he is cutting himself off from the source whence are to come the supplies of energy without which he will become incapable of further assimilation and use; besides putting himself in antagonism to the system of forces in the midst of which he lives, and without the co-operation of which he cannot be healthy and happy. Though and whilst renouncing normal personal relations he would fain maintain the dynamic relation even to God, and consequently to the cosmos, of which I previously spoke: —this, at all events, is the inner meaning, even though it be not the conscious aim of his conduct. Consciously to recognise God as what God is in Himself to him and to the world—this seems to him in his pride a sort of degradation and, in his unhealthy thirst for liberty, a sort of bondage; he vainly dreams of independence. Yet the very power which he then puts forth is derived from Him against whom he is revolting: and even if it were possible for him to be independent, as far as mere power or energy is concerned, the more specifically personal elements in him—his heart and intellect—would alike cry out for the living God. So that sin leads man twofoldly astray:—on the one hand, it persuades him that the personal relation to God, on which his conscious happiness depends, is an evil;

and, on the other hand, it flatters him that he can obtain and use according to his own pleasure the energy which he feels to be necessary to his healthy existence, independently of the personal relation to God on which it is dependent.

The truth that evils are at one and the same time fruits of human sin and divine punishments is forcibly brought out in various parts of the Bible, particularly of the Old Testament. Naturally, too, let it be remarked, in the Old, rather than in the New Testament; because the former, speaking generally, is specially concerned with the law of the world and the divine relation to it.

In the Book of Job, *e.g.* we read: "According as I have seen, they that plow iniquity, and sow trouble, reap the same. By the breath of God they perish, and by the blast of his anger are they consumed" (iv. 8, 9; cf. Prov. i. 24–33). Again, "The nations are sunk down in the pit that they made; in the net which they hid is their own foot taken: the Lord hath made Himself known, He hath executed judgment: the wicked is snared in the work of his own hands" (Ps. ix. 15 f.; cf. vii. 14 ff.). "Ah! sinful nation, a people laden with iniquity, . . . Why will ye be still stricken? . . . Your country is desolate; your cities are burnt with fire" (Isa. i. 4–7). "Hear, O Earth, behold I will bring evil upon this people, even the fruit of their thoughts, because they have not hearkened unto my words: and as for my law, they have rejected it" (Jer. vi. 19). "I the Lord search the heart, I try the reins, even to give every man according to his

ways, according to the fruit of his doings" (xvii. 10). "By the multitude of thine iniquities, in the unrighteousness of thy traffic, thou hast profaned thy sanctuaries: therefore have I brought a fire forth from the midst of thee, and I have burned thee to ashes upon the earth in the sight of all them that behold thee" (Ezek. xxviii. 18). "Ye have plowed wickedness; ye have reaped iniquity; ye have eaten the fruit of lies: for thou didst trust in thy way, in the multitude of thy mighty men":—"when it is my desire I will chastise them":—"therefore shall a tumult arise among thy people, and all thy fortresses shall be spoiled" (Hos. x. 14). "Be not deceived; God is not mocked: for whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap" (Gal. vi. 7).

2. The results for man as an organic whole.

Whether humanity came into existence as a single individual, or as one pair or as several pairs of individuals, it never was merely, it never has been, a simple congeries or series of individuals still incomplete, though destined one day to be completed. It was instituted as an organism, at each stage complete in its way, though destined gradually by a process of differentiation to attain to a magnitude, both of members and functions, of which at present no adequate conception can be formed. Like other organisms, too, humanity has its indwelling idea, which was meant to control the process of differentiation, and at last to find full realisation. As such it has a continuous life, both successive and contemporaneous; that is, life is transmitted from generation to generation; we inherit from those who

go before us: and life is transmitted more or less from member to member of the organism as it exists at any particular moment.

Now the human race was as really an organism when there was but one pair as it is now when the number of pairs cannot be counted. It might be compared at the beginning to the oak-tree just peeping above the ground with its two cotyledons or seed-leaves; at the present it resembles the same tree after it has grown and weathered the storms of centuries. In a sense, the entire oak was in the seed, still more in the seed-leaves; still more in these seed-leaves and the plumule or growing point of the stem, which could be seen just between the cotyledons. The successive parts do not make the oak: the oak is before and determines the parts; so, too, vital transmission is not merely successive, but also contemporaneous between the several parts of the oak as they are evolved or developed.

Regarded from this point of view, let me remark in passing, a great truth will be seen to underlie the idea of the federal headship of Adam. If he be regarded as a mere representative, in the ordinary external sense,—even though the fact of his having been put in that position, as ordinarily described, could be established,— then that his descendants, who were not even consulted as to his appointment, still less took an active part in it, should be held in any way responsible for his conduct, may well seem unjust. But if he were as truly the whole of humanity as the seedling oak is the whole of the oak, then that his conduct should determine to a very large extent the course of the subsequent expansion and

differentiation of the organism may be seen to be necessary and inevitable. To quarrel with transmission of life, whether successively or contemporaneously, is to quarrel with the constitution of the race—is to wish the human race, in other words, to be stripped of its humanity. Solidarity is a phase of this corporate or organic or vital unity of the members of the human race.

This is the reason why, in dealing with the results of sin, a beginning has to be made with the *race* rather than with *individuals*. The organism was affected before the individuals which are its successive differentiations and products were affected. This is the true meaning of original sin and of descriptions of mankind as a *massa perditionis*.

Humanity as an organism received an injury from sin. It received that injury at its very beginning. At the moment when, to speak in the language of botany, the seed began to germinate—when, on the one side, the stem and seed-leaves made their appearance, whilst, on the other, the root was shooting down into the soil from which it was to draw its energy, disease entered, and it was smitten with death because of sin. The exact nature of the effect produced on the vital protoplasm of humanity, on its constitutive, elementary tissues, no one can describe. But just as any young plant soon shows by the manner of its growth and development whether it is healthy or not, so humanity soon showed that, as Paul says, "by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death (death, *i.e.* in its beginning, death considered as a process culminating in what we know as death) passed upon all

men";—adding what cannot, of course, be predicated of any member of the vegetable or animal world, but only of man—"for that *all have sinned*" (Rom. v. 12).

History bears one long testimony to the disordered condition of the human organism. The members have been divided and opposed, instead of harmoniously co-operating; both individuals and minor communities have regarded their separate and corporate good as incompatible; they have therefore waged war on each other well-nigh without cessation, either in thought or purpose, or word or act; and nothing has been, as a rule, further from their thoughts than the great principle laid down by Christianity, that every man should care for every other man's good.

The constitution thus in some way saddled, if not with positive disease, yet with a liability or tendency thereto, which a wrong environment or a wrong relation to a right environment might evoke into actuality, was transmitted to the members of the race, as they came into existence, in varying ways and proportions. This was true both positively and negatively. Each man, each community, inherited a nature liable to the weaknesses and faults of its special characteristics; and everywhere men developed the vices of their virtues, the weaknesses of their strengths, the shadows of their lights, the hates of their loves. Nowhere did individuals or communities arise who perfectly realised the idea—or the particular differentiation of the idea—which they were meant to embody. Nay more, as was already indicated, they have very largely waged against each other wars of extermination: and even where there

has been no open conflict, selfishness has been more or less the rule of their inner and outer behaviour.

3. Results for individuals.

These results show themselves in three directions—first, in the very constitution or nature; secondly, in the functions and activities; and thirdly, in the state of the feelings.

As is directly involved in what has just been advanced with regard to the whole, individual members of the race come into existence more or less disordered. Some, as we know, are disordered to the point of complete imbecility or idiocy; others again to that of insanity. Most—may we not say all?—men are weaker, as far, certainly, as their higher nature goes—with which we are here specially concerned—than they ought to be; and there is more or less of disharmony between the body or flesh and the spirit. Rarely do we meet with persons in whom the various natural powers can be said to be fittingly blended. If there is strength and beauty and capacity at one point, there is undue weakness and incapacity at another. In one, the affections are strong, and the intellect disproportionately feeble; in another, the reverse: in one, the emotions and feelings are easily roused and touched, whilst another is stolid and insensitive. One man is born with a nature that at the least provocation or stimulus bursts out into passions that like a flood break through the restraining banks and overflow the whole life; whilst another goes quietly and steadily on his way, neither tempted to evil nor stimulated to good by surroundings apparently most fitted to do both.

The very seat of life has been more or less affected by sin; as, indeed, if man is a unity, could not but be the case. Not merely into the body, but into the soul; yea, also, into that centre where both meet, evil has forced an entrance, though no man can ever be said to be affected by it in exactly the same way or to the same degree as another. For individuality is everywhere prevalent.

The various *functions* and activities of the individual have accordingly suffered in a greater or less degree. Man suffers from a *corruptio totius naturæ*, though not from a *tota corruptio totius naturæ*, as has often been taught; so that not one of his activities can be said to be perfect either in degree or mode.

He neither loves nor hates, trusts nor distrusts, respects and reverences nor despises and contemns, with perfect wisdom and truth. Even his intellect, which is commonly supposed to have been either not at all or very little impaired, works imperfectly. Instead of being the light to the whole man, which cannot be put under a bushel or extinguished, showing him things as they are, it either misleads him, or fails him, or becomes darkness. Instead of guiding, it is guided by likes and dislikes, by desires and passions, by loves and hates. It takes error for truth, and truth for error; ugliness for beauty, beauty for ugliness; right for wrong, wrong for right. The various intellectual activities are seldom well balanced:—in one the imagination; in a second this and that form of the judgment or the reasoning power; in a third the perceptive and observative capacity; in a fourth the senses;

and so on, are strong where they should be weak, or weak where they should be strong; not to mention that they may be marked by defects of a more positive character.

Nor is the body, in all its members, as it should be, the plastic organ for carrying out the behests of the mind. Instead of that, it needs constant discipline to fit it to do, even in moderate measure, the work which it was designed to accomplish; and too frequently it is such that the cry is extorted, "O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from this body of death?"

4. Man's life is marked by disturbance of *feeling*.

Man's bodily and mental activities were intended to be accompanied or followed by satisfaction and pleasure, varying in intensity, but always stimulating to further activity. Instead of this, unrest, unhappiness, dissatisfaction, misery, in various forms and degrees, are the common lot of our race. Human life may not be as dark and sad a thing as the pessimist represents; it can rarely, if ever, be said to be not worth living at all: but it is equally far removed from the abiding, constant brightness, peace, and gladness of which the optimist dreams. As far as the majority of the human race is concerned, there can be no doubt that suffering, more or less keen, is their constant lot; and if some men pass over the stage of the world under a nearly unclouded sky, most have to traverse it whilst darkened by storm-clouds.

Not only, however, are the feelings arising out of man's own life of the same character as that life itself, namely, disordered, disharmonious, unhealthy; but he has in addition to share the pain and grief which his

conduct causes God—share it, namely, whether he will or no.

This is in strict conformity with the constitution of the system to which we belong. Let us approach the position from the side of humanity. Where the vital relation between man and man is close, it is impossible for one to do a wrong or cause a pain to another without being himself in turn more or less affected by the effect which he has produced. I am not now referring to pain or injury which may be the result of *conscious reaction* on the part of the one who is injured or pained; nor do I mean the action of conscience:—no, it is something still more organic and direct. It is rooted in the relation which Paul had in view when he wrote, "If one member suffer, all the members suffer." Men may and do suffer undeservedly from their fellow-members in this manner; but they suffer also deservedly: and be that as it may, it is a form of suffering far more real and common than most of us dream.

Now this may be transferred, with obvious limitations, to God.

If the relation between Him and mankind be that expressed in the words, "in Him we live and move and have our being," and presupposed in this discussion, it is clearly inevitable that if His life is disturbed by our sin, such disturbance will organically, vitally react on the life of sinners. As the electrical storms in the surface of the sun, concerning which we read, make themselves felt by waves and wavelets through the ether till they reach our own world, and may possibly affect so minute an object as the needle of a

compass; so if the heart of God is troubled and clouded, the human soul cannot but suffer along with it. Were God subject to merely natural law, the shadow would be cast equally into every soul in the universe, however pure and loyal; but inasmuch as God has the control of this influence, it naturally falls chiefly on those by whom it is caused, and chills or darkens them according to the degree of their responsibility.

This and the kindred influence of the human race are doubtless the source of much of the uneasiness and restlessness, of the sense of vacuity and lack, of the gnawing and yearning to which the more highly strung souls are exposed, and which expresses itself in the sadness and melancholy that so often characterise the legends and songs of the people, and in the minor key to which the tunes of the latter are so often set. The energy which flows into us from the divine fountainhead, as well as from our fellow-men, holds, as it were, in solution these sadder elements; and though the perception of them may differ in keenness in different men,—a difference due to various causes, partly hereditary and constitutional, partly voluntary,—they cannot but have a disturbing effect on the depths of the life.

This, too, is surely an abnormal relation for God to hold to His creatures, especially if it be true of Him that "He doth not afflict willingly"; and that it is not merely a privilege, but a duty, to taste of the goodness of the Lord, and always to rejoice in Him.

Finally, there are the pains which we ascribe to conscience.

It is on these that theologians and preachers are wont

chiefly to concentrate attention; and not altogether without reason. Paul refers to them as experienced by Gentiles, in the words: "They show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness therewith, and their thoughts one with another accusing or else excusing them" (Rom. ii. 15). Confirmatory sayings may also be quoted from ethnic writings. The Greek tragedians, particularly Æschylus, recognise a guilty conscience as the work of Deity—

> "For Jove doth teach men wisdom, sternly wins
> To virtue by tutoring of their sins;
> Yea, drops of torturing recollection chill
> The sleepers: 'gainst man's rebellious will
> Jove works the wise remorse:
> Dread powers, on awful seats enthroned, compel
> Our hearts with gracious force."[1]

So again—

> "'Tis robber robbed, and slayer slain; for, though
> Ofttimes it lag, with measured blow for blow
> Vengeance prevaileth
> While great Jove lives. Who breaks the close-linked woe
> Which Heaven entaileth?"[2]

One may doubt, indeed, whether what *we* call "pangs of conscience" are a common phenomenon of heathenism; at all events, in the form in which they occur in Christendom. They are rather a product of Christianity; and at their purest and intensest are experienced solely by Christian believers. What troubled Gentiles was fear of the fruits or penalties of sin; it was rather the painful consequences than the wrong of sin that oppressed them. And even the latter is far more

[1] Tyler, *Theology of the Greek Poets*, p. 236.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 239.

common and intense in Christendom than in heathendom. For moral and religious degradation is accompanied with ever-increasing insensibility, not less to the terrors of the law than to the law itself.

> "How will it fare shouldst thou impress on me
> That certainly an Eye is over all
> And each, to make the minute's deed, word, thought,
> As worthy of reward or punishment?
> Shall I permit my sense an Eye-viewed shame,
> Broad daylight perpetration—so to speak—
> I had not dared to breathe within the Ear,
> With black night's help about me?"
>
> R. BROWNING, "Ferishtah"—*Plot Culture.*

CHAPTER X

The Rectification of the Abnormal Relations between God and Man

I. The position.

A brief review of the ground thus far traversed will form a bridge to the constructive presentation of the reconciling work of Christ, which is the main theme of this work.

The presuppositions with which I started—presuppositions grounded in the cosmology of which the chief features were roughly sketched—were these, first, that a twofold relation of God, personal and vital (biodynamic), conditions man's normal growth, development, activity, state: second, that this twofold divine relation is in turn conditioned by man's personal relation to God: third, that if man's personal relation is normal, namely, one of reverence, trust, love, appropriate in degree to the stage of his development, God is able to respond, *personally*, with complacence and love; *vitally*, with supplies of His gracious energy, proportionate in quantity and quality to human needs: fourth, that man's personal relation to God is, and has been from almost the very beginning, in varying and too often ever-increasing degrees, abnormal, that is, one of

irreverence, distrust and alienation, disservice, disorderliness, yea, even rebellion and hostility: fifth, that the result of this abnormal relation has been of moral necessity divine condemnation, resentment, anger; that in the divine relations to man the aspect of the Divine Fatherhood, known as rectoral or legal, has had preponderance over that which we style love; that necessity has been imposed on God of punishing by deprivation and positive infliction; that disorder has been produced in the world; that disappointment and sorrow have been caused to the divine heart: and sixth, that the results for men have been disease of nature and enfeeblement of constitution, primarily generic, then individual; disordered functions, wrong activities; affections, perverse either in quality or quantity; and pains and miseries due to their own disordered state, to conscience, and to the reaction of the troubled feelings of God.

It is quite plain that as the evils under which men, nature, and even God Himself suffers are due to the abnormal relation between man and God and God and man, there can be no removal of those evils till the abnormal relation in question has been rectified; in other words, till God and man have been reconciled—God to man and man to God. Inasmuch, however, as the wrong relation originated on the human side, it surely follows that the human relation must first be rectified. If it were right for God to make His relations to man conditional on man's response, it must be consistent, nay necessary, for God to make the renewal of relations dependent on man's rectifying action. The normal relations depended on the fulfil-

ment of certain conditions by man; the abnormal relations resulted from certain conduct of man: the cessation of the abnormal relations and the resumption of normal relations, with, of course, the corresponding results, depended, therefore, on the fulfilment of certain conditions by man.

II. Three views have been taken of the rectification now under consideration.

Whilst all are agreed that the relation of man to God needs to be rectified, considerable differences prevail with regard to the question of the divine relation to man.

1. There are those who altogether deny that in any real sense God needs to be reconciled to man. The idea is scouted as unworthy of Him. At the present moment the majority of those who are regarded or regard themselves as "broad" probably range themselves on this side.

The objections raised to it are traceable—as it seems to me—largely or chiefly to a false conception of the unchangeableness of God, with regard to which a word or two in passing may not be out of place.

Protestant theology, to leave that of the Greek and Romish Churches out of consideration, has strangely enough, on the one hand, laid the strongest emphasis on the unchangeableness of God; whilst, on the other hand, it has also made a strong point of the objective character of the atoning work of Christ, *i.e.* of its having had not merely a manward or subjective, but also a Godward or objective, effect. Yet this second effect of the atonement *primâ facie* conflicts with the

absolute unchangeableness ascribed to the divine nature, mind, purpose, will. This is a curious problem of ecclesiastical psychology.

The inconsistency was veiled by the surreptitious substitution of the divine *law* for the *personality* of God: — a substitution carried out by innumerable thinkers in all good faith; and though unconsciously, as dexterously as if the keenest intellect had purposely devoted all its subtlety to the object.

By some, the divine law was hypostatised as an "eternal law of righteousness," to which God, man, and all beings alike must bow; by others, the relation between God and the law was left in a certain chiaroscuro, which rendered it possible for theologians, and particularly preachers, to pass from the one to the other, from the personal to the legal and the legal to the personal, in other words, from that which admitted of change to that which bore on its very front the stamp of invariability, as the exigencies of argument or practice required.

Unchangeableness has in recent days with equal skill—skill which may be allowed to be unconsciously exercised—been predicated of an aspect of the divine life and character which impresses the mind as of itself deserving the predicate, and which converts its apparent harshness into infinite graciousness.

I refer to the *divine love*, which we are assured is essentially unchangeable. God loves from eternity to eternity, because He is love. He can do no other than love. Whatever else may change in God, His love knows no change. Men may change towards

Him, but His love towards them remains unchanged. So far as change enters into the relations between God and men, it is on the side of men. Their recognition, their sense, their experience, their enjoyment of divine love may vary: but not divine love itself.

But love is the very heart and soul of a normal personal relation. How, then, can it be right to speak as if God could have held an abnormal personal relation which needed to be changed?

2. The most common view has been, and probably still is, that the abnormal relation under consideration can be rectified by the method known as legal or forensic.

The *existing* relation of God to man, it will be remembered I said, may be described as legal, judicial, rectoral. The concession that such is the fact seems of necessity to involve the further concession that the mode of rectification must also be legal, judicial, rectoral, or, to use another term, forensic.

But to insist on this is to forget that the very relation just referred to is itself abnormal, and one of the evil results of sin. How can an abnormal relation be rectified by means corresponding to and determined by that abnormal relation? Or to put the matter more concretely, that God should have to condemn men, to be angry with them, to punish them by deprivation and infliction, is an evil for God, is abnormal. For surely God created man not to the end that He might hold such a relation to him, but one of complacency and love. It is therefore the reverse of the relation He designed. Will this

relation be *rectified by being continued*? or by the substitution of an innocent or perfectly righteous person for those who are really guilty? If man endure the fruit of his own sin, the abnormal relation of God to him is perpetuated. If the Son of God endure judicially the penalty for him, God takes up an abnormal relation to the Son of God. Is this the way to rectify the abnormal divine relation to man? Would it thereby *actually* be rectified? In one sense, indeed, whilst the relation of God to man just referred to may be said to be abnormal in another respect it may rightly be designated normal. Considered in the light of man's conduct, it is just and righteous. God would, in fact, have acted unjustly, unrighteously, if His relation to man had been the same under sin as it would have been apart from sin. This righteousness of the divine relation to man under sin is one of the things that have led so many to conceive that, by transferring the effects of the relation to a substitute or representative, God would remain righteous, and yet man would be freed from condemnation and punishment. But it was not seen that two opposed relations of God may be equally righteous according to the conduct of those to whom He is related. To condemn the man who sins is to act righteously; to love the same man when he turns from sin is also to act righteously: but whereas the former is a relationship opposed to the purpose and mind of God, that is, abnormal, the latter is in full accord with the divine mind and purpose, that is, normal.

The view of the work of Christ too frequently set forth has involved a double abnormality,—first, that

of treating one as a sinner who knew no sin; and second, that of treating those as not being sinners who were sinners. That God's relation to a man who sins should be different from His relation to the same man if he had not sinned, though the difference involves abnormality for God, all will confess who are not hindered by the idea of immutability; but the two forms of abnormality just referred to have been ever felt, of late increasingly, to be saddled in addition with unreality, if not also with injustice.

It is pleaded, indeed, that to characterise a legal relation *ipso facto* as an evil result of an abnormal personal or ethical relation, is to beg the question; and that there is such a thing as a rectoral, governmental, legal relation between God and man which is perfectly normal in its kind; which is maintained by the fulfilment of properly legal conditions on the part both of God and man; which can be changed by conduct that is on an essentially legal plane; and which, therefore, can be re-established by the fulfilment of conditions of an essentially legal nature.

That this is ordinarily the case between men and men, especially between human rulers or authorities, and those who are subject to them, may be freely granted. Whether it be a truly ethical, much more an ideal, relation, is another question; but that it is an actual relation, nay more, that it is perhaps in most cases and increasingly the only possible relation, cannot be questioned. But is it permissible to apply the terms employed to God and man? This is the question. It may be allowed that there is a stage in

the life both of individuals, of nations, and of the race when God is to them, perhaps must be to them, merely the great, glorious, righteous ruler, and when the only *real* relation possible to them is one of—shall I say?—*political loyalty*, the loyalty of well-disposed subjects to a monarch who is admired for his abilities, and reverenced and trusted for his moral qualities. This would seem to have been, at all events, very much the attitude of the best part of the Israelites after their really national life began. They had not attained to a strictly *individual* ethical relation to God, save so far and as often as one and the other was elected for some extraordinary duty or position. Their relation resembled that of dutiful subjects to an earthly monarch, none of whom expect to enter into personal intercourse with the ruler, most of whom indeed shrink from it, but any one of whom may at any time be summoned for an audience or intrusted with some special mission. It was perfectly natural, nay, in a sense normal, for men at such a stage of development, on the one hand, to regard external works performed with goodwill and faithfulness as acceptable services, ensuring the favour of God; and no less for God to treat such men as His loyal subjects: on the other hand, in the case of transgression, to regard certain appointed performances or sacrifices, if offered with confession of fault, penitence, and resolves to be obedient, as adequate grounds of restoration to favour; and no less for God to restore such men to favour on these grounds. The relation in question, however, when it has become abnormal, as also the means of

rectification, though loosely describable as legal, are not such in the ordinary theological sense.

Assuming, however, the relation of Israel to Jehovah to have been, as stated, essentially one of political loyalty; and granting that it was the highest attainable by them; that the sacrificial system of Israel provided those who offered in good faith the prescribed sacrifices and offerings, with a means of atonement—a really valid means—for sins committed at that stage; and that, accordingly, an abnormal relation could be rectified by such means; it does not follow that all this was merely legal, still less that the atonement of Christ is on the legal plane, because the system in question, as the New Testament teaches, pointed forward to, and finds its fulfilment in, Christ and His sacrifice.

If the sacrificial system of the Old Covenant and the sacrifice of Christ have both to be interpreted forensically, the relation of the latter to the former would be analogous to that, say, which the sacrifice of an ox held to that of a pigeon, or the sacrifice of a first-born son to that of the most precious animal. In other words, in Christ's sacrifice all other sacrifices would culminate. No more precious offering could possibly be offered. Because of His personal nature and dignity, its value might well be described as infinite. The difference, however, between the sacrifice of Christ and the Old Testament sacrifices would, on this view, be quantitative, and not qualitative. Its significance, also, would be very much the same as that of human sacrifices generally in relation to animal sacrifices.

The sacrifices of the Old Testament, however, were

not of this kind. When offered in the spirit and manner that constituted an essential element of their acceptableness, *i.e.* of their fitness to rectify the relations that sin had disordered, they were truly ethical or personal.

They were not, indeed, ethical at the highest stage; but they were such at an early and elementary stage. They expressed a genuine sense of departure from duties towards the rightful Lord of Israel. The *duties*, though not purely outward, were not of a deeply inward kind; the sins accordingly had the same character. As was the sense of sin, so were the feelings with which the rectifying ceremonies were observed and sacrifices offered. Sacrifices, offerings, rites, ceremonies which altogether lacked truly ethical content were an abomination; and those who were ready to seek atonement by such means were constantly tempted to avoid really doing and offering what they professed to be doing and offering. Hence, too, an offering of the slightest intrinsic value might transcend in effectiveness for its purpose one of the greatest intrinsic value.

As a matter of fact, the logical effect of estimating the atoning work of Christ, from the point of view just described, was to reduce it to the level of sacrifices that were an abomination to God; though the real purport and drift of the procedure was concealed from view, partly by the personality of the sacrifice, and partly by elements of a totally different nature introduced at a secondary point. Its significance as the fulfilment of the sacrifices of the Old Testament has been too often found,

not in its ethical content, but in the infinitely superior value of Him who was offered up; not in the fact that He could say, "I am come to do Thy will," but that He who died was the Son of God, and as such a person of transcendent majesty and excellence. The worth of His humiliation and obedience was found in the dignity of His person. In other words, as was previously remarked, the differentia of His work was quantitative, not qualitative.

3. The third view is that which may be designated personal.

With few exceptions theologians have shrunk from an express recognition of the personal relation of the work of Christ, though really involved in terms like propitiated, satisfied, and so forth, employed to describe it. The idea has prevailed, first of all, that to suppose God to be personally affected, moved, disturbed by human sin was unworthy of Him, contrary to His dignity; still more to represent Him as personally needing the fulfilment of conditions ere He would or could lay aside His resentment. This latter notion in particular was, and is still, denounced as essentially heathenish, though it is to all appearance sanctioned by no less an authority than the Apostle John when he writes: "Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent His Son to be the *propitiation* (ἱλασμός) for our sins" (1 John iv. 10). To be influenced by "personal" considerations, we are assured, is to be guilty of falling below the level of a true man; how much more must it be unworthy of God! Hence the position taken up that "personal claims, if they are exclusively personal, may be waived." "If this theory

of sin and its punishment were complete," the theory, namely, that " sin is of the nature of a personal offence against the majesty of God, and that punishment is the expression of God's just resentment," it is urged, " God would be free to inflict or remit punishment at His own good pleasure "; consequently reconciliation could take place without the fulfilment of any conditions. If God chose, He could overlook men's sin; that is, the relation they hold to Him and His relation to them could become normal without any conditions. No greater mistake could be made. Indeed, Dr. Dale, from whom I have quoted,[1] shortly after seriously modifies, even if he do not surrender, the position, when he acknowledges that " God has *personal* claims on our reverence and obedience," adding, however, curiously enough, " but the phrase is ambiguous."

In point of fact, however, to put the matter at issue in a nutshell, this legal relation of God to man, being one of the evil effects of a prior cause, namely, the abnormal personal relation of man to God, cannot be changed by any similar relation or procedure. The personal relation was changed from normal to abnormal by ethical or personal conduct; and if it is to be changed from abnormal to normal, it must be as the result of ethical or personal conduct. Properly legal relations can be constituted or dissolved or modified by properly legal influences or conduct; but in this case, as above observed, these legal relations are

[1] See his *Atonement*, pp. 380 ff. Cf. also Park's *Atonement*, etc., pp. 443, 447, 438; Crawford's *Atonement*, p. 176; the Roman Catholic Dörholt's *Lehre von der Genugthuung Christi*, 1891, pp. 236 ff.

among the abnormal relations that have to be set aside.

4. The true element in the legal or forensic conception.

It would appear, then, that the rectification of the abnormal relation of God to man requires the fulfilment of properly personal or ethical conditions.

But is not something more to be said for the view of the subject which has held so large and so influential a place in the thought and life of the Christian Church?

Let it be repeated, that the legal relation of God to man, though abnormal, is righteous and just, nay more, is personally, that is ethically, necessary. God would not have acted as it befitted the Divine Father to act, relatively either to Himself or man, had He not let man see Him as the representative of law and experience the punishment which is due to sin. But the part thus imposed on God involves, notwithstanding, a kind of misrepresentation of God: God, in fact, misrepresents Himself, so to speak, in the act of taking the part on Himself. And yet had He not taken it upon Himself, He would not merely, in a sense, have misrepresented Himself; but would have been chargeable with real inconsistency.

Must not the rectification have regard also to this divine abnormality? Must not the conditions take into account the legal relation which God has had to hold;—do so, that is, directly, manifestly, specifically? Will it be enough simply to abolish the relation by the fulfilment of conditions which have no express affinity with or bearing on the relation abolished? In other words, must not the abnormal relationship of God be

justified, and its specific idea and significance be taken up into the method of rectification? Must not, therefore, the conditions fulfilled, whilst essentially personal or ethical, also include and recognise the properly legal element in some form or other? It would seem fitting, not to say necessary, that the relation of God to the cosmos as the living, abiding originator, upholder, and maintainer of its order, in other words, His legislative, His rectoral, His legal relation, should find specific recognition in the process by which the disturbed relations are rectified. The only alternative would be to conceive of man as either so ignorant of the meaning of his conduct, or so completely the playball, on the one hand, of his natural needs, impulses, and desires, and, on the other hand, of circumstances, that he cannot be treated as in any true sense free and accountable. But against any such conception the moral and religious history of humanity is one long and marvellously varied protest.

As a matter of fact, we shall find further on that the recognition of the law element is interwoven with and taken up into the ethical or personal rectification of relations; for in its inmost essence that element is itself essentially personal and ethical, though theology, following the lead of fallen human nature, has externalised it, that is, has robbed law of the character given it by the Apostle Paul when he speaks of it "as holy, and righteous, and good; yea, spiritual and unto life, though through sin it is unto death" (Rom. vii.).

CHAPTER XI

The Conditions of the Rectification of the Abnormal Relations between God and Man

I. The first condition to be fulfilled is that *man condemn and confess his sin from the point of view of God.*

This condition holds good as between offending and offended men.

If a normal personal relation previously existing between two men who have been estranged by the misconduct of the one is to be re-established, the first requirement is that the misconduct shall be recognised as such by him who is chargeable with it. If a relation has been changed because of a certain behaviour, either the change is an offence or the behaviour is an offence. To resume the relation that existed prior to the change, before the offence is confessed to be an offence, is practically to pronounce the change unjustified; that is, to pronounce the offence to be no offence. *Men* do sometimes resume personal relations in a certain way, even when this has not taken place; but either they are relations of a kind that need not have been disturbed, or which men do not care to allow to be disturbed, or the resumption violates the higher laws of the moral cosmos.

But it is further also necessary, even among men,

that an offender should look at his sin from the point of view of the offended one. This will be allowed, at all events, as far as they themselves are concerned, by all really right-minded men. In proportion as an offended man is a true man, in that proportion does he expect an offender to be, at the very least, willing to accept his estimate of the conduct in question. For an offender to have regard exclusively to his own estimate is instinctively condemned as unsatisfactory. Not less is this felt by an offender, in proportion as he is what he should be.

There are, of course, offended men who are content with less ;—any, yea the most, superficial confession of having done wrong serves their purpose. But this is either because their own moral character is superficial and their moral judgments low, or because they are chiefly concerned about certain inconveniences or disadvantages that attend the state of alienation or enmity; *i.e.* because the higher aspects of the personal life are subordinated to the lower.

There are also offended men whose estimate of offences is exaggerated ; whose *amour propre*, or sensitiveness, or self-importance, causes them to lay undue stress on everything that affects themselves, whether for good or evil. In such cases an offender would need to be untrue to himself ere he could condemn his sin to the satisfaction of the man offended, or else to pretend to feel what he did not feel. As either alternative would be sin, he must be content to leave things as they are. But this rather illustrates and confirms than militates against the principle, which is,

first, that ere old relations are re-established, whoso sins against another shall confess his sin to be sin; and secondly, shall be ready and try to judge it from the point of view of the one sinned against. The principle itself is not touched by defects in its application due to the weakness, or ignorance, or perversity, or indifference of human nature.

All this is most emphatically true of the relation between God and man.

The *starting-point* in the restoration of right relations is *confession of sin*:—"I have sinned and done evil in thy sight." We may fail—men actually do fail—for opposite reasons. First, because they conceive God to be indifferent to their sins. Of what concern can our personal relation be to God? it is asked. Can it matter any more to Him than the feelings of a fly buzzing about our room matters to us? If the fly were capable of personal feelings towards us, and we of the same towards it, and if we could both know the fact, the illustration would hold good; otherwise it is meaningless. Christianity rests on the assumption that our personal relation is of significance to God. We fail also—men often actually fail—because they will not, or do not think of their conduct as really sinful;—on the contrary, they excuse it; or they justify it; or they deny that it has any moral quality.

Here, however, a beginning must be made, or we implicitly accuse God of hardness and unrighteousness; nay more, as John says: "If we say we have no sin, we make Him a liar, and the truth is not in us." We thus make reconciliation more difficult, instead of more easy.

It is not enough, however, simply to recognise conduct as sinful, the further step must be taken of looking at sin from God's side, in *God's light*. We must take God's part against ourselves; we must put ourselves in His place. "Against *Thee*, Thee only have I sinned and done this evil in Thy sight," was the confession of David when he came to himself. God became his standard. In a general sort of way most men who believe in God at all confess that they have sinned; but they do not dream of endeavouring to form God's estimate of their sin. Yet how can a true and thorough restoration be possible until this takes place? One of the most frequent difficulties in the way of men's return to God, namely, their keen sense of the *evils* under which either they or others suffer, has its roots here. They form their own estimate of sin,—a low human estimate,—and they fail to see a just proportion between the sin and the punishment. As soon, however, as a man's eyes are opened; or rather, as soon as he changes his point of vision, the scene also changes, and he humbles himself beneath the mighty hand. Sometimes the transformation is wonderful. But until it has taken place, any new unexpected development of sin's *results*, or phase of its punishment, may suddenly convert the beginning of self-condemnation into self-justification; the beginning of confession of sin into a reproach or complaint of injured innocence.

This does not mean that every man's view of sin shall be identical. Men are not identical to God; their sin and its sinfulness vary in themselves, and

therefore God's estimate of them varies. Each man is himself, and it is our *individual* sin and sinfulness that we are to confess. Theologians and others have been too much in the habit of estimating sin in the abstract, or sin, if one may so say, in its ideal essence; and identifying every sinner with a sinner at his blackest vilest, lowest. They have spoken as if all sinners should confess sin in this sense. Yet there was truth in the exaggeration,—truth which we must seek carefully to conserve. Sin in its very beginning has for the law and goal of its nature, sin at its worst, sin at its consummation. A sinful man has entered on a course of conduct and development which tends to a goal, and that goal is the utmost sin of which a human being is capable. One may doubt whether any man is truly prepared for restoration until he have got a glimpse of this awful fact. But it is just this fact that God sees and estimates:—He beholds the full-grown plant in the seed. At the same time, this is not to represent our actual sin at any one point as being *fully grown*, *fully developed* sin. God sees it as it is,—an awful potentiality; but a less awful actuality: and that is what we, too, are to see, or try to see, be willing to see. As a matter of safety it may be or seem better to err on the side of over than underestimate, if the former be really possible; but truth is better than either.

The idea that sin is infinite, because God against whom we sin is infinite,[1]—an idea of which great use

[1] "Offensa infiniti Dei infinitas pœnas meretur," Quenstedt in Luthardt's *Dogmatik*, p. 228. "Reatus ex peccatis totius humani generis ortus erat infinitus, utpote in infinitam justitiam Dei impingens," Gerhardi, *Loci*

has been made in the discussions of the atoning work of Christ,—stands in the way of what I am urging. If God regards sin as infinite, it is clearly impossible for us to look at it from His point of view. But this reasoning carries us too far. If sin is infinite because God is infinite, then, as was pointed out in a previous connection, by parity of reasoning, everything done by man towards God must be equally infinite—every upward glance of adoring love, every yearning to serve and please, must be infinite; yea, of infinite merit, even as the least sin is of infinite demerit. But untenable as the position is in itself, the underlying idea or purpose was right; for that was to take the judgment of God as our standard—the infallibly true divine judgment; instead of the fallible human judgment.

Behind this mistake lay the other mistake, that all men are equally sinful and guilty in God's sight, and that the least sin is in His view as heinous as the most heinous. Yet this mistake was elsewhere rectified, especially by means of the distinction drawn between venial and deadly sins: a distinction which, however, was also again withdrawn when it was affirmed that all sins in themselves are "peccata mortalia," and not one "veniale," save through Christ.[1]

Unless the condition under consideration is fulfilled, how will it be possible for us to "justify God when He speaketh," or to acknowledge Him "clear when He

Theol. I. iv. p. 604. So, too, Bellarmine: "Peccatum est offensa infinita"; see Gerhard, *ut supra*, p. 605. Cf. Dorner, *Glaubenslehre*, ii. 560.

[1] Cf. Luthardt, p. 166; and Rothe's *Dogmatik*, vol. i. 290, note from Hollaz.

judgeth," as David says (Ps. lvii. 4). Yet one day, at all events, this will be necessary.

If sin is ever to be eradicated, this condition must be fulfilled; for as our own free act, either in the way of acceptance, when hereditary bias is in question, or of origination, in the case of our own acts, sin must become a matter of consciousness and judgment before it can be renounced. There is no such thing as involuntary, unconscious, that is magical, purification. And if we are to be really purified, the divine estimate must be taken. This is the significance, and the infinite consolation of that prayer of David, "Search *Thou* me, O God, and know *Thou* my heart: try *Thou* me, and know *Thou* my thoughts: and see *Thou* what way of wickedness is in me" (Ps. cxxxix.). The Epistle of John is largely dominated by this idea. We are to "walk in the *light*" of God. "God is greater than our heart, and knoweth all things."

In short, there can be no true rectification unless there is at the least the genuine, conscious purpose and effort to look at sin from the point of view of God, to see it in His light. It may be questioned, moreover, whether this is possible unless there is also a deep conviction that its awfulness, both relatively to God directly, and relatively to God and man indirectly, is something that transcends all our power to realise:—and such a conviction, whilst not necessarily presupposing clear vision and deliberate estimate, does imply the kind of insight which comes to men when the Spirit of God begins His gracious work.

II. The second condition is that *man must experience*

sorrow and pain because of the grief and pain which he has caused God.

Repentance is never without an element of sorrow and pain; but all depends on whether they relate to ourselves or to those who have been injured and offended.

Among right-minded men it is recognised as a principle that an offender should feel sorrow for his offence. It is not enough that he condemn his conduct; it is not enough that he condemn it from the point of view of the person offended: he is expected also to feel and exhibit grief. Indeed, it is scarcely possible for the former to be present without the latter. Doubtless, temperament and other natural characteristics have something to do with the degree of the *feeling* that arises in connection with the consciousness of wrong-doing; but some feeling, or something equivalent thereto, must be experienced.

What was remarked under the last head concerning men's ordinary treatment of offences applies here also. They are often too indifferent, or insensitive, or they form too low an estimate of the significance of personal relationships and of conduct that interferes with them, to care very greatly about the degree of feeling offenders may exhibit. They feel too little themselves to be very exacting in their demands on the feeling of others. Not always, indeed. Some are over-exacting. But neither the one class nor the other would doubt that to *feel* is the right and proper thing, if they could be got to pronounce a careful and deliberate judgment.

Surely no one can be so hardened and dead, so

utterly destitute of the true idea of personal relationship, as not to confess that for a man to be troubled and pained at his own shortcomings and sins is better than the reverse. At all events, to mock at it or to regard it with carelessness is to betray the gravest demoralisation.

There are, however, two sorts of emotions of the kind under consideration. In the one case, they *refer to the offender himself*; in the other, *to the person offended.*

The vexation, chagrin, and pain which men experience when they have committed an offence frequently have reference to the discredit, or disgrace, or suffering, or loss they have brought on *themselves.* That wrong has been done they do not deny; but the shame and vexation which the recognised fact causes is due to its bearing upon themselves. Sometimes, as in the case of the prouder sort,—of those who have national, or family, or social, or official reputation to maintain,—it may arise at the thought of the loss of self-respect, of their having degraded themselves, or perhaps at the thought of having sullied the honour of their family, or nation, or what not? They are ashamed of themselves for having lowered themselves, or those whom they identify more or less closely with themselves. It may even be due to the sense of having fallen short of their own ideal. There is a good deal of this in certain circles; and it is of advantage in its way: nay more, it is often a great safeguard against certain forms of sin.

Some men, again, have a positive distaste, or dislike, or aversion to certain forms of sin; and when they fall

into them the said feeling turns against themselves, instead of going out towards others. Hence expressions like, "I am disgusted with myself: I loathe myself." This may have been, in part, the meaning of clothing oneself with sackcloth and ashes, and in other ways rendering the person unsightly.

In other cases, again, offenders may experience vexation, irritation at themselves for causing pain, or loss, or injury to themselves by their folly or fault. Such states of mind sometimes, in fact, lead to or end in the despair which seeks an escape by means of self-destruction. But this is not the true state of mind. Shakespeare saw this, and saw too what it ought to be, when he says—

"DUKE. Then was your sin of heavier kind than his.
JULIET. I do confess it, and repent it, father.
DUKE. 'Tis meet so, daughter: but lest you do repent
As that the sin hath brought you to this shame,—
Which sorrow is always *toward ourselves, not Heaven*:
Showing we would not spare Heaven, as we love it,
But as we stand in fear,—
JULIET. I do repent me, as it is *an evil*;
And take the shame with joy."

Measure for Measure, Act II. ii.

The vexation and the sorrow must refer to that which is inflicted on the offended one, if it is to be true, —if it is to hold the place of a condition on which personal relations are to be rectified. Every true man would be still further repelled if he saw that the offender, whilst confessing his offence, was troubled solely on account of its effect on himself; but he would feel that hindrances were removed if he saw that the offender was suffering what he himself suffered,—

suffering it, too, because he himself suffered it. That would be in true harmony with the essential nature and law of the personal life. As Shakespeare says again—

> "Wherever sorrow is, relief would be.
> If you do sorrow at my grief in love
> By giving love, your sorrow and my grief
> Are both extermined."
>
> *As You Like It*, Act III. v.

It is quite possible that grief and shame referring to ourselves, and grief and shame for the grief and shame of the offended one, may not be clearly separated or distinguished; but without the latter a necessary condition of reconciliation is unfulfilled. The truer a man is, the more completely will he look away from the effect of his sin on himself,—or at least try to do so,—and bewail its effect on the person against whom it has been committed. He will exclaim: "What does my pain and shame matter? I deserve them! But they are undeserved by him whom I have injured or grieved! For that I am troubled;—it is his pain and grief that pains and grieves me; it is for him I am distressed!" When he can say with Angelo—

> "I am sorry that such sorrow I procure,
> And so deep sticks it in my penitent heart,
> That I crave death more willingly than mercy;
> 'Tis my deserving, and I do entreat it,"
>
> *Measure for Measure*, Act v. i.

then he has really repented, and reconciliation follows.

Not otherwise is it between man and God. We must not only condemn our sins in this light,—which is to take His part against ourselves; but we must also take upon ourselves His sorrow and dishonour—the sorrow and dishonour we have caused Him. There is

no other way in which the grief and pain of one who has been unjustly treated can be removed:—it must be taken upon the shoulders, or rather, upon the heart and emotions, of the offender. We call it sympathy, and sympathy it is; but the effect of sympathy in this case is to bear away the suffering which is shared;—when personal suffering because of personal wrong is thus sympathised with or borne, both the wrong-doer and the wrong-endurer cease to suffer:—the specifically personal suffering which is here in question is removed, —*such sympathy becomes a sort of scapegoat.*

This is altogether true with regard to God; for what God suffers is exclusively of a personal nature. His life, His emotions, are affected; not His nature, not His constitution. In man's case injury may have been inflicted on his very nature, as well as pain caused to his heart. When that is the case, clearly whilst the latter is relieved by the sympathy of which I am speaking, the former is left untouched. None the less is a right-minded man reconciled; and though he may be a lifelong sufferer through the misconduct of one to whom he is reconciled, the personal breach is healed for ever.

When I say that we must take upon ourselves the divine grief and suffering, that we must grieve and sorrow for God's grief and sorrow, I mean, of course, to the extent of our fault. Here, as in connection with self-condemnation, there may be a sort of exaggeration; just as there may be the reverse. Some earnest men have written and spoken as if they ought to endure the very pains of hell; sometimes, too, they have worked

themselves, or tried to work themselves, into an anguish almost beyond their power to bear; they have, at all events, had the idea that because they were not utterly crushed, because they actually could and did bear the shame and sorrow they felt, it could not be adequate. Possibly not; but possibly yes. Men have not all grieved God equally, because they have not sinned equally; and it is an error to speak as if all would be measured by one and the same standard.

The condition to which attention has been called is in accordance with the essential nature of personal life. We are so constituted, as has been previously remarked, that our activities shall be accompanied or followed by feelings of pleasure or of pain. This is true of the inner no less than of the outward man: it is true of our intellectual and affectional activities, no less than of those of the body. Besides the feelings which may be described as natural, there are others which accompany or follow upon free actions, considered in relation to the *law of right*, *i.e.* to the indwelling idea, which is designed to be at once the law and goal or ideal of life and development. These are called forth when moral judgment is pronounced. Such feelings, quantitatively regarded, may be more or less intense; as to quality, they are shame or vexation, or foreboding of evil or despair, and the like. As remarked already, these feelings relate to ourselves. In themselves, too, they are legitimate enough. We are constituted so that we must thus suffer when we violate the law of our spiritual nature, no less than that we must correspondingly suffer when we violate the law of our bodily nature.

But there is another phase of our being to be considered. The one just referred to may be called the centripetal: there is also a centrifugal aspect. We are constituted for *altruism*. We are meant to go out of ourselves; though unquestionably it is equally necessary for us to maintain ourselves, seeing that in neither respect can we be what we should be without the other. An altruism which should injure the self would clearly soon leave no self to be altruistic: altruism of this kind would be moral suicide. No less is self-centredness moral suicide, for the self that goes not forth stagnates, degenerates, dies.

The principle just laid down embraces the particular experiences dealt with above. If a man sins against man or God, it is right that his moral judgment should cause him pain on his own account; but so far as he is designed to be altruistic, he must regard his conduct from the side of man and God, and both *judge* himself, so to speak, *altruistically*, and *feel* with *regard to his sin altruistically*. His sin actually causes pain to others: —consequently, in virtue of this altruistic aspect of his conduct, when he pronounces judgment on it, he ought to experience pain because of their pain, just as he feels pain on his own account. Were a man incapable of altruism, he might sin and feel shame and pain in presence of his higher self, because he had violated the law of his own life, without at all taking into consideration those whom he sinned against.[1] But the altruistic element requires him to include others, and to feel

[1] There is actually a good deal of this in the world. It characterises men in dealing with classes or nationalities different from their own.

pain and shame on their account no less than on his own.

As has already been hinted, the two conditions—self-condemnation from God's point of view, and grief for the grief of God, constitute what Scripture understands by repentance. It is godly judgment of our conduct, and godly sorrow for its effect upon God.

III. The third condition is that *a desire be cherished to atone, to offer satisfaction, to make amends for the wrong committed.*

The more sincerely men condemn themselves in the true light, and the more genuinely they enter into the sorrow inflicted on the heart of those against whom they have sinned, the more earnest will be their desire, if possible, to make amends: yet the deeper will be their conviction, or at all events the stronger their feeling, that such compensation or satisfaction is as far removed as possible from being a purchase of favour. On the other hand, the truer an offended one is, the less possible will it be for him to make compensation a formal condition of the resumption of right personal relations; though, at the same time, the profounder will be his satisfaction and the purer his joy if an offender manifest the desire to make amends. It cannot be demanded as a condition; it cannot be offered as a condition; and yet neither the offender nor the offended one can be in the supremest measure content, unless there is the desire and effort, if not the accomplishment. This is one of the antinomies which are characteristic of the personal or ethical life.

All this holds good of human relations. But it equally applies to the relation between man and God. We cannot purchase God's favour. If the Bible, especially the New Testament, teaches one thing more clearly than another, it is that the favour and love of God are His free gift; that they are this no less to the righteous than to the sinful; that the sinful otherwise are without hope. Yet it is equally clear that in some sense or other compensation, satisfaction, is due to God and is claimed by God. God is rejoiced when He sees us yearn to make amends; but God is offended if we think to purchase His love by anything we can do. These two apparently contradictory things are brought together by David in one of his Psalms, when he says, first: "Thou *delightest not in sacrifice*; else would I give it: Thou hast no pleasure in burnt offering. The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit: a broken and contrite heart, O God, Thou wilt not despise." And afterwards: "Do good in Thy good pleasure unto Zion: build Thou the walls of Jerusalem. Then *shalt Thou delight in the sacrifices* of righteousness, in burnt offering and whole burnt offering: then shall they offer bullocks upon Thine altar."[1] Sacrifices designed to purchase God's favour He desires not: sacrifices offered by him who is returning to true personal relations are His delight.

There are two ways of making amends or offering satisfaction, or atoning (*sühnen*),—atoning in the sense known to all who have a deeper and intenser conscious-

[1] Ps. li. 16–19. How some critics can find in the antithesis between these two verses a mark of double authorship passes my comprehension.

ness of their wrong,—namely, *first*, doing honour to the law that has been violated by undergoing adequate punishment and rendering adequate obedience; and *second*, undoing the mischief done, and doing, if possible, greater good. These two ways constitute really one whole, not alternatives; they supplement, do not exclude, each other; though sometimes the one element may be more prominent, sometimes the other:—that, however, depends on the persons concerned, on the circumstances, and on the nature of the wrong.

There can scarcely be a doubt that the desire to atone does assume the forms just mentioned. Men are not satisfied with self-condemnation, be it ever so severe and true; nor with grieving at the grief and pain which their conduct has caused: no, they recognise, yea, they sometimes feel overwhelmingly, that something more is necessary; and *that more* is in essence what has been described. For whom and for what, or by whom and by what, it is needed or demanded may not always be quite clear to them. Their own conception of it, if asked, will be found to have been determined by various causes. But as to the *need*, there is no doubt; that which is highest and deepest in them cries out for it; feelings which transcend, and even silence, all other considerations compel them to demand that the atonement shall be exacted.

At the very bottom it is God whose claims are advocated, whose part is taken, by that in us which, whilst most truly our own, yea, our very selves, is also most truly His and of Him. The divine energy and

idea which constitutes us will not let its own root and source suffer wrong unatoned.

The desire in question is as completely congruous to the very nature of personality as are the other conditions which were considered. As a personal being, man is meant to be, in a secondary sense, a creator, and therefore capable of serving and giving. In the highest and fullest sense, this capability belongs of course to God alone: but God made us in His image that we might, in our measure, share this divine privilege. To desire to *serve* God, to offer *gifts* to Him, to make Him, as it were, richer for our existence and life,—that is, an efflux of the deepest in us—of our central essence. God does not intend us merely to receive,—not even from Him. It is doubtless true, as David says: "All things come of Thee, and of Thine own have we given Thee:—all this store that we have prepared to build Thee an house for Thine holy name cometh of Thine hand, and is all Thine own" (Chron. xxix. 14 f.); yet whilst there was first receiving, there was secondarily giving.

This law of our constitution is not abolished by sin: it only takes another form. The impulse of the offender ought to be, to make up for his shortcomings and misdoings; even as the impulse of the righteous is to render service and to glorify the name of his God. To aim at this is in truest harmony with the natural dignity of man: and the manhood of man is the last thing God ignores, or would consent to weaken.

Perverse modes of effecting the purpose aimed at may be, and have been, adopted. So, for example,

when God has been regarded as a mere exactor, or ruler, or tyrant, and men therefore have endeavoured to satisfy Him as such. But instead of being pleased, God was then insulted. Such has been to a large extent, even if not exclusively, the idea of heathen humanity. Sacrifices and offerings were designed to have an effect on Him similar to that which bribes and gifts were seen to have on earthly, especially Eastern, rulers and officials. Against this notion protest is constantly raised in the Old Testament. The prophets condemn sacrifices that had this purpose: they commend and require those which were meant to be a service or compensation of love. But the error of the heathen, the error of Israel, and the kindred errors now observable in Christendom do not abolish the truth,—they confirm it.

According to the view which is commonly regarded as orthodox in all the Churches,—Greek, Romish, Protestant,—the satisfaction God required could be rendered either by the punishment of the impenitent guilty themselves, or by the transference of the punishment due to the guilty to a righteous representative or substitute. I have pointed out, however, that in neither of these ways can the abnormal relation of God to man, which is the fountainhead of the evils that call for redemption, be rectified. At the same time, one cannot but feel that some true principle or other must underlie ideas which have held almost universal sway over the minds of men. For, as was pointed out, the heathen have taken essentially the same view of satisfaction: and the strongest condemnation which critics can pronounce

on the so-called orthodox doctrine is that it is not Christian, even though it be Jewish; in other words, to describe it as practically heathenish. A truth does, however, underlie it, as I have repeatedly stated. That truth seems to me to be the one which has just been very summarily indicated.

CHAPTER XII

Presuppositions of the Fulfilment of the conditions of the Reconciliation of God and Man

We have seen that these conditions are essentially personal, and are threefold: *first*, recognition and confession of sin from the point of view of God; *secondly*, grief and sorrow for the sorrow caused by sin to God; and *thirdly*, sincere willingness and desire to make satisfaction and amends for the wrong done to God.

The question now is, How shall the fulfilment of these conditions on the part of the human race be brought about? It is men who have offended: it is men therefore who in some way or other must be brought to confess their sin, to be truly penitent, and to make amends.

With this statement, heterodox and orthodox alike will agree in part, though each will in part dissent from it. The *former* will agree with the demand that *men* themselves shall fulfil the conditions of confession and penitence, or, in one word, shall repent; but they object altogether to the idea of offering satisfaction or making amends: the *latter* will agree with the conditions laid down, especially with the last mentioned;

but strongly object to the idea of any of them being in any sense or degree fulfilled by *sinners themselves*.

Eliminating the third of the conditions as unworthy of God, the heterodox regard the other two as so obvious and natural that anything of the nature of special divine intervention and sacrifice seems needless, and therefore absurd. "Of course, of course," they exclaim; "men must confess and lament their sins, as committed against God; but that lies within their own power: it is a duty plainly devolving on them."

The orthodox, on the other hand, are so impressed with the necessity, in particular, of the third condition, and the impossibility of the fulfilment of any one of the three apart from divine intervention and sacrifice, that they will condemn the words I have used as necessitating—if true—the conclusion that Christ lived, suffered, and died for no clear purpose.

But heterodox and orthodox are equally mistaken. Both alike have underestimated the significance and difficulty of the conditions in question, even of the first two, with the result, in the case of the *former*, that a superficial view has been taken, first, of the divine attitude towards man and his sin; and then, of what man needed to do in order to recover the divine favour: in the case of the *latter*, that they transferred the difficulty to the domain of public law, and sought, by enhancing its claims to the utmost, to demonstrate the need for the righteousness and sufferings of one, the dignity of whose person gave them infinite value.

The constructive exposition of the method by which

the conditions were fulfilled must, however, establish their necessity and exhibit their rationale.

If the principles expounded at the outset of this discussion be true, it is obvious that none of the conditions described in the last chapter can be fulfilled apart from specific divine action—divine action *ad hoc*. The constitution of the cosmos, or rather of the theocosm, would be violated; in other words, a miracle, according to the false definition of it frequently given, would be performed, if they were fulfilled without such intervention. But the very supposition is contradictory and absurd.

Every created member of the great system which I have termed the theocosm is subject to the law that its environment must work upon it, nay, more in it, if it is to grow, develop, and act normally; though, of course, the fact must not be overlooked that every factor is to some extent environment, even whilst it is itself environed. In other words, action, reaction, interaction, are conditions of the normal state of created things, alike in their distinct and in their corporate existence.

What the whole created system is to its parts, and what the parts are to each other, that, as I have repeatedly pointed out, God is to the whole system, yea, pre-eminently to the subordinate system or organism which we term humanity, with its myriads of subsystems down to the individual man.

God is the environment of humanity considered as a part of *nature*, just as He is the environment of the world's fauna and flora:—this is what may be termed His immanent relation. But He is also the environ-

ment of men transcendently, and as such is related to them both personally and vitally.

What was said with regard to the cosmic system, namely, that it must operate as such on and in its factors if they are to develop and live normally, holds true of God, that too both in His immanent and transcendent relation to men. Indeed, the function discharged by the cosmic system may not untruly be represented as discharged by God in His immanent relation, seeing that it is His energy and law that originated and are constantly evolving the cosmos. It is surely inconceivable that the law of God's immanent relation to man should be suspended in His transcendent personal and dynamic relation to men.

There is this difference, however, that whereas *immanently* God, that is, through the cosmos,—with the limitations previously laid down, God and the cosmos, as has just been hinted, might for the present purpose be interchanged,—works in part, though not of self-necessitation invariably, as some think, according to strictly natural law;—*transcendently*, God and man stand over against each other as personal independent wholes,—within the limits, of course, set by the fact that whilst God is self-existently independent, man has only a derived independence,—and God works on man, according to ethical law, unto ethical ends; in other words, He works in harmony with the constitution of man, for its upbuilding and renovation.

The modification introduced by the power of self-control conferred on man does not, however, essentially change or nullify the law. It still holds good that on

fitting action of man's divine environment depends man's power of fitting reaction; in a very special sense and measure, therefore, his power of fulfilling the conditions of the *rectification* of relations, which by his own personal conduct have been disturbed.

Under normal circumstances, as we saw, the action of God on men is twofold, namely, personal and biodynamic or vital. The abnormal circumstances due to sin have not affected the necessity of such twofold action, though, as we shall see, they have seriously modified the character of the respective modes of action. Otherwise expressed, God must work for the reconciliation of men; or, expressed more exactly, He must work on and in men that they may fulfil the conditions of reconciliation, both by the method of revelation or manifestation, and by that of quickening and energising or potentiation.

I. Let us consider, first of all, the *personal* action of God, which is necessary if men are to fulfil the conditions of the rectification of the abnormal relation of God to themselves, as laid down in the previous chapter.

1. *God Himself must bring home to the human mind His judgment of sin; the grief and pain caused Him by sin, and the nature of the compensation or satisfaction due on account of sin.*

(1) Into the inner, essential, and rational necessity of such divine action we shall best gain insight by approaching the subject from the side of human practice and experience. Concrete human analogies are here our safest, nay more, our truest, guide. For whilst they are no whit more anthropomorphic than the most

abstract of reasonings, they are controlled by those ethical principles which are the deepest, the most abiding, the most sacred, as well as the all-embracing elements of human nature.

That God should discharge this function is in exact accordance with human procedure. It is in an analogous way that human offenders are enabled, either directly or indirectly, to fulfil the conditions of reconciliation between themselves and those whom they have offended. The modes in which the end is actually attained doubtless vary; but means are adopted, direct or indirect, of one kind or another, either by the persons primarily concerned, or by society and its institutions, to bring home to offenders the significance of their misconduct to those who have had to suffer from it.

Children, for example, are taught more or less thoroughly by their parents, relatives, and teachers; nay, not only *taught*, but *sometimes compelled*, to feel and realise the meaning of their conduct for others; and where this training has had due effect, they spontaneously endeavour to put themselves, to a greater or less degree, in the position of those against whom they themselves have sinned. The rule, "put yourselves in his place," becomes to a certain extent entwined with consciousness.

When men arrive at a riper age they are brought, in addition, under the influence of the judgments pronounced and carried out in particular cases by the authorities whose recognised function it is to ensure that a certain class of offenders shall, as far as possible, be forced to apply an objective standard to their con-

duct. Public opinion, in other forms, also contributes its share towards the same result. But perhaps the most effective aid is, or may be, personal experience of the endurance of wrong. When we ourselves have had to suffer, if those who cause our suffering fulfil the conditions referred to, we are content; if they fail, we suffer all the more; and this experience sometimes, though, alas! by no means always, prepares us for appreciating the significance of offences we ourselves commit. There is still another way in which we are enabled to enter into the judgments and feelings of those whom we offend or injure:—and that is when they themselves let us see what our conduct means for and to them.

Considered, as one may say, in the abstract, this surely is the true way; and, whether viewed in relation to the offender or in relation to the one who is offended, ought to prove the most effective of all. For who should be able, regarded objectively, to reveal what an offence really signifies as clearly and exactly as he against whom it has been committed? Owing, however, to the differences in men's temperament, constitution, development, moral training, and so forth, the significance of acts done to them necessarily and greatly differs. And as to the interpretation put on them by others—that in particular is apt not only to vary, but to be very imperfect. It may be let pass; sometimes it may seem true; sometimes it may even be really truer than that of the man offended; but this is not the rule, and, ideally considered, ought surely never to be the case.

Considered in the abstract, too, one would imagine

that what an offended person says or does with a view to showing the meaning of an offence would not only be truer, but also more effectual than any other means, in opening an offender's eyes, and preparing him for the fulfilment of the conditions on which the realisation of reconciliation depends.

In point of fact, however, it is often, not to say most frequently, the least effective. As a rule, unless it be in the relation of parents to children,—with regard to which Elizabeth Barrett Browning is profoundly right when she says—

> "A mother never is afraid
> Of speaking angerly to any child,
> Since love, she knows, is justified of love,"—
> *Aurora Leigh.*

and even then by no means invariably, the moment a man sets about impressing on an offender the true nature and bearings of his conduct, not only does he harden himself and shut eyes and heart alike, but even feels inclined to turn upon the offended one and treat him as though he were committing an injustice.[1]

There can be no doubt, however, that the fulfilment of the conditions of reconciliation does presuppose that the judgment of the offended one has, either indirectly or directly, been brought to the knowledge of the offender —been brought *home* to him. But as the rightness of that which I have thus represented as an ethical necessity has been and is still commonly questioned, it may be advisable to dwell for a short time on the point.

That in itself it is right and proper for an offended

[1] Cf. Cain's conduct towards God relatively to Abel.

one to act as has been mentioned is surely involved in the fact that an offender is after all a self-conscious, self-controlled being; that the offence he commits is his own act; that, according to the supposition, it is committed with the knowledge that it is wrong; that to ignore the act altogether, or to treat it as if it were not wrong, is therefore in reality to fail in treating the offender as a personal being, that is, to fail in rendering him due respect and honour. When a man resents no notice being taken of his good or kind acts—and who does not? who should not?—still more, when a man resents the treatment of his good acts as evil, what is the reason? The deepest reason, I think, is that his power of conscious self-control, *i.e.* his personality, that which is most essential to him, that which constitutes his dignity as a man, is slighted; the less deep reason, though possibly the one most distinctly present to consciousness, is that his moral honour is touched. But if the first reason influences him, what follows? Surely that *not to recognise and treat his wrong acts as wrong* is equally to slight his personality, his essential dignity. A man's deliberate, conscious acts ought to be acknowledged and accepted as the acts of a *man*, whatever be their character and effects; whereas to ignore them, as by pursuing the reverse course to the one under consideration we should be doing, is to treat his acts as those either of an automaton or of an imbecile, or of a creature too childish, too thoughtless, too ignorant, or too much under the control of prejudice or passion to be properly accountable, *i.e.* to be fairly and truly regarded as the author of his own acts. This latter is the

modern tendency. As a reaction against exaggeration and undue severity, it may be excusable; but it cannot be regarded as either justifiable in itself or good. A man needs to be accepted as he gives himself; and if not thus accepted, he is practically insulted;—practically, and in the highest sense, injustice is thus done him.

Abstractly, therefore, as was remarked, it is the duty of an offended man to contribute his share *directly*, if it be needed, towards putting an offender in a position to fulfil the condition under examination.

The boundary line between this duty and the sin of condemning unjustly is, however, so easily crossed that, in the concrete, men do wisely and well, unless they are more sure of themselves than the vast majority of them can be, to leave offenders to themselves, even when they are not "brought to their senses," as the saying is, by the action either of their own conscience or of public opinion, or in more marked cases by the recognised authorities.

Action of the kind just discussed is needed for each of the three conditions which are to be fulfilled:—the estimate of the *offence* as an offence, of the *pain or sorrow* it has caused, and of the *compensation* which is due.

In some way or other—it may be in one or all of the modes to which reference has been made—those who are offended are under obligation to make clear to offenders the heinousness of their offences; and to enable them to estimate both the injury they have inflicted, and the compensation which ought to be made.

As a matter of fact, this does actually take place between man and man. A right-minded man not only regards himself as wounded afresh, as I already indi-

cated, if the offender forms a low estimate in either respect; but, where this is the case, feels spontaneously impelled to bring his duty home to him. He neither can nor ought to rest content without doing what lies in his power. Nay more, he is often driven, in opposition to a deliberate purpose to take no notice of offences, as by an instinct of his nature, to endeavour to attain the end under consideration.

From what was previously advanced, it will be obvious that the chief difficulty lies in the way of action bearing on the third of the conditions to be fulfilled. Can a true-minded man, it is asked, do anything to impress on an offender even the bare fact that compensation is an element in the process of reconciliation; much more his own estimate of its nature? Is not this utterly alien to his spirit? So, undoubtedly, in one aspect it would seem to be. He cannot certainly wish to convey the idea that a normal personal relation is a matter of purchase. But so far as a sense of disappointment cannot but come over him when there is insensibility to this aspect of the matter, and so far as a higher satisfaction must needs fill him when a sincere desire is exhibited to make good the wrong inflicted, so far must he also wish that this too may be brought home to the offender. He may and will prefer that he should come to see it of himself; or rather, what is truer to the facts, that the indirect means working to that end should serve their purpose. But this very desire, and the implicit, not explicit, approval of the employment of means to the end, involve the principle in question. For good reasons, a man may shrink for his own part from using means

to attain a certain end; but the principle is conceded if he approve both end and means, though he may refrain from personal action, either as a matter of expediency, or owing to a mistaken conception of his duty, or for less worthy reasons. In one way or another, men actually do in the long-run give expression, if they can, to their own view and estimate of the course an offender ought to adopt in order to atone for, or make good, the wrong he has inflicted.

If all this be true with regard to man in relation to man, it is even more emphatically true with regard to God in relation to man. As far as men are concerned, we are so constantly under the influence of the judgments which our fellow-men form and express of our conduct, that we easily overlook the fact of our estimate of our own conduct towards them being moulded and determined by their estimate thereof. It is accordingly only too natural for us to overlook the necessity for the divine judgment on conduct being made known to men. But if God do not pronounce judgment on sin, if He do not lay bare its true nature, if He do not make men understand the pain they had caused Him, and realise what they owe Him on account of sin, how is it to be done? Men's views of these things as they affect themselves and their fellow-men are often untrue enough;—never, perhaps, less true than when they are most severe, or even exaggerated,—that, too, just because they miss what is deepest and most essential: and this untruth is too often a hindrance to personal reconciliation. How, then, shall they be in a position to form a true estimate of what sin is to God? God

alone can judge it truly: God alone can therefore enable man to judge it truly.

It may be thought, however, that no specific action *ad hoc* on God's part is needed; it may seem that, as men ought of themselves to judge rightly, they are also able to do so. Some who take up this position are persons in whom God has already acted through Christ, yea, acted specially;—persons who, in consequence, find it so natural, fitting, and right to judge thus that they assume it to be within the reach of every man just as he is, that is, to use the scriptural description, of the *natural* or *psychical* man. But not even within Christendom do we find unanimity as regards this matter; much less do we find it outside Christendom. "The natural man," in the biblical sense, "knoweth not the things of God." Regarded from the true point of view, such a man is doubtless in an unnatural, rather than in a *natural*, state; but man is actually in the state in which what ought to be natural and easy is unnatural and hard, or even impossible. So in the case under consideration. Human history, apart from Christianity, testifies only too plainly to the need of the special action of which I am speaking. The more awful has been man's sinfulness, the less true his estimate of its significance. Christendom, with all its defects, exhibits an ever-growing improvement in this respect. The judgment of sin has perhaps never been so true as at the present moment, and never before were so many things branded as sinful as now.

The question therefore forces itself on us, why in heathenism sin and insensibility to its meaning con-

stantly increased; whilst in Christendom, or rather, from the earliest history of Judaism down to our own day, the reverse process has taken place. If, as only too often happens, men look solely to the latter, and credit their fellow-men everywhere with Christian ideas and feelings, the conclusion is natural, that special action on God's part was unnecessary: but, the premises being defective, the inference is false.

Men have, of course, feared deity, and their lives have been darkened by terrible anticipations of injury or vengeance from the powers whom they had wittingly or unwittingly offended: they have tried also to propitiate, and even satisfy by compensation; but how far removed from the truth! Indeed, so alien from the truth does all this seem to many nowadays, notwithstanding their profounder appreciation of sin and keener sense of its mischief; or, otherwise put, so unnatural, so contrary to human nature, do such ideas and conduct appear, that the significance of the facts entirely escapes them, and they run to the opposite extreme of denying that there can be anything in God or on God's part to account for the difference between Christendom and heathendom, and of affirming that the Christian attitude is perfectly natural to man as man. Were this phenomenon not so common, one would count its occurrence in a so-called age of scientific reasoning impossible.

(2) Consider, secondly, the significance of the experience thus briefly described. We will look at it, first, from the human side.

To enter into another man's *estimate of my offence*

against him is never a simply intellectual experience, never a matter of mere thinking. A man's apprehension of another's estimate of his conduct is not the same thing as his apprehension of an ordinary fact of nature or history, or of a truth of science or philosophy. No; it means, at the very least, the appropriation of an estimate of praiseworthiness, or, as in the present case, of blameworthiness: possibly of an accompanying feeling of moral aversion, affecting not only the conduct but the person. Such a man therefore condemns himself, and more or less despises himself.

What this is, and how widely it differs from any purely intellectual experience, everyone knows who has passed through it. Compare, for example, the state of mind of a man who simply knows that someone else has committed an offence which either an acquaintance, or society, or the public authority condemns; and that of a man who knows and feels that his own act is thus condemned; and the difference in question will appear at once. What self-condemnation, what self-loathing, what sense of guilt, or possibly remorse, the latter may involve; whilst the former leaves the mind calm, save as it is stirred by indignation at another's sin, or sympathy with another's disgrace.

Equally far removed from being a matter of mere thought or imagination is the *appreciation by offenders of the suffering, or the shame, or it may be the injury* which have been caused by their conduct. On the contrary, it involves, or, by the common consent of those best fitted to judge, ought to involve, suffering and a sense of shame, the intensity and burden of which are

increased by the consciousness of carelessness or more positive faultiness.

Ordinarily, indeed, men are too insensitive, or too self-centred, or too indifferent to be capable of experiences such as have been described. Only when the relationship between the parties is more intimate do they occur,—not always even then. If parents sin against children, or children against parents; or if relatives and friends sin against each other, the experience may be passed through. Even when one or the other is but the innocent cause of suffering, the experience is often painful enough; but when there is, in addition, the sense of blameworthiness, still more when there are the darker degrees of guilt, the state of mind becomes almost unendurable—sometimes, in fact, it lands the persons concerned either in madness or in suicide.

Nor, again, is it a matter of mere cold calculation when an offender is really made to enter into the question of *making good the wrong* done by his offence. Who has not known something of the distress or despair that fill the mind when one begins to consider how to make good wrongs or injuries that have been inflicted? Sometimes the whole after-life of men, especially of parents or children, is darkened by the experience. The one thought, especially if death has removed the injured one beyond reach, is, Oh! that he or she were here, that by years of loyalty, or sacrifice, or kindness and considerateness, I might make up for the shortcomings of which I am conscious!

Ordinarily, indeed, men are too careless and selfish to trouble themselves greatly about such compensation,

especially for personal offences; but no right-minded man would dream of regarding it as something to be even excused, much less to be justified. And the more evidently the matter is a burden, the profounder is the respect for an offender, and the easier the establishment of a new relation of genuine love.

If what has been advanced is true with regard to men in their relations to each other, how much more obviously true, if possible, in their relations to God.

To realise how *He regards our sin*; to pass verily under His condemnation; or rather, for the divine condemnation to become our own—that is no merely intellectual experience, no mere act of thought. No! it is to undergo trial and condemnation in reality; to undergo it in a court where the indictment receives our own endorsement, where the examination is aided by ourselves, where no charge evokes an excuse or denial, where no exception is ever taken to the verdict, and where the offender, from the very depths of his soul, cries guilty, guilty, guilty!

Even the Psalmist prayed: "Search *Thou* me, O God, and try *Thou* me: and know *Thou* my thoughts, and see *Thou* what way of evil is in me"; and he had experience of having his sins *set in the light of God*:—an awful experience it was too, as the references only too distinctly indicate. We talk lightly of God revealing His mind with regard to our sin; but we little think that such a revelation involves our passing into the awful darkness and oppressed state of soul that is denoted by the sense of guilt—a sense of guilt which sometimes overwhelms body,

intellect, heart, and reduces the whole man to a wreck. Shakespeare can tell us something of its meaning, though he does not expressly refer the experiences depicted by him to the action of God, unless the word conscience is to be thus interpreted—

> "O coward conscience how dost thou afflict me!—
> Cold fearful drops stand on my trembling flesh.
> What, do I fear myself? there's none else by:
> Richard loves Richard; that is, I am I.
> Is there a murtherer here? No;—yes, I am:
> Then fly,—What, from myself? Great reason: Why?—
> Lest I revenge. What? Myself upon myself?
> Alack, I love myself. Wherefore? For any good
> That I myself have done unto myself?
> O, no; alas, I rather hate myself
> For hateful deeds committed by myself.
> I am a villain: yet I lie, I am not.
> Fool, of thyself speak well:—Fool, do not flatter.
> My conscience hath a thousand several tongues,
> And every tongue brings in a several tale,
> And every tale condemns me for a villain.
> Perjury, perjury, in the high'st degree,
> Murther, stern murther, in the dir'st degree:
> All several sins, all used in each degree,
> Throng to the bar, crying all,—Guilty! guilty!"
>
> *Richard III.*, Act v. Scene iii.

In *Hamlet*, however, there is a distinct reference to God, though the picture of the experience is scarcely so grim and black—

> "In the corrupted currents of this world,
> Offence's gilded hand may shove by justice;
> And oft 'tis seen, the wicked prize itself
> Buys out the law: but 'tis not so above:
> There is no shuffling, there the action lies
> In his true nature; and we ourselves compelled,
> Even to the teeth and forehead of our faults,
> To give in evidence. What then? What rests?
> Try what repentance can: what can it not?

Yet what can it, when one can not repent?
O wretched state! O bosom, black as death!
O limèd soul, that, struggling to be free,
Art more engaged!"

Act III. Scene iii.

It is not necessary—on the contrary, it would be untrue—to suppose that if God by specific action brought home to men the guilt of their sin, His revelation would in each case be the same, and the result the same. For though all men are sinful, all men are not equally sinful; and God proceeds according to truth. Of necessity, therefore, the experiences of men in the sphere under consideration will widely differ: no one man can or need go through exactly the same as another man goes through.

Equally and more obviously true is it that, when *God reveals the pain and sorrow* caused Him by human sin, and His consequent *resentment*, man's experience cannot be merely intellectual. It is a felt thing: it is a thing that first, indeed, fully lays hold on the intellect and imagination; but then it stirs the heart with its affections, and especially excites the emotions. Grandly poetical expression is given to one aspect of it in the Book of Revelation: "And the kings of the earth, and the great men, and the chief captains, and the mighty men, and every bondman, and every free man, hid themselves in the dens and in the rocks of the mountains; and said to the mountains and rocks, Fall on us, and hide us from the face of Him that sitteth on the throne, and from the wrath of the Lamb: for the great day of His wrath is come; and who shall be

able to stand?" (vii. 15–17). The subject is referred to elsewhere in a variety of ways, both in the Old and New Testaments. "I have eaten ashes like bread, and mingled my drink with weeping, because of Thine indignation and wrath" (Ps. cii. 9, 10). "We are consumed in Thine anger and in Thy wrath are we troubled. Thou hast set our iniquities before Thee, our secret sins in the light of Thy countenance." "Who knoweth the power of Thy anger?" "Make us glad according to the days wherein Thou hast afflicted us" (xc. 7, 8, 9, 15). "I will bear the indignation of the Lord, because I have sinned against Him" (Micah vii. 9).[1] "Indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish, shall be upon every soul of man that doeth evil" (Rom. ii. 8 f.; cf. v. 5). The terribleness of the revelation of His anger is seen, or is represented as being seen, also in the effect produced on the earth. "At His wrath the earth trembleth, and the nations are not able to abide His indignation" (Jer. x. 10). "The mountains quake at Him, and the hills melt, and the earth is upheaved at His presence, yea, the world, and all that dwell therein. Who can stand before His indignation? and who can abide in the fierceness of His anger? His fury is poured out like fire, and the rocks are broken asunder by Him." "He will pursue His enemies unto darkness" (Nahum i. 5 ff.). "Through the wrath of the Lord

[1] Then follow the remarkable words: "until *He plead* my cause, and execute judgment for me: He will bring me forth to the light, and I shall behold His righteousness." Cf. Job xiv. 13: "O that *Thou* wouldest *hide* me in Sheol, that *Thou wouldest keep me secret, until Thy wrath is past*, that Thou wouldest appoint me a set time, and remember me!"

of hosts is the land darkened" (Isa. ix. 19; cf. Job xxvi. 11). "Shall not His dread fall upon you?" (Job xiii. 11). "For our God is a consuming fire" (Heb. xii. 2, 9).

No less must it be a cause of terrible anxiety and trouble, an almost unbearable burden, when *God lets men get a glimpse of the debt* which they have incurred and of the satisfaction which they owe to Him.

In all ages there have been those who have, at all events, acted as if they felt the awful burden resting on them. Hecatombs have been sacrificed; the most precious treasures have been offered up; loved ones have been surrendered; nay more, men have given themselves up to torture and death, for the purpose of satisfying an angry God. It is quite possible, indeed, that this may have been to some extent the result rather of priestly invention acting upon or co-operating with the universal consciousness of sin, than of divine action such as I am considering. This, too, may seem fairly deducible from such words as: "The times of ignorance God overlooked; but now commandeth He men that they should all of them everywhere repent: inasmuch as He hath appointed a day, in the which He will judge the world in righteousness by the man whom He hath ordained" (Acts xvii. 30 f.), and "Despisest thou the riches of His goodness and forbearance (*ἀνοχή*) and longsuffering; not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance" (Rom. ii. 4); "to show His righteousness because of the passing over of the sins done aforetime, in the forbearance (*ἀνοχή*) of God" (Rom. iii. 25). God had not yet made the revelation

which should enable men to appreciate His judgment, anger, and claim on them, and thus to fulfil the conditions previously referred to. There is little evidence that their state of mind was such as it needs must have been had that been the case—not even when the efforts put forth to satisfy deity were the most extreme. In fact, rightly considered, those very efforts are the best proof that God had not done so. Had He done so, they must surely have been paralysed—so borne down, so crushed as to be incapable even of making an attempt. This is not an uncommon experience as between man and man, and has to some extent influenced human legislation. Demand everything that seems just and right in cases when the offence is heinous, the injury great, and the righteous claim immense, and nothing will be done, nothing can be done. If this is so as between man and man, how much more so as between God and man!

Compensation, making up to God the wrong done —the wrong in the withholding of reverence, trust, love, and loyal service; in the manifestation of irreverence, distrust, aversion; in the sins of omission and commission; in the dishonour brought on His holy name; in the injury inflicted on the divine kingdom; in the pain and sorrow caused to the divine heart; and not least, in necessitating God, for consistency's sake, to hold a relation to the world of humanity and nature contrary to His eternal purpose—what a task! Who must not shrink from it? Who must not be crushed by the very thought, if he really and truly estimate it in the light of God?

The natural result of the divine action thus shown to be necessary in order to the fulfilment of the conditions of reconciliation could only, therefore, be to fill men with despair of reconciliation. It must inspire them with dread of God; with a desire rather to escape from Him than to find Him. To make men feel as guilty as they actually are; to impress them with a due sense of the grief they have caused, and the anger they have kindled; and to show them all that needs to be done by way of rectifying what has been made wrong—there is nothing in that, so far as one can see, to prepare the way for reconciliation. It is to lay bare the awful gulf which sin has opened between man and God; not to narrow it or bridge it. It is to awaken or intensify the sense of hopelessness and despair.

As a matter of fact, too, men have been thus reduced to hopelessness, even apart from such specific action as we are considering. Though God had not revealed His mind to them in the way we have considered, they were nevertheless "without hope in the world"; nay more, they were "all their life long subject to bondage through fear of death." In fact, the "sting of death was sin." How much more, then, would this have been their state if their secret and open sins, their sinfulness, the untold mischiefs wrought by sin, and the duty devolving on them as the authors of sin, and of the evils following in its train, to make the wrong good, had been set in the light of God, instead of being viewed in the dim twilight of human conscience and human opinion.

2. *God must Himself bring home to man the real*

purpose and meaning of the manifestation which has caused the experiences described.

Remember what that purpose is, namely, to enable man to fulfil the conditions on which reconciliation depends. Yet, strange to say, such fulfilment is impossible to anyone who does not feel that God is seeking his deliverance from sin; nay more, that God is practically proclaiming forgiveness, whilst and in that He is thus unveiling the real and true significance of sin. The states of mind previously described, considered in their ethical relation to personal reconciliation, are otherwise impossible. Neither manifestation of the divine judgment, sorrow, anger, and claims alone, nor manifestation of the divine purpose of salvation alone, either of them by itself, could subserve the purpose. The two must go together.

We shall see this if we properly distinguish the states of mind described from other states which are natural to the natural man, to which they are akin, and with which, therefore, they are often confounded.

First of all, a man may feel that his load of guilt is pressing him down, not only to the ground, but even into the very abyss; and yet he may be as far as possible from entering into and ratifying the divine judgment, from making that judgment his own. The more real the former experience, the darker and more awful will be his state of mind. The latter experience, on the contrary, is impossible apart from at least a dawning conviction that the God against whom the sin has been committed is seeking to save him from the sin which threatens and is fraught with ruin, and which for

that very reason, as well as because of its essential hostility to the divine creatures and rule, God hates; that He is condemning it and us, so far as we identify ourselves with it, in order to salvation; that to realise its blameworthiness, as He realises it, is necessary in order to being made as free from it as He is—that is, to becoming holy and therefore blessed, as He is holy and blessed.

Again, it is one thing to see, to gaze with horror on, the evil results our sin has caused, not only to the world which God made, and to ourselves created in His image, but even to Him; another thing to sorrow in His sorrow, to be afflicted in His affliction, to feel dishonoured in His dishonour, and even to be angry in His anger; in a word, to make His experience, if I may so speak, really our own, with the recognition of the fact that, whilst it ought not to be His, it is ours of right, because it is of our causing. Whilst in the one case we are ready to close our eyes, to turn away as in horror, and would fain escape from the spectacle and the vision; in the other, we confess that it is supreme mercy in God, and good for us that we should be brought face to face with the evil we have done, and caused to realise it as it is; because only thus can the fascination of sin be effectually overcome.

Still further, and lastly, it is one thing to see, with whatever clearness, the compensation that is due to God; even to be weighed down by the immensity of the task; to despair well nigh, if not utterly, of clearing oneself and paying off the debt one owes, and of thus reinstating oneself in the divine favour: another and very different thing to yearn to make good to one who

has freely forgiven and received us, and under the inspiration of love to surrender ourselves to Him a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable. In the former case, every new view of our debt fills us with deeper despair; blank hopelessness takes possession of us; we are ready to say of God, "He may have a right to the claim which He advances, but what a cruelty and monstrosity to lay it against one who cannot fulfil it": in the other case, we are more and more filled with thankfulness for the forgiving love which took us just as we were,—naked, helpless, destitute; and are inspired with new desire and fresh energy to magnify His name above all the heavens,—nay more, we regard Him as putting an honour on us by His claim.

At the same time, the means employed by God to attain the end seem only fitted to fill human souls with dread of Him; to drive them from His face; to make them desire, if 'twere possible, to torment Him, as He is thought to be tormenting them; and to brand Him as an exacting tyrant. Thus, too, is the natural mind prone to regard them.

II. Consider, secondly, the *vital* or *dynamic* action of God.

The divine purpose to prepare men for the fulfilment of the conditions of reconciliation could not be attained without vital or bio-dynamic as well as personal action.

Careful consideration of the divine method in nature will show that this is no new principle; that, on the contrary, this, no less than the principle of revelation or manifestation, is in fullest accordance with the constitution of the world—at all events, as that constitution

is conceived in this work. The divine action on man must be both personal,—or, as I might also term it, *deictic*, demonstrative, *i.e.* take the form of an appeal to consciousness and to the functions whose normal exercise is conditional on such an appeal; and vital or dynamic.

The relation even of our natural environment to us, involves essentially the same two things. It appeals, on the one hand, to consciousness; on the other, it acts dynamically; and each relation in turn depends on and conditions the other. Unless it *energise* in us, the appeal to consciousness will be null or destructive; unless the appeal to *consciousness* be effective, there can be no dynamic action. This is true, of course, of our natural environment taken as a *whole*; not equally true of the several parts taken separately—taken as many of them may practically be taken.

In this respect nature is emphatically the revelation of God. His action on man, too, must be both deictic and dynamic, the one normally depending on and conditioning the other, each alternately.

All this is if possible even more true when disorder and disease have set in. The natural environment has to supply the means by which man may resume a right active relation to itself; and yet unless he see that his relation is disorderly,—which seeing is also partly dependent on the action of his environment,—such dynamic action cannot take place.

Apply now the principle or law thus stated to the relation of God to man. God must appeal to man's consciousness in the ways I have been describing; but, if

that appeal is to answer its full purpose, He must also energise in man to bear, to see, and to appreciate the significance of what He is doing. When we say that the eye sees only what it brings with it, we are recognising the principle in part. "The natural man understandeth not the things of God, for they are spiritually discerned"; and in this case spiritual discernment does not stand alone; it is simply one of the functions discharged by the whole man as spiritually energised by God. Analogously, one might say, the natural man beareth not the vision of the divine judgment of sin, nor the weight of the divine anger; still less does he see in the manifestation of the divine judgment and divine anger the means which God is employing for his own salvation,—*i.e.* the proof that God is a forgiving and redeeming God,—unless God energise in him to that end. *God alone can reveal the divine view of sin, and God alone can enable man to see and appreciate it; God alone can make man feel the divine sorrow and anger, and God alone can enable man to bear it; God alone can present, as one may put it, His bill of claims, and God alone can enable man to understand it:—and in that such seeing, bearing, and understanding relate as truly to the divine purpose as to the experiences which are the vehicle thereof, His energy is no less needed for the discernment of His purpose.* The principle in question is expressed by Christ Himself when He says regarding the comforter, "He shall take of the things of Christ and show them to you." It has found its recognition also—a recognition now too generally, alas! misunderstood or misinterpreted—in the Church

doctrine, that before faith can be exercised not only must Christ be preached, but the Holy Spirit must open the eyes to see Him and prepare the heart to receive Him; in other words, in the doctrine of "prevenient grace."

CHAPTER XIII

The Dilemma

According to the God-given constitution of man, we found it to be necessary that God should act towards man, both personally and bio-dynamically, in a certain way termed normal, if man on his part were to be able to behave towards God in a certain way termed normal. *This is a fixed cosmic law.*

This law is not abolished by human sin, though, as sin is an abnormal relation to God, it involved the moral necessity of a corresponding abnormal relation of God to man. If man was to be able to behave towards God in the manner denoted by the term sin, God must of moral necessity act towards, or rather react on, man in the manner due to him as a sinner.

Considered in itself, such conduct on the part of God towards man, as was shown, is abnormal, though considered relatively to human sin righteous. So, too, considered in itself, conduct on the part of man towards God, such as was shown to be morally necessary if reconciliation is to take place, is abnormal, though considered in relation to sin it is fit and right. For, as was previously pointed out, it is certainly not normal that it should devolve on God to bring home to

man the guilt of sin: nor is it one whit more normal for man to condemn himself; though, after sin entered, the one was as right as the other.

The divine action towards man, previously described, though immediately designed and fitted to impress on him the significance of sin for God, had for its ultimate purpose to enable man to fulfil the conditions of reconciliation; in other words, though in itself a sentence of condemnation, it was *ipso facto* a declaration of forgiveness. But unless this, its ultimate purpose and essential meaning, were *discerned* in, with, and through the full experience of its condemnatory force, man would not be able to fulfil the conditions in question. Yet the immediate effect of the divine action would seem to be of necessity to crush man, to make him hopeless, to reduce him to despair. So that it would seem necessary, *primâ facie*, to pronounce the means and the end mutually incompatible.

The purpose referred to could not be attained by the personal means employed, unless, in accordance with the law just described, God also acted vitally or biodynamically. Without gracious divine energising man would not have been able either to bear the experience brought on him or to discern its meaning; in other words, to behave towards God as befitted the abnormal position into which his own sin had brought him, that is, to fulfil the conditions of reconciliation. Yet according to the order of the theocosm, it was not fitting that such gracious energy should be bestowed save when the personal relation of the recipient to God was normal; that is, in the case we are considering, save where the

conditions of rectification had been fulfilled by the recipient. The *fulfilment, in a word, has to precede that without which the fulfilment is impossible.*

So that, *first of all*, man cannot fulfil the conditions of reconciliation till he sees that God's action aims at reconciliation, *i.e.* until he regards God as already reconciled. *Further*, what God does to bring about reconciliation tends to produce a sense of condemnation. *Still further*, the divine energy needed in order to the fulfilment of the conditions of reconciliation cannot be bestowed till the conditions have been already fulfilled.

Such is the dilemma. We are face to face with ethical ὕστερα πρότερα. Or, as Paul put it, "the law which is unto life proves to be unto death"; and yet life can only be attained through the death which is brought by the law.

These are not mere subtleties. They are practical ethical difficulties:—difficulties which beset the problem of reconciliation between man and man, no less than between God and man. Various things are apt to cause the affinity between the two cases to be overlooked; but if the analogies urged in connection with the question of the revelation of the mind of God were valid, their affinity cannot be doubted.

In point of fact, these antinomies, or ὕστερα πρότερα, as they were termed, constituted the practical problem of the atonement whilst it was still a thing to be accomplished. Now that the atonement is a *fait accompli*; in other words, now that the *practical* problem has been solved, the *antinomies constitute for the Christian scien-*

tist the theoretical problem of the reconciliation of God and man.

Those who have found reconciliation through Christ, that is, those for whom God through Christ practically solved the problem before they faced it, are in danger, however, of imagining that there never was any such problem to be solved. Accordingly, on the one hand, they too frequently underestimate, or even quite misunderstand, the nature of the work done by Christ,—they deem it something very different from, something much more superficial, than it really was: and, on the other hand, naturally treat discussions of the doctrine or theory of the atonement as elaborate explanations of something that owes most of its mystery and difficulty to the imagination of believers and theologians.

We shall be saved from falling into either of these two mistakes if we go back in thought to the period prior to the advent of Christ. For then, as we shall find, some of the ideas which men, born in Christendom and subjected to Christian influences, deem universally known and well-nigh self-evidently true, lay altogether out beyond the range of vision; whilst others, of which the same judgment is formed, were regarded as self-evidently false, and their false counterparts no less self-evidently true. In point of fact, Christianity has not merely brought to the human mind a body of otherwise unknown truth, but has so quickened its power of discernment that nothing seems more natural than to recognise and hold the said truth to be true.

CHAPTER XIV

Methods Pursued with Humanity by God

The use of words like those which form the heading to this chapter is apt at the present moment to evoke either contemptuous or resentful criticism. We are supposed to have advanced far beyond the crudeness of phrases like "The Plan of Salvation." Both religiously and theologically, they are a stumbling-block and an offence.

That they should be this and worse to those who so emphasise the immanence of God in the cosmic system as to make it practically identical with pantheism; or who reduce God's rôle in human life to that of an almighty lover who does little more than sigh and breathe and shine forth His love, without variation or shadow of a turning, leaving men to bask in it and assimilate it as they bask in and assimilate the light of the sun, is natural enough: but that those who speak of evolution as the method of the divine working in nature, and recognise God as a Father who counts even the very hairs of our heads, and notices when even a poor sparrow—that *Proletarier* among the birds, as Germans call it—falls to the ground, should shrug their shoulders at it, is surely a fine specimen of undisciplined sentiment.

God's "ways with men," or otherwise expressed, His methods, never have been, are not now, and never will be marked by the inviolable uniformity which the one-sided scientific intellect is in constant danger of glorifying as the ideal. Whilst "righteous in all His ways, and holy in all His works," God varies with a variability that transcends all human calculation, but which belongs to the very essence of spirit and life.

I. God worked first of all along lines determined by the existing order of things in the realm of nature and spirit; in other words, lines drawn by the constitution, *first*, of man, considered both as an individual and as a member of the great body humanity, with its subordinate constituent systems, the family, the tribe, the nation; and *secondly*, of the mundane and cosmic systems, with the forces and laws, to which man is so closely—one might almost say organically—related.

Not a few thinkers have held, and still hold, that this was and is the only course open to God; that any other course would be inconsistent with the system He has Himself constituted, and therefore inconsistent with Himself. In all ages, they say, God has in various ways been acting and appealing to men, *externally*, by means of what may be summarily designated His providential dealings,—by the joys and sorrows, the pleasures and pains, the prosperity and adversity which have come upon individuals and communities, according as they have done what was right or wrong: *internally*, through conscience, both in the individual soul and as embodied in human laws, written and unwritten; by the stirrings, inbreathings, suggestings, which have been

vouchsafed to all souls without exception, but to which the earnest seekers, the prophetic and poetical natures, the religious geniuses, have been specially sensitive. His gracious uplifting aid has further been nigh to all who responded to such approaches. This, we are assured, is all that, according to the constitution, order, and laws of the world and humanity, He could do. What are called special revelations, manifestations, communications, interventions, owe any speciality that marks them not to special action *ad hoc* on God's part, but to special sensitiveness, fitness, affinity, responsiveness on the part of those who claimed to receive them. The position referred to is well presented in the following words, which, though not primarily relating to the particular point under discussion, are substantially relevant. "Religious experience and the spiritual insight which it affords are normal expressions of human nature; and if, as seems to be the fact, the Semitic mind, culminating in Jesus of Nazareth, revealed the personal relation between the finite and the universal spirit with a vividness and fulness to which no other section of mankind, before or since, has attained, this is not to be understood as meaning that the Eternal One has acted exceptionally and abnormally in the case of the Hebrew Prophets and of the Son of Man; but simply as meaning that the Old and New Testaments contain in their choicest passages the expression of the world's deepest religious consciousness."[1]

The method just indicated was the one pursued

[1] Upton, *Jewish Quarterly Review*, October 1893, p. 152.

by God with the *heathen*. His purpose, be it remembered, was to enable men to fulfil the conditions of personal reconciliation, so that He might communicate to them the gracious energy necessary to their deliverance from sin and evil. What was *primarily* necessary on His part to this end was to bring home to them His mind about sin, whilst at the same time letting them discern His redemptive aim. God sought to accomplish this object from the very first. Speaking familiarly, one may say that the Divine Father lost no time, lost not a moment, but began at once—as soon as sin and alienation began—the gracious education and discipline which the terrible change in man's relation to Him had rendered necessary.

It was not reserved, be it remarked, for the present day to discover and acknowledge that God has in all ages been using means to redeem other portions of the human race besides some Semites and some Aryans. In the judgment of Israelites—not, moreover, the least enlightened of them—they themselves were called, specially led, taught, aided, and disciplined in order that they might be "co-workers together with God" in this work of divine mercy.

But means were employed to the same end independently of the Jews, which, though not marked by the special features that characterised the divine dealings with them, had the same purpose. Not a few allusions in the New Testament, some more, some less distinct, warrant us in taking up this position.

The idea that no nation has been or should be left

alone by God has nowadays become almost a commonplace of Christian thought; it is regarded as self-evident. So natural and right, indeed, is it conceived to be that a good many are running to the opposite extreme of *denying that there has ever been anywhere any such exceptionality or difference of method as it has heretofore been customary to recognise in the case of the Jews*.[1] God, we are told, has been caring for all men, in all ages and lands, with equal intensity of loving care; and though, like a wise father, He has taken one way with one nation and another way with another, no one nation has been more wisely or generously treated than another, and each has been put in as good a position to find Him and attain blessedness as the other.

All which is doubtless true, as far as God is concerned. God has dealt conformably to His own love and wisdom with all men alike; and if all men had been equally ready to respond to His approaches, the one method would have been intrinsically as good as the other, though each might have had special features of its own, each might have differed from the other. But men themselves have to be taken into account. God Himself could not have dealt in exactly the same manner with all men without inconsistency—inconsistency with Himself and inconsistency with them. He had to accommodate Himself to them. If men, as Paul says, refuse to retain Him in their knowledge, if they willingly turn their backs on Him, He must needs let them go, in a certain respect, their own way; He

[1] See Martineau, *Seat of Authority in Religion*, pp. 75, 113.

must let them eat of the fruit of their own ways, and be filled with their own devices; He must conform His mode of getting hold of them to the relation assumed towards Him. But to treat this as a "forsaking" or "letting alone" is mistaken;—it is a divine method, not less fatherly than that which many a human father is morally compelled to adopt with self-willed, wayward, unmanageable children. The question put by Paul, "What advantage, then, hath the Jew?" should therefore, on this view, be answered, not as he answered it, "Much, every way; chiefly because unto them were committed the oracles of God"; but—No advantage whatever. The Gentiles were treated as well as the Jews, though the way taken with the latter differed from that taken with the former.

Without, then, denying the special character of the divine treatment of the Jews,—special treatment with a view to their special mission,—we are bound to acknowledge that God dealt also with the rest of men in various ways for their redemption.

We need, however, to be on our guard against looking for a fulfilment of conditions among the heathen such as was required even in Israel; still less such as has been rendered possible and obligatory by Christ. A good many modern students of the history of ethnic religion have fallen into this mistake when they profess to discover in ethnic religious writings estimates of sin relatively to God, which are apparently equal, or nearly so, in truth and intensity to those found in the Bible or present-day Christian literature.

Whilst we cannot help applying to the early relation of man to God the same general terms denoting abnormality which we apply to the relation of many in Christendom, it must not be supposed that the sinfulness denoted by the terms is in the two cases the same in degree. Sin's sinfulness varies immensely in the concrete. Objectively regarded, every sin of every form is, of course, a sin; considered subjectively, the same sin is never in any two cases the same. A murder committed by a savage is one thing, by a Christian another,—even as a blow inflicted on a mother by an angry baby is one thing, inflicted by a full-grown son something totally different.

This consideration necessarily affects the view we form of the conditions to be fulfilled. To refer again to the illustration of the child:—a wise mother will do enough to bring home even to the baby the sense of its act being wrong; but she will also feel that, as the meaning of its act was superficial, so the child's recognition of its wrongness can only be superficial. A savage should be made to realise that a murder is a sin to the degree of which he is capable; but no sensible man will consider or treat him as equally guilty with a Christian man who has committed the same crime. For though the crime is objectively the same, it is not the same subjectively.

The principle holds good of the relations of man to God and of God's treatment of man.

Another point also needs attention, namely, that, as was previously pointed out, heathendom has not stood still.

What means, then, did God use for bringing the heathen to Himself? These means, as was already indicated, fall into two great classes,—the deistic or revelational and the dynamic.

1. *The deictic or revealing action of God.*

(1) The primary necessity was that God should keep alive in men the sense of His existence and presence. I say *keep alive*, rather than *reveal*; for the first thing which God did for His newly created child was to impress it with His existence and presence. The specific sense for God, which is as truly one of man's senses as that for light, was so appealed to that once for all the idea *God* or *divine* was lodged in his mind, and, by means of the words which expressed it, became through heredity an inalienable possession of the race.

But it needed none the less to be quickened and filled with content, *i.e.* God Himself needed to become more and more known. *That* He existed and was present was a datum: *what* He was and how present—that had to be learnt. And the whole process received a twist through the incoming of sin.

The cosmos in general, and the earth in particular, continued to be, regarded in themselves and in the main, what they were before sin entered. The visible world, with its changes, order, beauty, and mystery, did not cease to discharge its function of manifesting the invisible power and glory of God, because man became less and less capable of understanding it. The heavens continued to *declare* the glory of God, and the firmament to show His handiwork.

History is full of evidence that the world's testimony

to God was clear and loud enough to leave men, as Paul says, without excuse. Indeed, so far from ceasing to speak and testify of God, it became as a matter of fact, in their eyes, so full of God, so permeated with God, that its humblest constituents were eventually regarded and worshipped as divine. A description given of the Hindus by an eminent authority applies substantially to men everywhere: "Everything great and useful —everything strange, monstrous, and unusual, whether good or evil, is held to be permeated by the presence of divinity. It is not merely all the mighty phenomena and forces of the universe—all the most striking manifestations of almighty energy— that excite the awe and attract the reverence of the ordinary Hindû. There is not an object in earth or heaven which he is not prepared to worship—rocks, stocks, and stones; trees, pools, and rivers; his own implements of trade; the animal he finds most useful, the noxious reptiles he fears; other creatures, like monkeys, for reasons difficult to assign; men remarkable for any extraordinary qualities,—for great valour, sanctity, virtue, or even vice; good and evil demons, ghosts and goblins, the spirits of departed ancestors; an infinite number of semi-human, semi-divine existences—inhabitants of the seven upper and the seven lower worlds;—each and all of these come in for a share of divine honour, or a tribute of more or less adoration."[1]

What was true of the natives of India was proportionally true of humanity in general. The world spake audibly enough, testified distinctly enough, of the God

[1] Monier-Williams, *Hinduism*, p. 168.

whose energy was evolving it, and whose idea gave it order and form.

The connection of the cosmos with God, the fact that God was in it, that it had its life and being in God, that His invisible power and divinity were expressed by it—all this forced itself on men's minds. They were perhaps more sensitive to the presence of the divine than we are; or, at all events, the sensitiveness to God which is native to man was in them less dulled and reduced to inaction by exclusive attention to the methods according to which God works. The eyes of the modern man are too frequently "holden"—as were those of the disciples who walked with Christ to Emmaus—by all sorts of presuppositions, so that they do not and cannot see what is before them. The heathen mind has not been wrong in *finding the divine everywhere*: it is the civilised mind that is wrong when it so emphasises the process as to put it in the place of God.

But when men went on to identify this object and that object with God, they went astray,—as far astray as if a child should confound the gifts or productions which an unseen father sends to remind it of his existence, and to tell of his mind, with the father himself. If they had identified God with the entire cosmos in its apparent infinitude, the error would have been grievous enough, though some excuse might have been pleaded for it; but to confound Him with the parts—and such parts!—was to dishonour, nay more, to ungod, God in the very act of recognising Him.

But the fault lay not with the cosmos. Notwithstanding the influence of sin, it still retained the greater part of

its essential glory; it remained full of divine meaning; the traces of the divine hand were as numerous as the shells in a piece of chalk; though there was no articulate speech or language, and though creation's voice was not audible to the outward ear, a harmonious song of infinite fulness and richness ascended day by day and night by night; and had not man's eye and ear been dulled by sin, he might at one and the same time both have seen and heard the testimony borne to the glory of its Maker.

(2) The next need was the revelation of the divine mind with regard to sin, the bringing home the significance of sin to man, and at the same time the awakening of hope.

What God did to this end is traceable in the view men took of the divine judgment of sin here and hereafter;[1] in the religious rites they observed, and the sacrifices they offered; and in the impression made upon them by the dark and bright dispensations of Providence, both in nature and history.

Though the phenomena classed under these three heads can scarcely be said ever to have been due to properly supernatural action, they none the less told of the divine presence. In not a few cases, however, it is difficult to avoid feeling that His work, though not what is commonly called supernatural, was in some real sense special. God drew nigh to men; He intervened on their behalf; He whispered to them, and directed them in ways which compelled a recognition of His nearness and action.

[1] See specially Salmond's fine work on *Immortality*.

Especially, however, by means of *conscience*, both individual and social, and through the laws and customs of men—family, social, national—conjoined with phenomena of the natural world, such as were some of those referred to under the last head, at the same time interpreting and being interpreted by them, God sought to bring home to man the significance of sin for Himself. The statement, that "conscience is the voice of God in the soul," besides being vague, can scarcely be held to be true if we understand by conscience the actual moral judgments pronounced by men on their own conduct and that of others; yet anyone who believes in the living relation of God to the world as a whole and humanity in particular, can scarcely avoid recognising the divine action in the human distinction of right and wrong, specially in the treatment of the latter. Paul, at all events, suggests this when, just after a reference to the divinely given Jewish law, he goes on to speak of the Gentiles as being "a law unto themselves," and as showing "the work of law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another" (Rom. ii. 15). When, further, men who judge others are said to be inexcusable, seeing that they thus condemn themselves (Rom. ii. 1), it is implied that such conduct is a proof that they have not been left to themselves by God.

We know, too, that save as men sank to the lower stages of degradation, harvests, fruit gatherings, and all the occasions on which nature regularly or irregularly supplied their wants, or afforded them special enjoy-

ments, or brought them special gifts, gave rise, as it was meant they should, to *religious* festivals; whilst, on the other hand, events and phenomena which involved suffering or deprivation or sorrow, and inspired alarm, became the occasion of the performance of special rites and ceremonies, and of the offering of sacrificial propitiations.

In fact, God or gods were everywhere present; some divine power was believed to be everywhere at work for good or evil; the *mind* or disposition of some good or evil spirit was constantly finding expession in threat or blessing, in the furtherance or hindrance of human happiness.

That the world did not serve its original purpose of being a vehicle of loving communication from God to man, and of reverential response from man to God, was not due to the world, but to the fact that men "held the truth in unrighteousness"; that "when they knew God they glorified Him not as God, neither were thankful" (Rom. i. 21). There can be no doubt that the consciousness of sin and guilt has been general, though it has varied infinitely in degrees of clearness and intensity. The more degraded men have been by sin,—which, according not only to Scripture, but even to ethnic writers, is in the last instance one of the results of sin itself,—the feebler their sense of guilt. The higher the minds, the stronger expression do they give to the fact of sin. "The greatest punishment of an evil deed," says Plato, "is that its doer becomes like the bad";[1] and Marcus Aurelius puts the same thought

[1] De legg. v. 728.

even more forcibly: "He who sins, sins for himself: he who does wrong, wrongs himself, in that he makes himself wicked." [1]

Very different estimates were formed of the moral turpitude of different offences. But that sin was sin; that sin separated from God; that reconciliation with God was the supreme need of men; and that reconciliation involved the fulfilment of conditions,—these things were in one form and degree or another felt and expressed by all.

Both the *Rig-Veda* and the *Atharva-Veda* speak clearly on these points. In the former we read that "the gods are haters of falsehood and punishers of all untruth. Hence the prayer, 'Take away whatever sin has been found in me, whether I have done wrong, or have pronounced imprecations, or have spoken untruth.' 'May the untruth which the wise and sinless Varuna observes in us, through thy favour, Indra, disappear'; for 'those who practise untruths attain not the inconceivable deity.'" Whilst, according to the *Atharva-Veda*, "the effect of sin is to separate man from God. 'Do I say this to my own self? How can I get unto Varuna? Will he accept my offering without displeasure? When shall I with a quiet mind see him propitiated? I ask, O Varuna, wishing to know this my sin—I go to ask the wise. The sages tell me the same,—Varuna is he who is angry with me.'" [2]

(3) Finally, God made His presence felt within the

[1] IX. 4.

[2] See Maurice Phillip's excellent book, *The Teaching of the Vedas*, etc., 1895.

souls of the morally earnest, and gave inspiring grace to elect poets, prophets, lawgivers, and religious leaders.

Save when men have sunk to the lowest depths of moral degradation, and well nigh ceased to experience moral stirrings, there have ever been, as was remarked in an earlier connection,—few or many,—those who hungered and thirsted after righteousness, and who sought to act righteously, even though it might be in a fitful and ineffective manner.

Wherever there have been such persons in any number, souls have been born to which might be applied the words, "Before I formed thee in the belly I knew thee; and before thou camest forth out of the womb I sanctified thee: I have appointed thee a prophet to the nations" (Jer. i. 5). Prophets, lawyers, poets, thinkers, arose who were specially sensible of the fact that "God is not far from anyone of us, seeing that in Him we live and move and have our being" (Acts xvii. 27 f.), who felt His breath, who responded to His touch, and in whom He was able to energise with unusual power. Through such men divine energy as well as light entered the sin-sick and sin-enfeebled body of humanity; and quickenings, illuminings, reformings followed proportionate to the intensity, singleness of eye, and power of the agents who obeyed the divine call and followed the divine impulse. But even in the best cases the energy was soon spent, and the effects produced by it were limited. Not that it did not work, but that it was insufficient for the leavening of the whole lump;—a far mightier force was needed than any that could work in and through a Zoroaster, or

a Buddha, or a Socrates and Plato, or a Marcus Aurelius, or any other heathen who can be mentioned or imagined as a saint.

God was willing; but God needed agents of a certain kind, and the organism of humanity did not provide Him with fitting agents.

History testifies so loudly to the darker elements of the sketch just roughly drawn that Christian thinkers have too frequently overlooked those of a different character. At the present moment the latter are being so emphasised, and the former so underestimated, that there is danger of the mission and work of Christ being robbed of its rightful place and true significance.

II. The second course was that pursued with the Israelites.

Humanity was fast lapsing into thorough polytheism, and the line of men who had been true to the living tradition and holier custom handed down from earlier days was in danger of dying out, when God called Abraham to quit his idolatrous surroundings—called him because he was one of the "faithful." The divine purpose, as gradually revealed alike in word and act, alike by promise and performance, was to take into the service of redemption those family, tribal, and national relationships which had already so largely become the means of perpetuating and diffusing error and sin, alienation from Himself and disorder among men.

In pursuance of this plan God gradually grafted special action on the ordinary means which He was employing in the case of the heathen, till in a certain sense the ordinary was filled with a significance which,

though considered in itself thoroughly normal, was yet relatively extraordinary; and the supernatural was felt to be natural for God under the special and abnormal conditions created by human sin, degradation, ignorance, and error.

In an external respect the life of the Israelites, frequently as individuals, and one may almost say regularly as a nation, was marked by special alternations of blessing and curse, of happiness and misery, of reward and punishment, the connection between which and their conduct, and the ultimate design of which, were not left to be discovered by their unaided intelligence, but were directly pointed out or revealed to them. Nay more, even miracles were sometimes employed to express more forcibly the anger and the love of God.

Institutions also, civil and political, moral and religious, were either *taken over from the ordinary organisations of men with a new divine sanction*, or were specially modified or ordained for the purpose of aiding in the establishment and maintenance of right relations between themselves and God.

For the sake further of guarding against the peril of externalisation and ossification, against legalism and self-righteousness, other more spiritual means were employed. Prophets and poets were raised up for the express purpose of setting forth the vanity of mere sacrifices, offerings, and external observances, and the absolute necessity of a broken and contrite heart, of fear, humility, and faith, of righteousness and truth.

The words of the Word came to prophets: and in a variety of ways the Logos and the Spirit sought to

bring about in men the fulfilment of the conditions necessary to redemption. In some cases, as, for example, in the writers of certain Psalms, depths are sounded and heights scaled which seem to leave little more to be done: and these experiences undoubtedly were not only examples, but also prepared the way for and in their degree *energised* towards the same thing in others,—they have done so for myriads of men; but neither the best of them, nor all together, could enter fully into the mind of God, still less become the channels through which divine energy could flood the race in sufficient measure to enable humanity to resume its normal relation to God.

III. Failure of the methods described to accomplish their purpose.

The *Gentiles* went from bad to worse. They became more and more ignorant of God, and more and more dead in their trespasses and sins, *i.e.* not perhaps, strictly speaking, more positively wicked, but more and more insensible to the true character of the trespasses and sins which they were committing.

Individuals, indeed, arose amongst them, as has already been stated, from time to time, who responded to the inner touch of the divine hand, and to the appeals of nature and history; through them, too, quickening influences—not slight—flowed into their fellow-men, especially when they were endowed with the exceptional gifts which fit men to be prophets, philosophers, legislators, priests, or poets; but the great organism was too sick and disordered and enfeebled to be thus adequately reached.

Larger and intenser results were undoubtedly achieved among the *Israelites.* In individual cases an estimate of sin, a penitence because of sin, and a consciousness of forgiveness are to be found which, whether or not, as is sometimes asserted, as true, deep, clear, and abiding as anything of the kind among Christians, are certainly far in advance of anything discoverable among Gentiles, and undoubtedly real and justifying as far as they went. But the vast majority of the people fulfilled the law, at the best, in an outward way; availed themselves of their specifically religious privileges perfunctorily, and turned a deaf ear to their prophets and poets and wise men. The deliverances, punishments, and mighty deeds of Jehovah became accordingly rather food for pride and presumption than means of bringing home to them the divine condemnation, anger, claims, and grace.

There always were some who both deictically and dynamically worked for the restoration of their fellow-men to God, not only in Israel, but also far beyond the limits of Palestine; but the nation, as a whole, proved itself so utterly unfit to serve as a channel of the quickening, potentiating energy of God, and a living embodiment of the fulfilment of the conditions of reconciliation, that, as Paul tells us, they were broken off from the stem because of unbelief, and blindness happened to them (Rom. xi. 20, 23).

It may seem offensive to speak of divine failures: and yet if God has constituted man with the power of either yielding to or resisting His will; if the divine power in relation to man's *will* is exclusively ethical, not physical; and if, as a matter of fact, all godly men

bewail the fact that God has oftentimes showed mercy to them, chastened them, instructed them, blessed them, borne with them, striven with them *in vain*—what other position can with consistency be taken up? To object to the doctrinal formulation of that which prayers, hymns, personal diaries, books of devotion, and the like prove to be matter of experience, may be the way of sentiment, but it is none the less a way of unreason.

When we speak of failure, however, we must not suppose that the divine work was absolutely in vain. The immediate end aimed at was not attained; but as the divine purpose stood fast, even the obstinacy, stupidity, and wickedness of men were so controlled as to redound to the glory of God, *i.e.* to the glory which consists in the accomplishment of the purpose to eliminate sin and evil and establish the divine kingdom. This is what Paul refers to, as far as Israel is concerned, when he says: "If the fall of them be the riches of the world, and the diminishing of them be riches of the Gentiles; how much more their fulness? . . . Blindness in part is happened to Israel, until the fulness of the Gentiles be come in. And so all Israel shall be saved. . . . As ye in times past have not believed God, yet have now obtained mercy through their unbelief: even so have these also now not believed, that through your mercy they also may obtain mercy. For God hath concluded them all in unbelief, that He might have mercy on all" (Rom. xi. 12, 25, 26, 30 f.).

CHAPTER XV

Some Features of the Constitution of Humanity which have a Special Bearing on the Divine Method of Reconciliation

At this point it is necessary to call attention again, and somewhat more at large, to certain features of the constitution of man which are involved in the cosmological principles previously expounded, and which are specially presupposed by the divine method of reconciliation.

I. The first of these is, that humanity constitutes a system or organism between all the factors or members of which not only *successive communication*, but *contemporaneous interaction* and *intercommunication* are constantly taking place.

All theories of the atoning work of Christ of any importance have taken this more or less distinctly for granted; though now one of its aspects has been emphasised, then another; and though the view taken of it may have been, in the main, external and superficial.

Humanity, however, we need to remember, is not—as many representations seem to imply—an organic whole in the sense of being complete. At any and every stage, indeed, it is a sort of whole, but withal an

ever-growing and expanding whole. Nor, again, is it restricted to the human beings who, at any particular time, form the visible population of the globe. On the contrary, it embraces not only those who now exist on the earth, but all who ever did exist, or who ever shall exist thereon; in other words, the human dwellers in the invisible world, no less than the human dwellers on the earth. That such is its compass seems to be clearly enough implied by the words: "For it pleased the Father that in Him should all the fulness dwell; and that through Him all things should be reconciled unto Him, . . . having made peace through the blood of His cross, . . . *whether those on the earth or those in the heavens*" (Col. i. 19, 20).

One day, perhaps, the organism will be complete; but at present it is progressing in differentiation and development by births, from moment to moment, just as a tree differentiates itself and develops till it reaches its culmination.

As an organic whole, a living body compacted of many members, a process of vital interaction and intercommunication is always going on between the constituent factors of humanity. There is not a member of the whole that does not influence, and is not influenced by, every other member. This influence is not merely *action on*, that is, stimulus, impulse, evocation; still less, any form of action analogous to action in the physical sphere, but also in the strictest sense vital communication. What living energy may be in itself, as distinguished from other forms of energy, we know not; but whatever it be, just as in a tree or an animal

its pulsations, its ebbs and flows, its stirrings, at any one point, make themselves felt more or less, sooner or later, at every other point; so is it with the organism mankind. This vital interaction and intercommunication varies, of course, infinitely, both in quantity and quality. It may reveal itself to consciousness, or it may stop short and never pass out of the subconscious region of mind; it may exert an important or a very insignificant influence; but whether recognised or unrecognised, whether near at hand or afar off, whether slight or the reverse, there is no stirring of life anywhere that does not more or less affect the whole organism; what any one member experiences affects the whole.

The law of *heredity*, which is explicitly recognised throughout the Scriptures, besides being presupposed where it is not explicitly mentioned; on which theology has always built, and which modern science has in a sense rediscovered for itself, assumes in reality two forms, which may be respectively designated *successive* and *contemporaneous*. The former is the one most distinctly, if not exclusively, referred to, built upon by Christian theology, and reaffirmed by modern science. The other form has not yet found due appreciation: indeed, it can scarcely as yet be said to have found distinct recognition at all as a law; though phenomena, which may be regarded as suggesting and illustrating it—some of a more, some of a less superficial character—are now attracting attention.

When Scripture says: "I the Lord thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of

them that hate me," it is the law of successive "heredity" that is recognised; for, as might be made quite clear, it is the manner—the correct manner of Scripture—to represent God Himself as bringing to pass or doing that which happens to men in accordance with the laws of nature, and of their own constitution;—they are, in fact, two ways of regarding the same occurrences, both of which are seen to be true when regarded from the point of view of the cosmology presupposed by the Scriptures (cf. Jer. xxxi. 29, and Ezek. xviii. 1). Paul's reasoning, "Wherefore, as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, in that all have sinned. . . . Death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression. . . . If by one man's offence death reigned by one; much more they which received abundance of grace and of the gift of righteousness shall reign in life by one, Jesus Christ" (Rom. v. 12, 14, 17), obviously takes the same thing for granted.

As to the *contemporaneous* form of "heredity," may we not find it hinted at in such passages as: "Speaking the truth in love, may grow up into him in all things, which is the head, even Christ: from whom the whole body fitly joined together and compacted by that which *every joint supplieth*, according to the effectual *working in the measure of every part*, maketh increase of the body unto the edifying of itself in love" (Eph. iv. 15 f.; Col. i. 24). And the effects traceable to intercessory prayer, are they not also in part the result of the law of "heredity" in this second form?

II. The second of these characteristics is that not only *existing potentialities of humanity are invigorated*, but possibly also *new potentialities are evoked* in the organism as the result of resolute effort or achievement on the part of members, whether acting individually or collectively.

Reference was made in a previous connection to the law of waste, recuperation, reinvigoration, and consequent increased invigoration to which organisms are subject; and in accordance with which, the result of putting forth special effort, whether intellectual or in the stricter sense spiritual, is an increase of the capability of higher effort of the same kind. This comes to pass, as was pointed out, not because effort itself strengthens, for effort involves waste of energy; but because the way is thus prepared for an enlargement of the reservoir in which the particular form of energy is stored by which the work has been done—provided, of course, that the energy expended is duly supplied as it is expended.

The same thing must clearly hold good of the organism of humanity as a whole, if it be in any real and true sense an organism. Men of achievement enrich and strengthen not only their own higher nature, their own inner man, but also the higher nature and capabilities of their fellow-men. The race becomes capable of higher poetic, artistic, and philosophic appreciation, insight, effort, through the work of poets, artists, and philosophers; a hero endows it with the capability of higher heroism, though no particular individual may thereafter attain the same pitch of excellence.

The reverse is also true. Men who let their powers run to waste, who live effortless lives, especially those who lag behind in the race of life and degenerate thereby, weaken their own potentialities, as well as those of humanity, and leave themselves and it poorer and less capable than before.

History is full of illustrations of the working of this law. The sensitiveness, the refinement of taste, and the accuracy of judgment in matters of art, poetry, oratory, and literary form, which marked the Athenians in so high a degree for a considerable period, were largely due to the unusual number of men who accomplished great things in these departments. The potentiality of the nation was heightened by the great aims, efforts, and achievements of the poets, artists, philosophers, orators, and writers who arose in its midst. And the decadence of Greece, Florence, Venice, and other states and cities in these same respects was doubtless due to their absence.

The degree to which potentialities will be affected in this way depends, of course, on the amount of new energy assimilated as the result of the efforts put forth by members. The larger the men, if their work be proportional, the greater the channels by which energy may flow in ; naturally, therefore, the richer the influx and the greater the intensification of the relative potentialities.

All this holds peculiarly good of the moral and spiritual sphere. One righteous, pure, holy, loving life puts new possibilities of righteousness, purity, holiness, love, within the reach of men generally.

Here again, of course, the effect is proportionate to the cause, though the greatness of the cause must not be estimated by standards that are applicable to the matters just now mentioned. The degree in which men may become channels of special energy from God —energy making for the spiritual elevation of the race —does not depend on qualifications which ordinarily discriminate them from their fellows. One may here apply the words: "*Not many wise men after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble,—but God hath chosen foolish things of the world to confound the wise; and God hath chosen weak things of the world to confound the things that are mighty*" (1 Cor. ii. 26 f.). This is the divine rule, and it is a rule as far from arbitrariness as the rule that for the poetic, artistic, and general intellectual elevation of mankind God uses men of special natural poetic, artistic, and intellectual aptitudes. That which fits men to be channels of the divine energy in question is essentially spiritual, not natural. It is not a gift, not a special endowment, but an attitude, a practical relation to God, which is obligatory on all souls alike; nor does it depend on culture, or station, or circumstances, or even manners.

The effect produced on mankind as a whole by any particular man, or set or succession of men, may be slight,—in point of fact, it cannot but be relatively slight; but it is real—real for the whole. Doubtless it is strongest within the circle or nation to which the workers belong. If at any epoch or in any land or community there are many men of vigorous, large, and intense spiritual life, the results become distinctly

perceptible; partly, however, because opportunity is in such cases afforded for the action of the characteristic to be noticed under the next head. The promise attached to the injunction, "Walk with wise men and thou shalt be wise" (Prov. xiii. 20), is fulfilled in a double way—by the conscious communication and assimilation of wisdom, and by the vital energising now under consideration. Analogously, too, should perhaps be understood the words: "When it goeth well with the righteous, the *city* rejoiceth" (Prov. xi. 10); and, "By the blessing of the upright the *city* is exalted; but it is *overthrown* by the mouth of the wicked" (Prov. xi. 11; cf. xxviii. 12).

If ever the race is to be renovated and elevated, if it is to grow and develop according to its true idea, it can only be by the incoming of a flood of divine energy through some personal channels or channel to which the way lies open into the recesses of the life of the organism, mighty enough to raise its potentialities to their normal intensity and force.

> "For the world still needs
> Its champion as of old, and finds him still,
> Not always now with mighty sinews and thews
> Like mine, though these still profit, but keen brain
> And voice to move men's souls to love the right
> And hate the wrong; even though the bodily form
> Be weak, of giant strength, strength to assail
> The hydra heads of evil, and to slay
> The monsters that now waste them: Ignorance,
> Self-seeking, coward fears, the hate of man
> Disguised as love of God.
> And though men cease
> To worship at my shrine, yet not the less
> I hold, it is the toils I knew, the pains
> I bore for others which have kept the heart

> Of manhood undefiled, and nerved the arm
> Of sacrifice, and made the martyr strong
> To do and bear, and taught the race of men
> How God-like 'tis to suffer through life, and die
> At last for others' good."
>
> LEWIS MORRIS, *Herakles.*

III. The third characteristic with which we are here concerned is that the *actualisation of potentialities depends on a fit appeal being made to the consciousness of individuals, and of their giving due response.*

Every individual man begins existence as a bundle of potentialities; that is, he has the power in a latent form of becoming and doing or enduring certain things: but before these latent forces can come into operation, he has to be acted on by corresponding influences from without. This is no less true of the outer man than of the inner man, of the body than of the mind, though it attracts more attention in connection with the latter. Whether a potentiality is quantitatively in a normal state—which, in view of the lapsed state of the human race is scarcely possible—or whether it have been occasionally heightened under circumstances such as have been under consideration, makes no difference; the principle holds good. This is obviously so in the other psychical domains. Unless the actual achievements of a great poet, or artist, or thinker are made known, the potentiality he has vitalised remains latent.

In the case, at all events, of the spiritual sphere, appeal needs to be made to the intelligence, to the will, and to the heart.

First and foremost, the human action which has

been the means of heightening the potentiality must be set clearly before the minds of the members of the race. They must be made aware of what has been done—*done for them.* It must be shown to them. Suppose, for example, that a great sacrifice has been made for the spiritual welfare of the race; or a great project has been launched, and time and power are being devoted to it—all this must be made known. It must be proclaimed, preached "with demonstration of spirit."

Further, everything must be done that can be done to impress the importance of a due response; reasons must be presented, motives urged, fears and desires appealed to,—in other words, stimulus must be brought to bear on the mind that has been informed. The affections, the sense of need, nay more, self-interest, must be aroused.

The *goal* is to evoke appropriate activity, to awaken out of slumber. This, we all know, is the primary end of instruction, and specially of preaching.

Unless there is latent *capability*, the communication of knowledge will not only be fruitless, but even in the strict sense impossible; appeals to the heart, the feelings, the will, must be useless, for what effort can be put forth by one who is afflicted with incapacity? 'Twere as rational to present pictures to the blind, and seek to stir them to admiration, study, and imitation; or to call upon one whose limbs are paralysed to accompany his friend up a hill. If, however, the *potentiality* is there, one may hope by using the proper means to evoke effort, the result of which will be the conversion

of the potentiality into an actual power that shall in the measure appropriate to it reproduce the effects by which it itself was originally invigorated.

It scarcely needs to be pointed out that potentialities may also be lost by lack of response. Whether, as in the physical domain, so also in the spiritual, they can disappear altogether through disuse and atrophy, may be open to doubt. In every age, however, men have existed—probably they still exist—in whom all capability of a higher life seemed to be extinct; and who yet, under the fitting action of a fitting environment, developed a remarkable spiritual character. The capabilities had lain dormant, like the life in seeds that had been hidden away deep in the earth, untouched by air, atmosphere, and sunshine, awaiting action from without.

The case is different with those to whom due appeal has been made, on whom influences fitted to evoke potentialities into active life have been brought to bear. *Neglect to respond* has results which no ignorance and no degradation due to heredity or circumstances can possibly bring in their train. The extinction of spiritual capabilities, possible as it certainly must be, can never be effected by anything but the conscious conduct of men themselves: it can be brought about by what Dr. Martineau expressively and aptly terms the "canker of unfaithfulness." In a word, the death of the inner man is always due to self-imposed starvation,—that is, to suicide.

THE INCARNATION OF THE DIVINE WORD

CHAPTER XVI

The Problem

If what has thus far been advanced is tenable, namely, that the rectification of the personal relation of *God to* man is the first step to a rectification of the entire relations *between God and man*; and that this step presupposes, *first* of all, the fulfilment by man of certain personal conditions, to wit, the condemnation of sin from the divine point of view, and consequent justification of divine resentment; sorrowing at the pain and sorrow caused to God; and sincere desire to make amends for the injury inflicted on God; and *next*, that God Himself has revealed or shown to men the significance of sin to Himself;—if this is true, then, two things are clear, namely, *first*, that every man must be *energised* to *enter into* the mind of God regarding sin: and *secondly*, that the *energising* process must be carried out within the human race itself, in accordance with the features of its constitution as an organism, referred to in the last chapter. The question now is, How and by whom this process shall be initiated? Who shall so potentiate the vast organism of humanity that every member of it shall be able, each for itself

and proportionately to its share in the general guilt, to fulfil the conditions on which God can resume normal relations?

A brief reconsideration of the precise nature of the conditions to be fulfilled will prepare the way for a better appreciation of the problem in hand. The experiences, be it remembered, are not mere processes of thought; but the most real possible,—that is, spiritually real.

1. The revelation of the divine mind with regard to human sin must be borne,—it must be borne as a practical burden; the divine condemnation, with all that it involves, must be felt as such; the sin of the race must be judged as God judges it; nay more, the divine condemnation must be endorsed and justified; in short, the condemner and the condemned must, as it were, become one.

2. Still further, the divine sorrow, resentment, anger, must be endured, entered into, felt, in all its awfulness; yet at the same time be recognised and confessed as reasonable. Grief at sin like the grief of God, anger like the anger of God, must be felt. In a very true sense God's burden must be borne away: God's place must be taken. It is not merely taking the sinner's place:—it is taking God's place, against whom the sinner has sinned. That is the true significance of this condition.

3. Still more, the divine estimate of the dishonour and injury inflicted by human sin, and of the magnitude of the work necessary to make good the dishonour and injury, must present itself to and be felt in its full truth and nakedness. It must be realised as a work that has to be accomplished. At the same time, the

estimate must also be absolutely approved, thoroughly accepted. The task must be cheerfully undertaken. The claimant and the one who meets the claim must be one in mind, one in realisation.

4. At the same time, the fulfilment of these conditions involves, nay more, is impossible without, an appreciation of the inner meaning of the divine procedure in relation to sin. The nature of that inner meaning has been already indicated. God condemns and is angry at sin; and because he condemns it and is angry at it, therefore must He seek to remove it out of the world He made. But such removal has for its essential and proper aim the deliverance of sinners from their sin; in other words, their redemption from death and their restoration to life and consequent blessedness. If sinners will not give up their sin, the only course open to God is to treat them as identified with their sin, and to become to them, as to it, "a consuming fire." Failing this, indeed, the fulfilment of the conditions just mentioned would be impossible.

5. Whoever fulfils these conditions will clearly need to know what it is to be tempted to sin, and yet to be absolutely free from sin.

This, at first sight, must wear the appearance either of a self-contradiction, or, at all events, of inconsistency with what has previously been urged. The problem is the fulfilment of certain personal conditions which, in their very nature, are commonly held to involve participation in human sin. How can one who knows no sin enter into the mind of God and sympathise with God at once in His sorrow, resentment, and claims

upon the sinner? Surely he ought rather to have been a sinner of the deepest dye;—a sinner who concentrated in himself the sin of the whole race;—a sinner who therefore could endure in a sense what each and all might have to endure. Is not this required if what is thus accomplished is to be a quickening, *energising* principle, as well as a *manifestation* to humanity of the task to be performed? Such a view of the matter, however, rests on the implicit assumption that the agent thus described is no longer the sinner he was, that he has passed out through the depths of iniquity and degradation into the higher sphere, that he is one of the men, only of the very highest type, to whom Tennyson refers—

> "And dare we to the fancy give,
> That had the wild oat not been sown,
> The soil, left barren, scarce had grown
> The grain by which a man may live."
>
> *In Memoriam*, LIII.

But such a passing out presupposes the very *fulfilment which is only possible after the fulfilment has taken place.* No! such sin as it seemed necessary to postulate would imply a sinfulness of character and nature that would incapacitate for the fulfilment of the conditions in question. The more sinful the sins and the sinner, the less capable does the sinner become of appreciating either the sinfulness of himself or of his acts.

On the contrary, it is only the sinless who can fully appreciate the character and import of sin.

Nay more, any one who is in the least degree tainted by sin is excluded by the fact that for this very reason his place is necessarily in the ranks of those who have

to be reconciled. It is said, indeed, "The susceptibility to possible repentance and consciousness of something short of 'Good,' rather lifts Jesus Christ for us nearer to the standard of holiness than detains Him in the precincts of sin. It is only in the sphere of mundane phenomena that a Revealer needs to *know more* than we: in the sphere of divine things the requirement is that he *be better*, and in the order of his affections and the secrets of his will make more approach to the Supreme Perfection. This intervening position it is which alone renders the function of a Mediator,—Uplifter,—Inspirer, possible; and *that* not *instead of immediate* revelation, but simply as making us more aware of it, and helping us to interpret it. . . . The train of the conspicuously righteous in their several degrees are for us the real angels that pass to and fro on the ladder that reaches from earth to heaven. And if Jesus of Nazareth, in virtue of the characteristics of His spirit, holds the place of Prince of Saints, and perfects the conditions of the pure religious life, He thereby *reveals* the highest possibilities of the human soul, and their dependence on habitual communion between man and God."[1]

The view of the actual relation between God and man, of the rectification of that relation, and of the conditions towards God needing to be fulfilled ere it can be rectified, underlying the words quoted, differs so thoroughly from that expounded in these pages that criticism would lead to no result. Dr. Martineau's Christ is only a higher—let us say the highest known

[1] Martineau, *Seat of Authority in Religion*, pp. 651 f.

—purely human revealer, inspirer, uplifter. That in His measure, regarded only thus, He could and would have inspired and uplifted, there is no difficulty in allowing. Had He been really perfect, with a perfection never for a moment, or in the least tittle of impulse, desire, thought, purpose, still less word or act, relaxed or infringed or strained,—that, too, throughout temptation and conflict, —he would have inspired and uplifted in still fuller measure. But even then He could not have fulfilled the other conditions which have been mentioned in this connection.

On the estimate of Him as needing repentance, He would clearly have been among those who required the revealing and dynamising action of God, less indeed, far less perhaps, than any other man, yet really:—in other words, He would Himself have been in His measure a subject of the reconciling and redeeming grace of God.

6. There must, further, be the capability of acting as a reservoir into which, and a channel through which, divine energy could and would flow adequate to the energisation of the entire race.

As was already pointed out, those who energise their fellow-men by their achievements, or sufferings, do so in virtue of the energy which they draw in larger measure than usual from our natural environment. The energy, however, which they themselves assimilate is *transmitted* by them in a specifically differentiated form:—it may be an artistic, or poetical, or scientific, or a properly practical form;—and as such it helps to quicken and enrich that in their fellow-men which is akin to itself.

Even so is it in the domain with which we are immediately concerned. He who is to energise his fellow-men for the discharge of spiritual duties and the bearing of spiritual burdens must draw larger measures of energy than usual from his divine environment. The energy thus assimilated, however, is transmitted in a specially modified form. If he have gone through great spiritual darkness, he will energise others to do the same; if he have felt profound spiritual sorrow, others through him will be helped to do the same; if he have gained great spiritual victories, he will make it easier for others to do the same.

Now, he on whom the function of quickening or potentiating every member of the organism of humanity, for the fulfilment of the conditions which were previously described, must clearly be capable of receiving and transmitting a measure of divine energy transcendently vast; and the experiences by which it is to be specifically modified for the purpose in question must be deep and varied beyond all estimate.

We shall feel this still more distinctly if we remember that he must be able to continue to discharge the functions of which I have been speaking until the members of the race have been put into a position through him also to fulfil each in his measure the conditions of which I have spoken. The work to be done is a gradual work, whether we embrace in our view merely the vast numbers of men who have already come into existence, or think also of those who are now coming, and still to come, into existence.

He who undertakes this tremendous task must for

ages possibly continue the work which he undertakes and initiates. One set of conditions demands that it be accomplished or completed in principle once for all at one point of time, in one place, by one series of acts. Another set of conditions not less stringently requires that he who accomplishes the task in principle, inasmuch as he has to be the living channel of energy, must continue to take a living interest in those to whom he aims to transmit such energy. Having become or being one with them, he cannot give them vital energy without at the same time entering into their needs and state. So that in a sense one may say that he will be *continuously* fulfilling the conditions to which reference was made, even though, in another respect, they were *fulfilled once for all.*

The two things just noted are, in fact, correlates. The conditions must have been fulfilled once for all, in order that the race might become endowed with the potentiality of their gradual, individual fulfilment. Not, of course, that every individual will repeat exactly what the one has accomplished :—that is not according to its constitution. When a great poet or artist or thinker, or other worker, has accomplished some great work, a new potentiality is conferred upon, or enters into, the race. But it is not the potentiality of indefinitely repeating what the originator has done :—it is rather, as one may say, that of so entering into his labour, that each man in the measure of his capacity, under conditions which vary according to the sphere to which they belong, makes his own that which has been accomplished by another.

7. It is further necessary that through that which the agent of man's potentiation does and suffers there should be revealed or manifested the grace and love of God. As was already pointed out, in itself the manifestation of the divine condemnation of sin, of the divine anger, and of the divine claim on man could not but tend rather to produce despair than hope, defiance than humble penitence. The bare spectacle of endurance such as we find to be involved in the divine action by itself would have no virtue to evoke the potentiality quickened by that endurance. That potentiality is more than merely an intense capability of realising the terrible nature of sin: it is also, and no less, a greater ability of sympathising with God as regards sin. Without the latter, as well as the former, repentance is not real repentance. He who should thus bear our sins must, of course, discern the gracious purpose of God in laying them on him; for otherwise he would not experience truly what God was doing, and thus quicken our potentiality of discerning the same thing. But how was this same potentiality to be evoked in man? By what means? Not, as I said, by the mere picture of endurance—simply as such. How, then, shall it be evoked?

8. But, still further, the quickening of the potentialities, their restoration to the position of real potentialities, was not all that was needed. According to the constitution of human nature—a constitution which it shares in essence with all living creatures—no potentiality can become an actuality, that is, realise and manifest itself in appropriate activity, unless it is

appropriately acted upon and solicited from without. The law of life is that a fitting environment must act on the living principle or germ to which it itself —environment regarded, of course, in its entirety— has previously given existence, if that principle or germ is to be evoked into ability to do the work for which it is potentially fitted. If a human potentiality is to be awakened and evoked, it has to be acted on by a corresponding external human embodiment, *i.e.* by an *actualisation* corresponding to itself, though outside and independent of itself. The potentiality of painting, *e.g.* has to be evoked by paintings which embody something of the kind that it is designed when actualised to body forth. The work for the race, by which the race is potentiated, needs also to be brought home to the consciousness of every member of the race, if its vitalised potentiality is to be evoked into actuality—a work, be it remembered, embodying, necessarily embodying, that which every man should body forth. Like a great moral painting, it must be set before the human painters whose well-nigh atrophied potentiality of painting has been quickened into new life, if their potentiality is ever to be evoked into actuality. Appeal has to be made to man's freedom to choose, and influence has to be brought to bear upon him. Apart from such appeal and influence, his power of choice would have no opportunity of putting itself forth; and apart from the quickening previously described, he would have a power of choice only in name. By nature his power of self-control, even as regards the good that is seen, is at the best enfeebled; generally

speaking, it is reduced well-nigh to null. Through the redeeming, potentiating action, however, it is to be so far restored to its normal state as to be a reality in *relation to the work done on his behalf*; but the work must be presented if it is to have an opportunity of having the due and designed effect.

The two are correlates: the former may be termed its dynamic action; the latter its deictic action!

But try to realise the significance of this. The work must be presented to every member of the human race, past, present, and to come, in such a way that the potentiality of entering into it which has been quickened in him shall be evoked into actuality, or at all events have the opportunity of becoming an actuality.

9. A tremendous problem, indeed, was the one whose chief points have just been past in review,—tremendous especially in view of the fact that man had to be energised to do what for him, according to his *true idea*, was abnormal; and which notwithstanding, in view of his actual state, was right and normal. Repentance—to sum up in the one word the conditions in question—involves a double effort for man,—the effort, *first*, to do *what at his deepest he necessarily feels*—dimly perhaps, yet really feels—*he should not have to do. Hence some of the reluctance men display to repent.* For repentance, though demanded by the contradiction to the law or idea of his being is *ipso facto* opposed to that law or idea, *i.e.* to the man's true self. And secondly, it is an effort to do what is normal by one who is actually in an abnormal state. To repent is the only normal course for one who has fallen into sin

and has become sinful. But clearly to impose a special duty on one who is indisposed towards good and disposed towards evil—such a duty, too, a duty which, intrinsically considered, as was just hinted, never ought to have been a duty, and ideally is not a duty—must be to ask what is practically impossible. He has therefore to be potentiated, not merely as would have been the case apart from sin, to go on in the course which he is pursuing; but to retrieve his steps, to nullify his own conduct, and to regard as worthy of him what in itself considered is a sign of his degradation. People who talk glibly of repentance ignore these considerations.

What must the member or members of the organism be who shall be capable of such a work? So to reinvigorate the enfeebled will of every man who ever has been or ever shall be born as that, so far as potentiality is concerned, he shall be without excuse. Apart from such potentiation man is incapable. He is, as Paul puts it, "*dead* in trespasses and sins" (Col. ii. 13);—not, that is, *absolutely given over to sin, not absolutely and totally depraved*, as theologians of a certain school have understood the words; but *even as men do and say things without being properly sensible or aware of what they are doing and saying in other domains*, that is, *as though they were dead whilst living*, so men sinned, sinned constantly in thought and word and deed, and yet were as insensible of the significance of their conduct as though they were dead. Whether their conduct were grossly or mildly wrong depended on various conditions: but, whether less or more or most wicked, they almost as thoroughly failed to

appreciate its real character, as if they had been actually without life.[1]

[1] The idea which I am urging, and which is an important factor of the theory of the work of Christ here expounded, was hinted at with a narrower application by the Reformed theologian Olevian (1536–1587) in his *De substantia fœderis gratuiti*: "Ita etiam oportebat λόγον vivificare propriam massam quo constaret, λόγον incarnatum esse Spiritum vivificantem, h.e. ut constaret, quemadmodum est Spiritus vivificus naturæ a se assumtæ ita esse Spiritum vivificum omnibus et solis qui hinc massæ inseruntur.—Eadem Deitas quæ plenitudinem vitæ in propria massa creat, ex ea plenitudine in nos et subjecta membra transfundit."—Heppe, *Dogmatik des deutschen Protestantismus*, vol. ii. p. 218.

CHAPTER XVII

The Solution

According to the New Testament and the faith of the Christian Church, the Logos, who was in the beginning with God and was God, became flesh, as John puts it; or as it is narrated by Matthew and Luke, the Holy Spirit overshadowed the Virgin Mary, and she conceived and brought forth a Son of whom the angel declared, "He shall be great and shall be called the Son of the Most High—the Son of God" (Luke i. 31, 35). Jesus, as He was named, by His obedience unto death, even the death of the Cross, wrought what needed to be wrought in order that men might attain to reconciliation to God.

In other words, using the language of the Church and theology, the second Person of the Trinity entered into personal union with the great body of humanity, and as such lived, taught, wrought wondrous works, was tempted, suffered, died and rose again that He might render possible and initiate the reconciliation of God and man.

The method by which the Incarnate Word accomplished His task is indicated in the numerous passages which either distinctly teach or imply or presuppose

that what Christ did and suffered is done and suffered by men, in power of His having already done and suffered it. Such expressions as "I am crucified with Christ" (Gal. ii. 20); "Planted together in the likeness of His death" (Rom vi. 5); "Communion or participation in His sufferings being conformed unto His death" (Phil. iii. 10); "Buried with Him, risen with Him" (Col. ii. 10); "If we be dead with Christ, we believe that we shall also live with Him" (Rom. vi. 8); "Your life is hid with Christ in God" (Col. iii. 3), which are but a sample of many others, are the outcome of a conception which dominated Paul's thinking even when he was not consciously going back to it as a premise from which he reasoned—a conception which points in the direction indicated.

Two things need, however, to be remembered,—*first*, that Paul uses the word "death" to denote not merely and solely "death," *i.e.* the actual dissolution of the physical organism, but "death" as the *culmination* and summing-up of Christ's whole work; in this sense "death" stands and is very appropriately used for the whole. He says elsewhere, *e.g.* "He humbled Himself and became obedient unto death, yea *even* unto the death of the Cross." So that what he really teaches is that in the self-humiliation, the obedience, the sufferings, the death, the resurrection, and the life of Christ, humanity humbled itself, obeyed, suffered, died and rose again to newness of life. And *secondly*, that when he refers to himself and his fellow-Christians he is not claiming something that belongs exclusively to them. In his view, on the contrary, they have entered

into the conscious enjoyment of something that belongs to the whole world. This seems clear enough from particular words like, "If one died for all, then were all dead"; no less than from the general doctrine of the New Testament, that the work of Christ affected the whole world.

In short, the New Testament represents the world as *already redeemed in and by Christ.*

Yet, on the other hand, it plainly enough also teaches that each individual man, as an individual, has to humble himself, to repent, to believe, to die, to rise with Christ and to begin to live through His life. In evidence of this it is only necessary to adduce the well-known passage: "The gospel of Christ, the power of God unto salvation to every one that *believeth*" (Rom. i. 16); for by the gospel Paul means the news of Christ and His work on behalf of men,—the work, namely, which has just been described. So that, though elsewhere he represents the salvation, *i.e.* the dying and rising with Christ, as finished and complete; men, therefore, as *ipso facto* in some way participants thereof, that is, as already reconciled and saved; he here treats salvation as conditional on believing.

In one sense, therefore, reconciliation was an accomplished fact, forgiveness was secured by the death of Christ; in another sense, reconciliation or forgiveness had to become an accomplished fact in the case of every individual man: it would therefore seem not yet to be complete.

CHAPTER XVIII

The Constitutional Relation of the Logos to the World, apart from Sin and under Sin

The constitutional relation of the Logos to the world may be looked at, first, independently of sin; and secondly, under the conditions imposed by sin. It is true, indeed, that we have no experience of a world without sin: yet it is also true that we should not even recognise a world under sin, much less understand it, unless we could form for ourselves some idea of a world that is free from sin. The un-ideal is known only through the ideal; the ideal is known through itself.

I. Let us consider, then, the constitutional relation of the Logos to the world, including humanity, apart from sin.

1. The earth to which man belongs is, as we saw, a partial immateriation of the Logos-idea. One might even venture to term it an incarnation, in so far as an incarnation is a specific form of immateriation. In a vastly larger sense the cosmos or universe as a whole is an embodiment of the Logos-idea; though even the universe as a whole will never exhaustively express and manifest it. For the divine life, of whose intellectual activity the Logos-idea is the eternal product, is

absolute; its content is therefore absolute. Whereas no cosmos, nay, no conceivable series of cosmic wholes, could ever be regarded as absolute, either in the negative or positive sense of the term, by anyone who regards them as products of the divine power; they cannot therefore embody all that is specifically characteristic of the Logos.

Speaking, however, without strict accuracy, the cosmos may be described as an incarnation of the Logos: in its measure, therefore, the *world* also, inasmuch as it is an integral factor of the cosmos. Really and truly, however, as was remarked already, it is an immateriation or incarnation of one of the ideas, the formation of which in the Godhead centres, as it were, in the Logos.

By means of the action of the divine energy, of which the Spirit may be regarded as the intra-divine centre and the immediate source, matter becomes the plastic vehicle of the specific life of the Logos, that is, of ideas which are, so to speak, the special product of His activity. So far as matter and its movements are intelligible, it is, in point of fact, because they are λογοειδεῖς (logoeid) like the Logos—a partial ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης καὶ χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ (brightness of His glory and impression of His hypostasis, Heb. i. 3). Hence such statements as, "Without Him was not *anything made* that was made," and "All *things* were *created* by Him and for Him, and He is before all things, and by Him all things consist" (Col. i. 16, 17). "*Things*" are His specific work. The energy is supplied, as we may say, by the Spirit;

but energy alone would produce no effect on matter, save that of simple restlessness—not even motion, so far as the idea of regularity is associated with it. Orderly motion is more immediately the work of Him in whom law and idea have their specific divine seat. Naturally, therefore, orderly action which issues in a form of existence, which has a constitution or organisation.

2. The Logos imposed on Himself accommodation and self-limitation in His relation to the cosmos.

The full treatment of the subject of the divine accommodation and self-limitation in relation to the cosmos belongs to cosmology, but its connection with the incarnation is so close that it must be referred to at this point.

The activity of the Logos in creating the world, be it not forgotten, is a vital, that is, a continuous, activity; not, however, unvarying. As such it may be said to evolve. Vital activity which gives rise to a productive process cannot but, in some sense, evolve with the evolution of that which it produces. The evolution of the cosmos *by* the Logos may be regarded in fact as, in some sense, the reflex of an evolution *in* the Logos.

Inasmuch now as the forces which generate the process of evolution, though, as was already laid down, in reality differentiations of energy put forth by God, are *not directly wielded by God*; being, on the contrary, endowed by God with a certain free independence of their own, obviously the process in God or in the Logos must, within specific limits, be *determined* by the process in the cosmos; the former must accommodate

itself to the latter. The only alternative is the pantheism which identifies God with the world or the world with God :—pantheism, which either conceals itself under the popular expression *divine immanence*: or with which Calvin is logically chargeable—strongly as he might resent the imputation—when he says: "Nothing happens but what He has knowingly and willingly decreed"; "He specially directs the action of every creature"; "All the changes which take place in the world are produced by the secret agency of the hand of God":—"Not heaven and earth and inanimate creatures only, but also the counsels and wills of men are so governed as to move exactly in the course which He has destined."

The accommodation referred to is not, of course, imposed on the Logos by an alien or foreign will. On the contrary, it is at the bottom included in the divine purpose. In fact, apart from such behaviour on the part of God, the cosmos could not have been the gradually evolving system which it actually is. It would have been finished and complete, so to speak, at one stroke; or, as the old divines used to say, by one eternal indivisible act.

Now the principle in question came into full operation, as far as the earth is concerned, when man appeared; for the blind or unconscious self-variability, which up to man, partially also in man himself, characterises the process of evolution, takes in man, at all events to some extent, the form of power freely and consciously to propose to himself ends of his own, and to choose the means by which the ends shall be

attained. In presence of this consciously self-variable force, which is the supreme product of the divine creative power, the Creator's action needed and needs to accommodate itself to that of the creature to a degree which must sometimes seem to verge on dualism, or to involve a kind of dethronement of the Supreme Lord.

3. The self-accommodation of the Logos just described passes at a certain point into self-limitation; or rather, self-limitation may be regarded as self-accommodation, either in new relations or at a higher potence.

We owe the term *kenosis* to the Epistle to the Philippians, where, in chap. ii. ver. 7, we read, ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε, *he emptied himself*. The self-emptying there referred to was really a form of self-limitation,—one imposed on the Logos by the new phase of the process of evolution which arose out of sin. Hitherto no effort has been made, to my knowledge, fully and logically to correlate the self-emptying of the Logos with the self-limitation of the Logos necessitated by the constitution given by God to the world. I shall therefore dwell here a little longer on the subject of the divine self-limitation in relation to the cosmos than might otherwise have been necessary.

(1) The divine *power* is self-limited.

The self-limitation of God, so far as His power is concerned, has found well-nigh universal recognition in one form or degree or another. God cannot, it is allowed, act even with regard to matter as though it were not matter; still less with regard to matter that is mechanically or

chemically combined as if it were not combined; still less, again, with regard to living beings, either as if they did not exist, or as if they were something else than living beings: least of all, with man as conscious and self-controlled, *i.e.* as in a secondary sense a self-maker or self-creator, as if he were totally subject to a law of necessitation, and had to act entirely in the dark, like most of the creatures below him. Relatively to each of these and all other classes of existences, God is limited. He could unmake them by ceasing to sustain them; but as long as they remain what they are He must needs recognise and treat them as such; they must therefore have a determining influence on His life and activity; His freedom to act is bounded by them; He cannot act as if they were not. Obvious, yea, even self-evident, or possibly tautological, as these words may seem, the earlier Protestant theologians too often really ignored or contradicted them in obedience to an abstract doctrine of the divine omnipotence and unchangeableness. Implicitly, too, they are contradicted nowadays by some who regard the theologians in question as unworthy of serious consideration. God cannot interfere with man by power or force,—no, not even to save a race from ruin and a world from disorder,—that is, He cannot interfere with that which specifically constitutes manhood, with man's spiritual nature, with his power of conscious choice. The human body is subject to natural law, and, within limits, may be treated by Him as other natural beings are treated; but the inner man forms a sacred enclosure at whose entrance-gate even the Almighty God must

knock—knock, too, in harmony with the laws of the personal life—ere He can secure admittance. The thunderbolts of the Great Jove must be laid aside when He would accomplish anything with this creature of His hand, this worm of the dust, this Titan whom a moth can vanquish.

(2) The divine *knowledge* is also self-limited.

Having gone thus far, it seems to me we must go still further. We cannot stop short at omnipotence: we must also include the divine *omniscience.*

If the energy which issues forth from God to initiate and carry through the process of evolution under the formative control of the Logos-idea has been endued with a certain independence; if, in other words, God Himself does not Himself work everything that is worked, directly and immediately; if the movements, changes, actions, and reactions in the cosmos, the integrations and disintegrations which constitute the cosmic process, are not due each and all directly to conscious divine volitions: if, on the contrary, they are brought about chiefly in the *dark relatively to the energy or forces* which produce them—what follows? Surely, that, however complete may be the knowledge God has of them, *ideally* considered, that is, regarded as parts of the divine idea which is being realised; *actually* considered, that is, considered as successively realised in the cosmos, He must depend for his knowledge of them in part on observation.

All this is true of the natural world, notwithstanding the fact that the forces evolving it work according to methods which, however complicated and subtle,

are yet fixed. Either this, or God works directly everything that is worked.

It is even more profoundly true of man. In his case there are two further elements to be considered. The *first* is his freedom with regard both to what he proposes to himself to do, and to what he actually chooses to do and sets about doing. The relation of the divine knowledge to the products of human freedom, whether to those which are purely mental, so far as any phenomenon of man's life can be so described; or to those which are both mental and bodily, is, of course, an old problem. Many modes of reconciling human freedom with an assumed real divine knowledge of its products *beforehand*, or with a knowledge absolutely free from conditions, have been suggested. This is not the place to review them. My own position is briefly this:—if every product of the human will is certainly, *i.e.* really, known to God before it comes into existence, its coming into existence must have been certain. Now, whatever may be said with regard to an already existing human being, it is surely not open to question, that if the doings of a human being *not yet* existing are absolutely certain, they cannot owe their certainty to anything in or of him. If he were in existence, it might be said that all his acts follow of necessity from what he was at the beginning, and from his first acts,—that his whole life is one long chain, each link of which is necessarily and unerringly forged in succession, even though, because the forging process goes on behind or beneath consciousness, he may think that he himself is the forger. But if he is not in existence, what is it

that makes them certain, and therefore *certainly knowable*? Either the will of God decreeing, foreordaining, and therefore, of course, foreknowing everything that shall come to pass; or the system of the world, with its chain of natural or necessary sequences.

But if anything is true, it is true that man is free; if he is not free, all is *Maya*. What, then, is the alternative?—Surely, that God has constituted a creature, the actions of which He can only know as such when they are performed. In presence of man, to a certain extent, even the Great God condescends to wait; nay more, has Himself so ordained things that He must wait, inquiring, *What will he do?*

And let it be remembered, this being, on which God as it were consents to wait, is itself but a differentiation of divine energy, an immateriation of a divine idea? Thoughts like these, bewildering and stupefying as they seem, are embodied, or, at all events, presupposed, in hymns that we sing, in prayers that we offer, in devotional books that we read, in sermons that we hear; but their logical implications are not duly recognised. We give utterance in an emotional guise to that which we either fear to face or obstinately deny when it comes before us in the dry light of reason.

Whether we choose to confess it or no, this is self-limitation, almost self-humiliation. It is consenting not to control, and not even to know, that which owes its existence, and the very possibility of self-control, to Him who gives the consent. God, as it were, thus hides Himself from Himself; or, if that be scarcely accurate, He hides from Himself that to which His own

energy proceeding through the Spirit, and His own reason acting through the Logos, has given the power which it wields.

Man, too, employs part of his energy to do work over which he has no direct control, and of which he has no direct knowledge—indeed, no knowledge at all till its results force themselves on his attention. But he does not consciously and freely send forth the energy on its mission, nor does he inform it with its controlling idea or law and fix its goal:—whereas God does all that. Here is the mystery.

If man were the creature of an anti-God, or of another God, or of a hostile Demiurge, such a position would be intolerable. But God Himself has made him thus; and when man penetrates the innermost recesses of his own spiritual nature he is compelled to confess that if it be not true, he himself is to himself the greatest of frauds and delusions.

If this be true, what a stretch of limitation, of self-effacement, so to speak, of condescending self-emptying, has God laid upon Himself! It is not, indeed, the kenosis which we find in the incarnation, but besides pointing in its direction, it is surely also a long step towards its accomplishment.

In the last instance, this and many other problems which seem, like the image of the great goddess Diana that fell complete down from Jupiter, to have been launched on us by Christianity, are all rooted in the great problem of creation:—the problem, namely, how the absolutely living God could create that which, whilst depending at every moment on His power,

should also be within limits independent of and able to disobey and even resist the power which made and upholds it.

4. The immateriation referred to above (p. 279) is a *process* which has an infinite number of stages,—a process nowadays termed evolution,—of which man is the culminating, the highest product. The chief law, or, at all events, one of the chief laws, of this process is the law of recapitulation, by which, as was previously stated (pp. 21 f.), is meant that each higher product of the process recapitulates, in brief and under special conditions, the whole of the previous steps of the process. It is at present recognised and traced only in the higher spheres of animal life, but it really is universal.

Man must accordingly be regarded as the recapitulation of the entire mundane process. As a matter of fact, too, there is not a force or law of the earth which is not found operating in him, in some one form or degree or another; nor is there a member of the kingdom of life between which and him there are not affinities, more or less remote or close.

Man may well, therefore, be described as a microcosm, nay more, as a *microlog*; for so far as a Logos-idea has become personal in him, he must in a very special sense be akin to, and therefore represent, the Logos. The whole cosmos, indeed, is akin to the Logos; for what else can be predicated of that which embodies a divine idea, and is produced by divine energy? But approximation to personality in the cosmos, wherever found, involves a special degree of kinship; nay more, a peculiar kind of participation in the nature of the Logos,

who is not only Himself personal, but the source of all that points towards, and actually has begun to be, personal in the universe. And be it said, by the way, every differentiation of energy in the cosmos is a step towards personality, and unconsciously points and reaches out towards it. In man personality has actually begun.

5. In the actual method of the *genesis* or evolution of the beings which constitute the earth, especially the *living* beings, there is a gradual approach to that of the incarnation of the Logos.

Let it be remembered, that the energy which from the very beginning acts on matter owes the method or law or idea which immanently regulates it to the Logos; that, in point of fact, whenever a *thing* makes its appearance, it does so through the co-operation of the Spirit and the Logos. Regarded from one point of view, the Spirit may be said to frame a body for a Logos-idea; from another, the Logos may be said to inform and control the energy proceeding from the Spirit with one of his ideas, so that out of matter it shall constitute a *thing*.

According to the account given in the Book of Genesis, it was "the power of the Highest" that, brooding over or overshadowing the unordered cosmic mist, initiated the process by which our earth has become what it is. Inasmuch now as the energy then put forth by the Spirit was not merely put forth once for all, but was the beginning of an infinite series of acts, each of these acts may be described as a brooding or overshadowing. Especially is this mode of speech appropriate when we are dealing with the higher orders of

animal life, particularly if, as there seems good reason for believing, new species take their rise in embryological modifications, which are by no means invariably slight variations, but not infrequently such as can be accurately termed "leaps or jumps" of a kind only to be accounted for on the assumption of a special self-action on the part of the energy which differentiates itself in the mundane forces. Not that there is intervention from without of any kind or degree;—no, it is strictly an immanent self-differentiation under the control of, and in accordance with, a Logos-idea; otherwise expressed, it is a self-differentiation, the purpose of which is to render possible a new immateriation of a Logos-idea.[1]

Is it not permissible to shelter ourselves under the authority of the Book of Genesis, and say that they are caused by a brooding of the Spirit of God? that a Logos-idea becomes flesh in them? The Spirit is perpetually active, and that which His activity causes to be conceived, or, in other words, to be embodied, is ideas of the Logos: or, if we choose to use the less strict terms sometimes employed with regard to men and their productions—the Logos Himself. For, as we say of the true artist, "he puts himself into his work"; so may we permit ourselves to say of the divine artist in the case under consideration, though we must not forget the difference between the human and the divine.

6. The microcosm, man, finally *foreshadows the in-*

[1] Immanent, however, not in the sense of independent residence in the cosmos, but in a sense which recognises the fact that all energy perennially flows from God. Self-differentiating, too, only in the modified sense here admissible.

carnation in that, turning back on and examining himself and the world, he endeavours to find God in both. Until he appeared on the scene, the world had evolved; but though the higher animals had begun to feel and to have sensations and perceptions, yea, even to judge and in a certain objective way to draw inferences, no evidence is adducible that any of them had made even the beginnings of a search into their own nature and the nature of the world. Not even of *wonder* is a trace discoverable. Such search, however, is the highest, the most abiding, and the most profoundly absorbing of all human occupations. In a very true sense, it may be said, too, that in men the world itself, of which man is the flower, turns back on itself and seeks its source, its origin, and its home. Nature, blind, deaf, dumb, as we count it, in its way and measure shares that "home-sickness" in which, as Novalis says, "all philosophy begins":—and surely the supreme problem of all philosophy is that of the real eternal home of the cosmos with its fulness.

At his lowest, man has always in a certain way been groping after, if haply he might find, God; though, as the Apostle Paul tells us, "He is not far from any one of us, seeing that in Him we live and move and have our being,"—specially that which is distinctive of humanity. If, as the same apostle adds, quoting from one of the Greek poets, we are also "his offspring," nothing could possibly be more natural. The profound truth of Paul's words becomes almost startlingly evident when it is acknowledged, as according to the positions previously laid down it must be, that each of us is a

veritable Logos-idea, conceived and infleshed by the overshadowing power of the Spirit of God. Of the three constitutive elements of our being,—matter, energy, and idea,—the only one that is not of divine genus (*θεῖον γένος*) is matter—the matter with which the Spirit of God clothed the divine idea: and even matter, though undivine, or non-divine, as owing its very being to the originative action of God, in contrast to energy and idea, which are, so to speak, of the very nature of God, cannot be said to be anti-divine.

No wonder, then, that men everywhere should be haunted by the sense of a divine presence—

> "A sense sublime
> Of something far more deeply interfused,
> Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
> And the round ocean, and the living air,
> And the blue sky, and the mind of man:
> A motion and a spirit, that impels
> All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
> And rolls through all things."
>
> WORDSWORTH, "Tintern Abbey."

Man, in fact, never finds himself till he finds God. And when I speak of finding himself, I do not use the word in a merely vague sentimental, but in the most realistic possible, sense. What he is and what he is to become; what are his powers and responsibilities; what he can do and enjoy; what he has to hope and fear,—man can never know, save through Him by whom and unto whom all things are created.

At the same time, when I speak of *man*, I do not mean merely the individual, but humanity—the organism constituted by individual men; and I take for granted that no one member of the organism

humanity can attain the highest possible to him, in any direction or respect whatsoever, save in conjunction with his fellow-members,—that, in other words, humanity and the individual man progress together, and not otherwise. This holds as true of his sense and consciousness of the divine source and root of his nature and idea as of his realisation of the latter. No mere individual can attain alone the knowledge of God which constitutes "eternal life." As the organism of humanity grows, provided there is a corresponding advance in the realisation of its idea, the knowledge of God possessed even by individuals will become ever richer and fuller. The knowledge which is the possession of the entire body of individuals constituting the race, though it can never be *directly* and *consciously* the property of every individual, will have an effect on each individual's conscious perception and thinking of God, at any particular moment, analogous to that which the sum total of an individual man's acquirements, though not present to consciousness, has on his conscious thinking of any particular constituent of the said acquirements. Experience and observation alike teach that the word of a philosopher or a scientist, or even of a well-informed man, on a particular point of a subject which he has investigated, is weightier and more significant than that of one who has thought less and knows less. Both, as a matter of fact, may use the same word; the man of profound learning and thought may be as little conscious as an uneducated man of all that he has studied and pondered bearing on the special point; yet his word will have a

richer life, a fuller import, and a greater weight than the word of one whose knowledge and thinking are both of them superficial.

If the development of the human race had been normal, the larger and richer its growth, the fuller and truer would have become the knowledge of Him by whom all things consist,—that, too, not merely from the point of view of the whole race, but from that of every individual member thereof. Under such conditions the knowledge possessed by individuals would have become in a certain sense *generic* as well as individual. Yet, however strong his conviction that he lived and moved and had his being in God; that the energy constituting him and the vast cosmos around him was of divine origin; still further, though his fellowship with God might have attained the highest degree of intimacy, his *direct consciousness*, relatively to God, could never have transcended—a kind of theopathy; a *theopathy*, however, which, being interpreted and strengthened by the evidences of the divine presence and activity diffused through the world, would have approximated ever more closely to what one might term *theoaisthesis*—God-perception:—a perception, even in this world, in some degree anticipating the extatic vision of the supremely blessed beyond.

II. The relations of the Logos to humanity under sin.

The principles or methods thus far expounded are those which characterise the evolution of the world, and the divine relation thereto, normally considered. But we have to do, at all events, as far the human race

is concerned, with a break, with an abnormal variation in the process; in other words, with the fact referred to by the Apostle Paul, that, "as through the disobedience of the one man, the many were made sinners," that is, were set in the position or relation of sinners; "so through the obedience of the one shall the many be made righteous," that is, set in the position or relation of righteous men.

Seeing that the force—the anthropic force, as we might term it—which has given an abnormal turn to the process of evolution is itself a differentiation of the energy which is generating the process, and that the energy is the energy of the Spirit of God informed and controlled by a Logos-idea, man may be said, in a sense, to have captured the process and to be using it for the realisation of an idea opposed to that of the Logos. Otherwise put, he undertook to establish in God's name and with God's means a kingdom which would be essentially hostile to God. No member of the human race has, indeed, so far as is known, ever distinctly set this before himself as an aim; but it was the essential meaning of the line of conduct on which humanity entered; it is the logic of sin. Shall this be permitted? Or shall God intervene to eliminate sin; to check and overthrow disorder? If an intervention is to take place, clearly it must be in harmony with the general principles laid down, if one may so speak, by God Himself for the guidance of His relation to the evolving cosmos,—the cosmos as a whole, and the human part of it in particular. The harmony may not appear at the first glance, but it

must be there; and must be discoverable by the reverent searcher.

Grave arguments and light ridicule have times without number been directed against the idea of God intervening in the course of the world for the repair of the damage supposed to have been caused by sin; but they owed any force they possessed either to a false conception of God Himself, or to a false conception of the divine relation to the world. This is not the place to go into this subject, but I cannot refrain from the remark in passing, that whether the divine transcendence or the divine immanence be exaggerated, the logical issue is the same. The former may be said to be the error of all who allow their conception of God to be dominated by the attribute of unchangeableness, in any of its applications; the latter, of those who look at the world solely from the point of view of law as it prevails in the preorganic domain.

1. If the evolution of a real world, more particularly one that was to culminate in an organism of free intelligences like humanity, imposed on God self-adaptation and self-limitation, such as were previously described, in how much greater a degree will they be necessary when the same world has been disordered by sin! Obviously, supposing the intervention just referred to must needs take place.

Nothing could have been easier, indeed, than for the Logos to have withdrawn the differentiating idea by which man is constituted what he is, and let the energy to which it gave limits and form flow back, so to speak, into the general stream of which it was a branch.

There seems every reason for thinking that great numbers of such differentiations were thus dealt with prior to the rise of man; and that they are still being thus dealt with. Whether we ascribe their disappearance to the action of the Logos; or say, with scientific writers, that it was due to some change in or action of their environment which deprived them of the nutriment and influences that conditioned further growth and development, yea, even existence; or to their being no longer adapted to their environment, in consequence of the decay of the organism, the fact remains; and from the point of view of biblical theism, one mode of describing the occurrence is as true as the other:—they are, in reality, but different ways of stating the same truth.

Inasmuch as the divine relation to man is not only personal but bio-dynamic, like that of his natural environment; inasmuch, further, as man's normal growth and development, consequently his very existence, depend on the vital action of God in him being what it should be; and inasmuch, still further, as the vitalising and energising relation of God to man is conditioned by the personal relation of man to God, the ultimate result of the personal misrelation, which is termed sin, must have been the gradual extinction of the human race. Like the beasts below him, man would have "turned to dust again,"—literally and exactly. Whether the subject be regarded from the point of view of the Logos; or from that of the constitution of the world, ordinarily termed nature, makes no difference. Have we not a right to ask, why should a being, constituted by divine energy, be permitted to

use the capabilities, opportunities, and means with which it was equipped, not only contrary to the law of its own constitution, but also for purposes different from those contemplated by its originator:—nay more, in a manner incompatible with the well-being of the system of which it is the flower? Could such permission be reconciled with any conception we are able to form of divine consistency, of divine wisdom, of divine rectitude, nay more, of divine goodness?

And as to the course of nature,—it is difficult to conceive how under such conditions man could continue to exist at all, much less lead a normal life, unless we reconcile ourselves to a thoroughly deistic or even atheistic conception of the world. That such a gradual disappearance might have been expected is surely taught also by the disorder, disease, misery, and disintegration that have marked the history of tribes and nations whose remnants still cumber the earth, or which have actually almost totally disappeared from its surface.

Instead of this, God imposed on Himself still greater limitations and accommodations. He bore with men. He remembered that they are dust. He exercised patience. And can anything more amazing be conceived than that such remembrance, such bearing, such patience, should be ascribable to the absolute God? nay more, that they should have to be characterised as in a sense forced on him by the creature which, more than any other, may be said to live and move and have its being in him? Without divine self-limitation and self-accommodation man could have had no real

existence at all; still less, could he have existed as a free being; but obviously and emphatically least of all, when he turned himself against the very fountain and sustenance of his life.

If *freedom* imposed a certain limit on the *divine knowledge*; if the Logos needed to consent to wait for His knowledge of what men actually chose to do till the volition to do it was formed; if He must still further wait for His knowledge of the external realisation of His volitions until such realisation took place, would not *sin* of necessity, involve a still further kenosis or self-emptying? For is not sin, in addition, a something essentially irrational, unintelligible, and dark? Is it not energy, or rather force, contradicting its own immanent law? And seeing that this law is not imposed from without, but is both congruous to and in a sense the expression of man's essential nature, is it not a self-contradiction,—that, too, not merely ideal, but real? Seeing, further, that both force and law are essentially divine, is not a *man sinning* a *divine thing contradicting itself*, acting undivinely, nay more, anti-divinely? Can this be other than dark to Him who constitutes man what he is? Even to the sinner himself it is unintelligible, because irrational, save in the sense that he *feels*, or *takes immediately for granted*, that it is his own act, not that of another; his own free act, not forced upon him either from within or from without. How much more, then, must it be in a very true sense irrational, and therefore, strictly speaking, unintelligible to the Logos. This, I am well aware, is exceedingly strange language to employ regarding one of the

Persons of the ever-blessed Trinity; but is the ethical logic at fault? If a certain kenosis were a condition of the evolution of the world normally, how much more of its evolution after sin had entered?

Sin further forces a kind or degree of kenosis even on the *divine love*. As God cannot continue to hold the same personal relation towards either humanity in particular or the world in general, so far as it and humanity form an organic whole, after as before the entrance of sin, activities like that of love, and others which constitute his specifically personal relation, must needs be checked; that is, be reduced in part to a potential state.

God would be untrue both to Himself and to man were He to behave to man after he began to sin, and whilst he continued sinning, just as He did or would have behaved to him apart from sin. The respect due to human freedom involved, as was remarked in a previous connection, the recognition of man's free decision to sin as sinful.

He would have ignored man's free decision, *i.e.* man's freedom as well as His own claims and the claims of the system He is evolving, had He continued to love him after sinning and whilst sinning, just as He did or would have done apart from sin. The man of the divine purpose and idea was to be the object of complacency, of approval, of affection; the actual man is the object of disapproval, condemnation, resentment. What about the former active relations? Are they not in some sense reduced to potentiality? Just as resentment is a potentiality till it is called forth by sin, so

does love become a potentiality when it encounters sin.

Yet love is the highest and most glorious of the activities or outgoings, or, as it has been termed, attributes of God! "*God is love.*" God does not cease altogether to be love in the presence of sin, any more than He becomes altogether anger when He is angry; but, so far as His relation to humanity is concerned, a change comes over Him. As regards one part of the vast cosmos which He is evolving, His loves recedes, as it were, into partial—yea, might recede into total—inactivity or unconsciousness. As He is said to cast our sins behind Him into the abysses, and to forget them, so, too, is it possible for Him to forget His love for humanity, to deny it,—that, too, in obedience to the will of the creature whose life is rooted in and sustained by His love (cf. Jer. xxiii. 39; Hos. iv. 6).

Here we have a still nearer approach to a veritable kenosis within God Himself. *Himself, as it were, in one relation hidden from Himself; that relation, too, intrinsically the divinest.*

Reference has been several times made to the apparent difficulty, on this view, of accounting for redemption as essentially a work of love. In its very deepest divine roots redemption is God's method of remaining true to His original purpose, of asserting His claims, of doing justice to Himself. To have let sin work itself out would have been to inflict on Himself an eternal loss—the loss of the race and world, which at its creation He pronounced very good—good in itself as begun, good as to the process of evolution

on which it was to enter, good as to the purpose which it was destined to fulfil.

It is a proof and act of love, because the securing, so to speak, of the divine right, the extinction of injustice, the crushing out of sin, signifies the restoration of man to his true position—to righteousness, harmony, beauty, blessedness, in a word, to *love*—unless man obstinately and finally turns his back on God.

Justice to God, justice to man, and atonement for sin, have in this respect one and the same goal as love.

2. We are compelled, however, by the premises previously laid down, to go even a step further.

Sin has introduced, in some sense, disorder into the very life of God Himself. For consider that this being, man, which has sinned, is a *differentiation of divine energy*, according to a divine idea. He is the immateriation or incarnation of a Logos-idea. But let it be also borne in mind that the energy in question is not something that is absolutely dissociated from or outside God. The independence which it possesses is but relative. It may be compared with that which is enjoyed by the branch of a vine which, though dependent for life and well-being on the life and well-being of the parent stem, conditions in its turn the life and well-being of the stem, so that neither can be what it is meant to be independently of the other, so long as their mutual relation continues the same. The power which constitutes and wields itself as man is being continuously bestowed by God: it flows from God in a living stream, constantly varying, indeed, yet never interrupted.

If an analogous relation subsist between man and the divine source of the energy which constitutes him; in other words, if the Logos is the great stem or "vine" of which humanity is one of the branches and individual men are the innumerable branchlets and leaves,—*one*, not the only one, for the cosmos embraces, there is reason to believe, many such branches,—then the entrance of disease and suffering into a branch, as it must needs affect the streamlet of life in the branch, so must it needs affect the great stream out of which it flows. For there is perpetual action and reaction between the source of our being and ourselves. Not that we can injuriously affect the divine health, but, as was pointed out in another connection, we can, and do, cause God pain and sorrow.

This, surely, is a still fuller degree of the self-limitation or kenosis which we are considering.

Nay more, something of the nature even of a *schism* has been introduced into the Godhead by sin. Inasmuch as man, the sinner, is a differentiation of the energy controlled by the Logos, is it not as though the very Logos Himself were in some sense the occasion of the introduction of a warring element into His own life, if not into the life of deity, through the creature which He had not only constituted, but was sustaining? Had He, the living vine, at once cast off His human branch, the case would have been different; but He let it retain its place, He patiently bore with it. Such retention, however, such patience,—what does it mean but making Himself in a certain sense answerable for the misrelation and the jar which is its result? His own

life must, of course, first and foremost be affected by it; but the life of the Godhead would also of necessity participate therein. And inasmuch as the offending creature, as was just now again remarked, is a differentiation constituted by the Logos, may not the guilt of its conduct in some mysterious way cast a shadow over the relation between the Logos and the Father? As far as the sin was concerned, would not the experience be a kind of anticipation of that which is described in the paradoxical, though profoundly true, words of Paul, "*He was made sin* for us—He who knew no sin"? And as far as the shadow was concerned, would it not be a kind of anticipation of the awful moment on the Cross when the Son of God cried, "My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me"?

CHAPTER XIX

The Actual Incarnation of the Logos

Up to the point which we have been considering, the kenosis, which we found to be imposed on the Logos by the very creation and sustentation of man, especially after the entrance of sin, had not extended to that which made the Logos a constitutive factor of the personal life of the Godhead—if one may so speak. If the one God or Deity is constituted by three factors, each of which is from eternity really personal,—personal, however, not in separation from the rest, but in, with, and through the rest, or otherwise expressed, if the περιχώρησις, the immeatio, the *Ineinanderseyn* (as the German has it), of three personific factors conditions the absolute personality of each, neither being absolutely personal apart from the rest,—then the Logos, no less than the factors designated Father and Spirit, had His own personal self-centre, and this self-centre was the seat of that which differentiated Him from the Father and Spirit, no less than the ground of His factorhood. In virtue of this He was that *to Himself* which the Father and Spirit were not to Him; though He could not have shared the absoluteness of Deity,

He could not have been Θεὸς, as John terms him, apart from the περιχώρησις.

What the Logos was *to Himself* had been subject to certain passing or partial obscurations, as we have seen, in consequence of the sin of the being which owes to Himself its life and power to act. One might say that shadows flitted across the consciousness of the Logos, rising mysteriously out of the depth in which His life and that of sinful humanity were one; or, to employ the analogy of our own human experience, a sense of the wrong, disorder, and woe, which troubled the human differentiation of His own energy, affected Him, as sometimes a strange feeling of depression, uneasiness, wrongness comes over us, whence and how we for our part can but uncertainly guess.

But these experiences were partial and transitory. There remained a still further depth into which He might descend—the depth which is indicated in a variety of statements in the New Testament, and which found its formulation, if it may be so termed, in the word ἐκένωσε.

But let us endeavour to approach it a little more closely.

I. The light thrown on the subject by human experience.

The experience of men is at this point instructive; and let it be remembered that, wide as is the difference between man and God, the affinity between the Creator and His image is no less real: as becomes specially obvious when the latter is regarded from the point of

view of the cosmology presupposed throughout this entire discussion.

1. Every man is in a very true sense essentially of divine nature—even as Paul teaches, θεῖον γένος.

The energy of which a differentiation, in association with matter, constitutes man, is, as was laid down, energy continuously emanating from God:—not like matter, created from nothing. But no man is for this reason conscious of himself as divine; otherwise expressed, in no man does this divine energy *directly identify itself in consciousness* with the source from which it proceeds. In fact, whilst we say, and are compelled to say, *I*; whilst we speak, and cannot but speak, of our *Self*; in reality the essential content or nature of this self, of this subjective *noumenon*, is veiled from us. We observe its phenomena; we cannot help predicating the phenomena of the noumenon termed self; but direct insight into the very nature of this noumenon we have not: though we treat ourselves as one of the causes of the phenomena, we cannot tell how we cause them.

However closely thinkers may go to the verge of pantheism or panentheism, they stop short at the point indicated. No one of them says, I am divine. The predicate divine contains that which absolutely forbids its application to a human self, by itself, in this direct manner. Indirectly, the self may be logically compelled to make the application; but the self as present to consciousness never forces from the man the exclamation, "My Lord, my God." No man feels in the presence of his own self, whether he take it empirically or ideally, as every man does feel, and knows he ought

to feel, yea, and exults to feel, when he is face to face with the eternal and the absolute God.

In one word, the anthropic force, though divine, does not know itself directly as such: it knows itself as anthropic—as this particular differentiation; but not in its real essential character as divine. Could it do so, it would cease to be what it essentially is, namely, a differentiation of divine energy, and would become that which is differentiated.

Still further, were the energy which constitutes man to be thoroughly conscious of itself, were it to know itself, it would recognise in itself a recapitulation of all the forms of energy which have arisen in the course of the evolution of the world:—for is it not the very flower of that evolution, and the differentiation which presupposes all the differentiations that have gone before? Such a direct consciousness, however, we know is not ours. In the way of scientific reflection, we infer that all this is true of ourselves; but we do not and cannot *see* it in ourselves, nor does the self suggest it to us. Otherwise, *at the centre, as it were, enswathed in fold after fold, after the manner of a bulb, we should discern the living divine spark, impressing us qualitatively, if not quantitatively, with the absoluteness of the great sun to which it belongs.*

Consciously or unconsciously, the desire and effort of mystics of the most diverse schools, and of nearly all ages and lands, has been to pierce through these various wrappings of their own nature, and, as it were, to enter into and be absorbed in the divine kernel; or, to change the image, to plunge into, never again to emerge from, the ocean of

the divine life through the narrow channel of the innermost self.

2. At the same time, the bearing on this subject of some of the phenomena of our inner life must not be overlooked. The idea of right, the idea of truth, the idea, too, of beauty, each in its own way suggests absoluteness; and absoluteness and the divine are correlates. When the admonition—Be right, act rightly; think and speak the truth; aim at the beautiful, makes itself mysteriously, silently, and inarticulately, but yet clearly, heard in the soul, we recognise in it a *must*, an *imperative*, which neither we nor any other being capable of apprehending it can under any circumstances gainsay. We feel it to be absolute. Yet we feel it also to come from ourselves, to be, as it were, bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh—spiritually,—not imposed from without. It is from without, yet from within; it is divine, yet human; though no created eye can gaze on the point where the two that seem as far asunder as the infinite and finite meet and are one.

What man cannot help—what is a necessity of nature to him,—that the Logos voluntarily took upon Himself. He could not renounce the essential divinity of His nature, that which had constituted Him from eternity what He was. Indeed, *no being can renounce its own essential nature*; for the nature, in performing the act of renunciation, would be reaffirming and strengthening itself. But the direct and *immediate consciousness* of divinity, which He had enjoyed in conjunction with the Father and the Holy Spirit from all eternity, was interrupted during the time of His tabernacling in

the flesh. The essential nature, *i.e.* the divinity of His noumenon, was hidden from itself: at all events, if it ever made itself distinctly known to His consciousness, it was only, on the one hand, intermittently as it were, by flashes, such as sometimes may illumine the otherwise unbroken darkness of an earthly night; and, on the other, through reflection on thoughts He was able to think, words He was able to speak, works He was able to do, transcending human power and experience :—each of these also—the flashes and the reflection—ministering and lending force to the other.

II. The difficulties that present themselves.

But difficulty on difficulty seems to open before us when we think of the divine power, the divine knowledge, the divine unapproachableness by temptation, which belonged to the Logos, and which surely are inseparable from His very essence.

We can but again look at the matter in the light of human experience.

1. Now, it teaches us that the *possession* of power is in a certain measure separable from the *consciousness* thereof; and that the *exercise* of power is not always preceded, or even followed, by a distinct consciousness of its nature, or extent, or even *existence.*

We men act thus and thus, we perform this and that, not always because we are first *conscious* of the power to do so, but simply because we *have* the power; and the consciousness of the power is awakened in us by its exercise. Hence such sayings as that a man can never know what he is able to do until he is in circumstances that call forth his power. And if we have

done something exceptional, we ourselves may remain in doubt whether we can do it again until the occasion arises and we put ourselves to the test. In fact, a man is revealed to himself no less than to others by the acts which he finds himself able to perform. If the ability had never been called forth, he would have remained ignorant of possessing it. And all this is as true of ordinary as it is of exceptional power.

The case is similar with *human knowledge*. It is asked, indeed, how can a man know a thing and not be conscious of the knowledge? What we know, surely we know. Doubtless, and yet no man ever had all his knowledge present at one and the same moment to consciousness. Consciousness has, in reality, very narrow limits. Strictly speaking, it most resembles a string of beads, of which thoughts, whether they be of the kind which constitute knowledge proper, or relate to sensations, feelings, emotions, and the like, are the beads and the self the string; and only one at once passes through or over the field of our own inner observation, to disappear immediately below the mental horizon, sometimes to remain hidden for ever, sometimes to be recalled by what we style memory. Now, a piece of knowledge cannot be said to cease to be ours because for a longer or shorter time its place in consciousness is taken by something else. An astronomer does not lose his astronomical knowledge whilst he is consciously occupied with other matters,—such, for example, as his food, or clothing, or dwelling, or instruments, even though for the time being they completely absorb his attention; and though, as far as they are

concerned, he be subject to the limitations of one to whom the heavenly bodies and their motions are a complete *terra incognita.*

2. Analogously, both as regards power and knowledge with the Incarnate Logos:—for surely, I would repeat, it is permissible thus to reason from ourselves to Him, our archetype; nay more, unless we are simply to take up a position so completely agnostic that the very fact of the Incarnation would become incredible to us, are we not compelled to do so, not only by our own constitution, but by the very constitution of the world and of ourselves as part of it?

The Logos remained as truly possessed of divine *power* after incarnation as He was before. But having consented to the limitation of *consciousness* previously described; having drawn the veil of the flesh between Himself and His proper divinity; having ceased for the time to have a specifically divine self-consciousness, the divine power inherent in His divine nature could not be a matter of consciousness, as it must have been before. As one of the Persons of the Trinity, He previously shared the self-transparency of deity: He too "was light, and in Him was no darkness at all." Now, however, there was darkness—darkness, at least in part, relatively to His power. Yet as occasion arose, He wielded a power over the visible and invisible worlds which demonstrated Him the Lord of both. Such occasions came apparently unsought. He paid no heed to, nay, He put aside suggestions to work signs simply as such. When he worked them, He did so either out of sympathy with the needs and sufferings of men, as if in

obedience to impulses arising out of the depths of His being; or because the exigencies of His divine mission called for them; or perhaps in consequence of thoughts impressed on consciousness, or words spoken directly by the Father, such as came to the prophets in the old time. That He who was Himself possessed of divine power should speak, as He repeatedly did, of His works as given Him to do by the Father, and as if He owed the power as well as the commission to do them to the Father (see John x. 38, xvii. 4; v. 20, 36, ix. 4, x. 25), need occasion no difficulty, if the whole matter be regarded in the present light.

Not being directly conscious of His divine nature and its endowments, yet retaining these same endowments, naturally enough when the occasion arose for work He worked, and worked perhaps miracles: nay more, they might produce in Him the kind of confidence expressed in the words, "Thinkest thou that I cannot now pray the Father, and He shall send legions of angels?" The Lord Jesus Christ's meat was to do the will of the Father; but the particular thing He should do was apparently in most cases determined, as we say, by circumstances. There is very little sign of anything like a fixed plan. If the moment called for a word, the word was spoken; if for a prayer, a prayer was uttered; if for a simple act such as needed no special endowment, then such an act; and if an act demonstrating the supremacy over nature and mind that inhered in Him, then as easily, as spontaneously, did He heal the sick, give sight to the blind, or even raise the dead to life. Each and every act, whether

simple or mighty, was done, as far as His conscious volition was concerned, because He deemed it to be part of the great task entrusted to Him, and He was no more uninterruptedly conscious of His divine power than we are of ordinary human power.

The same thing holds true of the *knowledge* possessed by the Logos—of what we term His omniscience, as divine. He did not, and could not, divest Himself of His knowledge without divesting Himself of His divinity; but in taking upon Himself flesh, and in subjecting Himself to human limitations, He consented to share the human capability of being *unconscious of His own knowledge*. Those words of His, "My meat is to do the will of Him that sent Me," related not merely to His works, in the narrower sense, but also to other functions and activities which characterised Him as incarnate. His body, of course, shared our needs: but even His consciousness was marked by our limitations. He could not think of several things at one and the same time; and whilst occupied, as He must needs have been, with the manifold details which enter into the daily life of men, however simple it may be, He could not at the same time occupy Himself with the questions of the kingdom which it was His mission to proclaim and establish; still less with the things of which He had taken cognisance in His divine capacity and nature. They remained, as it were, just below consciousness.

This possession and non-possession accounts for two features of our Lord's utterances:—*first*, His declaration of ignorance of certain things; and *secondly*, the

mysterious tone of authority, certainty, and immediacy which mark His discourses. He knew not His knowledge of certain things, just as is the case with most of us; and yet, as the unconscious possession of extraordinary knowledge on the part of men properly colours their tone even when speaking of ordinary things —they cannot even then speak as other men speak—so in Christ's case the divine knowledge which was His in the depths temporarily covered from view, inspired all His words with an authority which is otherwise often inexplicable. Nay more, one may say that whilst *for consciousness* His words were not shaped and filled by this unconscious knowledge, in reality that unconscious knowledge found voice and utterance through them—if not as to what may be termed matters of faith, yet certainly as to spiritual and moral truth and life. The real content even of merely human words is not always restricted to that which is consciously put into them. Sometimes, nay indeed, very often, our words have less content than they are taken to have; but the words of thinkers, prophets, poets may have a larger content—larger than is appreciated by those to whom they are addressed,—larger, too, than they themselves intend; that, too, partly because a richer life than can ever express itself in consciousness uses them as its channel or vehicle,—a life of their own, and a life which belongs not only to them, but also to the smaller or larger humanity which, as it were, pours its flood through the narrow channel, first, of their spiritual nature, and then through the still narrower channel of their consciousness.

All this was emphatically the experience of the Lord Jesus Christ. Unless we remember these possibilities we shall inevitably be puzzled, first, by the very simple character of his utterances; next, by the depths within depths which open up as we meditate on them; and thirdly, by the tone of absoluteness—not of the dogmatist, not of the pedagogue, not of the self-confident sciolist, not of the discoverer of new truth, but of unconscious, naïve absoluteness that characterises His words.

We must not, however, ignore the difference—the tremendous difference—between *ignorance* or the temporary obscuration of His own knowledge and *error*. Some modern biblical critics speak as if this difference had never dawned on them; and therefore deem themselves warranted in allowing that Christ shared the mistakes and errors of his contemporaries. Even of men it is sometimes true that they are at particular moments ignorant of that which they really know; and, speaking about themselves, they would never confound ignorance with error.

A great deal is made, I may just remark in passing, by certain critics of the Christian Incarnation of what are styled parallel stories in ethnic religions. For my own part, having regard to Christianity as a whole, and to the part it has played in the history, in particular, of religious life and thought, these ethnic stories seem rather to confirm than to discredit the incarnation, which is the central feature of the Christian faith. It is easy, of course, to ridicule them. Their extravagances are obvious. Considered as actual occurrences, they are

saddled with too many absurdities, incongruities, inconsistencies, intellectual, moral, and religious, to be credible. But surely that is not all. Have they no meaning,—no deeper meaning? Why did men think of Deity as assuming, either for their sake or for its own sake, the human form? Must not something true, something congruous to the needs of man and the nature of God, lie at the heart of these imaginings? Is it credible that the idea of incarnation should have taken the hold it did on the subtle and intensely religious Hindoo nature, if it were little else than a symptom of mental disease or perversity? May we not rather regard it as the outcome of a glimpse of the true *mode* in which divine redemption would be accomplished, not to say of the condition of the attainment of the highest fellowship with God? To represent these incarnations as anticipations, or even "unconscious prophecies" of *the* Incarnation, is perhaps going too far. It seems to me truer to the constitution of human nature, and to the divine relation to nature and man, to distinguish between the kernel and the husk of the stories; and, whilst treating the husk, with the impossible and grotesque elements too frequently characteristic of it, as the product of an unhealthy fancy, to regard the kernel as supplied by genuine insight into the condition of human redemption. As Mr. Illingworth says: "Folk-lore and mythology find endless traces of supposed incarnations which are quite as unspiritual, and even immoral, as they are unscientific, and conflict not only with all canons of rational criticism, but even with the ordinary dictates of plain common sense. Yet these

fictions only emphasise the persistence of the instinct which continued to invent them, because it continued to demand them. And when at length we are confronted with a tale of Incarnation whose spiritual sublimity and actual influence are absolutely unique, its believers may fairly recognise in the previous expectations of mankind an additional proof of its truth. *The* event has occurred, they may reasonably say, which man's prophetic soul divined. The Incarnation which he so often fantastically dreamed of has at last become a fact." [1]

[1] *Divine Immanence: an Essay on the Spiritual Significance of Matter.* My own line of thought was penned long before I made the acquaintance of Mr. Illingworth's most thoughtful and charming work. It is a great satisfaction to find oneself thus agreeing with one who has dealt so profoundly with the problems of personality, spirit, matter, especially in relation to God. Had the scope of this book permitted, I should have had a good deal more to say on these root-questions. If a theology that shall do justice to the primal and essential Christian verities—not quasi-philosophically explaining them away, nor rationalistically watering them down—is to be constructed, a beginning must be made with problems such as those to which Mr. Illingworth's *Personality, Human and Divine*, and this new work of his are devoted.

CHAPTER XX

The Supernatural Conception

At this point we may consider the question of the mode in which the Logos entered into the organic relationship to humanity of which we have spoken? In other words, how the Son of God—the New Man, the Lord from heaven—was constituted? The view that, in my judgment, is least encompassed with difficulties, embraces most of the facts, is most agreeable to analogy, and falls in most with the dim anticipations, or, as they are too often regarded, the phantasings of the human race, is that which has commanded the assent of the Church. It is commonly termed the supernatural *birth*; it is, and ought therefore to be consistently termed, the supernatural *conception*; for though the act of origination in Christ's case is traced to the power of the Highest, overshadowing Mary, *i.e.* to the Holy Spirit, and is therefore an exception to the regular course of human origination, no hint is given in the New Testament that the birth as such deviated in any material respect from the birth of ordinary human beings.

Inasmuch as man is essentially soul and body, the Logos could not have been regarded as in any sense

human unless He had become in this respect like His brethren: "Forasmuch as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, He also Himself likewise took part of the same" (Heb. ii. 14).

But He could not have been organically one with humanity, save on the condition of owing His flesh and blood to humanity. It was necessary that His body should be drawn from essentially the same sources, and built up out of essentially the same material as the bodies of men generally.

The New Testament account of the transaction is that the Holy Ghost, the source and wielder of the energy which, in its immanent form through the human father, is in every case the means of generating the human embryo, took the place of the father. As Luke reports, Gabriel said to Mary: "The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee. Therefore also shall that Holy Thing which shall be born of thee be called the Son of God" (Luke i. 35). *Ordinarily* the seed of the male is the vehicle in and through which the energy with its informing idea is deposited in the womb of the female; *in this case*, the divine source of all energy and of every informing idea acts directly; and what the womb in ordinary cases does, namely, supply the earliest environmental nourishment and modifying influences, so in the case before us, the womb of the Virgin Mary. It was, be it remembered, the same energy wielded by the same power, only wielded *directly*, instead of through a *human differentiation of itself*.

With Luke's account agrees that of Matthew, who

tells us that Mary, *before* she and Joseph came together, was "found with child of the Holy Ghost" (i. 18), and that when Joseph was in doubt, "the angel of the Lord appeared to him in a dream, saying, Joseph, thou son of David, fear not to take unto thee Mary thy wife, for that which is conceived in her is of the Holy Ghost" (i. 20). Though John does not expressly refer to the process in the manner of Matthew and Luke, his words, ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο (John i. 14), first become properly intelligible when viewed in the light of the account given by the other Evangelists.

The subject is doubtless beset with perplexity, partly because the transaction belongs to the domain of the transcendent rather than the immanent, of the direct rather than the indirect, action of God; partly because of the peculiar character of the event itself; partly because of difficulties in some of the subordinate details of the accounts given by the two Evangelists; partly because of the real silence of Mark, and the apparent silence—silence at all events as far as explicit references are concerned—not only of John, but of James, Peter, and Paul; and finally, because of the occurrence of incarnations under similar circumstances in connection with other religions.

1. It is worthy of note that the thought of the present century has found more and more truth in the idea of an incarnation, however various may have been the modes of conceiving it, and however far it may have been from accepting the simple account of the incarnation of the Logos given in the Gospels and

accepted by the Christian Church. The attitude of the modern mind to this and other Christian doctrines contrasts markedly with that of the Rationalism and Deism of the eighteenth century. That, at all events, a profound truth could underlie and be embedded in the doctrine; and that whatever defects may characterise the shell, it had been the means of protecting and preserving a kernel of priceless value to the higher life of man, never entered into their minds, and to have affirmed it would have seemed to them as extravagant as it seems to some of the moderns to maintain the essentially literal accuracy of the accounts given by the Evangelists. So far, then, we have advanced. Ideally the incarnation is true; but not the realistic form of it accepted by most Christian people—that, we are assured, is the mythical clothing of an eternal truth.

2. As far as the difficulty attaching to the *peculiar nature* of the event recorded by the two Evangelists is concerned, a good deal depends on the general view taken of the relation of God to the cosmos. If we take our stand on the old antithesis between the infinite and the finite; or if our conception of the divine relation is essentially deistic, clearly the transaction must awaken serious doubts. But if we approach it from the point of view which has dominated the discussion of the subject in this work, the difficulty is decidedly lessened. If we hold that humanity as a whole, as well as every individual man, is a differentiation of energy proceeding from God; and that in the last instance God is the cause of the conception of every such individual man,

even though his causative energy is transmitted through innumerable links, commonly termed second causes; then that the Holy Spirit should work directly, instead of through intermediate links, as He ordinarily does, would but be an example of the transcendent divine action for which the cosmos in certain eventualities was constituted. And when I speak of eventualities, I mean such as it was in the power of man to originate —a power, be it remembered, with which God Himself endowed him. Ideally, one may say, such transcendent divine interventions were provided for in the constitution of the cosmos. In view of the man's power to sin, they needed to be provided for. It would have been unwisdom instead of wisdom in God to have created a world of the kind imagined by some eminent theists, *i.e.* a world so dovetailed and mortised, so bound by iron law, in which link is so welded to link, that even the Maker Himself is absolutely excluded from any rôle with regard to it, save that of a patient and surely sad and suffering observer.

The long preparations for some such event which were pointed out also do something to clear up the perplexity which it occasions.

As I stated at the very beginning, and as I have assumed throughout, the intelligible rationality, no less of the Atonement than of the Incarnation of the Logos which it involves, depends on our cosmology. Not the *fact* or the *reception* of the fact, be it observed: that is a matter of authority, and the reception depends on a perception of the trustworthiness of the authority, which, though not irrational, is not wholly the result

of logical processes; on the contrary, it depends also on subjective conditions, which may be modified by intellectual considerations, but which neither owe to them their existence nor solely depend on them for their warrant.

CHAPTER XXI

The proper Nature and Designation of the Incarnate Word

This is not the place, even if it were possible, to sketch the history of Christian thought, with its terminology, on this subject.

Most people are aware nowadays that in the main it has oscillated between two positions—the position of those who held the divinity explicitly, the humanity implicitly; the other position, that of those who held the humanity explicitly, the divinity implicitly,—both with corresponding differences of formulation and emphasis, with intervals during which the two were, as far as possible, held in equilibrium. At the present moment it is the humanity that is explicitly recognised, the divinity only implicitly, with a tendency towards the essential identification of the latter with the former, on the basis of a doctrine of immanence which is logically pantheistic in everything but the name.

It seems to me that we cannot improve on the terms employed in the New Testament, especially in the Gospels,—"the Son of the Highest," "that Holy Thing which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God" (Luke i. 32–35); "the Logos who became flesh"

—incarnate, infleshed, or carnificate; "the Son of man"; "the Second Man"; "the last Adam"; "the quickening Spirit"; "the Lord from heaven" (1 Cor. xv. 45 ff.).

The person with whom we have to do is not *actualiter* Logos, the Second Person of the Trinity; for He had become flesh, He had emptied Himself of the divine form, that is, of the specific divine consciousness. Nor was He *man*; for though, agreeably to the positions previously set forth, He was essentially *akin* to man, seeing that man is but a differentiation of the energy which He informs with a Logos-idea, He differed from man in nature, in powers, in sub-consciousness, and in intermittent consciousness, no less than in His moral and spiritual character.

To speak of Him solely as divine whilst incarnate, is to ignore His incarnation, with the self-limitation it involved; to speak of Him as a man, like other men, and to try to prove that as such He had a properly human development, is to miss the essence of His person and work, namely, that He is the Logos who had entered into organic relation with humanity for its redemption.

The Logos was designated "Son of God" *as incarnate*. Prior to incarnation He was simply the Logos,—this is the only designation applied to Him in His intra-divine relationship in the Scripture. The references in the Epistle to the Hebrews are to His relation to the Father as incarnate, not prior to incarnation. The Trinity was constituted, let it be here again said in passing, by three personal or personific factors, each eternally coexistent, and as such, to use the technical term, not merely modal, but ontological. The *name*

Son and Father, on the other hand, are modal or æconomic, *i.e.* they refer to the relation which arose in consequence of the incarnation of the Logos. Jesus the Christ was the Son of God; there is no warrant, however, for designating the *Logos* the Son of God, and for thus representing the relationship of the Father and Son as an eternal and immanent divine relationship. The expression, "Eternal generation," first adopted by Origen, for the purpose of explaining how an eternally existent factor of the Godhead could yet be a Son, has no intelligible meaning, unless the Logos or Son be resolved into the product of a process—the process, as one may perhaps describe it, of the creative activity of the self-sustained, self-generated divine life, conceived as objectified in a product which is both process and product, or a product in process of becoming a product.

Humanity in its entirety, according to its constitution and normal relation to deity, as previously set forth, was meant to be one of the Sons of God,—a Son, *the Human Son*,—of which every member should himself be in turn and in his measure a son, and which could only be truly the Human Son, so far as each member in its place was true to its divine idea and destiny. I speak of Humanity as *one* of the Sons of God, because there may be, probably there are, other rational organisms similar to Humanity, which are also Sons, and constituted by Sons. Even if no express reference to this is contained in the words, "When the morning stars sang together, and all the *Sons of God* shouted for joy" (Job xxxviii. 7),—namely, when the earth

was founded, its measures set, and the line stretched upon it; yet they may be used to hint at the idea.

The incarnate Logos is *human*; for how could He in whom men are constituted men be other than human? but He was not, and is not *a* man. He is the constitutor of man, entering into a new relation to that which He had constituted like Himself, in order that instead of losing its likeness to and vital union with Himself, and thereby its very existence, through sin, it might throw off sin, and resume the character it had borne and re-enter on the development for which it was intended. He could not have discharged this function had He and humanity not been essentially akin: it would have been equally impossible for Him to discharge the function had He been a man. He was the divine Logos, self-limited; and as such doubly akin to, though not one with or of, humanity,—self-limited in order to save that which had its life through, and was, in a very real sense part of, Himself.

NOTE.—The affinity between the view of the Person of Christ which I have set forth and that ascribed to *Apollinaris* can scarcely fail to attract attention. Anyone wishing to realise it should read the section on Apollinaris in Dorner's *History of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, or in Neander's *History of the Christian Church*. Harnack's *Dogmengeschichte* contains nothing of consequence that is not said more fully and, in my judgment, where there is difference, with more insight by the two writers just mentioned.

I do not care to question the affinity:—why should I? I think Apollinaris saw certain truths more clearly than even his greatest opponents. At the same time, I may be permitted to say that as my agreement with Apollinaris is not consciously due to my studies in the History of Christian Doctrines, but in part the logical consequence of the theory of evolution from which I take my start; and that as, further, my view of God, of the cosmos, and of the relations between the two, differs greatly from that of Apollinaris, it can scarcely be just either to Apollinaris or me to label me Apollinarist.

CHAPTER XXII

The Relation of the Incarnate Logos or the Son of God to the Father

Though the Logos had consented to forego the direct consciousness of His divinity, and therefore of His eternal and essential relation to the Father and the Spirit, His relation to the Father and Spirit, even as incarnate, was incomparably richer, fuller, more certain than that which men can hold. This is recognised as a fact by all schools of thought; indeed, it is treated as perhaps His most distinctive characteristic by those who would question whether as to nature He essentially transcends man. Whilst this must be acknowledged, it is, on the other hand, scarcely possible to suppose that the consciousness of the Father's nearness and love could be always equally clear, and always fill His soul with brightness, peace, and joy. On the contrary, He must often have been troubled by dark clouds, vague fears, apparently causeless unrest, —states that suggested sin. The influences to which He had been exposed prior to incarnation acted now with no less intensity and massiveness, and with infinitely greater concentration; whilst they were not counteracted by the direct and unbroken consciousness

of divinity which He then enjoyed. In addition to these old causes, new ones naturally came into operation in consequence of the new relation to humanity into which He had entered by His infleshment.

What force must have been added to the causes just hinted at by the perplexities and doubts necessarily suggested to His mind when He contrasted—and surely He could scarcely avoid so doing—the absence of any sense of failure, much more of sin, with the opposition, malignity, misrepresentation, and sufferings which He encountered! It was probably in part these experiences that drove Him to spend, as He did, whole nights in prayer. One season of conflict due to a complication of causes, such as I have hinted at, is set before us in the scene of the garden of Gethsemane; though that was probably but the culmination of a long series of inward struggles, traceable to the darkening effect of human sin, both on the sub-conscious depths of His nature and on His conscious life; as well as to the fearful contrast between the perfection of His life, both as regards God and man, and the awful hostility to Him of the latter and the no less strange relation to Him of the former—a relation so strange that at the most terrible and tragic moment of His career it presented itself to Him as a veritable forsaking.

Human beings also sometimes have experience of what it is *to be* and *not to be*, to have *lost* and yet *not altogether lost*; to have a vague *sense of being something of which all the tangible signs are absent from consciousness*, nay more, *with which all tangible actualities are in conflict*; to be *haunted by dim memories of relations*

with which the observable relations form a terrible contrast, and which *come and go without the possibility of fixing* them or giving them form. Something like this, only to an infinitely intensified degree, fell to the lot of the Son of God.

At the same time, the counteractive influences must not be overlooked.

He doubtless realised a closeness of fellowship with the Father, a sense of the divine nearness such as cannot be vouchsafed to men, when He spent His nights in prayer, or when at other times He sent up petitions and thoughts to heaven.

What a wonderful increase of confidence and courage and certainty must have come to Him, too, from the occasions on which He heard the Father's voice, saying, "This is my beloved Son"; especially on the Mount of Transfiguration! even though the restricted meaning be attached to this designation elsewhere expounded.

The wonderful powers which He found Himself able to wield, and the extraordinary knowledge which came to Him, might have two opposite effects:—on the one hand, recognising them as He did as due to the direct commission of the Father, they would be a seal of His love and approval; yet, on the other hand, the remembrance of them in hours of depression, danger, straitness and sorrow might be an occasion, at one and the same time, both of perplexity and of temptation, each lending strength to the other.

And what if occasionally, as might surely be expected, there were mysterious upflashings from the veiled divine depths of His nature compelling Him to

utterances such as, "I and my Father are one"; "Before Abraham was I am"; and many others which tremble on the very verge of a distinct affirmation of divinity, and which have frequently been treated as proofs of His having a divine consciousness?—they, too, would be fraught alike with infinite inspiration and terrible peril—the peril of which a hint is given to us in one of the temptations of the desert.

A faint glimpse of experiences analogous to, though infinitely shallower than, those of the Logos is recorded in Wordsworth's lines—

> "Enough, if something from our hands have power
> To live and act and serve the future hour;
> And if, as toward the silent tomb we go,
> Thro' love, thro' hope, and faith's transcendent dower,
> We feel that we are greater than we know."
>
> *After-thought.*

On occasion, too, of the mighty works which He wrought—wrought sometimes at the command of the Father, conveyed either by a consciously received word, or by an impressed idea; sometimes at the impulse of His own nature stirred by what He heard or saw around Him, or again, occasioned by some special insight into His essential unity with the Godhead, coming to Him through words or inward experiences, —He probably or possibly had intermittent realisations of His proper divinity. The veil of unconsciousness may well sometimes have been lifted, if only for brief moments or seasons. This, too, would help to account for utterances like those just adduced, and others such as "He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father,"

which seem at first sight incompatible with the ordinary tone and character of His speech and behaviour.

The great thinkers of the Church—whom, be it observed, it is scarcely decent, still less respectful, to treat in the cavalier fashion now only too common among the very modern—have always recognised what has just been noted ; but owing to their opposition to the kenosis, or their failure adequately to appreciate its nature and scope, they left the problem unexplained.

Such intermittence is not only a characteristic—yea, a marked characteristic—of the human mind, but is also in complete harmony, nay more, of one piece, with the view of the state of the Logos as incarnate which has thus far been expounded.

CHAPTER XXIII

The Fulfilment of the Conditions of Reconciliation by the Incarnate Word

These conditions, as was previously pointed out, are —(1) looking at and estimating sin in its relation to God; (2) sorrowing for sin because of what it is to God; (3) desiring to offer for sin a satisfaction that is worthy of God. These conditions needed to be fulfilled by men; but they could not fulfil them, unless they were energised to do so by one who should first fulfil them on their behalf; whose fulfilment should be so truly that of the whole race, that each member could be said, not merely representatively or federally, or even substitutionally, but in all three senses, with something added, vitally uniting them and lifting them to the higher ethico-spiritual plane, *i.e.* in the sense of bio-dynamic potentiation previously expounded, to have died with Christ, to rise with Christ, to live with Christ, and to be glorified with Christ.

I. But in order to the fulfilment of these conditions the Son of God must share the moral position of the human race, without sharing its moral failure, *i.e.* without yielding to sin. Unless He do both, He cannot be the Saviour of the race. In other words, He must

undergo our probation, nay more, He must participate in our infirmities in the widest sense of that word, and be tempted in all points like as we are; yet there must never be or arise anything in Him or in His conduct to cause Him to say, "I, too, share the sin and guilt of the race." The incarnate Logos must be liable to sin, as men are; He must fight the human battle of sin with essentially the same weapons as are available for men; He must gain the victory over sin in essentially the same way as men ought to gain it, if they ever are to gain it, and must actually gain it. Otherwise He cannot, by what He does and suffers, energise in humanity to do and suffer with Him; or to express it in Paul's words, none of us can say, "I am crucified with Christ, nevertheless I live, yet not I but Christ liveth in me, and the life which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me and gave Himself for me" (Gal. ii. 20 f.).

1. The Logos, as I have shown, still remained, as to essential nature, the same Logos after incarnation that He was before. He did not and could not give up or empty Himself of that which constituted Him what He was. All that He emptied Himself of, or, as it were, suspended, was one of the *functions* or *activities* of His essential nature,—the function or activity, namely, of the *consciousness* or *knowledge of His essential nature*, that is, of His nature as a factor of the Godhead, of His divine nature. Thus remaining essentially the same, His relation to the cosmos in general and to humanity in particular remained, of course, essentially the same, with the exception that His consciousness of

that relation was necessarily suspended, along with His consciousness of His own proper nature. He was still the source of the world's idea, and mediately of the energy that constituted it what it was; but He was no longer aware of the fact. The distinction between Him personally and the energy which proceeded through Him remained; but He was no longer conscious of the distinction. Men continued to be differentiations of His energy; but He no longer knew it, even as He knew it prior to incarnation. Still less did He know it immediately.

All the forms of existence and force around Him in the world were to Him essentially what they are to us. Men, too, were as His fellow-men, though actually they and all other beings were constituted what they were by Him, and between Him and them, therefore, there was an infinite distance.

Not that He could or did remain to Himself just exactly what we men are to ourselves. He must have been to Himself a strange mystery—the strangest possible mystery. Every man, indeed, becomes a greater and greater mystery to himself the longer he lives and the more he examines himself. As long as our eyes, like those of the fool, are in the ends of the earth, we may seem to ourselves very simple animals, of a somewhat higher and cleverer kind than those in the midst of which we live; but let our eyes, like those of the wise man, be in our heads, then question after question about ourselves forces itself on us, and we exclaim at last, "It is high; we cannot attain unto it."

How much more must this have been the case with

the Son of God!—He could not be all that He actually was and hold the relations He actually did, even though He were no more aware or conscious thereof, than we men are thus conscious, without being stirred by wonderful impulses, startled by strange inklings, dazzled by unearthly upflashings, and altogether agitated to bewilderment by the mystery of his own being. Christ, we know, was a mystery to those with whom He had to do: the reproach or accusation of being "beside Himself" points to words, acts, behaviour, which could not be rhymed with each other, still less rhymed with those of ordinary sane men. Recognition of the position just described will help us to understand why such an impression should be made.

2. We saw that, prior to the incarnation, the life of the Logos was abnormally affected by the sinful conduct of the human differentiations of the energy of which He was the immediate source and moulder. This influence, however, was then kept in check by His consciousness as a factor of the Godhead, and by the clear knowledge that men themselves were the free and conscious originators of the sin which was the source of the disturbance.

The incarnation neither nullified nor suspended the vital relation of the Logos to the world and humanity in which the experience just mentioned was rooted: that remained exactly what it was. Its suspension or nullification would, in fact, have involved either the collapse of the cosmos or the substitution of another divine creative and sustentative mediator.

It did, however, of course bring with it the suspension of the divine consciousness just alluded to. The sinfulness with which human conduct coloured the energy that continuously proceeded from the Godhead, and returned to the Godhead through Him, could no longer be ascribed to its true cause. The Logos no longer *knew directly*—whatever reflection might teach Him—that, though inhering in His own energy, and therefore in a sense His own, it was not a thing of His own producing. The energy which was specifically His, and that which was lent, as it were, to constitute and be controlled by men, formed one indivisible whole. The elements of good and evil, too, with which the innumerable human streamlets that debouched in Him were laden, all blended in Him and for Him as if they were of His own production.

We men, too, have an analogous experience. The reservoir of living energy which *constitutes us* is not fed solely from our physical environment, but also from the race to which we belong. At all events, there is a constant inflow and outflow, a constant interchange between the several members of the race, which, though it does not abolish, yet of course conditions, yea, partially constitutes, us what we are. But as far as consciousness goes, the living energy in question is one indivisible, self-contained reservoir. We have no distinct knowledge or consciousness of the different constituents; we cannot discriminate between what is our own and what comes to us from our fellow-men. Naturally, therefore, the good and evil with which the inflow is laden so blends

with the energy and its elements, which may be regarded in a more strict sense as our own, that all seems one.[1] For consciousness, therefore, we are in our individual capacity whatever all these converging streamlets are.

The Son of God subjected Himself also to human limitations with regard to the *store of energy* which thus constituted Him. Individual men, we know, are never entirely conscious of the life that constitutes them. We name ourselves; we say I or me; we speak of self-consciousness: but even the most self-observant of men,—the men who have attained to the highest degree of self-knowledge,—are never distinctly aware at one moment of more than one or two of the constituents of the living reservoir which they designate themselves. A man can only know what is in himself, gradually; and each element, after it has, as it were, presented itself or been summoned into the open court of consciousness for examination, passes out again into that dark region which it is now common to call our sub-conscious selves.

So with Christ. He too was divided into a conscious and a sub-conscious region; and the contents of the latter He could only know by degrees, and more or less singly.

[1] The experience might be illustrated by what physiologists term "Osmosis," that is, "the process by which two fluids separated by a membrane, or other porous substance, penetrate it and mix together—the lighter fluid permeating it most readily. Thus, when two fluids of different specific gravity are separated by a membrane, the lighter passes through and becomes diffused among the heavier, an appreciable quantity of which also passes into the lighter. A fluid passes into a vessel by endosmosis, out of it by exosmosis" (Bale, *Anatomy and Physiology of Man*, p. 56).

As in our own case, so doubtless in that of the Son of God, the rise to consciousness of the constitutive elements of His life was variously determined. Spontaneity, or what we may term such, played its part with Him as with us; but the various forces outside Himself as incarnate were the chief evoking influence:—there was the world of nature, the world of humanity, the world of evil spirits; and the world of Him who for His consciousness was now necessarily God or Father.

The world of men as He knew it, and so far as we can learn about it from Jewish and Gentile as well as biblical sources, was beyond measure corrupt. Satan and his host, too, seem to have been then specially active.

It scarcely needs to be remarked, that additional complication is lent to the case by the fact that the Son of God, as such, was both body and psychic force. To what extent He inherited, as men do, physical tendencies, the germs of physical passion and disease, we know not. He may have been born with a physical constitution and temperament that involved Him in ceaseless hand-to-hand battles such as those which forced the Apostle Paul to cry out, "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from this body of death?" (Rom. vii. 24). Statements like, "God sending His own Son in the likeness of flesh of sin" (Rom. viii. 3); "A high priest able to sympathise," *i.e.* "to suffer with our weaknesses" (Heb. iv. 15; cf. viii. 2); "Learned obedience from the things which He suffered or endured" (Heb. v. 8; cf. Gal. iv. 4), seem to warrant,

or at all events to leave open, the conclusion that He verily had a body which needed to be watched and struggled with and kept under control.[1]

Had He not derived His body from the human organism of which He had become a member He would not have been able to fulfil His redemptive mission; He could not have shared our moral position, our temptations, our conflicts. But the flesh which He took over from Mary, His mother, was flesh laden with potentialities, of evil as well as of good, due to the sins of innumerable previous generations.[2] The case is well put in the following quotation:—

"The law of heredity is one which has been, not, certainly, discovered, but formulated by modern physiology. The influence of physical antecedents upon individuals is immense. Each infant brings into the world with it a flesh and blood which have been specialised by the channel in which they have been moulded since man appeared upon the earth. They have been manufactured in a family factory which has been at work since the family existed. All that St. Paul would call "the flesh" is built up and modified by all—bad and good, moral and physical—which has passed in the lives and habits, nay, in the habitual thoughts, of its progenitors to the first generation. Every infant comes into the world charged and saturated with these antecedent conditions, stamped with

[1] For a fuller presentation of the probable experiences of Christ, particularly of the satanic assaults to which He was exposed, see my *Redemption of Man*, "Passio Christi," pp. 319 ff.

[2] Reference will be made further on to the traditional idea that the Virgin conception counteracted or cut off the evil due to heredity.

an immemorial history, penetrated through and through with imperishable influences. In one of the councils of the ancient Church the stiff prosaic theological Latin is, for a moment, at once suffused with the tenderest glow of poetry, and elevated by the most majestic conception of imaginative speculation. Each parent who stoops down to kiss a babe is bidden to pause with instinctive reverence and venerate the very hands of God which have just been lifted from His work. So it is most truly as regards the wonderful living principle which inhabits the frame. But that frame is built up under a divine law of materials which are inconceivably old, and, inasmuch as the soul is influenced to an indefinite degree by the body, atavism seems to derationalise the Christian theory of morality." [1]

What, then, must have been the experience of the Son of God under such conditions, inward and outward, constitutive and environmental? possessed of a sub-conscious life and a body, with which were interwoven sinful elements due to the conduct of the race whose energy was drawn from Himself, and with which in addition He had organically united Himself?

We men know by sad experience what it is for thoughts and impulses of sin to rise to consciousness, whether by a species of spontaneity, or by the interaction of body and soul, or through the influence of our external environment, or through the secret inspirations of invisible enemies, which seem for the moment to be our own sins,—sins of the past rising

[1] *Church Quarterly Review*, Jan. 1880.

out of the dark recesses of memory,—and we have to do battle with them lest they become our own, either for the second or the first time. Sometimes they are really the ghosts of former sins; for—

> "'Of sorriest fancies' we 'companions' make,
> Using those thoughts which should indeed have died
> With them they think on."

Nor are we able to realise that—

> "Things without all remedy
> Should be without regard: what's done is done."
> *Macbeth*, Act III. ii.

In some cases our own conduct, though not the actual cause, may have furnished the occasion. Sometimes, however, we are bewildered at thoughts and feelings rushing in upon us like a flood which we are unable to trace in any way to ourselves—the responsibility for which, therefore, we cannot take upon ourselves; and yet they are there, inmates of our heart, forming, as it would seem, a veritable part of ourselves. Accordingly an indefinable sense of guiltiness takes hold of us and well-nigh, at moments, drives us to despair.

The true explanation of this phase of human experience, which, though undescribed and unmentioned, is perhaps not so rare as some may think, is really that the life of the race, with its evil elements, is streaming in on our nature at its sub-conscious depths, through the subtle channels which connect man with man:—is it not an exemplification of Paul's words, "Whether one member suffer, all the members suffer with it; or one member be honoured, all the members rejoice with it"?

May we not use them, in a somewhat wider sense, concerning phenomena of the kind just referred to.

In the case of the Son of God, of course, there were no ghosts of past sins with which He could either directly or indirectly charge Himself. His own impulses and thoughts had been holy, and only holy—holy with a holiness of which the impulses and thoughts of an unfallen man would have been only a reflection,—true, indeed, though faint. But the permeation to blending of His own proper life by the sin-stained life of the human race, both psychical and corporeal, must have been the occasion of many phenomena bearing all the character of sin which, though not His own, for the reasons previously assigned, must needs have seemed to be His own. In the truest possible way, therefore, He thus took our sins upon Him; He made them His own. In a sense all the sins of men became latent in Him; and as they rose to consciousness, in response to the soliciting action of the terrible visible and invisible environment in the midst of which He lived, He must surely have experienced a horror of great darkness—there must have been forced from Him the exclamation of His great prototype, "Innumerable evils have compassed me about, mine iniquities have overtaken me, so that I am not able to look up: they are more than the hairs of my head, and my heart hath failed me" (Ps. xl. 12).

Now, we men know that impulses and thoughts such as have been referred to, whether we are ourselves to blame for them or not, do prove sources of temptation —temptation either to repeat an old sin or to commit a

new one. Sometimes they wield a kind of fascination over us. We may disapprove, we may be faced by thoughts which we know to be the ghosts of past sins, and may even be engaged in seeking forgiveness for them afresh; yet at that very moment they may prove, or at all events threaten to become, enticements. And even should we be able to resist the sin to which we are actually tempted, they not unfrequently become the occasion of doubts with regard to God, which possibly conceal within themselves still greater perils.

What fearful temptations must then have assailed the Son of God:—temptations to dally with and commit, who knows what forms of actual, of racial sins? temptations to doubt God; temptations to despair! And what wonder that in the Garden of Gethsemane He should pray in an agony, and that His sweat should become, as it were, great drops of blood falling down upon the ground; that He should fall on His face and pray, saying, "O my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from Me"; and that on the Cross He should cry, "My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me"?

Looked at in the light of what has been advanced, these descriptions seem to me to be true to the very letter. But from a less serious estimate of the position, the thought—horrible dictu!—of hysterical exaggeration inevitably suggests itself.

3. Theologians have been almost universally of the opinion that the sinlessness of the Son of God was rooted first in His virgin birth, and then in His possession of divine power. For the two reasons conjoined it could be said of Him, *posse non peccare*, even though

we should be going too far to say, *non posse peccare.* Apart from the conception by the Holy Ghost, the concupiscence which so often attends ordinary conception, not only on the side of the father, but also on that of the mother, could scarcely, it is said, have been avoided; and if it could not have been avoided, then from very babyhood that inherited characteristic of the flesh which gave rise to Scripture words like the "mind of the flesh," "fleshly," "the will of the flesh," must have interwoven itself with and helped to determine all His conduct. He might therefore, it is urged, have been entangled in sin at the very moment when consciousness and volition awakened. The idea that sinlessness could be secured in this way has commended itself even to scientists of materialistic and sceptical tendencies.

The writer of the article previously quoted goes on afterwards to say: "But if the law," that is, "of heredity," which had been under consideration, "seems to derationalise moral theory, it rationalises Christian dogma, especially the central dogma of the Incarnation. In the days of the giants of scholastic philosophy it was the fashion, after the type of Aquinas, to lay much stress upon the conveniential, the moral suitabilities of the great leading characteristics of the Redeemer's person and work. Now the law of atavism leads us to the convenientia of the conception of our Lord by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary. It has been said that, in a company of scientific physiologists of the most positive and material school, a discussion arose upon the Christian miracles, and especially upon the

birth from the Virgin's womb. A Christian thinker, who happened to be present, shrank, with some sensitiveness, from the free handling of a topic where a superficial wit might so easily wound the delicate susceptibilities of a Christian's reverence. He was surprised, however, to find that no such disposition appeared to exist. It seemed to be admitted that—given a Personal God, and a design upon His part to elevate the creatures whom He had made by entering into a more sympathetic relation with their nature—such a relation was conceivable upon one condition only. It must be brought about by an intervention which would secure 'the Second Man' from the long-accruing fatalities connected with the ordinary processes of human generation. The new humanity could be kept holy, harmless, and undefiled only by a new contact with the creative power of God. Such a birth can only be expressed in the language of the angel Gabriel. The mystery is seen through the crystal clearness of those marvellous words. The delicacy of the sentence is so exquisite, so unconscious, so unsuspicious, with a purity which is at once virginal and divine, that we are instinctively convinced that it comes to us from 'the sphere in which the miracle was wrought.' This is an illustration—we think a very important one—of the mode in which newly discovered or amplified laws of science, which from one side present new difficulties, may from another endow Christian thought with new fitness and new meaning. The battle-guns of one generation may thus sometimes be melted into church bells for the next."

The assumption underlying this position, however, is a mistaken one. For inherited physical tendencies, weaknesses, infirmities, and so forth, are not, as has been taken for granted, in themselves sinful. They may, in the first instance they doubtless do, originate in violations of divine law of some kind or other; and they may, yea, often do, become the occasion or starting-point of sin in those who inherit them; but considered *in and by themselves*, they are not sinful. Sinful, according to Scripture and the moral law, is only that which directly or indirectly is under our own control. So far as evil tendencies are interwoven with our physical constitution, they are physical; and for their existence the individual man is no more responsible than he is responsible for the thunderbolt which incapacitates him from performing the ordinary duties of life.

These inherited physical "infirmities" were the source of fearful temptations, especially as conjoined with the other evil elements—the *latent sins*, as I ventured to term them—to which attention was directed; but in themselves they were infirmities, not sins; and the temptations of which they became the occasion were also simply temptations, not sins. Nay more, they were infirmities for which the Son of God was in no sense responsible. He might have taken the responsibility of them on Himself by giving place to them; but by overcoming them He kept them strictly in the domain of the natural, that is, of the non-moral.

4. But the further reason assigned for His freedom from sin, — namely, His divine nature and actual

possession of divine power,—whilst, of course, adequate, seems to nullify His temptability—the temptability which is necessary to His being on a sufficiently equal footing with man to fit Him for the performance of the task He had undertaken—even more effectually than the idea of His exemption from the hereditary weaknesses of the body which He derived from His mother. For the possession of divine nature and power, it is maintained, would have prevented burdens from being real burdens, infirmities from being real infirmities, temptations from being real temptations. This has doubtless been a weak link in the doctrine of the incarnation which has not been removed or strengthened by distinguishing what Christ was in His divine nature and what He was in His human nature: for the distinction, as too often drawn, involved real separation.

It is doubtless true that, apart from divine power, the Son of God would not have been able to resist the temptations to which He was exposed from the flesh and from the mind; but herein He was not an exception. If the presuppositions on which this entire discussion rests are valid, *every* man, *by his very constitution*, needs the constant influx of spiritual energy direct from God, if he is to grow, develop, and act normally. Men would have needed it if not one of them had ever sinned. Considered in the abstract, no single man now needs it more *really* than He ever could have needed it, though the need of each is larger and more pressing. Hence the stress laid on divine "grace" in the New Testament. Given enough grace, neither the sinful thoughts man owes to his organic connection with the

race, nor the disorderly impulses he owes to the flesh, would ever pass the boundary line of sin. They might cause consideration and conflict, perhaps darkness and anguish, but not sin. Even those for which he himself is responsible need not repeat themselves. But without such divine grace he is normally, still more abnormally, helpless.

If the Son of God was endowed with infinitely more power than we men possess, it was because He needed it. To us the Spirit is given as we need it,—some receiving more, some less; to Him it was given, we read, "*without measure*," *because His needs were without measure.* But how did He avail Himself of this grace or energy? Before trying to answer this question let me recall one or two things which were previously advanced.

The consciousness of the Son of God, inasmuch as He was essentially divine, notwithstanding that the real nature of His own relation to Himself was veiled from Him, must have been saturated with God to a degree which is not possible for men. He was divine, yet did not know Himself as such; He was a personal factor of the Godhead, yet did not know that He was such. But this necessarily involved an all-pervading *sense* of God; a possession of His whole being by thoughts of God, of a force, intensity, and richness infinitely transcending what is possible to the holiest and grandest of men. Yet at the same time the veiling in question must necessarily have caused God to seem distinct from, transcendent to, Himself. The content of His thought and feelings of God must have

been infinitely richer than ours; but He was ordinarily as far from identifying Himself with that content, as far from saying this is the content of *Myself*, as any sane man is from saying so. Mysterious upflashings there probably were, as I previously stated, and stirrings which gave birth to words that almost seem to betray a distinct and formulated consciousness of His identity with the divine, as, for example, the saying, "I and My Father are one"; but they never amounted to an abiding, specific divine *self-consciousness*. Whenever, then, He referred to God, of whom He was *full*, He necessarily did so as to one who was distinct from and transcendent to Himself, intimate beyond measure though the fellowship between them might be. Naturally also, the name by which He named God was the name of Father; for to know God as fully as He knew Him was to be compelled to address and speak of Him as Father, Holy Father, Father in Heaven, Heavenly Father, Father *par excellence*. No other word expresses all that God is in relation even to man — Originator, Sustainer, Provider, Protector, Illuminator, Lover, Friend. Yea, what is more, Christ had in absolute measure the filial consciousness which corresponded to Fatherhood as thus understood. He felt, thought, willed, moved, lived, loved as a Son, as the Son of God. Accordingly, at one of the moments when something from without touched the secret spring of His being, and gave rise to one of the upflashings referred to, He said to Philip: "He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father." But to convert this into a deliberate, didactic, dogmatic, formal state-

ment of His identity with God is, as it seems to me, to go as truly, if not perhaps so far, astray as those do who deduce from the question: "Why callest thou Me good?" which He addressed to the young Jewish ruler, the inference that He meant to repudiate the possession of a goodness which belongs exclusively to God, that is, to confess Himself morally imperfect.

Now, if these things are true, and if the Divine Word as incarnate, that is, if the Son of God could be holy only in virtue of the possession of the divine energy which was the seat or secret of His holiness prior to incarnation;—He possessed it, be it remembered, as divine, though He knew it not; He knew it also to belong essentially to God, the Father, the God whom He necessarily regarded as transcendent to Himself;—if these things be true, how did He, how could He, how must He avail Himself of this divine energy when face to face with the temptations to which reference has been made?

There were only two alternatives. The *one alternative* was that the divine energy, which really belonged to Him as the Logos, should *assert itself*, should act, so to speak, *independently* of the conscious control and consent of the Son of God. One can conceive of the relation between Himself as self-conscious and Himself as not self-conscious, or below consciousness, *i.e.* between Himself as self-conscious and His divine nature, as analogous to that which men hold in part to their own physical nature, or even in some measure to their psychical nature. A power within us, which we can neither watch nor directly control, causes us, for

example, to yawn or to do other things of which, when done, we are aware or conscious, but which we do not control, still less freely originate. To some extent the higher animals act thus. A power within them—a divine power, one might call it—acts through and by them, they act in virtue of it; but though in a dim sort of way they are aware of the actions performed, it is not they which consciously perform them. Of them we may say, *agunt ex sua natura*; but it is not a *natura* that *consciously controls itself*.

We men in like manner, at the early stages of life, act in obedience to impulses from within, the source of which is hidden from our gaze, and over which we have no control; but such actions are not in the proper sense moral:—they are non-moral or præ-moral. It is only after we have become capable of watching the impulses, and as it were furthering or calling halt to them on their way to realisation, that for praise or blame, for responsibility, they really are ours.

If the energy of God acted after such a manner in the Son of God, clearly His life was as much out of relation to ours as that of God Himself. It would have been the mere semblance of a human life. The body He bore would have been a mere garment and His mind a mere instrument or organ, of the divinity within, between which and them the connection would have been essentially that between God and the impersonal parts of creation. God would have been immanent in Him in the stricter sense of that term.

The only *other alternative* was that He should look upon God, His Father, as the source and giver of the

grace and light He needed; and that accordingly He should *ask* the Father for it as He needed it. He was conscious of needing divine energy,—conscious as we, alas! in our sinful self-reliance, are not always conscious: divine energy seemed necessarily stored up in the transcendent Father, who though more than ready to give needed to be asked: prayer therefore would seem to have constituted the link between a possession which because *unconscious* was not a *real* possession, and a *utilisation* which was necessary to victory over temptation, to the bearing of the burdens imposed and the accomplishment of the tasks undertaken.

It may be objected that this amounts to nothing more than the conscious self praying to the unconscious self; or to the conception of prayer as a sort of pressure on the button which sets energy free for work; that it is not the Father who responds, and in responding bestows the energy; and that the whole is therefore an illusion—one that is necessary for a consciousness subject to limitations like those which encompass the minds of men, but still for all that an illusion.

Passing by the position of those who hold that human prayers are all really of this nature, I would point out that if the Logos were simply God this might be a valid objection;—but the following points need to be taken into consideration—most of which have been more or less fully dealt with in the course of the discussion of the subject in hand:—namely, *first*, that in some real sense the Father in the Godhead is supra-ordinate to the Son and the Holy Spirit,

in other words, that the factors which constitute the Godhead are not absolutely co-ordinate; *secondly*, that the Logos reduced Himself to unconsciousness relatively to both the intra-divine and extra-divine life of deity, and thus suspended that conscious fellowship between Himself and the Father and Spirit which was specifically characteristic of their life; *thirdly*, that such suspension of conscious fellowship involved a sacrifice, not only for Himself, but for the Father and the Spirit; *fourthly*, that by "becoming flesh" the Logos surrendered the conscious, and therefore the free, the true, the real *control* (*not the possession*) of the divine energy by which He was essentially constituted; and *fifthly, that the personal, and therefore conscious, free control over this energy must for the duration of the Kenosis have rested with the other factors of the Godhead. If these points be duly weighed, especially the last in which the rest culminate, it will be evident that the prayers of Christ for gracious energy and comfort, instead of being unreal, were most profoundly real:—that as regards them He is our example in an infinitely grander and sublimer sense than He could have been had He been simply a man like the rest of us.*

II. We have seen that the Logos by becoming incarnate put Himself in the position of men, as far as temptation to sin went, and that He had to encounter temptation with the same weapons that are available for man. But this was not all. A perfect man might have done this, and have thus shown the way to men, become their captain and

leader, and deserved in a certain superficial sense the designation Saviour. Such, too, is the idea that appears to satisfy many at the present moment. But *this was not the specific task which the Son of God had to accomplish.* A work of the nature just described might perhaps have sufficed for a race that merely needed leadership, example, the realisation of the ideal, stimulus, solicitation to the exercise of its latent powers, and guidance in the choice of the right and true and beautiful,—in a word, of the good. But what the human race, as we found, needed was to be *energised* to fulfil the conditions on which right personal relations could be established between itself and God — those personal relations without which God could not be to them what was necessary to normal growth, development, and activity.

Such energising meant the fulfilment of the conditions on their behalf by one of themselves; by one who was of their flesh and blood; or rather, by one whose very essence they themselves shared, who constituted them, in whom they consisted, and whose work therefore was their work. The conditions in question were, moreover, as was previously shown, those peculiar to an abnormal state. What the race needed was to be enabled to do that which, though in itself abnormal, was in the case of sinful beings right: for abnormal it surely is that a man should condemn himself before God, and sorrow for the sorrow he has caused God. Yet clearly, that a man who has sinned should thus condemn himself and sorrow is according to the true idea of man, that is, normal. It

is normality of a kind, and at a height unto which not even the perfectly righteous can attain. For one whose sinfulness has enfeebled his spiritual nature of himself to fulfil such conditions would be a veritable moral wonder.

1. This moral wonder was rendered possible by the Son of God. He did not merely condemn sin in others—condemn it from the point of view of God: no, face to face constantly with thoughts and impulses arising apparently out of the depths of His own nature and life, and therefore apparently belonging to Himself,—thoughts and impulses which filled Him with dread, and yet dragged Him into conflict; He condemned them with a divine condemnation, or rather, freely entered into the divine condemnation which was constantly being pronounced on them. As the things referred to rose above the horizon of consciousness, the first effect naturally must have been a feeling as if they were His own, and as if He therefore were Himself under accusation and condemnation. This would be all the more His experience because He was sinless; even as in our case too, the truer and richer our spiritual life, the intenser grows our distress at the evil still clinging to us. Hence the possibility that a Paul should write as he does in the Epistle to the Romans: "O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" though he had been a believer for a quarter of a century, and could testify, as few other men ever testified, to the gracious deliverances wrought for him by Christ.

Had the things referred to not been in a certain sense the product of His own sub-conscious life, the Son of God could not have entered into the shadow of the divine condemnation; but in point of fact He could and did do so. Yet the moment the sentence was pronounced He made it in the fullest respect His own. Before the sin, which for the moment seemed to be His, could become His, He condemned it—condemned it because of its hatefulness to God, condemned it in all its significance for God.

Had He not thus entered into the mind of God as regards sin, it could not have been said of Him, "and yet without sin"; for the most spiritual, and therefore the deepest, of all sins, is to look at sin solely in its relation to ourselves or our fellow-men or the world, and to ignore, disregard, or underestimate its relation to God. Such a state of mind points back to or is rooted in a personal relation, which, whether the fruit of inherited ignorance or of disregard is alike deserving of condemnation. Sinlessness and its positive correlate holiness are inconceivable apart from entire sympathy with the divine judgment of sin.

2. But the Son of God went further still.

The miseries, sorrows, sufferings, shames, woes that sin produced had, of course, been in a measure felt by God, especially by the Logos, prior to the incarnation. A disordered world and humanity are not merely an abomination to God, but also a source of grief and pain, as well as an object of resentment. It repented God that He had made man, we read, just as it is a joy to God to receive man back to Himself

in loving loyalty. Such expressions, anthropopathic though they may seem, must answer to a reality if God is not merely our manufacturer and controller, but the living Father in whom *we* live and move and have our being.

As the Son of God felt the sinful thoughts and impulses which flooded His life through the sub-conscious channels by which He was connected with humanity as His own; so also naturally and necessarily the fears and dreads, as well as the sorrows and sufferings of men, which were due to and inseparably associated with sin.

Accordingly we read of Him that He was in the truest sense a "man of sorrows, and acquainted with grief"; that "He bore our sicknesses and carried our sorrows"; that "He was wounded for our transgressions, and bruised for our iniquities: the chastisement of our peace was upon Him"; "He was oppressed, and He was afflicted"; "the Lord was pleased to bruise Him: He put Him to grief" (Isa. liii.). This description was literally fulfilled; but we shall not enter into all its significance unless we recognise that the intensest grief and sorrow, the sharpest wounding and the sorest bruising—the heaviest burden borne by Him—was that which was due to His sympathy with the mind and heart of God.

Had the sorrow of the Son of God been due simply to His sympathy with human woes and sorrows, and had it not culminated in His sympathy with the sorrow of God, He could not have been described as being *without sin*. For, as has been remarked before, one of the saddest fruits of sin, as well as one of the clearest

signs of human degradation, is that the thought of the pain caused by our depravity and iniquities to God seems not only so remote, but also so difficult to grasp, if not so irrational. At the present day especially we are in imminent danger of putting human needs and claims into the very centre, and of demanding that even God shall revolve round humanity, instead of humanity revolving round God.

In the sufferings and sorrows of humanity the Son of God saw a reflection of those which had been caused the Father; nay more, He saw in them the outcome of an abnormal relation forced on God by the rebellion of the creatures whom He had made for fellowship with Himself. For, as was pointed out elsewhere, God is dishonoured, God is shamed, God is grieved and pained because He is compelled to inflict suffering instead of bestowing blessing, and pronouncing condemnation where He would alone express approval. Yea, the Son of God not only bore the sorrows and fears inflicted by God on men, or, which otherwise regarded, they had brought upon themselves; but He also justified God, and what was still more, sympathised with God, in the sad moral necessity to which the sin of humanity had thus subjected Him.

3. The fulfilment of the conditions to which I have been referring culminated in death—the death of the Cross.

The becoming incarnate, *i.e.* the becoming a member of the organism of humanity, naturally, and under the circumstances, involved not only a life such as men live, but also a death such as men die. The assumption of

the "body of sin" had for its correlate the experience that it was a "body of death." Whatever might have been man's experience apart from sin,—whether he would have undergone a more or less gradual transformation, or a sudden though painless, dreadless change when he reached the goal of his earthly career, —we cannot say; but in any case, man, as he is, is born to suffering and death. As the Logos entered earthly life through birth, so He must needs quit it through death.

Two mistakes have, however, been made in the theological treatment of this event.

The *first* is that of representing death as the sole end and aim of the mission of the Son of God. As the culmination of that part of His work which has been under consideration, it amply deserves the prominence given to it in the New Testament. It did sum up the work of the Son of God; but it was not the whole work: it was its most striking, most central, most essential factor, but for all that was only a factor. His earthly work began with His conception, and ended with His resurrection and ascension. In a very true sense He could not have come into the world unless He had been prepared to die; and as He came to the world to save the world, so did He emphatically come to die for the sins of the world. We need not underestimate the significance of the death, because we deny that it alone has significance in relation to the work of reconciliation.

The other mistake is that of identifying death with the *death of the Cross*. It was the death of the Son of God that was a necessity,—a necessity as an integral

part of His work,—but not any one particular mode of death; not even a death of special cruelty and violence. Paul's words set the matter in its proper light, though their point has rarely been appreciated:—he says, "Obedient unto death, yea, *even the death of the Cross*," as though he had meant to say, "It behoved Him to die: He was prepared to die, because He was absolutely obedient, because He shrunk not from completing the work He came to accomplish; nay more, He was ready even to be crucified, and actually submitted to be crucified."

Had He died an ordinary death, it would doubtless have had for Him all the significance which it has for the sinful race of which He had become a member; but there was clearly a special fitness in His dying one of the most awful deaths known to the then world—a death the most cruel and the most infamous that it was possible under Roman rule and law to inflict. That He Himself should also in some sense anticipate the kind of death He was to die need occasion no surprise; for it can scarcely have been unknown to the Jews that this was one of the ultimate *supplicia* or punishments of Roman law, and that such a punishment probably awaited anyone who should be delivered up to the Roman authorities on charges such as were likely to be advanced by the malice of the Jewish authorities.

Death, according to Scripture, is the highest and completest fruit and wage of sin:—"the wages of sin is death": "when sin is finished it bringeth forth death." As such also it has been in all ages regarded, save by

men who were too brutalised or hardened to be able to appreciate its significance. Specially has it been feared and dreaded in connection with the unknown future. As Shakespeare finely puts it, through Hamlet—

> "The dread of something after death,
> The undiscovered country, from whose bourn
> No traveller returns, puzzles the will;
> And makes us rather bear the ills we have
> Than fly to others that we know not of.
> Thus conscience does make cowards of us all."

And Shakespeare does but expand and give poetic form to the expressive words of the Epistle to the Hebrews, "through fear of death, all their lifetime subject to *bondage*."

We of present-day Christendom scarcely appreciate what death was and is to the heathen; for we live in, at all events, partial enjoyment of the fruits of the work of Him who robbed death of its sting, and brought life and immortality to light. We are therefore in danger of underestimating the importance of the death of Christ.

In consequence of the veiling of His essential nature, to which reference was previously made, the Son of God could not be conscious of the fact of His own inherent immortality. *Unlike us, He was essentially immortal*, but He was as unconscious of the fact as we men are, though for a very different reason—the reason, namely, that whilst He was unconscious of what He actually was, we not being essentially immortal, could not have it as a fact of consciousness, even if the region of which such a quality could be predicated were not sub-conscious. Not that there may not have

been upflashings which gave Him transient glimpses of the fact, even as men sometimes get a vision of the possibility, yea, destiny, of immortality open to them; but that it was not an abiding element of consciousness, save perhaps as a hope rooted in and fed by His fellowship with and life in God.

The thought of death, on the contrary, was being constantly forced on His attention by the experience of men around Him; and how could it fail to cast its shadow over His mind, the more and not the less for His own hope in God?

We must remember, too, that the sin-stained life which streamed into His nature was laden with elements due to men's fear of death, which contact with the fact of death naturally evoked into consciousness and supplied with form. We men know full well what inarticulate fears and forebodings are, and how terrible is their effect on our life. Naturally, in His case they were at once interpreted and intensified by observation of the feelings with which men around Him universally regarded it.

The terrible significance of death to the Son of God is clear from His conduct in the Garden of Gethsemane, and from the words which He uttered on the Cross. There was, however, an element in His utterances on those occasions due not so much to the mere natural shrinking from death as to the influence of the polluted and therefore darkened life of men on His life. Unless this be recognised, His attitude towards it would be unintelligible, or even something else. Death, even to Him, was in some sense the wages of sin. He

could not, indeed, charge Himself, or suffer Himself to be charged, with actual sin; and yet, as He faced the death which sin brought into the world, He was necessarily perplexed and distressed:—He felt as if somehow or other, though He could not understand it, He Himself must have brought it on Himself. Still more completely was this His experience whilst hanging on the Cross. At the very threshold there was the physical agony—agony unto death—which He then endured; further, inasmuch as the sin of the human race culminated in the very crucifixion which crowned His own sufferings, clearly the life of humanity entering Him sub-consciously must have been most completely laden with sin and with the fear of death, which is its fruit, at the very moment when He Himself was enduring death in its most terrible form. Of necessity, therefore, He felt as if He were the sinner of sinners, and cried out in agony, "My God, My God, why hast thou forsaken Me?"

Yet through all these experiences no murmur escaped Him; nay more, He accepted what befell Him as in very deed the will of the Father. "Not My will, but Thine be done," was His exclamation in the Garden; and "It is finished," on the Cross,—and these were the two great testing moments of His career. It must be borne in mind that all the sufferings of humanity, whether outward or inward, whether spiritual or physical, whether individual or social, are in the last instance, according to Scripture, directly or indirectly the fruit of sin; which is only another way of saying that they are effects of the reaction of God

against forces making for disorder; that is, they are divine punishments. When, therefore, the Son of God took them upon Himself, and, whilst feeling them to be what they actually were, bore them submissively, He really entered into the mind of God regarding sin.

Had He not, however, been obedient unto death, even the death of the Cross, He would neither have stood the severest test to which human nature, according to its own judgment, could be put; nor would He have borne the divine reaction against sin in its sternest and yet justest form.

III. Christ made satisfaction or amends for the dishonour done to the name of God.

We found that, even according to the judgment of men, one of the conditions of true reconciliation is that an offender should desire and put forth efforts to make good the injury or dishonour which he had inflicted by his sin.

This principle really underlies the sacrificial system of heathendom, largely too even that of the Jews at the later period of their history; but it took the form of purchasing the favour of God, rather than that of compensating the God who had already bestowed His favour. The distinction is brought very sharply out, as was previously indicated in the 51st Psalm, where we read, "For Thou desirest not sacrifice; else would I give it; Thou delightest not in burnt offering" (ver. 16); and again, "Then shalt Thou be pleased with the sacrifices of righteousness, with burnt offering and whole burnt offering" (ver. 19). In the one case sacrifices are means of *procuring* favour; in the other,

means of *expressing thanks* for favour and of *making good* the wrong that had been done.

Repentance is, indeed, the primary and essential condition of reconciliation; but neither man nor God could be truly satisfied unless the desire arose in the mind of the sinner to be able to make good the dishonour and injury caused by sin. The one is as true an ethical necessity as the other.

The Son of God fulfilled this condition by giving Himself up for us an offering and a sacrifice to God, for a sweet-smelling savour (Eph. v. 2). Not only did He judge sin from the point of view of God, and enter into its significance to God; but He lived for the Father.

This He did first of all by seeking to undo the dishonour done to the name of God, and by honouring God. He could therefore say, "Now is the Son of man glorified, and God is *glorified, in Him*" (John xiii. 31); "I have *glorified* Thee on the earth, *having finished* the work which Thou gavest Me to do" (John xvii. 4). He glorified God, *positively*, by manifesting and demonstrating, as had never been done before, the essential and infinite excellence, purity, loveliness, and goodness of God; and *negatively*, by laying the axe at the root of all the dishonour done to His name by the distrust and errors and alienation of the human mind. He Himself, in every beat of His pulse, every throb of His heart, every breath he drew; He Himself, in every organ and movement of His being, in every stirring of intellect, affection, and emotion, in every inclination and purpose, in every word and deed, was

a living, self-consistent, faultless demonstration that God is at once absolute holiness and perfect love; that the divine goodness and righteousness were essentially one; and that the awful fact of evil everywhere dogging the steps of sin is a necessity alike of the moral nature of God and of the realisation of the divine idea of man. God and His ways were thus vindicated, though the vindication was essentially ethical, not merely legal. Legal vindications have their value; but at the best they are imperfect and lower forms of vindication:—vindications with which men have to be satisfied, because the higher thing is often unattainable. God and the law of the world—the law for nature, the law for man—were seen in Christ to be one; and both alike were seen to be essential goodness.

Christ also spent His life both in undoing the injury done to God and preparing the way for a good to which even the mischief wrought by sin should have ministered. This is intimated to us when it is said that He devoted Himself to the establishment of the kingdom of heaven. The divine purpose in creating the world had been temporarily frustrated by the incoming of sin. Christ laid the foundation of a realisation of that purpose in a glory which will perhaps add brightness to heaven itself.

IV. Having completed the *bio-dynamic* task which was the primary object of the incarnation, the Divine Word at once entered on what one may describe as the second, the other, part of His work, that,

namely, which I have taken the liberty of designating *deictic*.[1]

As was previously pointed out;[2] whilst the first and foremost need of humanity was that it should be quickened or energised *into* the capability of fulfilling the conditions of personal reconciliation with God, —in other words, that it should be made able to believe and repent,—it was no less necessary that the work of the Son of God, by which humanity had been energised, should be made known; should be livingly, adequately, set before men's minds, brought home to their consciousness and heart. This is in strict accordance with the biological principle which has dominated the treatment of the theme of this work. Potentialities must first either be created *de novo*, or be re-created or be quickened: then, they must be acted on fittingly by a fit environment, *i.e.* they must be evoked into actuality.

How is the Son of God fulfilling this part of His saving work?

In harmony with the constitution and needs of men He adopts two chief methods; in other words, His deictic action takes two chief forms. He approaches men simultaneously from without and from within.

1. From *without* He approaches them by means of the Church. The Church serves as the organ through which Christ carries on His saving work in the following ways:—*First, by preaching* (κήρυγμα). "How, then,"

[1] Deictic, δεικτικός from δείκνυμι—to show, to portray, to make known, to teach.

[2] See particularly Chapters XV. III., and XVI. 8.

asks Paul (Rom. x. 14), "shall they call on Him on whom they have not believed? And how shall they believe on Him whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a *preacher*?" When God revealed His Son in Paul, it was that he might "*preach* Him among the Gentiles" (Gal. i. 16); and so faithfully did he discharge the function that he could reproachfully exclaim, "O foolish Galatians, who did bewitch you before whose eyes Jesus Christ was openly set forth crucified?" (Gal. iii. 1). Preaching, that is "testifying," was at the very first, has been throughout these two thousand years, and is still, the chief means of stirring up redeemed humanity to "repentance towards God and faith in the Lord Jesus Christ" (Acts xx. 21).

After the death of the preachers who had personally known the Lord, the witness borne and message brought rested, of course, primarily on authority; yet in so far as personal experience of salvation formed an element of it, in so far was the κήρυγμα still independent and original. The assumption or requirement of the presence of this latter element caused Protestantism to describe preaching in general as "preaching the Word of God," though it might be far from a simple reiteration of that which was regarded as pre-eminently the "Word of God."

The *next* is by the production of the *Written Word.* The New Testament is *par excellence* the Christian written Word; but though almost from the very first its books were naturally and rightly assigned a unique, not to say absolutely authoritative and regulative position,

historically regarded, they depended on, or grew out of, or were occasioned by, the living *κήρυγμα*, and were therefore primarily subordinate to it. When, however, those who "from the beginning had been eye-witnesses and ministers of the Word" (Luke i. 1) disappeared from the scene, the New Testament became pre-eminently the *written* witness for Christ and His work.

To a limited extent the *Written Word* of the Church has discharged the same function as the New Testament; and the more it has been the outcome of experience and divine illumination, the more efficiently has it helped to evoke the potentialities quickened by Christ.

Thirdly, by its worship, ordinances, rites, ceremonies, and every true embodiment and manifestation of its life.

Sacred song, prayer, adoration, praise—especially when the outward form and the inward spirit thoroughly harmonise; the rite of baptism, when its significance is made apparent; the Lord's Supper, when its memorial, symbolical, and sigillic character is brought out with a fit commingling of solemnity and familiarity; the appropriate enlistment of art in the service of religion, whether as regards the style of architecture or the arrangement and decoration of the house of worship, or the proper robing of the ministrants;—all may, all should, all sometimes do prove to be, means by which Christ awakens in the soul the response of penitence and faith.

Fourthly, by the daily walk and conduct of the members. All believers, both as individuals and

as forming more or less elaborate organisations, are called to be "Epistles of Christ, written not with ink, but with the spirit of the living God; not in tables of stone, but in tables that are hearts of flesh" (2 Cor. iii. 3). They are living as they should when it can be said of them as Paul said of the Romans, "Your faith is spoken of throughout the whole world" (i. 8), and "Your obedience is come abroad unto all men" (xvi. 19). Their business is to "show forth the virtues of Him who called them out of darkness into His marvellous light" (1 Pet. ii. 9); and all men are to know that they are Christ's disciples, in particular because of their love one to another (John xiii. 35). They are to let their light so shine before men that men may see their good works and glorify their Father in heaven (Matt. v. 16).

Finally, the Church discharges the function under consideration when it enters into, shares, and exhibits the mind of the Lord Jesus Christ with regard to the present condition and future destiny of those who do not believe unto actual salvation.

Christian men should all be able honestly, even if with all humility, to say of themselves as did the Apostle Paul, "being affectionately desirous of you, we were well pleased to impart unto you, not the gospel of God only, but also our own souls" (1 Thess. iii. 8); or as to the spirit, "We are fools for Christ's sake, but ye are wise: we are weak, but ye are strong: ye are honourable, but we are despised" (1 Cor. iii. 10). In a secondary degree the words of Isaiah must be applicable also to them, they must bear the griefs of

their fellow-men, and carry their sorrows; they must be wounded for their transgressions, and bruised for their iniquities; the chastisement for their peace must be upon them (Isa. liii. 4, 5). They should travail in the travail of Christ; they should act and feel as very mediators at the throne of grace, bearing on their souls their fellow-men and their sins. They should be ready to say, as Moses said when he returned unto the Lord from witnessing the conduct of Israel, "Oh, this people have sinned a great sin, and have made them gods of gold. Yet now, if Thou wilt forgive their sin —; and if not, blot me, I pray Thee, out of Thy book which Thou hast written" (Ex. xxxii. 31 f.); or to declare with Paul, "I say the truth in Christ, I lie not, my conscience bearing witness with me in the Holy Ghost, that I have great sorrow and unceasing pain in my heart. For I could wish that I myself were anathema from Christ for my brethren's sake" (Rom. ix. 1–3).

Through such men Christ can work; and where He has such co-operation the potentiality which, by His life, works, sufferings, and death He quickened in humanity, at once begins to express itself in appropriate activities, even as a germ swells and grows and develops under the stimulating influence of a fitting physical environment.

2. From *within*, Christ acts upon men by the Holy Spirit.

We do well to distinguish between the deictic action of the Holy Spirit and His dynamic and vital action; though it is impossible to separate them.

Whilst Christ's primary action may be said to be

dynamic and His secondary deictic: that of the Holy Spirit is primarily one of revelation or manifestation, and secondarily one of energisation — the former directed towards evoking the potentiality which the Son of God has quickened into actuality; the latter, towards enriching, energising, guiding, illuminating, and comforting the potentiality whose actualisation has begun through repentance and faith.

Christ Himself referred to this work of the Spirit when He assured His disciples, "Nevertheless I tell you the truth; it is expedient for you that I go away; for if I go not away, the Comforter will not come unto you; but if I go I will send Him unto you. And He, when He is come, will convict the world in respect of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment; of sin, because they believe not on Me; of righteousness, because I go to the Father and ye behold Me no more; of judgment, because the prince of this world is judged" (John xvi. 7–11). So too in His conversation with Nicodemus, "Except a man be born of water, and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the Kingdom of God. That which is born of the flesh is flesh; and that which is born of the Spirit is Spirit. . . . Ye must be born anew. The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the voice thereof, but knowest not whence it cometh and whither it goeth; so is everyone that is born of the Spirit" (John iii. 5–8). "When the Comforter is come, whom I will send unto you from the Father, even the Spirit of truth which proceedeth from the Father, He will bear witness of Me," even as believers bear witness of Christ (John xv. 26, 27).

3. The mistake has often been made, and is still constantly committed, of speaking and writing as if the change wrought in men by the preaching of the Gospel were due primarily to the appeal made in these various ways, as it is said, to their mind and heart, or to their heart and conscience, including, of course, their will. Both those who hold the forensic view of the work of Christ and those who hold the moral view are chargeable therewith. The former, indeed, believe that Christ removed hindrances out of man's way to God by His life, sufferings, and death, which the latter deny; but as the work thus done lay outside man, though it was of the utmost moment to him, the actual salvation of the individual, his actual reconciliation with God, is made really to depend on the influence of the presentation of the story of the cross on his mind, heart, conscience, and will.

The same position is taken up by the advocates of the moral view as far as the individual is concerned, with of course the difference that in presenting the story of the cross they leave out its Godward aspect, and emphasise exclusively the mercy and love of God revealed in and through Christ and His sufferings. Both of them rely on moral influence: the first mentioned, on the moral influence of the work done for man towards God and His law, as well as on the divine love thus manifested; the others, on the moral influence of the example, sufferings, and death of Christ as a personal embodiment and manifestation of divine love.

Neither of them recognise that, apart from the effect

produced on humanity by the incarnation of the Divine Word, and all that it involved, which I have termed potentiation—the potentiation, namely, to fulfil certain spiritual conditions—the preaching of Christ would have had as little influence on men generally as the actual, visible, audible life of Christ had on His contemporaries.

But though the bare presentation of the truth, the mere *preaching* of the gospel is not, in the proper sense, the *cause* of the conversion and revivification of men,[1] it is a necessary *condition*—as necessary as the action of light and heat, or other physical agencies, are on a germ, if it is to develop, grow, and bear its appropriate fruit. Christ by His life, sufferings, and death created the germ of the new humanity, or, at all events, quickened what was ready to die; and Christ Himself, as set forth, re-embodied, or re-incarnated in men who fill up that which is lacking of His sufferings (Col. i. 24), and as brought home by the Spirit, is the sun whose light and heat call forth the newly quickened man into growth, development, and activity.

[1] This statement may possibly startle some. As a matter of fact, even the most orthodox resolve the influence of the work of Christ on men into a "moral" influence. They overlook the significance of the Pauline idea that, in *Christ's death men died*, in *Christ's life men live*; that is, in my view, what I have designated, the vital potentiation of humanity, etc. In order to escape the mistake above referred to, Lutheran and Reformed divines represent the "Word," both written and preached, as endued, quick with the vital energy of the Spirit, besides emphasising also the concurrent action of the Holy Spirit. The Puritans and their true successors did much the same thing.

CHAPTER XXIV

Evidence that the Conditions of Reconciliation were actually Fulfilled by the Incarnate Word

In trying to estimate the work which the Son of God Himself spoke of as having finished, we need to guard against two mistakes, one affecting the essence of the *task itself*; the other affecting its *method.*

If Christ's immediate aim had been to reconcile all men to God, or to make all things really new, we should have to confess that He had failed. His immediate aim was, as I have set forth, to energise the race, so that it should be capable, under appropriate action from without, of fulfilling the conditions of reconciliation, *i.e.* of the establishment of truer normal relations between God on the one side and man on the other, by living and dying so that men might live and die with Him. Constituted as men are, they can only be actually *renovated* with their own consent and co-operation; but they could be *energised* or *potentiated* by the action of a member of the race without their individual consent being given.

Due co-operation, either in the race or in the indi-

vidual, can only be a thing of very gradual growth. The initiation of the process was accomplished once for all by Christ; this was His merit, not ours: apart from that initiation we should be helpless. But the initiation is an initiation of a relation to God which has to become ever more close and intimate. The renovation in turn depends on the growth of this intimacy, and on the incoming of vital energy from God which is thereby rendered possible.

But what is the evidence that Christ by His work has actually energised the race in its individual members to fulfil the conditions to which attention was called? That evidence lies in the tremendous contrast, the radical difference, between what may be summarily designated the *Heathen Consciousness* and *Christian Consciousness.*

It is, as one may say, natural and easy for the Christian Consciousness to treat sin as an offence against God, and to try to consider it from the point of view of God. We are not content to judge it by the standard of men, or to regard it solely as it affects men. But this attitude of mind had to be created. The heathen did, indeed, ask, What is my sin to God? but it was only with a view to the further question, What, accordingly, will God do to me? How will He avenge Himself? The less the fear of consequences, the lower the estimate of sin. God is only in seeming the standard. Only in seeming is the judgment of God regarded.

Still more obvious is this difference in connection with the second question, What does my sin mean to

God? I have sinned against Him, I have dishonoured and grieved Him, I have brought disorder into His world.

The heathen, too, it is true, might ask this question in a certain sense: he might ask,—Is God exceedingly angry? What due have I withheld? How far have I dishonoured Him? But it is, again, only with a view to the further question, How is it going to affect me? There is no real *feeling for God.* There is no *sympathy with God.* This, however, is of the very essence of the Christian consciousness. How unworthily has the Ruler, the Father, the Friend of men been treated. Those who are most thoroughly permeated by the spirit and life of Christ are ashamed and distressed because they have dishonoured the name of God and pained His heart. To be told that this is right surprises no one in a Christian land. Even if we fall short of realising it, we recognise it as fitting. But it was foreign to the heathen mind.

How has the change been effected? The first step was the *vitalising* action of the work of the Son of God. Through Him we are potentiated; and when the proper influence is brought to bear on us we find ourselves able to enter into His work, to die with Him that we may live with Him.

At no point, however, is the contrast greater than at the *third*—that which is designated satisfaction. To work for God, to live for God, to honour God, to glorify God, both negatively and positively,—this, surely, is now more and more completely and generally confessed to be the duty of a true man:—

to do so for the sake of God, and not merely for the sake of some advantage that may accrue to ourselves. The idea of making God Himself, for His own sake, our aim—this, which seems to us the very glory of man, was totally foreign to the consciousness of heathendom.

The sense of the ideality of such an aim is growing stronger and deeper, amid all changes of form, from year to year, and the conception of it broader. Why? Surely it is to be traced to the same cause. Christ, by offering Himself a sacrifice to God, potentiated us to see that to offer ourselves a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable, is a reasonable service: by making it His meat and drink to do the will of God, He potentiated us to take as our highest prayer, "Thy will be done on earth as in Heaven"; and His work for the establishment of the kingdom of heaven is increasingly inspiring us to regard that as the very goal of effort, sacrifice, and aspiration.

INDEX

Acosmism, its origin, 90.
Adam, federal headship of, 155.
Affections, their place and satisfaction, 45–49.
Altruism, in judgment and feeling, 192.
Apollinaris, 329.
Aquinas on the anima, 28.
Atone, the desire to, 193–198.
Atonement, forensic view of, 145–147, 169–175; Protestant theology on, 167–169; personal view of, 175–178; antinomies of, 228–230.

Bain, 29.
Basil, St., 67.
Boyesen, H. H., 27.
Bretschneider, 75.
Browning, 99, 122, 133, 164.
Browning, Mrs., 206.

Calderwood on man's place in nature, 27.
Calov, 75.
Calvin on Scripture as a means of grace, 76; and divine immanence, 282.
Chapman, Prof., 23.
Choice, free, 94, 95, 286, 287, 300–302.
Christ, our fellowship with, 109; as a sacrifice, 173; personal relations of His work, 175; why sinless, 265–268; as energising humanity, 268, 335, 357–370; in relation to the Father and divine energy, 340–356; His temptability, 349–351; His consciousness of God, 351–353.
Church views of Sacraments, 71–74; of the satisfaction required by God for sin, 197.
Clodd, 31.
Conception, the supernatural, 319–325.
Conscience, pains of, 162–164; and God's mind with regard to sin, 242, 243.
Consciousness of Christ, 311–319, 330–334, 351–353; difference between heathen and Christian, 371.
Cosmology, need of an all-comprehensive, 8; features of the biblical, 10–35; and the Incarnation, 323–325.
Cosmos, no isolation in the, 6; ultimate factors of, 10; evolution of the, 20; ideally considered, 31; its systems, their interactions, 32, 33; God's relation to the, 128–131, 134; partial embodiment of the Logos-idea, 279–281.
Cowper, 44.
Creation, consequences of, on the modes of divine behaviour, 89–91.

Dale, Dr., on Atonement, 176.
Davies, Sir John, 43.
Death, Paul's use of the word, 277; of Christ, two mistakes in the

theological treatment of, 362, 363; significance of, to Christ, 364–367.
Development of man, 24, 25, 100, 148, 149.
Dualism, 98, 283.

Emerson, quoted by Tyndall, 26.
Energy, its place and function in the cosmos, 10–31; emission of, 33-92, 96, 111; how checked, 139; in man and to man, 24, 128, 129; spiritual, necessity of, and mode of its communication, 50–78, 94, 256; its vehicles, 69–78, 130; Christ's store of, 340–356.
Environment, man's twofold, 40–78, 203; in spiritual growth, 56–58, 103 – 107, 225; errors arising, 59–62; persistence of its laws in personal life, 85; natural, inadequate for man's needs, 93; and man's potentialities, 271–273.
Erigena, Scotus, on development of man, 25.
Evil, how it arises, 129, 130 (see Sin).
Evolution, its two momenta, 21; God's relation to, 90; and the Logos, 282, 289–291; anthropic force in, 296, 309; God's intervention in, 296.

Fall, "upward," the alleged, 117.
Fatherhood, the Divine, 80–92, 142, 145, 146, 235.
Feelings, 160–164, 191.
Flint, Professor, 14.
Frohschammer, 13, 14, 28.

God, relation to the cosmos, 33, 34, 89, 128–130, 134, 178, 233, 324; relation to man, 33, 40–78, 101–113, 128 – 150, 203, 225; His love, 89–92, 168, 232; kenosis of, 301; results for, of man's abnormal relation to Him, 128–150; the, of philosophy and deism, 132, 133; wrath of, 136–138; His essence unalterable, His emotions mutable, 147–150, 190, 233; unchangeableness of, views on, 167, 168; His modes of action to enable men to fulfil the conditions of reconciliation, personal, 203–224; vital, 224–247; methods with humanity under sin, 232–251; His deictic or revealing action, 239–251; self-limitation of, in power, 283–285; in knowledge, 285–289; vindicated by Christ, 369.
Godhead, personific factors, 34, 327; disorder and schism in the, after sin, 304–307.
Goethe, 7, 61.
Gore, Canon, 11.
Grace, place of, in biblical Weltanschauung, 63, 350; channels of, 69–78, 258, 259; its function under normal relations, 112; "prevenient," doctrine of, 226, 227.
Guilt, sense of, 213, 217–227, 244.

Heathenism prior to and since Christ, 119–122, 231; and sin, 211, 212, 371; God's dealing with, for redemption, 235–247.
Heaven, kingdom of, 369, 373.
Herbert, G., 111.
Hettinger, 14.
Hindus and the sense for God, 240.
Hollaz, 75.
Huber, 13.
Humanity, system of, 32, 154, 252–262; realising its ideal, 47; did not begin with heathenism, 120; results of sin on, 154–158; God's relation to, 201–203; under sin, God's methods with, 232–251; constitution of, and reconciliation, 252–262; its potentialities, 256–262; development of, 293–295; foreshadows the Incarnation, 291–293; one of the Sons of God, 328, 329; energised to fulfil the conditions of reconciliation, 357–369.

Idea an ultimate factor in the cosmos, 10, 16–18; differentiations of, 19, 20 (see Law).
Illingworth and the Incarnation, 318, 319.

Immortality, Christ unconscious of His inherent, 364.
Incarnation of the Logos, 306–319.
Individuals, results of sin for, 158–164.
Inspiration, its nature and modes, 49, 234.
Israelites, relation to Jehovah, 172, 173; God's exceptional dealings with the, 235–237, 247–249.

JACOBI, 13.
Jews (see Israelites).

KENOSIS, of the divine energy, 33; involved in God's relation to the cosmos, 283–289; and to man under sin, 297–305; within God Himself, 302, 303; of the divine love, 301 (see Logos).

LAW, apart from sin, 109, 110; natural and spiritual, 130; its range, 140–144, 146; of heredity in Scripture, 254, 255; as affecting Christ, 342, 345, 349.
Laws of heredity and variability, 21.
Le Gallienne, 61.
Letourneau, 15, 24.
Lewes, 56.
Logos, the, in the Godhead, 34, 306, 307; the, and redemption, 276; relation of the, to the world apart from sin, 299–305; and self-accommodation in relation to the cosmos, 281–283; and kenosis, 283–289; actual incarnation of the, 306–319; His consciousness of divinity, 310, 337; His consciousness of divine power and knowledge, 313–319; nature and designation as incarnate, 326–329; relation while incarnate to the Father, 330–334; and to the world, 337, 338; as sharing our moral position, 335–342; fulfils the conditions of reconciliation, 335–369.
Logos-idea, the, the earth a partial embodiment of, 279–281.
Lotze on Matter, 13.
Love, potentiality and actuality of, in man, 83–89; in God, 89–92, 301.
Luther, views on Scripture as a means of grace, 74, 75.

MAN, nature and development of, 24–30, 39, 40, 45–50; constitution of, 36–43, 51, 140–142, 308–310; normal relation to God, 112–116; primary state of, 115–125; abnormal relation to God, 125–127; results of, 128–164; as sharing God's grief, 160–162; sense of guilt, 213–224; his freedom, 286, 287 (see Choice); his power and knowledge, 311–313.
Marshall, M., on "Recapitulation, 21.
Martineau, 236, 262, 267.
Matter, its nature and place in the cosmos, 10–14.
Maudsley, 29.
Milton, 116.
Miracles, probability of, 7; among the Israelites, 248.
Monism, its logical issue, 15; its inadequacy, 18–41.
Monnier, 73, 74.
Morris, L., 260.
Mystics, 309.

OUVAROFF, 120.

PANTHEISM, 18, 106, 282, 308.
Personality, consequences involved in its nature, 95, 196; and conditions of reconciliation, 191; and deliberate acts, 206–208; and evolution, 289, 290.
Philosophy and matter, 13.
Plato, conception of the body, 28; and sense of guilt, 244.
Pneuma, the rise of, in man, 69, 70.
Potentiality, relation to actuality in living beings, 82–84.
Prayer, what it meant for Christ, 355.
Problem of reconciliation, summed up and solved, 263–278.
Punishment, a moral necessity, 140, 151.

RECAPITULATION, Law of, its meaning and scope, 22, 23; in systems, 32.
Reconciliation between God and man, 3–9, 165–178; presuppositions of the fulfilment of the conditions of, 199–227; the dilemma of, 228–231; constitution of humanity and the divine method of, 252–262; problem of, 263; and forgiveness, 278; fulfilment of the conditions of, by the incarnate Logos, 335–369; evidence of the above fulfilment, 370–373.
Reconciler, qualifications of, 265–275.
Redemption, its three phases, 1–3.
Relations, modes of material, 16; personal, illustrated, 45; personal, between God and man, 44–50, 102–111; vital, between God and man, 50–78, 111–113; conditions of, between God and man, 79–100; normal, between God and man, 101–116; actual personal, of man to God, 117–127; abnormal personal, of man to God, 125–127; results for God of abnormal personal, 128–150; for man, 150–164; of Logos to the world, apart from sin, 279–295; under sin, 295–305; of incarnate Logos to the Father, 330–334.
Religion, ethnic, 237; and Incarnation, 317.
Repentance, 186–193, 273, 274, 368.
Romanes, G. J., 11.
Rothe, 12, 14.

SACRAMENTARIANS, views of, on the communication of divine energy, 71–73.
Sacrifice, Old Testament, 173, 174; heathen humanity and, 197; principle underlying, 367.
Schelling, 13.
Scripture, its implicit cosmology, 10; on vital relations of God to man, 62; on relations between spiritual and material, 65; as a means of grace, views on, 74–78; on primary state of man, 115–118; on God's grief over man's conduct, 149, 150; on the results of sin for man, 150–154; on heredity, 254, 255.
Selection, natural, 38, 142.
Self, consciousness of, 308.
Shakespeare, 138, 144, 188, 189, 216, 344, 364.
Shelley, 41.
Sin, of humanity and individuals, 122, 123; actual and ideal, 123; due estimate of, 124, 182–184, 223; influence of, on the relation of God to man, 135–150; and suffering, 151; and divine energy, 152; original, 156; confession of, 181, 182; to be viewed by man as God sees it, 182–184, 264; sorrow and pain for, 186–193, 218–221, 264; God must reveal His estimate of, 210–212, 242–245; its sinfulness varies, 238; and the sense for God, 239; as unintelligible to the Logos, 300; as introducing disorder into God's life, 303–305, 339; liability of Christ to, 336; as borne by Christ, 345–358; Christian and heathen view of, 371–373.
Sinlessness of Christ, 267, 268, 340–356, 359.
Soul, in relation to body, 28.
Species, destruction of, 298, 299.
Spencer, H., 11, 20, 21, 22, 51.
Spirit, Holy, in vital relation of God to man, 60; place in the Godhead, 34.
Stallo, 10, 12.

TAIT, 10, 13.
Theology in Scripture, 16.
Tennyson, 266.
Testament, New, teachings regarding the flesh, key to, 64; Old, teachings regarding communication of divine energy, 64; Old, on sacrifice, 173, 174, 197; New, and God's dealings with heathenism, 235; New, and Christ's work, 278.
Theocosm, the, 131, 201, 229.

Theologians, and the due estimate of sin, 183; older Protestant, idea of the first human beings, 119; older Protestant, and God's unchangeableness, 284.
Theopathy, 295.
Tyler, 163.
Tyndall, 18, 24, 26.

Upton, 63, 234.

Vedas, on sin, 245.

Wernsdorff, 76.
Will, definition of, 38; its perils, 99.
Williams, M., 240.
Wordsworth, 293, 333.
Wundt, 24.

Zwingli, 15, 76.

EDINBURGH: PRINTED BY MORRISON AND GIBB LIMITED.

The International Critical Commentary.

UNDER THE EDITORSHIP OF

The Rev. S. R. DRIVER, D.D., Oxford; the Rev. A. PLUMMER, M.A., D.D., Durham; and the Rev. C. A. BRIGGS, D.D., New York.

'The publication of this series marks an epoch in English exegesis.'—*British Weekly.*

The First Seven Volumes are now ready, viz.:—

Deuteronomy. By S. R. DRIVER, D.D., Regius Professor of Hebrew, and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford; formerly Fellow of New College, Oxford. Price 12s.

Romans. By W. SANDAY, D.D., LL.D., Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity, and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford; and Rev. A. C. HEADLAM, B.D., Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford. Price 12s.

Judges. By G. F. MOORE, D.D., Professor of Hebrew in Andover Theological Seminary, Andover, Mass., U.S.A. Price 12s.

St. Mark. By E. P. GOULD, D.D., Professor of New Testament Exegesis in the P. E. Divinity School, Philadelphia. Price 10s. 6d.

St. Luke. By A. PLUMMER, D.D., Master of University College, Durham. Price 12s.

Philippians and Philemon. By MARVIN R. VINCENT, D.D., Union Theological Seminary, New York. Price 8s. 6d.

Ephesians and Colossians. By T. K. ABBOTT, D.Lit., Trinity College, Dublin. Price 10s. 6d.

(1) Of DRIVER'S 'DEUTERONOMY,' Prof. G. A. SMITH (in *The Critical Review*) says: 'The series could have had no better introduction than this volume from its Old Testament editor. . . . Dr. Driver has achieved a commentary of rare learning and still more rare candour and sobriety of judgment. . . . It is everywhere based on an independent study of the text and history. . . . it has a large number of new details: its treatment of the religious value of the Book is beyond praise.'

(2) Of SANDAY'S 'ROMANS,' Principal F. H. CHASE, D.D., Cambridge, says: 'We welcome it as an epoch-making contribution to the study of St. Paul.'

(3) Of MOORE'S 'JUDGES,' Professor H. E. RYLE, D.D., says: 'I think it may safely be averred that so full and scientific a commentary upon the text and subject-matter of the Book of Judges has never been produced in the English language.'

(4) Of GOULD'S 'MARK,' *The Baptist Magazine* says: 'As luminously suggestive as it is concise and sober. The commentary proper is thoughtful, judicious, and erudite—the work of a master in hermeneutics.'

(5) Of PLUMMER'S 'LUKE,' *The Record* says: 'Dr. Plummer's work is, it need hardly be said, admirably done, both in the introduction and in the commentary. Readers will peruse with pleasure his treatment of the leading characteristics of the Gospel. The linguistic analysis leaves nothing to be desired.'

(6) Of VINCENT'S 'PHILIPPIANS,' *The Scotsman* says: 'In every way worthy of the series which was so well commenced with the admirable commentary on the Romans by Dr. Sanday and Mr. Headlam.'

(7) Of ABBOTT'S 'EPHESIANS,' *The Expository Times* says: 'There is no work in all the "International" series that is more faithful or more felicitous. . . . Dr. Abbott understands these Epistles—we had almost said as if he had written them.'

*** *A Prospectus giving full details of the Series, with list of Contributors, sent free on application to the Publishers, Messrs. T. & T. Clark, 38 George Street, Edinburgh.*

The International Theological Library.

EDITED BY

Principal S. D. F. SALMOND, D.D., and Professor C. A. BRIGGS, D.D.

'A valuable and much needed addition to the theological literature of the English-speaking nations.'—*Academy.*

The First Seven Volumes of the Series are now ready, viz.:—

An Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament. By Professor S. R. Driver, D.D., Oxford. Seventh Edition. Post 8vo, price 12s.

Christian Ethics. By Newman Smyth, D.D., Author of 'Old Faiths in New Light,' etc. Third Edition. 10s. 6d.

Apologetics; or, Christianity Defensively Stated. By Professor A. B. Bruce, D.D., Glasgow. Third Edition. 10s. 6d.

History of Christian Doctrine. By Professor G. P. Fisher, D.D., LL.D., Yale College, New Haven, Conn. Second Edition. 12s.

A History of Christianity in the Apostolic Age. By Professor A. C. McGiffert, D.D., New York. 12s.

Christian Institutions. By A. V. G. Allen, D.D., Professor of Ecclesiastical History, Cambridge, Mass. 12s.

The Christian Pastor and The Working Church. By Washington Gladden, D.D., LL.D. 10s. 6d.

(1) Of Driver's 'INTRODUCTION,' *The Guardian* says: 'By far the best account of the great critical problems connected with the Old Testament that has yet been written. . . . It is a perfect marvel of compression and lucidity combined. A monument of learning and well-balanced judgment.'

(2) Of Newman Smyth's 'CHRISTIAN ETHICS,' *The Bookman* says: 'It is the work of a wise, well-informed, independent, and thoroughly competent writer. It is sure to become *the* text-book in Christian Ethics.'

(3) Of Bruce's 'APOLOGETICS,' *The Expository Times* says: 'The force and the freshness of all the writings that Dr. Bruce has hitherto published have doubtless led many to look forward with eager hope to this work; and there need not be any fear of disappointment. It has all the characteristics of the author's personality. . . . It will render an inestimable service.'

(4) Of Fisher's 'CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE,' *The Critical Review* says: 'A clear, readable, well-proportioned, and, regarding it as a whole, remarkably just and accurate account of what the course and development of doctrine throughout the ages, and in different countries, has been.'

(5) Of McGiffert's 'APOSTOLIC AGE,' *The Literary World* says: 'A reverent and eminently candid treatment of the Apostolic Age in the light of research.'

(6) Of Allen's 'CHRISTIAN INSTITUTIONS,' *The Christian World* says: 'Unquestionably Professor Allen's most solid performance; and that, in view of what he has already accomplished, is saying a great deal.'

*** *A Prospectus giving full details of the Series, with list of Contributors, sent free on application to the Publishers, Messrs. T. & T. Clark, 38 George Street, Edinburgh.*

CONCORDANCE TO THE GREEK TESTAMENT. MOULTON-GEDEN.

A Concordance to the Greek Testament: According to the Texts of Westcott and Hort, Tischendorf, and the English Revisers. Edited by W. F. Moulton, D.D., and A. S. Geden, M.A. In crown 4to (pp. 1040), price 26s. net; or in half-morocco, price 31s. 6d. net.

**** *It will be generally allowed that a new Concordance to the Greek Testament is much needed in the interests of sacred scholarship. This work adopts a new principle, and aims at providing a full and complete Concordance to the text of the Greek Testament as it is set forth in the editions of Westcott and Hort, Tischendorf (VIIIth), and the English Revisers. The first-named has throughout been taken as the standard, and the marginal readings have been included. Thus the student with any one of these three editions in his hands will find himself in possession of a complete Concordance to the actual text on which he is engaged; while the method employed, it may fairly be claimed, precludes the omission of any word or phrase which, by even a remote probability, might be regarded as forming part of the true text of the New Testament On the other hand, passages disappear, as to the spuriousness of which there is practical unanimity among scholars.*

Professor W. SANDAY, D.D., LL.D., Oxford, writes: 'There can be no question as to the value of the new "Concordance." It is the only scientific Concordance to the Greek Testament, and the only one that can be safely used for scientific purposes.'

'It would be difficult to overpraise this invaluable addition to biblical study. . . . For all English students of the Greek Testament this great work is indispensable.'—British Weekly.

Prospectus, with Specimen Page, free on application.

DILLMANN ON GENESIS.

Genesis: Critically and Exegetically Expounded. By A. Dillmann, D.D., late Professor of Theology in Berlin. *Authorised Translation.* In Two Volumes, 8vo, price 21s.

'The most perfect form of the *commentarius perpetuus* to the Old Testament which the 19th century has produced.'—Professor Budde, Strassburg.

'Dillmann's commentaries are inimitable works for labour and insight, for the mass of their contents, as for the thoroughness and fineness of their scholarship. They form an indispensable basis for all further works on the same subjects. . . . There is not a living scholar of the Old Testament but follows him to his rest with the deepest reverence and gratitude.'—*Bookman.*

St. Paul's Conception of Christ; or, The Doctrine of the Second Adam. Being the Sixteenth Series of the 'Cunningham Lectures.' By Rev. David Somerville, M.A., Edinburgh. In demy 8vo, price 9s.

'By its keen and profound insight, by its sanity, and by its fulness of knowledge, the volume will at once take its place as the best authority on that department of New Testament theology with which it deals.'—*Critical Review.*

'This is the work of an honest and careful student of St. Paul's writings. . . . One of the most solid contributions that has been made to the study of St. Paul's Epistles for a considerable time.'—*Guardian.*

The Christ of History and of Experience. Being the 'Kerr Lectures' for 1897. By Rev. David W. Forrest, D.D., Glasgow. In demy 8vo, price 10s. 6d.

'An exceedingly able treatment of a great and important subject.'—The late Professor Calderwood.

'An eminently stimulating and improving book.'—*Glasgow Herald.*

'Displays marked ability, and possesses unusual interest.'—*Manchester Guardian.*

'. . . It is scarcely necessary, however, to specify particular passages in a book which throughout exhibits literary and theological powers of a high order, and which abounds in observations and criticisms which could only have been penned by a masculine and fearless, but reverent, thinker.'—*Literature.*

DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE.

To be completed in Four Volumes, imp. 8vo (of nearly 900 pages each). Price per Volume: in cloth, **28s.**; *in half-morocco, 34s.*

A Dictionary of the Bible, dealing with its Language, Literature, and Contents, including the Biblical Theology. Edited by JAMES HASTINGS, M.A., D.D., with the assistance of JOHN A. SELBIE, M.A., and, chiefly in the revision of the Proofs, of Professor A. B. DAVIDSON, D.D., LL.D., Edinburgh; Professor S. R. DRIVER, D.D., Oxford; and Professor H. B. SWETE, D.D., Cambridge.

MESSRS. T. & T. CLARK have pleasure in announcing the publication of Volume I. of this work. Every effort has been made to make the information it contains reasonably FULL, TRUSTWORTHY, and ACCESSIBLE.

Articles have been written on the NAMES of all PERSONS and PLACES, on the ANTIQUITIES and ARCHÆOLOGY of the Bible, on the ETHNOLOGY, GEOLOGY, and NATURAL HISTORY, on BIBLICAL THEOLOGY and ETHIC, and on the Obsolete and Archaic Words occurring in the English Versions.

The Names of the Authors are appended to their Articles, and these names are the best guarantee that the work may be relied on.

In addition to the Editor and his Assistant, every sheet has passed through the hands of the three distinguished Scholars whose names are found on the title-page, and the time and trouble they have spent upon it may be taken as a good assurance that the work as a whole is reliable and authoritative.

The MAPS have been specially prepared by Mr. J. G. BARTHOLOMEW, F.R.G.S.

*** *Full Prospectus, with Specimen Pages, from all Booksellers, or from the Publishers.*

'The first volume of the "Dictionary of the Bible," which Dr. Hastings has had in hand for the last five years, is now before us; and we offer him our sincere congratulations on the publication of the first instalment of this great enterprise. . . . A work was urgently needed which should present the student with the approved results of modern inquiry, and which should also acquaint him with the methods by which theological problems are now approached by the most learned and devout of our theologians. . . . The names of the three scholars who have read through the entire work in proof will, as Dr. Hastings says, give a reasonable guarantee that the articles are, as a whole, fairly authoritative. Dr. Davidson, Dr. Driver, and Dr. Swete have given their invaluable aid in this way, and have, besides, written more or less important articles of their own. The Dictionary is, indeed, particularly strong in scholarship and criticism. . . . We have left ourselves no space to speak of many important articles which we had marked for notice. We have only to add that the book is well printed, that the maps are good, and that the price is not excessive. . . . The work promises to be, when completed, the best biblical encyclopædia in English. Dr. Hastings has shown his wide sympathies by his choice of contributors, who represent many shades of Christian opinion.'—*Guardian.*

'We welcome with the utmost cordiality the first volume of Messrs. Clark's great enterprise, "A Dictionary of the Bible." That there was room and need for such a book is unquestionable. . . . We have here all that the student can desire, a work of remarkable fulness, well up to date, and yet at the same time conservative in its general tendency, almost faultlessly accurate, and produced by the publishers in a most excellent and convenient style. We can thoroughly recommend it to our readers as a book which should fully satisfy their anticipations. . . . This new Dictionary is one of the most important aids that have recently been furnished to a true understanding of Scripture, and, properly used, will brighten and enrich the pulpit work of every minister who possesses it. . . . We are greatly struck by the excellence of the short articles. They are better done than in any other work of the kind. We have compared several of them with their sources, and this shows at once the unpretentious labour that is behind them. . . . Dr. A. B. Davidson is a tower of strength, and he shows at his best in the articles on Angels, on Covenant (a masterpiece, full of illumination), and on Eschatology of the Old Testament. His contributions are the chief ornaments and treasure-stores of the Dictionary. . . . We are very conscious of having done most inadequate justice to this very valuable book. Perhaps, however, enough has been said to show our great sense of its worth. It is a book that one is sure to be turning to again and again with increased confidence and gratitude. It will be an evil omen for the Church if ministers do not come forward to make the best of the opportunity now presented them.'—EDITOR, *British Weekly.*

'Will give widespread satisfaction. Every person consulting it may rely upon its trustworthiness. . . . Far away in advance of any other Bible Dictionary that has ever been published in real usefulness for preachers, Bible students, and teachers.'—*Methodist Recorder.*

'This monumental work. It has made a great beginning, and promises to take rank as one of the most important biblical enterprises of the century.'—*Christian World.*

'We can, in the most cordial way, congratulate the publishers, the editor, and the contributors on the appearance of this new "Dictionary of the Bible." We can no less cordially congratulate biblical students on an excellent and helpful, and, on the whole, accurate and scholarly aid to their studies. All concerned in its production seem to have done their work well and with conscientious thoroughness. The editor has got together a very remarkable staff of contributors, representing various Churches, but all possessing a common spirit and purpose and character. . . . There has been no Dictionary of the Bible produced in any modern language up till now that can, on the whole, be so unreservedly commended as this, for it is remarkable that as much care has been taken with small articles as with large. . . . We are grateful to find scholars like Canon Driver and Professors Davidson and Swete giving up their time to the revision of proofs, or the direction of research, in order that they may secure more science in detail and a more satisfactory result.'—*Speaker.*

PUBLICATIONS OF
T. & T. CLARK,
38 GEORGE STREET, EDINBURGH.

Abbott (T. K., B.D., D.Lit.)—EPHESIANS AND COLOSSIANS. (*International Critical Commentary.*) Post 8vo, 10s. 6d.

Adams (Prof. John. B.Sc.)—PRIMER ON TEACHING, with special reference to Sunday School Work. 6d.

Adamson (Rev. R. M., M.A.)—THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF LORD'S SUPPER. Imperial 16mo (8 × 6), 4s. 6d. net.

Adamson (T., D.D.)—THE SPIRIT OF POWER. 2nd Ed., fcap. 8vo, 1s.

Ahlfeld (Dr.), etc.—THE VOICE FROM THE CROSS. Cr. 8vo, price 5s.

Alcock (Deborah)—THE SEVEN CHURCHES OF ASIA. 1s.

Alexander (Prof. W. Lindsay)—BIBLICAL THEOLOGY. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.

Alexander (Rev. Prof. W. M.)—DEMONIC POSSESSION IN THE NEW TESTAMENT. Post 8vo, 5s.

Allen (Prof. A. V. G., D.D.)—CHRISTIAN INSTITUTIONS. (*International Theological Library.*) Post 8vo, 12s.

Ancient Faith in Modern Light, The. 8vo, 10s. 6d.

Andrews (S. J.)—THE LIFE OF OUR LORD. Large post 8vo, 9s.

Ante-Nicene Christian Library—A COLLECTION OF ALL THE WORKS OF THE FATHERS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH PRIOR TO THE COUNCIL OF NICÆA. Twenty-four vols. 8vo, Subscription price, £6, 6s. Selection of Four Volumes at Subscription price of 21s. *Additional Volume, containing MSS. discovered since the completion of the Series*, 12s. 6d. net.

Augustine's Works—Edited by MARCUS DODS, D.D. Fifteen vols. 8vo, Subscription price, £3, 19s. net. Selection of Four Volumes at Subscription price of 21s.

Balfour (R. G., D.D.)—CENTRAL TRUTHS AND SIDE ISSUES. 3s. 6d.

Ball (W. E., LL.D.)—ST. PAUL AND THE ROMAN LAW. Post 8vo, 4s. 6d.

Ballard (Frank, M.A., B.Sc.)—THE MIRACLES OF UNBELIEF. Sixth Edition. Post 8vo, 2s. 6d. net.

Bannerman (Prof.)—THE CHURCH OF CHRIST. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.

Bannerman (D. D., D.D.)—THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH. 8vo, 12s.

Bartlet (Prof. J. Vernon, M.A.)—THE APOSTOLIC AGE: ITS LIFE, DOCTRINE, WORSHIP, AND POLITY. (*Eras of Church History.*) Crown 8vo, 6s.

Baumgarten (Professor)—APOSTOLIC HISTORY. Three vols. 8vo, 18s. net.

Bayne (P., LL.D.)—THE FREE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND. Post 8vo, 3s. 6d.

Beck (Dr.)—OUTLINES OF BIBLICAL PSYCHOLOGY. Crown 8vo, 4s.

——— PASTORAL THEOLOGY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. Crown 8vo, 6s.

Bengel—GNOMON OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. With Original Notes, Explanatory and Illustrative. Five vols. 8vo, Subscription price, 31s. 6d. *Cheaper Edition, the five volumes bound in three*, 24s.

Besser's CHRIST THE LIFE OF THE WORLD. Price 6s.

Beveridge (Rev. W., M.A.)—A SHORT HISTORY OF THE WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY. Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d. net.

Beyschlag (W., D.D.)—NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY. Two vols. demy 8vo, Second Edition, 18s. net.

Bible Dictionary. Edited by JAS. HASTINGS, D.D. *Special Prospectus on application.* In Five Volumes, imperial 8vo, price per Volume, in cloth, 28s.; in half-morocco, 34s. Sets can also be had in various styles of leather bindings.

Bible Class Handbooks. Crown 8vo. Forty-seven Volumes, 1s. 3d. to 3s. each. Edited by Prof. MARCUS DODS, D.D., and ALEX. WHYTE, D.D. *Detailed List free on application.*

*** *Detailed Catalogue free on application.*

Bible-Class Primers. Forty-four now issued in the Series. Edited by Princ. S. D. F. SALMOND, D.D. Paper covers, 6d. each; free by post, 7d. In cloth, 8d.; free by post, 9d. *Detailed List free on application.*

Bigg (Prof. C., D.D.)—ST. PETER AND ST. JUDE. (*International Critical Commentary.*) Post 8vo, 10s. 6d.

Blaikie (Prof. W. G., D.D.)—THE PREACHERS OF SCOTLAND FROM THE 6TH TO THE 19TH CENTURY. Post 8vo, 7s. 6d.

Blake (Buchanan, B.D.)—HOW TO READ THE PROPHETS. Part I.—The Pre-Exilian Minor Prophets (with Joel). Second Edition, 4s. Part II.—Isaiah (ch. i.-xxxix.). Third Edition, 2s. 6d. Part III.—Jeremiah, 4s. Part IV.—Ezekiel, 4s. Part V.—Isaiah (ch. xl.-lxvi.), and the Post-Exilian Prophets. *The Series being now complete, Messrs. Clark offer the Set of Five Volumes for* 15*s.*

——— JOSEPH AND MOSES: FOUNDERS OF ISRAEL. Crown 8vo, 4s.

Bleek's INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW TESTAMENT. 2 vols. 8vo, 12s. net.

Briggs (Prof. C. A., D.D.)—GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF HOLY SCRIPTURE (*Replacing the Author's* 'Biblical Study,' *entirely re-written and greatly enlarged*). 8vo, 12s. net.

——— THE MESSIAH OF THE APOSTLES. Post 8vo, 7s. 6d.

——— THE MESSIAH OF THE GOSPELS. Post 8vo, 6s. 6d.

——— THE BIBLE, THE CHURCH, AND THE REASON. Post 8vo, 6s. 6d.

Brockelmann (C.)—LEXICON SYRIACUM. With a Preface by Professor T. NÖLDEKE. Crown 4to, 30s. net.

Brown (Prof. W. Adams)—THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY. Post 8vo, 6s. net.

Bruce (Prof. A. B., D.D.)—THE TRAINING OF THE TWELVE; exhibiting the Twelve Disciples under Discipline for the Apostleship. 6th Ed., 10s. 6d.

——— THE HUMILIATION OF CHRIST. 5th Edition, 8vo, 10s. 6d.

——— THE KINGDOM OF GOD; or, Christ's Teaching according to the Synoptical Gospels. Post 8vo, 7s. 6d.

——— APOLOGETICS; OR, CHRISTIANITY DEFENSIVELY STATED. (*International Theological Library.*) Third Edition, post 8vo, 10s. 6d.

——— ST. PAUL'S CONCEPTION OF CHRISTIANITY. Post 8vo, 7s. 6d.

——— THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS: The First Apology for Christianity. Second Edition, post 8vo, 7s. 6d.

Bruce (Rev. R., D.D., Hon. Canon of Durham Cathedral.)—APOSTOLIC ORDER AND UNITY. Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d. net.

Bruce (W. S., D.D.)—THE ETHICS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. Cr. 8vo, 4s.

——— THE FORMATION OF CHRISTIAN CHARACTER. Crown 8vo, 5s.

Buhl (Prof. F.)—CANON AND TEXT OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. 8vo, 7s. 6d.

Bungener (Felix)—ROME AND THE COUNCIL IN 19TH CENTURY. Cr. 8vo, 5s.

Burton (Prof. E.)—SYNTAX OF THE MOODS AND TENSES IN NEW TESTAMENT GREEK. Post 8vo, 5s. 6d. net.

Caldecott and H. R. Mackintosh (Profs.)—SELECTIONS FROM THE LITERATURE OF THEISM. 7s. 6d. net.

Calvin's INSTITUTES OF CHRISTIAN RELIGION. (Translation.) 2 vols. 8vo, 14s.

——— COMMENTARIES. Forty-five Vols. *Price on application.*

Calvini Institutio Christianæ Religionis. Curavit A. THOLUCK. Two vols. 8vo, Subscription price, 14s.

Candlish (Prof. J. S., D.D.)—THE KINGDOM OF GOD, BIBLICALLY AND HISTORICALLY CONSIDERED. 8vo, 10s. 6d.

——— THE CHRISTIAN SALVATION. Lectures on the Work of Christ. 8vo, 7s. 6d.

Caspari (C. E.)—INTRODUCTION TO THE LIFE OF CHRIST. 8vo, 7s. 6d.

Caspers (A.)—THE FOOTSTEPS OF CHRIST. Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d.
Cassel (Prof.)—COMMENTARY ON ESTHER. 8vo, 6s. net.
Cave (Principal A., D.D.)—THE SCRIPTURAL DOCTRINE OF SACRIFICE AND ATONEMENT. Second Edition, 8vo, 10s. 6d.
——— AN INTRODUCTION TO THEOLOGY. Second Edition, 8vo, 12s.
Chapman (Principal C., LL.D.)—PRE-ORGANIC EVOLUTION AND THE BIBLICAL IDEA OF GOD. Crown 8vo, 6s.
Christlieb (Prof. T., D.D.)—MODERN DOUBT AND CHRISTIAN BELIEF. 8vo, 6s. net.
——— HOMILETIC: Lectures on Preaching. 7s. 6d.
Clark (Professor W. R., LL.D., D.C.L.)—THE ANGLICAN REFORMATION. (*Eras of Church History.*) 6s.
——— THE PARACLETE. The Person and Work of the Holy Spirit. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d.
——— PASCAL AND THE PORT ROYALISTS. Crown 8vo, 3s.
——— WITNESSES TO CHRIST. A Contribution to Christian Apologetics. Crown 8vo, 4s.
Clarke (Professor W. N., D.D.)—AN OUTLINE OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. Thirteenth Edition, post 8vo, 7s. 6d.
——— WHAT SHALL WE THINK OF CHRISTIANITY? Cr. 8vo, 2s. 6d.
——— CAN I BELIEVE IN GOD THE FATHER? Crown 8vo, 3s.
Concordance to the Greek Testament—MOULTON (W. F., D.D.) and GEDEN (A. S., M.A.). Second Edition, crown 4to, 26s. net.
Cooper and Maclean.—THE TESTAMENT OF OUR LORD. With Introduction and Notes by Prof. COOPER, D.D., and Canon MACLEAN, M.A. 8vo, 9s.
Crawford (J. H., M.A.)—THE BROTHERHOOD OF MANKIND. Post 8vo, 5s.
Cremer (Professor)—BIBLICO-THEOLOGICAL LEXICON OF NEW TESTAMENT GREEK. Third Edition, with Supplement, demy 4to, 38s.
Crippen (Rev. T. G.)—A POPULAR INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE. 8vo, 9s.
Cunningham (Principal)—HISTORICAL THEOLOGY. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.
Curtiss (Dr. S. I.)—THE LEVITICAL PRIESTS. Crown 8vo, 5s.
——— FRANZ DELITZSCH: A Memorial Tribute. *Portrait.* Cr. 8vo, 3s.
Dahle (Bishop)—LIFE AFTER DEATH. Demy 8vo, 10s. 6d.
Dalman (Prof. G.)—THE WORDS OF JESUS. Demy 8vo, 7s. 6d. net.
Davidson (Prof. A.B., D.D., LL.D.)—AN INTRODUCTORY HEBREW GRAMMAR. With Progressive Exercises in Reading and Writing. 17th Edition, 8vo, 7s. 6d.
——— A SYNTAX OF THE HEBREW LANGUAGE. 3rd Ed., 8vo, 7s. 6d.
——— OLD TESTAMENT PROPHECY. Edited by Prof. J. A. PATERSON, D.D. Demy 8vo, 10s. 6d. net.
——— THE THEOLOGY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. (*International Theological Library.*) Edited by Principal SALMOND, D.D. 12s.
——— THE CALLED OF GOD. With Biographical Introduction by A. TAYLOR INNES, M.A., Advocate, and Portraits. Post 8vo, Second Ed., 6s.
——— WAITING UPON GOD. A Further and Final Selection of Sermons. Post 8vo, 6s.
Davidson, Dr. Samuel. Autobiography and Diary. Edited by his DAUGHTER. 8vo, 7s. 6d.
Davies (Principal D. C.)—THE ATONEMENT AND INTERCESSION OF CHRIST. Crown 8vo, 4s.
Deane (Wm., M.A.)—PSEUDEPIGRAPHA: The Books which influenced our Lord and the Apostles. Post 8vo, 7s. 6d.
Deissmann (Dr. G. A.)—BIBLE STUDIES. Second Edition, 8vo, 9s.

Delitzsch (Prof.)—System of Biblical Psychology, 8vo, 6s. net; New Commentary on Genesis, 2 vols. 8vo, 12s. net; Psalms, 3 vols., 18s. net; Proverbs, 2 vols., 12s. net; Song of Solomon and Ecclesiastes, 6s. net; Isaiah, Fourth Edition, rewritten, 2 vols., 12s. net; Hebrews, 2 vols., 12s. net.

*** Any Four Volumes may be had at original Subscription price of 21s. net.

Dictionary of the Bible, A. (*See page* 1.)

Dods (Prof. Marcus)—The Bible: Its Origin and Nature. Crown 8vo, 4s. 6d. net.

Dods (Marcus, M.A.)—Forerunners of Dante. Crown 8vo, 4s. net.

Doedes—Manual of New Testament Hermeneutics. Cr. 8vo, 3s.

Döllinger (Dr.)—Hippolytus and Callistus. 8vo, 6s. net.

——— Declarations and Letters on the Vatican Decrees, 1869–1887. Authorised Translation. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d.

Dorner (Professor)—History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ. Five vols. Subscription price, 26s. 3d. net.

——— System of Christian Doctrine. Subscription price, 21s. net.

——— System of Christian Ethics. 8vo, 14s.

Driver (Prof. S. R., D.D.)—An Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament. (*International Theological Library.*) 7th Edition, post 8vo, 12s.

——— Deuteronomy: A Critical and Exegetical Commentary. (*International Critical Commentary.*) Third Edition, post 8vo, 12s.

Drummond (R. J., D.D.)—The Relation of the Apostolic Teaching to the Teaching of Christ. Second Edition, 8vo, 10s. 6d.

Du Bose (Prof. W. P., D.D.)—The Ecumenical Councils. (*Eras of Church History.*) 6s.

Duff (Prof. David, D.D.)—The Early Church. 8vo, 12s.

Dyke (Paul Van)—The Age of the Renascence. With an Introduction by Henry Van Dyke. (*Eras of Church History.*) 6s.

Eadie (Professor)—Commentaries on St. Paul's Epistles to the Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians. New and Revised Editions, Edited by Rev. Wm. Young, M.A. Three vols. 8vo, 10s. 6d. each; *or set*, 18s. *net.*

Ebrard (Dr. J. H. A.)—The Gospel History. 8vo, 6s. net.

——— Apologetics. Three vols. 8vo, 18s. net.

——— Commentary on the Epistles of St. John. 8vo, 6s. net.

Edgar (R. M'C., D.D.)—The Gospel of a Risen Saviour. 7s. 6d.

Elliott—On the Inspiration of the Holy Scriptures. 8vo, 6s.

Eras of the Christian Church—*Now complete in Ten Volumes*—

Du Bose (Prof. W. P., D.D.)—The Ecumenical Councils. 6s.
Waterman (L., D.D.)—The Post-Apostolic Age. 6s.
Dyke (Paul Van)—The Age of the Renascence. 6s.
Locke (Clinton, D.D.)—The Age of the Great Western Schism. 6s.
Ludlow (J. M., D.D.)—The Age of the Crusades. 6s.
Vincent (Prof. M. R., D.D.)—The Age of Hildebrand. 6s.
Clark (Prof. W. R., LL.D., D.C.L.)—The Anglican Reformation. 6s.
Wells (Prof. C. L.)—The Age of Charlemagne. 6s.
Bartlet (Prof. J. Vernon, M.A.)—The Apostolic Age. 6s.
Walker (Prof. W., Ph.D., D.D.)—The Protestant Reformation. 6s.

Ernesti—Biblical Interpretation of New Testament. Two vols., 8s.

Ewald (Heinrich)—Hebrew Syntax. 8vo, 8s. 6d.

——— Revelation: Its Nature and Record. 8vo, 6s. net.

——— Old and New Testament Theology. 8vo, 6s. net.

Expository Times. Edited by James Hastings, D.D. Monthly, 6d.

Fairbairn (Prin.)—The Revelation of Law in Scripture, 8vo, 10s. 6d.

Fairbairn (Prin.)—EZEKIEL AND THE BOOK OF HIS PROPHECY. Fourth Edition, 8vo, 10s. 6d.

——— PROPHECY. Second Edition, 8vo, 10s. 6d.

——— PASTORAL THEOLOGY. Crown 8vo, 6s.

Fairweather (Rev. W., M.A.)—ORIGEN AND GREEK PATRISTIC THEOLOGY. 3s.

Falconer (J. W., B.D.)—FROM APOSTLE TO PRIEST. A Study of Early Church Organisation. Crown 8vo, 4s. 6d.

Fisher (Prof. G. P., D.D., LL.D.)—HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE. (*International Theological Library.*) Second Edition, post 8vo, 12s.

Forbes (Prof.)—SYMMETRICAL STRUCTURE OF SCRIPTURE. 8vo, 8s. 6d.

——— ANALYTICAL COMMENTARY ON ROMANS. 8vo, 10s. 6d.

——— STUDIES IN THE BOOK OF PSALMS. 8vo, 7s. 6d.

——— THE SERVANT OF THE LORD IN ISAIAH XL.–LXVI. Cr. 8vo, 5s.

Foreign Theological Library—Four Volumes for One Guinea. *Detailed List on application.*

Forrest (D. W., D.D.)—THE CHRIST OF HISTORY AND OF EXPERIENCE. Fourth Edition, post 8vo, 6s.

Frank (Prof. F. H.)—SYSTEM OF CHRISTIAN CERTAINTY. 8vo, 6s, net.

Funcke (Otto)—THE WORLD OF FAITH AND THE EVERYDAY WORLD, as displayed in the Footsteps of Abraham. Post 8vo, 7s. 6d.

Garvie (Prof. A. E., D.D.)—THE RITSCHLIAN THEOLOGY. 2nd Ed., 8vo, 9s.

Gebhardt (H.)—THE DOCTRINE OF THE APOCALYPSE. 8vo, 6s. net.

Geere (H. Valentine)—BY NILE AND EUPHRATES. A Record of Discovery and Adventure. Demy 8vo, price 8s. 6d. net.

Gerlach—COMMENTARY ON THE PENTATEUCH. 8vo, 6s. net.

Gieseler (Dr. J. C. L.)—ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY. Four vols. 8vo, 21s.

Gifford (Canon)—VOICES OF THE PROPHETS. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d.

Given (Rev. Prof. J. J.)—THE TRUTH OF SCRIPTURE IN CONNECTION WITH REVELATION, INSPIRATION, AND THE CANON. 8vo, 6s.

Gladden (Washington, D.D., LL.D.) THE CHRISTIAN PASTOR AND THE WORKING CHURCH. (*International Theol. Library.*) Post 8vo, 10s. 6d.

Glasgow (Prof.)—APOCALYPSE TRANSLATED AND EXPOUNDED. 8vo, 10/6.

Gloag (Paton J., D.D.)—THE MESSIANIC PROPHECIES. Cr. 8vo, 7s. 6d.

——— INTRODUCTION TO THE CATHOLIC EPISTLES. 8vo, 10s. 6d.

——— INTRODUCTION TO THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS. 8vo, 7s. 6d.

——— EXEGETICAL STUDIES. Crown 8vo, 5s.

——— THE PRIMEVAL WORLD. Crown 8vo, 3s.

Godet (Prof. F.)—AN INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW TESTAMENT—
I. THE EPISTLES OF ST. PAUL. 8vo, 12s. 6d. net.
II. THE GOSPEL COLLECTION, AND ST. MATTHEW'S GOSPEL. 8vo, 6s. net.

——— COMMENTARY ON ST. LUKE'S GOSPEL. 2 vols. 8vo, 12s. net.

——— COMMENTARY ON ST. JOHN'S GOSPEL. 3 vols. 8vo, 18s. net.

——— COMMENTARY ON EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS. 2 vols. 8vo, 12s. net.

——— COMMENTARY ON 1ST EPISTLE TO CORINTHIANS. 2 vols. 8vo, 12s. net.

*** Any Four Volumes at the original Subscription price of 21s. net.

——— DEFENCE OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH. Crown 8vo, 4s.

Goebel (Siegfried)—THE PARABLES OF JESUS. 8vo, 6s. net.

Gotthold's Emblems; or, INVISIBLE THINGS UNDERSTOOD BY THINGS THAT ARE MADE. Crown 8vo, 5s.

Gould (Prof. E. P., D.D.)—ST. MARK. (*International Critical Commentary.*) Post 8vo, 10s. 6d.

Gray (Prof. G. Buchanan, M.A.)—NUMBERS. (*International Critical Commentary.*) Post 8vo, 12s.

Grimm's GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. Translated, Revised, and Enlarged by JOSEPH H. THAYER, D.D. Demy 4to, 36s.

Guyot (Arnold, LL.D.)—CREATION; or, The Biblical Cosmogony in the Light of Modern Science. With Illustrations. Crown 8vo, 5s. 6d.

Hagenbach (Dr. K. R.)—HISTORY OF DOCTRINES. 3 vols. 8vo, 18s. net.

——— HISTORY OF THE REFORMATION. 2 vols. 8vo, 12s. net.

Halcombe (Rev. J. J., M.A.)—WHAT THINK WE OF THE GOSPELS? 3s. 6d.

Hall (Newman, D.D.)—DIVINE BROTHERHOOD. 3rd Ed., cr. 8vo, 4s.

Hamilton (T., D.D.)—BEYOND THE STARS; or, Heaven, its Inhabitants, Occupations, and Life. Third Edition, crown 8vo, 3s. 6d.

Harless (Dr. C. A.)—SYSTEM OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS. 8vo, 6s. net.

Harper (Prof. W. R., Ph.D.)—AMOS AND HOSEA. (*International Critical Commentary.*) Post 8vo, 12s.

Harris (S., D.D.)—GOD THE CREATOR AND LORD OF ALL. Two vols. post 8vo, 16s.

Hastie (The late Prof.)—THEOLOGY OF THE REFORMED CHURCH IN ITS FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES (*Croall Lectures*). Crown 8vo, 4s. 6d. net.

——— OUTLINES OF PASTORAL THEOLOGY. For Young Ministers and Students. 1s. 6d. net.

Haupt (Erich)—THE FIRST EPISTLE OF ST. JOHN. 8vo, 6s. net.

Hävernick (H. A. Ch.)—INTRODUCTION TO OLD TESTAMENT. 6s. net.

Heard (Rev. J. B., M.A.)—THE TRIPARTITE NATURE OF MAN. Cr. 8vo, 6s.

——— OLD AND NEW THEOLOGY. A Constructive Critique. Cr. 8vo, 6s.

——— ALEXANDRIAN AND CARTHAGINIAN THEOLOGY CONTRASTED. The Hulsean Lectures, 1892–93. Crown 8vo, 6s.

Hefele (Bishop)—A HISTORY OF THE COUNCILS OF THE CHURCH. Vol. I., to A.D. 325. Vol. II., A.D. 326 to 429. Vol. III., A.D. 431 to the close of the Council of Chalcedon, 451. Vol. IV., A.D. 451 to 680. Vol. V., A.D. 626 to 787. 8vo, 12s. each.

Henderson (Rev. H. F., M.A.)—THE RELIGIOUS CONTROVERSIES OF SCOTLAND. Post 8vo, 4s. 6d. net.

Hengstenberg (Professor)—COMMENTARY ON PSALMS, 3 vols. 8vo, 18s. net; ECCLESIASTES, ETC., 8vo, 6s. net; EZEKIEL, 8vo, 6s. net; THE GENUINENESS OF DANIEL, ETC., 8vo, 6s. net; HISTORY OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD, 2 vols. 8vo, 12s. net; CHRISTOLOGY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT, 4 vols., 21s. net; ST. JOHN'S GOSPEL, 2 vols. 8vo, 21s.

*** Any Four Volumes at the original Subscription price of 21s. net.

Herkless (Prof. J., D.D.)—FRANCIS AND DOMINIC. Crown 8vo, 3s

Herzog—ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF LIVING DIVINES, ETC., OF ALL DENOMINATIONS IN EUROPE AND AMERICA. (*Supplement to Herzog's Encyclopædia.*) Imp. 8vo, 8s.

Hill (Rev. J. Hamlyn, D.D.)—ST. EPHRAEM THE SYRIAN. 8vo, 7s. 6d.

Hilprecht (Prof. H. V.)—EXPLORATIONS IN BIBLE LANDS. Large 8vo, 12s. 6d. net.

Hodgson (Principal J. M., M.A., D.Sc., D.D.)—THEOLOGIA PECTORIS: Outlines of Religious Faith and Doctrine. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d.

Holborn (Alfred, M.A.)—THE PENTATEUCH IN THE LIGHT OF TO-DAY. A Simple Introduction to the Pentateuch on the Lines of the Higher Criticism. Crown, 2s. net.

Hudson (Prof. W. H.)—ROUSSEAU, AND NATURALISM IN LIFE AND THOUGHT. Crown 8vo, 3s.

Inge (W. R., D.D.)—FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE. Post 8vo, 4s. 6d. net.

Innes (A. D., M.A.)—CRANMER AND THE ENGLISH REFORMATION. Crown 8vo, 3s.

Innes (A. Taylor)—THE TRIAL OF JESUS CHRIST. In its Legal Aspect. Second Edition, post 8vo, 2s. 6d.

International Critical Commentary.

GRAY (Prof. G. BUCHANAN, D.D.)—Numbers. 12s.
DRIVER (Prof. S. R., D.D.)—Deuteronomy. 12s.
MOORE (Prof. G. F., D.D.)—Judges. 12s.
SMITH (Prof. H. P., D.D.)—Samuel. 12s.
TOY (Prof. C. H., D.D.)—Proverbs. 12s.
HARPER (Prof. W. R.)—Amos and Hosea. 12s.
GOULD (Prof. E. P., D.D.)—St. Mark. 10s. 6d.
PLUMMER (ALFRED, D.D.)—St. Luke. 12s.
SANDAY (Prof. W., D.D.) and HEADLAM (Prin. A. C., D.D.)—Romans. 12s.
ABBOTT (Prof. T. K., B.D., D.Lit.)—Ephesians and Colossians. 10s. 6d.
VINCENT (Prof. M. R., D.D.)—Philippians and Philemon. 8s. 6d.
BIGG (Prof. C., D.D.)—St. Peter and St. Jude. 10s. 6d.

For List of future Volumes see p. 15.

International Theological Library.

DRIVER (Prof. S. R., D.D.)—An Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament. 12s.
SMITH (Prof. H. P.)—Old Testament History. 12s.
SMYTH (NEWMAN, D.D.)—Christian Ethics. 10s. 6d.
BRUCE (Prof. A. B., D.D.)—Apologetics. 10s. 6d.
FISHER (Prof. G. P., D.D., LL.D.)—History of Christian Doctrine. 12s.
ALLEN (Prof. A. V. G., D.D.)—Christian Institutions. 12s.
MCGIFFERT (Prof. A. C., Ph.D.)—The Apostolic Age. 12s.
GLADDEN (WASHINGTON, D.D.)—The Christian Pastor. 10s. 6d.
STEVENS (Prof. G. B., D.D.)—The Theology of the New Testament. 12s.
RAINY (Prin. R.)—The Ancient Catholic Church. 12s.

For List of future Volumes see p. 14.

Iverach (Prof. James, D.D.)—DESCARTES, SPINOZA, AND THE NEW PHILOSOPHY. Crown 8vo, 3s.

Janet (Paul)—FINAL CAUSES. Second Edition, demy 8vo, 12s.

——— THE THEORY OF MORALS. Demy 8vo, 10s. 6d.

Johns (C. H. W., M.A.)—THE OLDEST CODE OF LAWS IN THE WORLD. The Code of Laws promulgated by Hammurabi, King of Babylon, B.C. 2285–2242. Crown 8vo, 1s. 6d. net.

——— BABYLONIAN AND ASSYRIAN LAWS, CONTRACTS, AND LETTERS. Demy 8vo, 12s. net.

Johnstone (P. De Lacy, M.A.)—MUHAMMAD AND HIS POWER. 3s.

Johnstone (Prof. R., D.D.)—COMMENTARY ON 1ST PETER. 8vo, 10s. 6d.

Jones (E. E. C.)—ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 8vo, 7s. 6d.

Kaftan (Prof. J., D.D.)—THE TRUTH OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION. *Authorised Translation.* 2 vols. 8vo, 16s. net.

Kant—THE METAPHYSIC OF ETHICS. Crown 8vo, 6s.

——— PHILOSOPHY OF LAW. Trans. by W. HASTIE, D.D. Cr. 8vo, 5s.

——— PRINCIPLES OF POLITICS, ETC. Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d.

Keil (Prof.)—PENTATEUCH, 3 vols. 8vo, 18s. net; JOSHUA, JUDGES, AND RUTH, 8vo, 6s. net; SAMUEL, 8vo, 6s. net; KINGS, 8vo, 6s. net; CHRONICLES, 8vo, 6s. net; EZRA, NEHEMIAH, ESTHER, 8vo, 6s. net; JEREMIAH, 2 vols. 8vo, 12s. net; EZEKIEL, 2 vols. 8vo, 12s. net; DANIEL, 8vo, 6s. net; MINOR PROPHETS, 2 vols. 8vo, 12s. net; INTRODUCTION TO THE CANONICAL SCRIPTURES OF THE OLD TESTAMENT, 2 vols. 8vo, 12s. net; HANDBOOK OF BIBLICAL ARCHÆOLOGY, 2 vols. 8vo, 12s. net.

*** Any Four Volumes at the original Subscription price of 21s. net.

Kennedy (James, D.D.)—THE NOTE-LINE IN THE HEBREW SCRIPTURES. 4s. 6d. net.

Keymer (Rev. N., M.A.)—NOTES ON GENESIS. Crown 8vo, 1s. 6d.
Kidd (James, D.D.)—MORALITY AND RELIGION. 8vo, 10s. 6d.
Killen (Prof.)—THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CHURCH. 8vo, 9s.
——— THE OLD CATHOLIC CHURCH. 8vo, 9s.
——— THE IGNATIAN EPISTLES ENTIRELY SPURIOUS. Cr. 8vo, 2s. 6d.
Kilpatrick (Prof. T. B., D.D.)—CHRISTIAN CHARACTER. 2s. 6d.
König (Dr. Ed.)—THE EXILES' BOOK OF CONSOLATION (Deutero-Isaiah). Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d.
König (Dr. F. E.)—THE RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF ISRAEL. Cr. 8vo, 3s. 6d.
Krause (F. C. F.)—THE IDEAL OF HUMANITY. Crown 8vo, 3s.
Krummacher (Dr. F. W.)—THE SUFFERING SAVIOUR. Cr. 8vo, 6s.
——— DAVID, THE KING OF ISRAEL. Second Edition, cr. 8vo, 6s.
——— AUTOBIOGRAPHY. Crown 8vo, 6s.
Kurtz (Prof.)—HANDBOOK OF CHURCH HISTORY (from 1517). 8vo, 7s. 6d.
——— HISTORY OF THE OLD COVENANT. Three vols. 8vo, 18s. net.
Ladd (Prof. G. T.)—THE DOCTRINE OF SACRED SCRIPTURE. Two vols. 8vo, 1600 pp., 24s.
Laidlaw (Prof. J., D.D.)—THE BIBLE DOCTRINE OF MAN. Post 8vo, 7s. 6d.
Lambert (Rev. J. C., B.D.)—THE SACRAMENTS IN THE NEW TESTAMENT. Demy 8vo, price 10s. 6d.
Lane (Laura M.)—LIFE OF ALEXANDER VINET. Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d.
Lange (J. P., D.D.)—THE LIFE OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST. Edited by MARCUS DODS, D.D. 2nd Edition, in 4 vols. 8vo, price 28s. net.
——— COMMENTARIES ON THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS. Edited by PHILIP SCHAFF, D.D. OLD TESTAMENT, 14 vols.; NEW TESTAMENT, 10 vols.; APOCRYPHA, 1 vol. Subscription price, net, 15s. each.
——— ST. MATTHEW AND ST. MARK, 3 vols. 8vo, 18s. net; ST. LUKE, 2 vols. 8vo, 12s. net; ST. JOHN, 2 vols. 8vo, 12s. net.
*** Any Four Volumes at the original Subscription price of 21s. net.
Le Camus (E., Bishop of La Rochelle)—THE CHILDREN OF NAZARETH. Fcap. 4to. 4s.
Lechler (Prof. G. V., D.D.)—THE APOSTOLIC AND POST-APOSTOLIC TIMES. Their Diversity and Unity in Life and Doctrine. 2 vols. cr. 8vo, 16s.
Lehmann (Pastor)—SCENES FROM THE LIFE OF JESUS. Cr. 8vo, 3s. 6d.
Lewis (Tayler, LL.D.)—THE SIX DAYS OF CREATION. Cr. 8vo, 7s. 6d.
Lidgett (Rev. J. Scott)—THE FATHERHOOD OF GOD IN CHRISTIAN TRUTH AND LIFE. 8vo, 8s. net.
Lilley (J. P., D.D.)—THE LORD'S SUPPER: Its Origin, Nature, and Use. Crown 8vo, 5s.
——— THE PASTORAL EPISTLES. 2s. 6d.
——— PRINCIPLES OF PROTESTANTISM. 2s. 6d.
Lillie (Arthur)—BUDDHA AND BUDDHISM. Crown 8vo, 3s.
Lindsay (Prin. T. M., D.D.)—LUTHER AND THE GERMAN REFORMATION. Crown 8vo, 3s.
Lisco (F. G.)—PARABLES OF JESUS EXPLAINED. Fcap. 8vo, 5s.
Locke (Clinton, D.D.)—THE AGE OF THE GREAT WESTERN SCHISM. (*Eras of Church History.*) 6s.
Lotze (Hermann)—MICROCOSMUS: An Essay concerning Man and his relation to the World. Cheaper Edition, 2 vols. 8vo (1450 pp.), 24s.
Ludlow (J. M., D.D.)—THE AGE OF THE CRUSADES. (*Eras of Church History.*) 6s.
Luthardt, Kahnis, and Brückner—THE CHURCH. Crown 8vo, 5s.
Luthardt (Prof.)—ST. JOHN THE AUTHOR OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL. 7s. 6d.
——— COMMENTARY ON ST. JOHN'S GOSPEL. 3 vols. 8vo, 18s. net.

Luthardt (Prof.)—HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS. 8vo, 6s. net.

——— APOLOGETIC LECTURES ON THE FUNDAMENTAL (7 *Ed.*), SAVING (5 *Ed.*), MORAL TRUTHS OF CHRISTIANITY (4 *Ed.*). 3 vols. cr. 8vo, 6s. each.

Macdonald—INTRODUCTION TO PENTATEUCH. Two vols. 8vo, 12s. net.

——— CREATION AND THE FALL. 8vo, 6s. net.

Macgregor (Rev. Jas., D.D.)—THE APOLOGY OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION. 8vo, 10s. 6d.

——— THE REVELATION AND THE RECORD: Essays on Matters of Previous Question in the Proof of Christianity. 8vo, 7s. 6d.

——— STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF NEW TESTAMENT APOLOGETICS. 8vo, 7s. 6d.

Macgregor (Rev. G. H. C., M.A.)—SO GREAT SALVATION. Cr. 32mo, 1s.

Macpherson (Rev. John, M.A.)—COMMENTARY ON THE EPISTLE TO THE EPHESIANS. 8vo, 10s. 6d.

——— CHRISTIAN DOGMATICS. Post 8vo, 9s.

McCosh (James), Life of. 8vo, 9s.

McGiffert (Prof. A. C., Ph.D.)—HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE APOSTOLIC AGE. (*International Theological Library.*) Post 8vo, 12s.

——— THE APOSTLES' CREED. Post 8vo, 4s. net.

M'Hardy (G., D.D.)—SAVONAROLA. Crown 8vo, 3s.

M'Intosh (Rev. Hugh, M.A.)—IS CHRIST INFALLIBLE AND THE BIBLE TRUE? Third Edition, post 8vo, 6s. net.

Mackintosh (Prof. R., D.D.)—HEGEL AND HEGELIANISM. Crown 8vo, 3s.

M'Realsham (E. D.)—ROMANS DISSECTED. A Critical Analysis of the Epistle to the Romans. Crown 8vo, 2s.

Mair (A., D.D.)—STUDIES IN THE CHRISTIAN EVIDENCES. Third Edition, Revised and Enlarged, crown 8vo, 6s.

Martensen (Bishop)—CHRISTIAN DOGMATICS. 8vo, 6s. net.

——— CHRISTIAN ETHICS. (GENERAL — INDIVIDUAL — SOCIAL.) Three vols. 8vo, 6s. net each.

Matheson (Geo., D.D.)—GROWTH OF THE SPIRIT OF CHRISTIANITY, from the First Century to the Dawn of the Lutheran Era. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.

Meyer (Dr.) — CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL COMMENTARIES ON THE NEW TESTAMENT. Twenty vols. 8vo. *Subscription price*, £5, 5s. *net; selection of Four Volumes at Subscription price of* 21s.; *Non-Subscription price*, 10s. 6d. each volume.

ST. MATTHEW, 2 vols.; MARK AND LUKE, 2 vols.; ST. JOHN, 2 vols.; ACTS, 2 vols.; ROMANS, 2 vols.; CORINTHIANS, 2 vols.; GALATIANS, one vol.; EPHESIANS AND PHILEMON, one vol.; PHILIPPIANS AND COLOSSIANS, one vol.; THESSALONIANS (*Dr. Lünemann*), one vol.; THE PASTORAL EPISTLES (*Dr. Huther*), one vol.; HEBREWS (*Dr. Lünemann*), one vol.; ST. JAMES AND ST. JOHN'S EPISTLES (*Huther*), one vol.; PETER AND JUDE (*Dr. Huther*), one vol.

Michie (Charles, M.A.)—BIBLE WORDS AND PHRASES. 18mo, 1s.

Milligan (George, D.D.)—THE THEOLOGY OF THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS. Post 8vo, 6s.

Milligan (Prof. W., D.D.)—THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD. Second Edition, crown 8vo, 4s. 6d.

Milligan (Prof. W., D.D.) and Moulton (W. F., D.D.) — COMMENTARY ON THE GOSPEL OF ST. JOHN. Imp. 8vo, 9s.

Moffatt (James, D.D.)—THE HISTORICAL NEW TESTAMENT. Second Edition, demy 8vo, 16s.

Moore (Prof. G. F., D.D.)—JUDGES. (*International Critical Commentary.*) Second Edition, post 8vo, 12s.

Morgan (J., D.D.)—SCRIPTURE TESTIMONY TO THE HOLY SPIRIT. 7s. 6d.

——— EXPOSITION OF THE FIRST EPISTLE OF JOHN. 8vo, 7s. 6d.

Moulton (W. F., D.D.) and Geden (A. S., M.A.)—A CONCORDANCE TO THE GREEK TESTAMENT. Crown 4to, 26s. net, and 31s. 6d. net.

Muir (Sir W.)—MOHAMMEDAN CONTROVERSY, ETC. 8vo, 7s. 6d.

——— INDIAN MUTINY. Two vols. 36s. net.

Muirhead (Dr. Lewis A.)—THE TIMES OF CHRIST. New Edition. With Map. 2s.

Müller (Dr. Julius)—THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF SIN. 2 vols., 12s. net.

Murphy (Professor)—COMMENTARY ON THE PSALMS. 8vo, 6s. net.

——— A CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL COMMENTARY ON EXODUS. 9s.

Naville (Ernest)—THE PROBLEM OF EVIL. Crown 8vo, 4s. 6d.

——— THE CHRIST. Translated by Rev. T. J. DESPRÉS. Cr. 8vo, 4s. 6d.

——— MODERN PHYSICS. Crown 8vo, 5s.

Neander (Dr.)—CHURCH HISTORY. Eight vols. 8vo, £2, 2s. net.

Nicoll (W. Robertson, M.A., LL.D.)—THE INCARNATE SAVIOUR. Cheap Edition, price 3s. 6d.

Novalis—HYMNS AND THOUGHTS ON RELIGION. Crown 8vo, 4s.

Oehler (Prof.)—THEOLOGY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. 2 vols., 12s. net.

Olshausen (Dr. H.)—BIBLICAL COMMENTARY ON THE GOSPELS AND ACTS. Four vols., 21s. net. Crown 8vo Edition, four vols., 24s.

——— ROMANS, one vol. 8vo, 6s. net; CORINTHIANS, one vol. 8vo, 6s. net; PHILIPPIANS, TITUS, AND FIRST TIMOTHY, one vol. 8vo, 6s. net.

Oosterzee (Dr. Van)—THE YEAR OF SALVATION. 2 vols., 6s. each.

——— MOSES: A Biblical Study. Crown 8vo, 6s.

Orelli (Dr. C. von)—OLD TESTAMENT PROPHECY; COMMENTARY ON ISAIAH; JEREMIAH; THE TWELVE MINOR PROPHETS. 4 vols. Subscription price, 21s. net; separate vols., 6s. net, each.

Orr (Prof. James, D.D.)—DAVID HUME. Crown 8vo, 3s.

Owen (Dr. John)—WORKS. *Best and only Complete Edition.* Edited by Rev. Dr. GOOLD. Twenty-four vols. 8vo, Subscription price, £4, 4s.
The '*Hebrews*' may be had separately, in seven vols., £1, 5s. net.

Palestine, Map of. Edited by J. G. BARTHOLOMEW, F.R.G.S., and Prof. G. A. SMITH, M.D., D.D. With complete Index. Scale—4 Miles to an Inch. In cloth, 10s. 6d.; mounted on rollers, varnished, 15s.

Philippi (F. A.)—COMMENTARY ON THE ROMANS. Two vols. 8vo, 12s. net.

Piper—LIVES OF LEADERS OF CHURCH UNIVERSAL. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.

Popular Commentary on the New Testament. Edited by PHILIP SCHAFF, D.D. With Illustrations and Maps. Vol. I.—THE SYNOPTICAL GOSPELS. Vol. II.—ST. JOHN'S GOSPEL, AND THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES. Vol. III.—ROMANS TO PHILEMON. Vol. IV.—HEBREWS TO REVELATION. In four vols. imperial 8vo, 12s. 6d. each.

Plummer (Alfred, D.D.)—ST. LUKE. (*International Critical Commentary.*) Fourth Edition, post 8vo, 12s.

——— ENGLISH CHURCH HISTORY, 1575–1649. Crown 8vo, 3s. net.

Pressensé (Edward de)—THE REDEEMER: Discourses. Crown 8vo, 6s.

Profeit (Rev. W., M.A.)—THE CREATION OF MATTER; or, Material Elements, Evolution, and Creation. Crown 8vo, 2s. net.

Pünjer (Bernhard)—HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION FROM THE REFORMATION TO KANT. 8vo, 16s.

Purves (Rev. Dr. D.)—THE LIFE EVERLASTING. Crown 8vo, 4s. net.

Räbiger (Prof.)—ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF THEOLOGY. Two vols. 8vo, 12s. net.

Rainy (Principal)—DELIVERY AND DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE. 8vo, 10s. 6d.

——— THE ANCIENT CATHOLIC CHURCH. (*International Theological Library.*) Post 8vo, 12s.

Rashdall (Rev. H., D.C.L.)—CHRISTUS IN ECCLESIA. Post 8vo, 4s. 6d. net.

Reusch (Prof.)—NATURE AND THE BIBLE: Lectures on the Mosaic History of Creation in relation to Natural Science. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.

Reuss (Professor)—HISTORY OF THE SACRED SCRIPTURES OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. 640 pp. 8vo, 15s.

Riehm (Dr. E.)—MESSIANIC PROPHECY. New Edition. Post 8vo, 7s. 6d.

Ritchie (Prof. D. G., M.A.)—PLATO. Crown 8vo, 3s.

Ritschl (Albrecht, D.D.)—THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION AND RECONCILIATION. Second Edition, 8vo, 14s.

Ritter (Carl)—COMPARATIVE GEOGRAPHY OF PALESTINE. 4 vols. 8vo, 21s.

Robinson (Rev. S., D.D.)—DISCOURSES ON REDEMPTION. 8vo, 7s. 6d.

Robinson (E., D.D.)—GREEK AND ENG. LEXICON OF THE N. TEST. 8vo, 9s.

Rooke (T. G., B.A.)—INSPIRATION, and other Lectures. 8vo, 7s. 6d.

Ross (C.)—OUR FATHER'S KINGDOM. Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d.

Ross (D. M., D.D.)—THE TEACHING OF JESUS. (*Bible-Class Handbooks.*) 2s.

Rothe (Prof.)—SERMONS FOR THE CHRISTIAN YEAR. Cr. 8vo, 4s. 6d.

Saisset—MANUAL OF MODERN PANTHEISM. Two vols. 8vo, 10s. 6d.

Salmond (Princ. S. D. F., D.D.)—THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF IMMORTALITY. Fifth Edition, post 8vo, 9s.

Sanday (Prof. W., D.D.) and **Headlam** (Principal A. C., D.D.)—ROMANS. (*International Critical Commentary.*) Third Edition, post 8vo, 12s.

Sanday (Prof. W.)—OUTLINES OF THE LIFE OF CHRIST. Post 8vo, 5s. net.

Sartorius (Dr. E.)—DOCTRINE OF DIVINE LOVE. 8vo, 6s. net.

Sayce (Prof. A. H., LL.D.)—THE RELIGIONS OF ANCIENT EGYPT AND BABYLONIA. Post 8vo, 8s. net.

Schaff (Professor)—HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH. (New Edition, thoroughly Revised and Enlarged.) Six 'Divisions,' in 2 vols. each, extra 8vo.

1. APOSTOLIC CHRISTIANITY, A.D. 1–100, 2 vols. 21s. 2. ANTE-NICENE, A.D. 100–325, 2 vols., 21s. 3. NICENE AND POST-NICENE, A.D. 325–600, 2 vols., 21s. 4. MEDIÆVAL, A.D. 590–1073, 2 vols., 21s. (*Completion of this Period*, 1073–1517, *in preparation*). 5. THE SWISS REFORMATION, 2 vols., extra demy 8vo, 21s. 6. THE GERMAN REFORMATION, 2 vols., extra demy 8vo, 21s.

Schleiermacher's CHRISTMAS EVE. Crown 8vo, 2s.

Schubert (Prof. H. Von., D.D.)—THE GOSPEL OF ST. PETER. Synoptical Tables. With Translation and Critical Apparatus. 8vo, 1s. 6d. net.

Schultz (Hermann)—OLD TESTAMENT THEOLOGY. Two vols. 18s. net.

Schürer (Prof.)—HISTORY OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE. 5 vols. Subscription price, 26s. 3d. net.

*** Index. In separate Volume. 2s. 6d. net.

Schwartzkopff (Dr. P.)—THE PROPHECIES OF JESUS CHRIST. Crown 8vo, 5s.

Scott (Jas., M.A., D.D.)—PRINCIPLES OF NEW TESTAMENT QUOTATION ESTABLISHED AND APPLIED TO BIBLICAL CRITICISM. Cr. 8vo, 2nd Edit., 4s.

Sell (K., D.D.)—THE CHURCH IN THE MIRROR OF HISTORY. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d.

Shaw (R. D., D.D.)—THE PAULINE EPISTLES: Introductory and Expository Studies. 8vo, 8s. net.

Shedd—SERMONS TO THE SPIRITUAL MAN. 8vo, 7s. 6d.

——— DOGMATIC THEOLOGY. Three vols. ex. 8vo, 37s. 6d.

Sime (James, M.A.)—WILLIAM HERSCHEL AND HIS WORK. Cr. 8vo, 3s.

Simon (Prof.)—RECONCILIATION BY INCARNATION. Post 8vo, 7s. 6d.

Skene-Bickell—THE LORD'S SUPPER & THE PASSOVER RITUAL. 8vo, 5s.

Smeaton (Oliphant, M.A.)—The Medici and the Italian Renaissance. 3s.

Smith (Prof. H. P., D.D.)—I. and II. Samuel. (*International Critical Commentary.*) Post 8vo, 12s.

——— Old Testament History. (*International Theological Library.*) 12s.

Smith (Professor Thos., D.D.)—Mediæval Missions. Cr. 8vo, 4s. 6d.

——— Euclid: His Life and System. Crown 8vo, 3s.

Smyth (John, M.A., D.Ph.)—Truth and Reality. Crown 8vo, 4s.

Smyth (Newman, D.D.)—Christian Ethics. (*International Theological Library.*) Third Edition, post 8vo, 10s. 6d.

Snell (F. J., M.A.)—Wesley and Methodism. Crown 8vo, 3s.

Somerville (Rev. D., D.D.)—St. Paul's Conception of Christ. 9s.

Stählin (Leonh.)—Kant, Lotze, and Ritschl. 8vo, 9s.

Stalker (Prof. Jas., D.D.)—Life of Christ. Large Type Edition, crown 8vo, 3s. 6d.

——— Life of St. Paul. Large Type Edition, crown 8vo, 3s. 6d.

Stanton (V. H., D.D.)—The Jewish and The Christian Messiah. A Study in the Earliest History of Christianity. 8vo, 10s. 6d.

Stead (F. H.)—The Kingdom of God. 1s. 6d.

Steinmeyer (Dr. F. L.)—The Miracles of Our Lord. 8vo, 7s. 6d.

——— The Passion and Resurrection of Our Lord. 8vo, 6s. net.

Stevens (Prof. G. B., D.D.)—The Theology of the New Testament. (*International Theological Library.*) Post 8vo, 12s.

Stevenson (Mrs.)—The Symbolic Parables. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d.

Steward (Rev. G.)—Mediatorial Sovereignty. Two vols. 8vo, 21s.

——— The Argument of the Epistle to the Hebrews. 8vo, 10s.6d.

Stier (Dr. Rudolph)—On the Words of the Lord Jesus. Eight vols. 8vo, Subscription price of £2, 2s. Separate volumes, price 6s. net.

——— The Words of the Risen Saviour, and Commentary on the Epistle of St. James. 8vo, 6s. net.

——— The Words of the Apostles Expounded. 8vo, 6s. net.

Stirling (Dr. J. Hutchison)—Philosophy and Theology. Post 8vo, 9s.

——— Darwinianism: Workmen and Work. Post 8vo, 10s. 6d.

——— What *is* Thought? 8vo, 10s. 6d.

Strachan (Rev. J., M.A.), Hebrew Ideals; from the Story of the Patriarchs. Crown 8vo, 2s.

Tholuck (Prof.)—The Epistle to the Romans. Two vols. fcap. 8vo, 8s.

Thomson (J. E. H., D.D.)—Books which Influenced Our Lord and His Apostles. 8vo, 10s. 6d.

Thomson (Rev. E. A.)—Memorials of a Ministry. Crown 8vo, 5s.

Tophel (Pastor G.)—The Work of the Holy Spirit. Crown 8vo, 2s. 6d.

Toy (Prof. C. H., D.D.)—Proverbs. (*International Critical Commentary.*) Post 8vo, 12s.

Troup (Rev. G. Elmslie, M.A.)—Words to Young Christians: Being Addresses to Young Communicants. On antique laid paper, chaste binding, fcap. 8vo, 4s. 6d.

Uhlhorn (G.)—Christian Charity in the Ancient Church. Cr. 8vo, 6s.

Ullmann (Dr. Carl)—The Sinlessness of Jesus. Crown 8vo, 5s.

Urwick (W., M.A.)—THE SERVANT OF JEHOVAH: A Commentary upon Isaiah lii. 13–liii. 12; with Dissertations upon Isaiah xl.–lxvi. 8vo, 3s.

Vinet (Life and Writings of). By L. M. LANE. Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d.

Vincent (Prof. M. R., D.D.)—THE AGE OF HILDEBRAND. (*Eras of Church History.*) 6s.

——— PHILIPPIANS AND PHILEMON. (*International Critical Commentary.*) Second Edition, post 8vo, 8s. 6d.

Walker (James, of Carnwath)—ESSAYS, PAPERS, AND SERMONS. Post 8vo, 6s.

Walker (J., D.D.)—THEOLOGY AND THEOLOGIANS OF SCOTLAND. New Edition, crown 8vo, 3s. 6d.

Walker (Prof. W., D.D.)—THE PROTESTANT REFORMATION. (*Eras of Church History.*) 6s.

Walker (Rev. W. L.)—THE SPIRIT AND THE INCARNATION. Second Edition, 8vo, 9s.

——— THE CROSS AND THE KINGDOM. 8vo, 9s.

Warfield (B. B., D.D.)—THE RIGHT OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. Crown 8vo, 2s.

Waterman (L., D.D.)—THE POST-APOSTOLIC AGE. (*Eras of Church History.*) 6s.

Watt (W. A., M.A., D.Ph.)—THE THEORY OF CONTRACT IN ITS SOCIAL LIGHT. 8vo, 3s.

——— A STUDY OF SOCIAL MORALITY. Post 8vo, 6s.

Watts (Professor)—THE NEWER CRITICISM AND THE ANALOGY OF THE FAITH. Third Edition, crown 8vo, 5s.

——— THE REIGN OF CAUSALITY: A Vindication of the Scientific Principle of Telic Causal Efficiency. Crown 8vo, 6s.

——— THE NEW APOLOGETIC. Crown 8vo, 6s.

Weir (J. F., M.A.)—THE WAY: THE NATURE AND MEANS OF REVELATION. Ex. crown 8vo, 6s. 6d.

Weiss (Prof.)—BIBLICAL THEOLOGY OF NEW TESTAMENT. 2 vols., 12s. net.

——— LIFE OF CHRIST. Three vols. 8vo, 18s. net.

Welch (Rev. A. C., B.D.)—ANSELM AND HIS WORK. 3s.

Wells (Prof. C. L.)—THE AGE OF CHARLEMAGNE. (*Eras of the Christian Church.*) 6s.

Wendt (H. H., D.D.)—THE TEACHING OF JESUS. 2 vols. 8vo, 21s.

——— THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO ST. JOHN. 8vo, 7s. 6d.

Wenley (R. M.)—CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY AND THEISM. Crown 8vo, 4s. 6d.

White (Rev. M.)—SYMBOLICAL NUMBERS OF SCRIPTURE. Cr. 8vo, 4s.

Williams (E. F., D.D.)—CHRISTIAN LIFE IN GERMANY. Crown 8vo, 5s.

Winer (Dr. G. B.)—A TREATISE ON THE GRAMMAR OF NEW TESTAMENT GREEK, regarded as the Basis of New Testament Exegesis. Third Edition, edited by W. F. MOULTON, D.D. Ninth English Edition, 8vo, 15s.

Witherow (Prof. T., D.D.)—THE FORM OF THE CHRISTIAN TEMPLE. 8vo, 10/6.

Woods (F. H., B.D.)—THE HOPE OF ISRAEL. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d.

Workman (Prof. G. C.)—THE TEXT OF JEREMIAH; or, A Critical Investigation of the Greek and Hebrew, etc. Post 8vo, 9s.

Wright (C. H., D.D.)—BIBLICAL ESSAYS. Crown 8vo, 5s.

THE INTERNATIONAL THEOLOGICAL LIBRARY.

THE following eminent Scholars have contributed, or are engaged upon, the Volumes named:—

An Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament.	By S. R. DRIVER, D.D., Regius Professor of Hebrew, and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford. [*Seventh Edition.* 12s.
Christian Ethics.	By NEWMAN SMYTH, D.D., Pastor of the First Congregational Church, New Haven, Conn. [*Third Edition.* 10s. 6d.
Apologetics.	By the late A. B. BRUCE, D.D., Professor of New Testament Exegesis, Free Church College, Glasgow. [*Third Edition.* 10s. 6d.
History of Christian Doctrine.	By G. P. FISHER, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Ecclesiastical History, Yale University, New Haven, Conn. [*Second Edition.* 12s.
A History of Christianity in the Apostolic Age.	By ARTHUR CUSHMAN MCGIFFERT, Ph.D., D.D., Professor of Church History, Union Theological Seminary, New York. [12s.
Christian Institutions.	By A. V. G. ALLEN, D.D., Professor of Ecclesiastical History, Episcopal Theological School, Cambridge, Mass. [12s.
The Christian Pastor.	By WASHINGTON GLADDEN, D.D., Pastor of Congregational Church, Columbus, Ohio. [10s. 6d.
The Theology of the New Testament.	By GEORGE B. STEVENS, Ph.D., D.D., Professor of Systematic Theology in Yale University, U.S.A. [12s.
The Ancient Catholic Church.	By ROBERT RAINY, D.D., Principal of The New College, Edinburgh. [12s.
Old Testament History.	By H. P. SMITH, D.D., late Professor of Biblical History and Interpretation, Amherst College, U.S.A. [12s.
The Theology of the Old Testament.	By the late A. B. DAVIDSON, D.D., LL.D. Edited by Principal SALMOND, D.D. [12s.
The Literature of the New Testament	By S. D. F. SALMOND, D.D., Principal, and Professor of Systematic Theology, United Free Church College, Aberdeen.
Canon and Text of the New Testament	By CASPAR RENÉ GREGORY, Ph.D., Professor in the University of Leipzig.
The Latin Church.	By Rt. Rev. ARCHIBALD ROBERTSON, D.D., Lord Bishop of Exeter.
Encyclopædia.	By C. A. BRIGGS, D.D., Professor of Biblical Theology, Union Theological Seminary, New York.
Contemporary History of the Old Testament.	By FRANCIS BROWN, D.D., Professor of Hebrew and Cognate Languages, Union Theological Seminary, New York.
Contemporary History of the New Testament.	By FRANK C. PORTER, Ph.D., Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
Philosophy of Religion.	By ROBERT FLINT, D.D., LL.D., Emeritus Professor of Divinity, University of Edinburgh.
The Study of the Old Testament.	By the Right Rev. H. E. RYLE, D.D., Lord Bishop of Winchester.
Rabbinical Literature.	By S. SCHECHTER, M.A., Reader in Talmudic in the University of Cambridge.
The Life of Christ.	By WILLIAM SANDAY, D.D., LL.D., Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity, and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford.

THE INTERNATIONAL CRITICAL COMMENTARY.

TWELVE VOLUMES NOW READY, viz. :—

Numbers, Deuteronomy, Judges, I. and II. Samuel, Proverbs, Amos and Hosea, S. Mark, S. Luke, Romans, Ephesians and Colossians, Philippians and Philemon, S. Peter and S. Jude.

The following other Volumes are in course of preparation :—

THE OLD TESTAMENT.

Genesis.	JOHN SKINNER, D.D., Professor of Hebrew, Westminster College, Cambridge.
Exodus.	A. R. S. KENNEDY, D.D., Professor of Hebrew, University of Edinburgh.
Leviticus.	J. F. STENNING, M.A., Fellow of Wadham College Oxford ; and the late Rev. H. A. White, M.A., Fellow of New College, Oxford.
Joshua.	GEORGE ADAM SMITH, D.D., Professor of Hebrew, United Free Church College, Glasgow.
Kings.	FRANCIS BROWN, D.D., Professor of Hebrew and Cognate Languages, Union Theological Seminary, New York.
Isaiah.	The late A. B. DAVIDSON, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Hebrew, New College, Edinburgh.
Jeremiah.	A. F. KIRKPATRICK, D.D., Regius Professor of Hebrew, and Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge.
Minor Prophets.	W. R. HARPER, Ph.D., President of Chicago University. [*Continuation.*
Psalms.	C. A. BRIGGS, D.D., Edward Robinson Professor of Biblical Theology, Union Theological Seminary, New York.
Job.	S. R. DRIVER, D.D., Regius Professor of Hebrew, Oxford.
Daniel.	Rev. JOHN P. PETERS, Ph.D., late Professor of Hebrew, P. E. Divinity School, Philadelphia, now Rector of St. Michael's Church, New York City.
Ezra and Nehemiah.	Rev. L. W. BATTEN, Ph.D., Professor of Hebrew, P. E. Divinity School, Philadelphia.
Chronicles.	EDWARD L. CURTIS, D.D., Professor of Hebrew, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.

THE NEW TESTAMENT.

Synopsis of the Four Gospels.	W. SANDAY, D.D., LL.D., Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity, Oxford ; and Rev. W. C. ALLEN, M.A., Exeter College, Oxford.
Matthew.	Rev. WILLOUGHBY C. ALLEN, M.A., Chaplain, Fellow, and Lecturer in Theology and Hebrew, Exeter College, Oxford.
Acts.	FREDERICK H. CHASE, D.D., Christ's College, Cambridge.
Corinthians.	Right Rev. ARCH. ROBERTSON, D.D., Lord Bishop of Exeter.
Galatians.	Rev. ERNEST D. BURTON, A.B., Professor of New Testament Literature, University of Chicago.
I. and II. Thessalonians.	E. H. FRAME, M.A., Assistant Professor of Biblical Literature, Union Theological Seminary, New York.
The Pastoral Epistles.	WALTER LOCK, D.D., Dean Ireland's Professor of Exegesis, Oxford.
Hebrews.	Rev. A. NAIRNE, M.A., Professor of Hebrew in King's College, London.
James.	Rev. JAMES H. ROPES, A.B., Instructor in New Testament Criticism in Harvard University.
The Johannine Epistles.	S. D. F. SALMOND, D.D., Principal, and Professor of Systematic Theology, United Free Church College, Aberdeen.
Revelation.	ROBERT H. CHARLES, D.D., Professor of Biblical Greek in the University of Dublin.

Other engagements will be announced shortly.

The World's Epoch-Makers.

EDITED BY OLIPHANT SMEATON, M.A.

NEW SERIES. IN NEAT CROWN 8VO VOLUMES. PRICE 3S. EACH.

'An excellent series of biographical studies.'—*Athenæum.*

'We advise our readers to keep a watch on this most able series. It promises to be a distinct success. The volumes before us are the most satisfactory books of the sort we have ever read.'—*Methodist Times.*

The following Volumes have now been issued:—

Buddha and Buddhism. By ARTHUR LILLIE.

Luther and the German Reformation. By Principal T. M. LINDSAY, D.D.

Wesley and Methodism. By F. J. SNELL, M.A.

Cranmer and the English Reformation. By A. D. INNES, M.A.

William Herschel and his Work. By JAMES SIME, M.A.

Francis and Dominic. By Professor J. HERKLESS, D.D.

Savonarola. By G. M'HARDY, D.D.

Anselm and his Work. By Rev. A. C. WELCH, B.D.

Origen and Greek Patristic Theology. By Rev. W. FAIRWEATHER, M.A.

Muhammad and his Power. By P. DE LACY JOHNSTONE, M.A. (Oxon.).

The Medici and the Italian Renaissance. By OLIPHANT SMEATON, M.A., Edinburgh.

Plato. By Professor D. G. RITCHIE, M.A., LL.D., University of St. Andrews.

Pascal and the Port Royalists. By Professor W. CLARK, LL.D., D.C.L., Trinity College, Toronto.

Euclid. By Emeritus Professor THOMAS SMITH, D.D., LL.D.

Hegel and Hegelianism. By Professor R. MACKINTOSH, D.D., Lancashire Independent College, Manchester.

Hume and his Influence on Philosophy and Theology. By Professor J. ORR, D.D., Glasgow.

Rousseau and Naturalism in Life and Thought. By Professor W. H. HUDSON, M.A.

Descartes, Spinoza, and the New Philosophy. By Professor J. IVERACH, D.D., Aberdeen.

The following have also been arranged for:—

Socrates. By Rev. J. T. FORBES, M.A., Glasgow. [*In the Press.*

Marcus Aurelius and the Later Stoics. By F. W. BUSSELL, D.D., Vice-Principal of Brasenose College, Oxford. [*In the Press.*

Augustine and Latin Patristic Theology. By Professor B. B. WARFIELD, D.D., Princeton.

Scotus Erigena and his Epoch. By Professor R. LATTA, Ph.D., D.Sc., University of Aberdeen.

Wyclif and the Lollards. By Rev. J. C. CARRICK, B.D.

The Two Bacons and Experimental Science. By Rev. W. J. COUPER, M.A.

Calvin and the Reformed Theology. By Principal SALMOND, D.D., U.F.C. College, Aberdeen.

Lessing and the New Humanism. By Rev. A. P. DAVIDSON, M.A.

Kant and his Philosophical Revolution. By Professor R. M. WENLEY D.Sc., Ph.D., University of Michigan.

Schleiermacher and the Rejuvenescence of Theology. By Professor A. MARTIN, D.D., New College, Edinburgh.

Newman and his Influence. By C. SAROLEA, Ph.D., Litt. Doc., University of Edinburgh.

234.3P
Si 53

Simon, D.W.

Reconciliation by

234.3P
Si 53